# Afedo

> District Court, N.D. California · January 6, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11236852

## Case

- **Full name:** Dynasto Afedo v. Google LLC
- **Court:** District Court, N.D. California
- **Decided:** January 6, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11236852

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding that “appellants were being reviewed for 20 loan modification” was not a promise

## Opinion text

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7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
8 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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10 DYNASTO AFEDO,
Case No. 25-cv-01884-NC
11 Plaintiff,
ORDER GRANTING IN PART
12 v. UNDER RULE 12(b)(6) AND
DENYING IN PART UNDER RULE
13 GOOGLE LLC, 12(b)(1) DEFENDANT’S MOTION
TO DISMISS
14 Defendant.
15 Re: ECF 61

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17 This civil case against Defendant Google LLC brought by Plaintiff Dynasto Afedo
18 arises from Google’s alleged statements and omissions about issues with its Google Play
19 Console developer verification system. Plaintiff alleges three claims in his Second
20 Amended Complaint (SAC): negligence, negligent misrepresentation by omission, and
21 promissory estoppel. Google moved to dismiss the entirety of Plaintiff’s SAC under
22 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and in the
23 alternative, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. The
24 Court DENIES IN PART and GRANTS IN PART Google’s motion to dismiss. As further
25 explained below, Google’s motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) is denied because it does
26 not appear to a legal certainty that the amount in controversy is less than the required
27 jurisdictional amount, and its motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is granted with leave
1 I. BACKGROUND
2 A. Factual Background
3 Plaintiff’s SAC alleges the following facts.
4 Plaintiff Dynasto Afedo is an independent mobile application developer from
5 Ghana. ECF 58 (SAC) ¶ 6. Google operates Google Play Console, the dominant global
6 distribution platform for Android applications. Id. ¶ 12.
7 Plaintiff has previously maintained active developer accounts on Google Play
8 Console. Id. ¶ 6. Plaintiff developed and published multiple applications, including RWC
9 Racing, which achieved over 69,000 downloads on Google Play and reached the number
10 one position on the Apple App Store and Google Play. SAC ¶¶ 7–8.
11 In July 2023, Google announced that beginning in November 2023, all developer
12 accounts would be subject to mandatory verification of phone numbers and email
13 addresses to maintain platform access on Google Play Console. Id. ¶ 13. Google required
14 verification before applications could be submitted or updated. Id. ¶ 58. After Plaintiff
15 used Ghanaian credentials and phone numbers to comply with the new process, the Google
16 Play Console developer verification system repeatedly rejected the verification and
17 blocked Plaintiff from uploading, updating, or republishing applications. Id. ¶ 14.
18 In November 2023, Google publicly stated on its Play Console Help Page entitled
19 “Verifying your Play Console developer account (for accounts created before September)”
20 that “[d]evelopers can complete verifications in Play Console 60 days before their
21 individual deadline.” Id. ¶ 57. Google also stated in public statements and ongoing
22 enforcement policies, that between May 2024 and February 2025, “[d]evelopers can
23 complete verifications in Play Console 60 days before their individual deadline” and that
24 developers needing more time could extend this verification deadline by 90 days. Id. ¶ 47.
25 Plaintiff alleged he relied on these statements to mean that the Google Play Console
26 verification system was functional and accessible to developers worldwide, and thus, did
27 not contact Google Support immediately, deferred roll-out to alternative channels, and
1 Beginning in July 2024, after numerous verification failures, Plaintiff repeatedly
2 contacted Google Developer Support. Id. ¶¶ 15, 52. Google Support instructed Plaintiff to
3 “[t]ry verifying your phone numbers every other 5–7 days,” but it failed to provide a fix.
4 Id. ¶¶ 15, 57. Plaintiff’s valid Ghanaian information continued to be rejected. Id. On
5 August 27, 2024, Plaintiff emailed Google asking for advice and informing them that he
6 could not publish any applications because of the verification issues and was being harmed
7 economically. Id. ¶ 50. Plaintiff subsequently referenced this economic harm in his
8 follow-up emails. Id. ¶ 51. On November 4, 2024, Google emailed Plaintiff stating:
9 “Please note that issues with verifying phone numbers are being experienced by developers
10 around the world, making the issue more complex than it appears to be.” Id. ¶ 37. Google
11 also again instructed Plaintiff to “[t]ry verifying your phone numbers every other 5–7
12 days.” Id. ¶ 57. On November 4, 2024, Google also maintained an “In Progress” status
13 for Plaintiff’s support case through Google Developer Support. Id. ¶ 57.
14 Despite communicating with Plaintiff about his issues with Google Play Console’s
15 verification system, Google did not update its public statements to alert developers of
16 them. Id. ¶ 48.
17 Plaintiff conducted repeated verification attempts for more than 470 days in
18 accordance with Google’s instructions. Id. ¶ 58. Plaintiff remained locked out of Google
19 Play Console and was unable to maintain, update, or monetize his applications, despite full
20 compliance with stated requirements. Id. ¶ 17.
21 Plaintiff also implemented technical measures, including the use of a VPN, to
22 comply with Google’s directives. Id. ¶ 58. After masking his actual location and
23 simulating a U.S.-based IP address, Google’s system accepted the verification. Id. ¶ 21.
24 Plaintiff’s first account remained active due to his VPN, but his second account was later
25 terminated despite compliance. Id. ¶ 24. Plaintiff’s verification issue with his second
26 account remains unresolved as of the time of the SAC. Id. ¶ 25.
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1 B. Procedural Background
2 Plaintiff filed his initial complaint against Google on February 21, 2025, and filed
3 his first amended complaint (FAC) on February 24, 2025. ECF 1; ECF 8. In his FAC,
4 Plaintiff alleged four breaches of contract of the Google Developer Distribution
5 Agreement (the Agreement). ECF 8. Google then moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s FAC,
6 which the Court granted with leave to amend. ECF 36; ECF 55.
7 Plaintiff timely filed his Second Amended Complaint (SAC). ECF 58 (SAC).
8 Google then moved to dismiss the SAC. ECF 61 (Mot.). Plaintiff opposed. ECF 66
9 (Opp’n). Google replied. ECF 72 (Reply). The Court denied Plaintiff’s motion to file a
10 sur-reply and did not hold a hearing on the motion. ECF 71; ECF 74.
11 All parties have consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction. ECF 20; ECF 27.
12 II. LEGAL STANDARD
13 A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) – Lack of Subject Matter
14 Jurisdiction
15 “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins.
16 Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). District courts must have subject matter jurisdiction
17 through federal question or diversity jurisdiction to hear a case. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332.
18 A federal court exercises diversity jurisdiction over a case when (1) the case is between
19 “citizens of different States” and (2) the amount in controversy “exceeds the sum or value
20 of $75,000.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
21 If a plaintiff invoking diversity jurisdiction fails to adequately assert the amount in
22 controversy exceeds $75,000, a defendant may move to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint
23 under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). Generally, in assessing such a Rule
24 12(b)(1) motion, a court takes the amount stated in the complaint as true. See St. Paul
25 Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288 (1938) (“The rule governing
26 dismissal for want of jurisdiction in cases brought in the federal court is that, unless the
27 law gives a different rule, the sum claimed by the plaintiff controls if the claim is
1 plaintiff cannot recover the asserted amount, a Rule 12(b)(1) motion will be granted and
2 the case dismissed. Id. at 289.
3 In the Ninth Circuit, “legal certainty” exists “when a rule of law or limitation of
4 damages would make it virtually impossible for a plaintiff to meet the amount-in-
5 controversy requirement.” Pachinger v. MGM Grand Hotel-Las Vegas, Inc., 802 F.2d
6 362, 364 (9th Cir. 1986). In effect, this standard is clearly met in only three situations: (1)
7 “when a specific rule of law or measure of damages limits the amount of damages
8 recoverable,” (2) “when the terms of a contract limit [a] plaintiff’s possible recovery,” and
9 (3) “when independent facts show that the amount of damages was claimed merely to
10 obtain federal court jurisdiction.” Id.
11 B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) – Failure to State a Claim
12 A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal
13 sufficiency of a complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). “To
14 survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
15 true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
16 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). When
17 reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court “must accept as true all factual allegations in the
18 complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.” Retail
19 Prop. Trust v. United Bd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 768 F.3d 938, 945 (9th Cir.
20 2014). A court, however, need not accept as true “allegations that are merely conclusory,
21 unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Secs.
22 Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008). A claim is facially plausible when it “allows
23 the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
24 alleged.” Id. If a court grants a motion to dismiss, leave to amend should be granted
25 unless the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts. Lopez v.
26 Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000).
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1 III. DISCUSSION
2 Google moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s SAC under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject
3 matter jurisdiction and in the alternative, under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.
4 For the following reasons, the Court denies Google’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s SAC
5 under Rule 12(b)(1) but grants Google’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s SAC under Rule
6 12(b)(6) with leave to amend.
7 A. The Court Cannot Consider the Agreement and Therefore Denies
8 Google’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s SAC Under Rule 12(b)(1)
9 Google first argues that Plaintiff’s SAC should be dismissed for lack of subject
10 matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1). Google reasons that it is “clear to a legal certainty
11 that the amount in controversy does not exceed $75,000” because the Google Play
12 Developer Distribution Agreement (the Agreement) bars Plaintiff’s “consequential
13 damages . . . and [p]unitive and [e]xemplary [d]amages,” Plaintiff is not entitled to
14 restitution or disgorgement, and Plaintiff’s injunctive relief does not exceed $75,000. Mot.
15 at 5–9. The Court is not persuaded.
16 As an initial matter, the Court cannot consider the Agreement. While a court may
17 consider “documents attached to the complaint [or] incorporated by reference in the
18 complaint” on a motion to dismiss, the Agreement is not attached to or incorporated by
19 reference in the SAC. U.S. v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003). Thus, despite the
20 Agreement being attached and incorporated by reference in previous complaints, the Court
21 cannot consider the Agreement. Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992)
22 (“[A]n amended pleading supersedes the original pleading.”).
23 The Court also declines to take judicial notice of the Agreement. See Mot. at 3 n.2.
24 Although the Agreement is available on a publicly available website and its contents are
25 not subject to reasonable dispute, the Agreement is irrelevant if the Court cannot also take
26 judicial notice that Google and Plaintiff were parties to the Agreement. Even if it is not
27 disputed that Google and Plaintiff were parties to the Agreement, this fact cannot be
1 accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be
2 questioned. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 201(c).
3 Thus, the Court assesses the SAC without considering the Agreement to determine
4 whether it is apparent “to a legal certainty that the claim is really for less than the
5 jurisdictional amount.” St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 303 U.S. at 289. Plaintiff alleges in
6 his SAC that the combined value of his losses, along with his requested equitable
7 remedies, is “reasonably believed to exceed $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs.”
8 SAC ¶ 28. He also alleges that his “compensatory damages” from “economic losses, lost
9 revenues, wasted expenditures, opportunity costs, and reputational harm” alone are
10 “reasonably believed to exceed $75,000.” 1 Id. ¶ 64. The Court takes these allegations as
11 true because Google does not dispute that they were made in good faith. See St. Paul
12 Mercury Indem. Co., 303 U.S. at 288 (“[T]he sum claimed by the plaintiff controls if the
13 claim is apparently made in good faith[.]”). Google does not raise any other rule of law or
14 limitation of damages that would make it virtually impossible for a plaintiff to meet the
15 amount in controversy agreement. See Pachinger, 802 F.2d at 364. As such, these
16 allegations are sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction on a federal court because it
17 is not legally certain the amount in controversy is $75,000 or less. Geographic
18 Expeditions, Inc. v. Est. of Lhotka ex rel. Lhotka, 599 F.3d 1102, 1107 (9th Cir. 2010)
19 (finding that an allegation of a “reasonable, good-faith belief that the damages exceed
20 $75,000” is sufficient to find subject matter jurisdiction”).
21 The Court therefore declines to dismiss Plaintiff’s SAC under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack
22 of subject matter jurisdiction.
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1 B. The Court Grants Google’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s SAC Under
2 Rule 12(b)(6)
3 Google also argues that Plaintiff’s three causes of action, negligence, negligent
4 misrepresentation by omission, and promissory estoppel, fail to state a claim upon which
5 relief can be granted, and thus should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6). Mot. at 2.
6 1. The Court Dismisses Plaintiff’s Negligence Claim Under Rule
7 12(b)(6)
8 Under California law, the elements of negligence are: (1) duty, (2) breach, (3)
9 causation, and (4) damages. Cnty. of Santa Clara v. Atl. Richfield Co., 137 Cal. App. 4th
10 292, 318 (2006). Plaintiff fails to sufficiently plead that Google had a duty of care towards
11 Plaintiff, and thus, the Court dismisses his negligence claim under Rule 12(b)(6).
12 Plaintiff alleges that Google’s duty arises from California Civil Code § 1714 and
13 that he only suffered financial harm from Google’s breach of duty. 2 SAC ¶ 33. However,
14 it is “not presumed that a defendant owes a duty of care to guard against economic losses
15 unaccompanied by injury to person or property.” S. Cal. Gas Leak Cases, 7 Cal. 5th 391,
16 397 (2019). This holds true for § 1714. Id.; Sheen v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 12 Cal. 5th
17 905, 920 (2022) (finding that § 1714 “does not impose a general duty to avoid purely
18 economic losses”).
19 Further, Plaintiff’s claim does not fall under the “special relationship” exception to
20 the general rule of no recovery for negligently inflicted purely economic losses, as he only
21 conclusorily alleges that Google “owed a special duty of care to the Plaintiff” without
22 alleging that he “was an intended beneficiary of a particular transaction but was harmed by
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2 Plaintiff alleges that Google’s negligence resulted in “exclusion from the platform and
inability to upload, update, or public applications,” later explaining that the loss of the
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platform’s value equated to the inability to “upload, update, or monetize his applications.”
SAC ¶ 40; Reply at 7; Dugas v. Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc., No. 16-cv-
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00014-GPC-BLM, 2016 WL 6523428, at *12 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2016) (finding “costs
associated with time spent and loss of productivity” are economic losses); Robinson
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Helicopter Co. v. Dana, 34 Cal. 4th 979, 988 (2004) (“[W]here a purchaser’s expectations
1 the defendant’s negligence in carrying it out to show a special relationship.” S. Cal. Gas
2 Leak Cases, 7 Cal. 5th at 400.
3 As such, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s negligence claim for failure to state a claim
4 under Rule 12(b)(6).
5 2. The Court Dismisses Plaintiff’s Negligent Misrepresentation by
6 Omission Claim Under Rule 12(b)(6)
7 Under California law, the elements of negligent misrepresentation3 are “(1) the
8 misrepresentation of a past or existing material fact, (2) without reasonable ground for
9 believing it to be true, (3) with intent to induce another’s reliance on the fact
10 misrepresented, (4) justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation, and (5) resulting
11 damage.” Apollo Capital Fund LLC v. Roth Capital Partners, LLC, 158 Cal. App. 4th
12 226, 243 (2007). The misrepresentation must be a positive assertion, which may include
13 “misleading half-truths” “when the defendant purports to convey the whole truth about a
14 subject.” OCM Principal Opportunities Fund, L.P. v. CIBC World Mkts. Corp., 157 Cal.
15 App. 4th 835, 854 (2007) (quoting Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified Sch. Dist., 14 Cal. 4th
16 1066, 1084 (1997)). Plaintiff fails to sufficiently plead that Google made a positive
17 assertion for the purpose of negligent misrepresentation.4
18 Plaintiff alleges that Google made three positive assertions that its Google Play
19 verification system was functional and accessible to developers worldwide: (1) when
20 Google publicly stated that between May 2024 and February 2025, “[d]evelopers could
21 complete verifications in Play Console 60 days before their individual deadline” and
22 “[d]evelopers needing more time could extend this verification deadline by 90 days;” (2)
23 when Google Support instructed Plaintiff to “[t]ry verifying your phone numbers every 5–
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3 Although the claim is entitled “Negligent Misrepresentation by Omission” in the SAC,
Plaintiff appears to be pleading a claim for negligent misrepresentation.
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4 The Court finds that it need not determine whether Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading
standard applies to negligent misrepresentation claims because Plaintiff did not meet the
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regular pleading standard. See Levit v. Nature’s Bakery, LLC, 767 F. Supp. 3d 955, 970
1 7 days;” and (3) when Google maintained Plaintiff’s support case with an “In Progress”
2 status. Opp’n at 22.
3 Plaintiff argues that these statements were misleading half-truths because “Google
4 omitted the material fact it knew” that there were issues with the verification system.
5 Opp’n at 22. However, these three “half-truths” do not imply that the verification process
6 was functional and were thus not misleading—stating a timeline of when to complete
7 verifications or working to resolve issues do not mean that there is a “viable path to
8 success” or that the system is functional. Opp’n at 22. Further, Plaintiff does not allege
9 that Google purported to convey the whole truth about the functionality of the verification
10 system. See OCM Principal Opportunities Fund, L.P., 157 Cal. App. 4th at 854 (finding
11 that misleading half-truths about the subject may constitute positive assertions when the
12 defendant purports to convey the whole truth).
13 As such, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s negligent misrepresentation claim for
14 failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).
15 3. The Court Dismisses Plaintiff’s Promissory Estoppel Claim
16 Under Rule 12(b)(6)
17 Under California law, the elements of a promissory estoppel claim are “(1) a
18 promise clear and unambiguous in its terms; (2) reliance by the party to whom the promise
19 is made; (3) [the] reliance must be both reasonable and foreseeable; and (4) the party
20 asserting the estoppel must be injured by his reliance.” US Ecology, Inc. v. State of Cal.,
21 129 Cal. App. 4th 887, 901 (2005). Plaintiff fails to sufficiently plead that Google stated a
22 promise clear and unambiguous in its terms.
23 Plaintiff alleges that Google’s clear and unambiguous representations were that
24 Google: (1) made “policy representations” by publicly stating that “[d]evelopers can
25 complete verifications in Play Console 60 days before their individual deadline;” (2) made
26 “directive representations” by directing Plaintiff to “[t]ry verifying your phone numbers
27 every other 5–7 days,” while acknowledging the phone number verification issues in the
1 for his support case. SAC ¶ 57. The Court finds that none of these “representations” were
2 promises, or “an assurance that a person will or will not do something.” Granadino v.
3 Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 236 Cal. App. 4th 411, 417 (2015).
4 Plaintiff argues that that Google’s statement that “Developers can complete
5 verifications in Play Console 60 days before their individual deadline” was a “clear
6 promise that the process would be functional and accessible.” Opp’n at 24. The Court
7 disagrees—“can” often indicates permission or possibility, not an assurance. The
8 statement merely lays out the acceptable timeline for developers to complete their
9 verifications, not that the system process will be “functional and accessible.”
10 Plaintiff then argues that in instructing Plaintiff to “[t]ry verifying [his] phone
11 number every other 5–7 days,” Google gave a “clear promise that this specific action was a
12 viable method for achieving compliance.” Id. However, the Court finds that this directive
13 merely gave Plaintiff a suggestion in an attempt to fix his verification issues. Google did
14 not state that doing so would fix his issues and is thus not a promise.
15 Plaintiff gives no argument or clarification as to what promise Google created by
16 maintaining an “In Progress” status. The Court finds that the status of a support case is
17 merely a statement of fact: Google was in the process of looking at Plaintiff’s support case.
18 It does not promise that successful verification was possible and imminent. See
19 Granadino, 236 Cal. App. 4th at 413 (finding that “appellants were being reviewed for
20 loan modification” was not a promise).
21 As such, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s promissory estoppel claim for failure to
22 state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).
23 IV. CONCLUSION
24 For the reasons above, the Court DENIES IN PART and GRANTS IN PART
25 Google’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s SAC. The Court DENIES Google’s motion to
26 dismiss Plaintiff’s SAC under Rule 12(b)(1). The Court GRANTS Google’s motion to
27 dismiss Plaintiff’s SAC under Rule 12(b)(6) with leave to amend. Because the Court finds
1 || amended complaint by January 27, 2026. Plaintiff may not add new claims or parties
2 || without further leave of the Court.
3 The Court reminds Afedo that the Federal Pro Se Program at the San Jose
4 || courthouse is available by phone appointment at (408) 297-1480 to provide free
5 || information and limited-scope legal advice to self-represented civil litigants.
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7 IT IS SO ORDERED.
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9 || Dated: January 6, 2026 —<———~_ _
NATHANAEL M. COUSINS
10 United States Magistrate Judge
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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11236852. Public record. Not legal advice.