# McKay

> District Court, E.D. Louisiana · January 8, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11238737

## Case

- **Full name:** Brandy McKay, Individually, and on Behalf of Her Minor Child, P.M. v. Lamar Davis et al.
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Louisiana
- **Decided:** January 8, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11238737

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding that district court did not abuse its discretion in retaining jurisdiction over state law claims where the case had been pending for well over a year, the discovery deadline had passed, and the parties had fully briefed the defendants’ motion for summary judgment
- concluding that district court abused its discretion in retaining jurisdiction over state law claims after it had dismissed the federal claims where the four common law factors favored dismissal
- finding that district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to remand when the lawsuit had been in litigation for more than two years and, among other factors, the parties had already filed more than 300 pleadings

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

BRANDY MCKAY, INDIVIDUALLY, CIVIL ACTION
AND ON BEHALF OF HER MINOR
CHILD, P.M.

VERSUS NO. 21-2304

LAMAR DAVIS ET AL. SECTION: “P” (3)

ORDER AND REASONS

Keeping with the district court’s fundamental duty to examine jurisdiction at every
stage of the litigation, this cause is before the Court sua sponte for consideration of
dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). What began as multiple federal and state law
claims against ten-plus defendants has been whittled down to a few state law claims against
only two defendants. With stays, continuances, and an appeal, this case has been
slow-moving. And now, another motion seeking to continue the trial and trial-related
deadlines is pending before this Court. For the following reasons, Plaintiff’s remaining
federal law claims are dismissed; this Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over the remaining state law claims; and the joint motion for continuance is denied as moot.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This tragic case arises from a criminal investigation by Louisiana State Police
(“LSP”) into one of their own. In 2020, LSP Narcotics Division began investigating
allegations that LSP senior trooper August McKay was using fraudulent prescriptions to
obtain controlled dangerous substances from a local pharmacy in Franklinton, Louisiana,
the city where Trooper McKay resided with his wife and their minor daughter.1 On
December 30, 2020, LSP officials arrived at the McKay home to execute a search warrant
as part of the investigation.2 The situation then escalated quickly, culminating in Trooper

McKay fatally shooting himself in the presence of his wife, their daughter, and their
daughter’s friend.3 Nearly one year later, on December 15, 2021, Trooper McKay’s wife
filed this action against multiple LSP officials in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Louisiana, individually, and on behalf of her and Trooper McKay’s
minor daughter.4

II. RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In her original complaint, Plaintiff alleged several federal constitutional claims
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and several Louisiana state law tort claims against the following
defendants: Colonel Lamar Davis, then-Superintendent of the LSP; Captain Heath
Guillotte; Captain Brad Cook; Lieutenant Craig Rhodes; Lieutenant Chad Lacoste;

Sergeant Heath Miller; Sergeant Rohn Bordelon; Sergeant Justin Rice; Trooper David
LaCroix; and “Defendants, John Doe and Jane Doe 1–10.”5 Specifically, Plaintiff alleged
violations of the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments and state law claims for
wrongful death, survival action, and negligence.6 The Court possessed federal subject
matter jurisdiction over the federal claims under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(a)(3) and

1 R. Doc. 30 ¶ 2.
2 See id. ¶¶ 5, 12.
3 See id. ¶¶ 12–22.
4 R. Doc. 1.
5 See id.
6 Id.¶¶ 37–44.
thus exercised supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1367(a).

On February 10, 2022, the named defendants responded by filing a motion to
dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) or, in the alternative, a motion
for a more definite statement pursuant to Rule 12(e), wherein, in addition to other
arguments, they asserted qualified immunity.7 Then-Chief Judge Nanette Brown8 granted
the motion as to Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim for alleged violations of the Eighth Amendment,
but otherwise denied the motion, granting Plaintiff leave to amend her complaint.9

Therefore, the claim alleging violations of the Eighth Amendment was dismissed as to all
defendants.
On October 18, 2022, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint, limiting her claims
to the Fourteenth Amendment and the same state laws asserted in the original complaint
against Defendants Cook, Lacoste, Lacroix, and Bordelon only.10 Plaintiff also added a

claim for vicarious liability under Louisiana law.11 In response, Defendants again filed a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss and asserted qualified immunity.12 Approximately two
months later, Defendants also filed a motion to stay discovery and related deadlines

7 R. Docs. 12, 12-1 at 13–18.
8 This case was initially assigned to then-Chief Judge Nanette Brown. R. Doc. 2.
9 R. Doc. 23 at 33–34.
10 R. Doc. 30. Despite “adopt[ing] and incorporat[ing] by reference the entirety of [her] Original Complaint
as if copied in extenso pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c)[,]” it appears that Plaintiff intended to voluntarily
dismiss her Fourth Amendment claim. Id. at n.1; R. Doc. 38 at 4 (“To be clear, the Plaintiffs are no longer
asserting any claims under the Eighth or Fourth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Further, Plaintiffs
dismiss all of the Defendants with the exception of CAPTAIN BRAD COOK, LIEUTENANT CHAD
LACOSTE, TROOPER DAVID LACROIX, and SERGEANT ROHN BORDELON.”).
11 R. Doc. 30 ¶ 29.
12 R. Doc. 34.
pending resolution of the qualified immunity defense, to which Plaintiff opposed.13 On
June 9, 2023, the case was transferred from then-Chief Judge Brown to this district judge
upon his taking the bench.14

Then, on October 4, 2023, this Court issued an order and reasons and judgment,
granting in part and denying in part Defendants’ motion to dismiss the first amended
complaint.15 Noting that Plaintiff had voluntarily dismissed some of her claims and some
of the defendants, this Court granted the dismissals, so that only the § 1983 Fourteenth
Amendment claim and state law claims remained against the four remaining defendants,

Bordelon, LaCroix, Cook, and Lacoste.16 This Court ultimately dismissed the § 1983 and
negligence claims against Cook and Lacoste but denied the motion as to Bordelon and
LaCroix.17 Bordelon and LaCroix then sought interlocutory review of this Court’s order
denying the motion to dismiss, seeking dismissal of the § 1983 claims and Louisiana state
law claims.18 The case was stayed as a result.19 On October 15, 2024, the United States

Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit dismissed without prejudice the appeal of the state
law claims; reversed this Court’s judgment as to the qualified immunity claim, finding that
Bordelon and LaCroix were entitled to qualified immunity; and remanded the matter to this
Court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.20 On August 14, 2025, the

13 R. Docs. 37, 39.
14 R. Doc. 49.
15 R. Docs. 53, 54.
16 R. Doc. 53 at 6, 16–17.
17 Id. at 16.
18 R. Doc. 61.
19 R. Doc. 62.
20 R. Doc. 67.
now-remaining defendants, Bordelon and LaCroix, filed an answer to the first amended
complaint, acknowledging that only state law claims remain since the Fifth Circuit’s
reversal.21

Notably, throughout this years-long procedural history, the trial and trial-related
deadlines were continued several times22 and several motions extending the time to plead
were granted.23 Now the parties have filed another joint motion to continue the trial date
and pre-trial deadlines (R. Doc. 81), seeking a four- to six-month continuance of the
pre-trial conference and trial dates and of all pre-trial deadlines set forth in the Amended

Scheduling Order (R. Doc. 73).
III. LEGAL STANDARD
Title 28 United States Code Section 1367 grants federal district courts, which are
courts of limited jurisdiction, supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims that “form
part of the same case or controversy” as the claims over which the district court has original

jurisdiction.24 But this same conferrer of jurisdiction allows a district court to decline the
exercise of supplemental jurisdiction in certain circumstances when exercising
supplemental jurisdiction may be imprudent.25 Section 1367(c) outlines these
circumstances, one of which is when “the district court has dismissed all claims over which

21 R. Doc. 75 ¶¶ 6–7.
22 R. Docs. 27, 46, 71.
23 R. Docs. 26, 32, 57.
24 See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a); see also Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 547 (2005)
(“Section 1367(a) is a broad grant of supplemental jurisdiction over other claims within the same case or
controversy, as long as the action is one in which district courts would have original jurisdiction.”).
25 See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).
it has original jurisdiction[.]”26 In such a situation, where “all federal claims have been
eliminated[,]” the “district court has ‘wide discretion’ in deciding whether to retain
jurisdiction over state law claims . . . .”27 Indeed, in the Fifth Circuit, the “general rule is

to dismiss state claims when the federal claims to which they are pendent are dismissed.”28
But that rule is “neither mandatory nor absolute,” and the district court must “analyze the
statutory and common law factors that are relevant to the question of its jurisdiction over
pendent state law claims.”29
The relevant statutory factors are those circumstances found in section 1367(c),

including “(1) whether the state claims raise novel or complex issues of state law; (2)
whether the state claims substantially predominate over the federal claims; (3) whether the
federal claims have been dismissed; and (4) whether there are exceptional circumstances
or other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.”30 “The common law factors . . .

26 Id. § 1367(c)(3).
27 Enochs v. Lampasas Cnty., 641 F.3d 155, 161 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing Guzzino v. Felterman, 191 F.3d 588,
595 (5th Cir. 1999)).
28 Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co. v. Dresser Indus., 972 F.2d 580, 585 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing Wong v.
Stripling, 881 F.2d 200, 204 (5th Cir. 1989)).
29 Enochs, 641 F.3d at 160, 161.
30 Francis v. Louisiana, No. CV 21-706, 2022 WL 1134935, at *2 (E.D. La. Apr. 18, 2022) (Vance, J.)
(quoting Enochs, 641 F.3d at 158–59 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c))).
include judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.”31 “These interests are to be
considered on a case-by-case basis, and no single factor is dispositive.”32

IV. DISCUSSION
“Courts are instructed to examine their jurisdiction ‘at every stage of the
litigation.’”33 Despite the number of years this action has been pending, the case is barely
out of the Rule 12(b) stage, and the remaining defendants, Bordelon and LaCroix, have
only recently filed their answer to Plaintiff’s first amended complaint. At this new stage,
only state law claims remain, so as Defendants acknowledge in their answer, this Court no

longer has federal subject matter jurisdiction—only supplemental. Thus, this Court must
decide whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining claims.34 And as
discussed below, this Court finds that the statutory and common law factors weigh in favor
of dismissal.
a. Statutory Factors

This Court first considers the statutory factors, starting with whether this case
presents novel or complex issues of state law. Plaintiff’s remaining tort claims may not be

31 Enochs, 641 F.3d at 159.
32 Mendoza v. Murphy, 532 F.3d 342, 346 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co., 972 F.2d
at 587).
33 Enochs, 641 F.3d at 161 (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988)) (citing
United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 727 (1966)).
34 Just as a district court may abuse its discretion in improvidently dismissing state law claims over which
it has supplemental jurisdiction, a district court may also abuse its discretion in exercising supplemental
jurisdiction to retain state law claims that should have been dismissed given the balance of the statutory and
common law factors. See, e.g., Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co. v. Dresser Indus., 972 F.2d 580, 586–92
(5th Cir. 1992) (concluding that district court abused its discretion in retaining jurisdiction over state law
claims after it had dismissed the federal claims where the four common law factors favored dismissal);
Enochs, 641 F.3d at 159–61 (“The mistake which led the district court to abuse its discretion was in failing
to reconsider its jurisdiction over the Texas state law claims as of the moment it granted Enoch’s motion to
file an amended complaint deleting all federal claims from the case.”).
novel or complex issues of state law, but some of Defendants’ affirmative defenses, such
as state law discretionary immunity35 and state statutory limitation of liability,36 raise issues
of state importance that are not as straightforward.37 In fact, recent prior decisions from

this district, though not precedential, have declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
in cases involving state law immunity where no federal law claims remain.38 Therefore,
this factor, however slightly, weighs in favor of dismissal.
The second and third statutory factors collapse into each other and heavily weigh in
favor of dismissal.39 Because all federal claims have been dismissed (the third factor), the

35 R. Doc. 75 at 19 (asserting, as the Nineteenth Affirmative Defense, discretionary immunity pursuant to
La. R.S. § 9:2798.1, which provides immunity for public entities and their employees for discretionary
functions).
36 R. Doc. 75 at 18 (asserting, as the Eighteenth Affirmative Defense, statutory limitation of liability
contained in La. R.S. §§ 13:5106 and 13:5112).
37 See Francis v. Louisiana, No. CV 21-706, 2022 WL 1134935, at *3 (E.D. La. Apr. 18, 2022) (Vance, J.);
E.H. by & Through Abron v. Barrilleaux, 519 F. Supp. 3d 328, 342 (E.D. La. 2021) (Vitter, J.).
38 See Francis, 2022 WL 1134935, at *3 (finding that state law immunity defenses, “which involve
interpretations of state law and issues of state importance,” weigh in favor of remand); Barrilleaux, 519 F.
Supp. 3d at 342 (declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims because
they “involve[d] complex issues of state law, including the determination of whether [defendants] are
entitled to qualified immunity under a Louisiana state statute”).
39 See Smith v. Amedisys Inc., 298 F.3d 434, 447 (5th Cir. 2002) (“Considering the second and third factors,
our analysis above affirms the trial court’s dismissal of the only federal claims alleged. Thus, the state law
claims now predominate over the nonexistent federal claims.”).
state law claims wholly predominate over the non-existent federal law claims (the second
factor). Therefore, the balance of the statutory factors weighs in favor of dismissal.

b. Common Law Factors
Because of the length of time this suit has been pending, the common law factors
are not as plain sailing as the statutory factors, yet they too weigh in favor of dismissal.
i. Judicial Economy
First, despite the age of this case, judicial economy would not be served by retaining
jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. Although this action has been pending in

this district for over four years, the length of time the action has been pending is not
indicative of its progress. Trial and discovery deadlines have been continued, on the
parties’ request, three times (with another motion for a continuance pending)40; at one
point, discovery was unofficially stayed for five months pending a motion to stay discovery
and trial-related deadlines41; and at another point, the case was stayed for one year pending

appeal.42 At four years in, the remaining defendants have only recently filed their answer,43
and the first discovery deadline has only recently lapsed.44 Trial is currently seven months
away and, if the pending continuance is granted, could be as much as over a year away.45

40 R. Docs. 27, 46, 71, 81.
41 R. Doc. 46 at 1 (“The parties maintain that discovery has not advanced in this matter because Defendants
filed a ‘Motion to Stay Discovery and Related Deadlines Pending Resolution of Application of the Qualified
Immunity Defense’ pursuant to the Fifth Circuit’s recent decision in Carswell v. Camp.”).
42 R. Doc. 62.
43 R. Doc. 75 (filed August 14, 2025).
44 R. Doc. 73 at 1. The first discovery deadline was January 2, 2026. Id.
45 Trial is currently set for July 13, 2026. Id. at 4.
Moreso, discovery is ongoing, and even appears to still be in the early stages, as indicated
by the pending motion for continuance.46

Accordingly, the docket is primarily comprised of non-dispositive motions and
orders.47 The most that can be said for retaining jurisdiction at this stage in the case, besides
the length of time the case has been pending, is that the district court has decided two
dispositive motions.48 But these motions (which were decided by two different judges in
this district) were Rule 12(b) motions and did not involve the state law affirmative defenses
that were pled after the ruling on the latest Rule 12(b) motion. Thus, excluding time spent

on routine non-dispositive motions, the only time and resources the district court has spent
on this case has concerned early-stage pleadings.49
Where the Fifth Circuit has found the case’s age to be a factor favoring retention of
the case, multiple other factors—such as completion of discovery, number of pleadings
filed, trial-readiness and proximity of trial, and existence of substantive motions—also

46 R. Doc. 81 at 1. As of three weeks ago, it appears that only written discovery had been exchanged, initial
disclosures were still being updated, and subpoenas had been issued. Id. See Parker & Parsley Petroleum
Co. v. Dresser Indus., 972 F.2d 580, 587 (5th Cir. 1992) (finding “judicial economy would have been better
served by dismissal” where the trial “was still a few weeks away; and discovery had not been completed”).
47 Cf. Doddy v. Oxy USA, Inc., 101 F.3d 448, 456 (5th Cir. 1996) (finding that district court did not abuse
its discretion in declining to remand when the lawsuit had been in litigation for more than two years and,
among other factors, the parties had already filed more than 300 pleadings).
48 See, e.g., Batiste v. Island Recs. Inc., 179 F.3d 217, 228 (5th Cir. 1999) (concluding that district court
erred by declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction when, in addition to other factors, the case required
significant consideration by the district court of multiple motions to dismiss claims or grant summary
judgment).
49 Cf. Smith v. Amedisys Inc., 298 F.3d 434, 446 (5th Cir. 2002) (concluding that trial court did not abuse its
discretion in exercising supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims when, among other
factors, the trial court had “devoted many hours to reviewing [the parties’] memoranda, the attached exhibits
and the record in this case; researching legal issues involved; and reaching the decisions” in its
comprehensive summary judgment ruling).
favored retention.50 But in those other cases, the age of the case accurately reflected its
development, as evidenced by the subject factors favoring retention.51 Here, the age of the
case is deceptive where none of those subject factors are present.52

Instead, “whittled to a few remaining state claims” after two motions to dismiss and
a stay pending an interlocutory appeal, this case “has ‘only recently “restarted”’ and ‘trial
is not imminent.’”53 Therefore, despite the length of time the case has been pending, there
is little indication that this district judge has “substantial familiarity with the merits of the

50 See, e.g., Newport Ltd. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 941 F.2d 302, 307–08 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that
district court abused its discretion in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction “on the eve of trial”
after four years of litigation produced 23 volumes and thousands of pages of record, the preparation of a
pretrial order exceeding 200 pages, over 100 depositions, and nearly two hundred thousand pages of
discovery production); Batiste, 179 F.3d at 228 (concluding that district court abused its discretion in
declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction when the case, which had been pending for almost three
years, produced more than 16 volumes of record, numerous depositions and discovery disputes, and
significant consideration by the district court of multiple motions to dismiss or grant summary judgment).
Cf. Mendoza v. Murphy, 532 F.3d 342, 347 (5th Cir. 2008) (finding that district court did not abuse its
discretion in retaining jurisdiction over state law claims where the case had been pending for well over a
year, the discovery deadline had passed, and the parties had fully briefed the defendants’ motion for
summary judgment); Doddy, 101 F.3d at 456 (finding that district court did not abuse its discretion in
declining to remand when the lawsuit had been in litigation for more than two years; the trial date was less
than a month away; the parties had filed more than 300 pleadings; most of the parties had already prepared
extensive discovery disclosures; and summary judgment motions on behalf of many of the remaining
defendants were pending); Amedisys Inc., 298 F.3d at 446 (concluding that trial court did not abuse its
discretion in exercising supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims where the case had been
pending for almost three years; the parties had taken numerous depositions; and the matter had progressed
to the advanced stages of litigation with little left to do before trial).
51 Supra note 51.
52 See Waste Sys., Inc. v. Clean Land Air Water Corp., 683 F.2d 927, 931 (5th Cir. 1982) (finding that
“[i]nterests of judicial efficiency and economy would not be advanced by exercising supplemental
jurisdiction, where the “action [was] still in its infancy, however long it ha[d] in fact been pending; no trial
has taken place, any discovery could be utilized in a state court proceeding, and the action present[ed]
technical questions of Louisiana law that [were], of course, most appropriate for resolution by a Louisiana
state court judge”).
53 Knatt v. Hosp. Serv. Dist. No. 1 of E. Baton Rough Par., 373 F. App'x 438, 443 (5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam)
(quoting the district court).
case” warranting exercise of supplemental jurisdiction in the interests of judicial
economy.54

ii. Convenience
Second, dismissal will likely not cause undue inconvenience to the litigants.55
Concretely speaking, the location of the Twenty-Second Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Washington, located in Franklinton, Louisiana, compared to the location of this
Court, located in New Orleans, Louisiana, is likely neutral, if not slightly in favor of
dismissal, as the shooting and surrounding events occurred in Franklinton, Louisiana.56

Further, little additional legal research would be necessary in state court, as the surviving
claims are governed by state law, in either forum.57 And not only is much discovery left to
be completed, largely eliminating the risk of duplicative costs, the discovery that has been
conducted is probably mostly usable in the state proceeding.58
iii. Fairness

Third, and similarly, the parties will likely not be unduly prejudiced by dismissal.
As already stated, with only some of discovery already completed, and much of that being
only written discovery, parties will not have to repeat much of the effort and expense of

54 Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co. v. Dresser Indus., 972 F.2d 580, 587 (5th Cir. 1992).
55 Id.
56 See Hicks v. Austin Indep. Sch. Dist., 564 F. App'x 747, 749 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (comparing
locations of federal and state courthouses when balancing common law factors).
57 Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co., 972 F.2d at 588.
58 Id.; see Moak v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 631 So. 2d 401, 406 (La. 1994), holding modified by Wolford v.
JoEllen Smith Psychiatric Hosp., 96-2460 (La. 5/20/97), 693 So. 2d 1164 (describing, in dicta, that “the
basic objectives of the Louisiana discovery process are to allow parties to obtain pertinent facts, to discover
true facts and to compel their disclosure, to assist in trial preparation, to narrow and clarify the issues, and
to encourage settlement or abandonment of claims lacking merit” so “any relevant information, not
privileged, whether or not admissible at trial, whether documents or tangible things, is discoverable”).
the discovery process.59 Further, under Louisiana law, not only is prescription interrupted
while the supplemental-jurisdiction claims are pending in federal court, but “if a suit is

involuntarily dismissed without prejudice, the entire prescriptive period begins to run anew
from the date of that dismissal.”60 Thus, Plaintiff will have the same amount of time to file
her state suit as she had to file her federal suit. Additionally, “allowing Louisiana courts to
rule on Louisiana law encourages fairness between the parties ‘by procuring them a surer-
footed reading of applicable law.’”61

iv. Comity
Finally, comity considerations only further favor dismissal. “The federal courts are
courts of limited jurisdiction, and often are not as well equipped for determinations of state
law as are state courts.”62 “Additionally, Louisiana has a significant interest in resolving
issues of state law that involve claims against its State Troopers . . . .”63 Therefore,
“[d]eclining supplemental jurisdiction is appropriate where, as here, a state court is better

positioned to determine the application of its own state statute[s].”64

59 Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co., 972 F.2d at 588.
60 Henry v. Sw. Airlines, 23-522 (La. App. 5 Cir. 7/31/24), 392 So. 3d 1176, 1182, writ denied, 2024-1081
(La. 11/20/24), 396 So. 3d 68 (citing Louisiana appellate court cases and a Louisiana Supreme Court case);
see also Artis v. D.C., 583 U.S. 71, 88 (2018) (explaining that in some cases, the state-law tolling period
“undoubtedly will” be longer than § 1367(d)’s 30-day grace period, like Louisiana, which “provides that
after dismissal the limitations period ‘run anews’” (citing La. Civ. Code Ann. arts. 3462, 3466 (West
2007))).
61 Watt v. New Orleans City, 647 F. Supp. 3d 496, 507 (E.D. La. 2022), aff'd, No. 23-30050, 2023 WL
6807033 (5th Cir. Oct. 16, 2023) (citing Fountain v. New Orleans City, No. CV 18-145, 2018 WL 3475375,
at *2 (E.D. La. July 19, 2018) (quoting United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966))).
62 Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co., 972 F.2d at 588–89 (internal citation omitted).
63 Francis v. Louisiana, No. CV 21-706, 2022 WL 1134935, at *4 (E.D. La. Apr. 18, 2022) (Vance, J.).
64 E.H. by & Through Abron v. Barrilleaux, 519 F. Supp. 3d 328, 342 (E.D. La. 2021) (Vitter, J.).
Vv. CONCLUSION
In light of the opinion issued by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit in this case, IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment claims
against the remaining defendants, Sergeant Rohn Bordelon and Trooper David LaCroix,
are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
In light of the opinion issued by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit in this case, and Plaintiff’s attempt at voluntary dismissal,° IT IS FURTHER
ORDERED that the Fourth Amendment claims against any remaining defendants are
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
For the reasons outlined above, IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs state
law claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, with each party to bear its own
attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d), Plaintiff shall have
the applicable time period under Louisiana law to file her remaining claims in state court,
if she so chooses.
Accordingly, IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Joint Motion to Continue Trial
Date and Pre-Trial Deadlines (R. Doc. 81) is DENIED AS MOOT.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 8th day of January 2026.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
65 Although the plaintiff’s deleting claims may indicate forum manipulation, which the Fifth Circuit
instructs courts to guard against, this Court does not find Plaintiff engaged in forum manipulation, when
she originally filed in federal court and only voluntarily dismissed one federal claim, leaving another federal
claim in the case. See Enochs v. Lampasas Cnty., 641 F.3d 155, 159-60 (5th Cir. 2011).
14

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11238737. Public record. Not legal advice.