# Martinez

> District Court, E.D. New York · January 6, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11236668

## Case

- **Full name:** Adelaida Martinez v. Staten Island University Hospital; Karyn Treval, In Her Individual and Official Capacities; and Antoinette Henderson, In Her Individual and Official Capacities
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. New York
- **Decided:** January 6, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11236668

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- affirming a grant of summary judgment for an employer where “[t]he summary judgment record establishes that IBM provided Noll with several accommodations” that the court concluded were reasonable
- noting that the New York Court of Appeals “constru[es] NYSHRL and NYCHRL claims together” following the 2019 amendment (citing Syeed v. Bloomberg L.P., 235 N.E.3d 351, 354 (N.Y. 2024))

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
—————————————————————X
ADELAIDA MARTINEZ,

Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM & ORDER

-against- 19-cv-2672 (NRM) (MMH)

STATEN ISLAND UNIVERSITY
HOSPITAL; KARYN TREVAL, In Her
Individual and Official Capacities; and
ANTOINETTE HENDERSON, In Her
Individual and Official Capacities,

Defendants.
—————————————————————X
NINA R. MORRISON, United States District Judge:
Plaintiff Adelaida Martinez brings claims against her former employer, Staten
Island University Hospital (“SIUH”), and two former supervisors, Karyn Treval and
Antoinette Henderson, under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C.
§ 12101 et seq. (the “ADA”), the Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq.
(the “FMLA”), the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. L. § 296 (the
“NYSHRL”), the New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107 (the
“NYCHRL”), and the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 et seq. (the
“LMRA”).
Martinez was terminated from her position as a technician in the SIUH
emergency department following an incident in November 2018. Martinez contends
that she suffered a panic attack at work, after which she was discriminated and
retaliated against, wrongfully denied protected FMLA leave, and fired in violation of
the collective bargaining agreement between her employer and her union. In
contrast, the hospital characterizes Martinez’s conduct as workplace violence that
justified her immediate termination.

The parties have cross-moved for summary judgment, each arguing that the
record before the Court contains undisputed facts that entitle them to judgment as a
matter of law. The Court has reviewed the extensive summary judgment record as
well as the parties’ submissions and, for the reasons set forth below, finds that there
are significant disputed facts going to the heart of Martinez’s disability
discrimination claims. These genuine disputes of material fact preclude summary

judgment as to Martinez’s disability discrimination claims. Her retaliation, FMLA
interference, and LMRA hybrid claims, however, fail as a matter of law. Accordingly,
Martinez’s motion for partial summary judgment is DENIED in its entirety, and
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in
part.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The following undisputed factual background is drawn from Plaintiff’s Rule

56.1 Statement of Material Facts (“Pl. 56.1 Stmt.”), ECF No. 89, Defendants’ Rule
56.1 Statement of Material Facts (“Def. 56.1 Stmt.”), ECF No. 97-1, Plaintiff’s
Counterstatement to Defendants’ Rule 56.1 Statement (“Pl. Resp. 56.1 Stmt.”), ECF
No. 94, and Defendants’ Counterstatement to Plaintiff’s Rule 56.1 Statement (“Def.
Resp. 56.1 Stmt.”), ECF No. 95-1.
Staten Island University Hospital (“SIUH”) is a member hospital of Northwell
Health and a two-campus specialized teaching hospital that provides care to residents
of Staten Island and the New York metropolitan region. Pl. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 1. At

all relevant times, Antoinette Henderson was employed as SIUH’s Labor and
Employee Relations Manager, responsible for ensuring that staff and managers
adhered to the applicable collective bargaining agreements and contracts. Id. ¶¶ 2–
3. At all relevant times, Karyn Treval was employed as Senior Director of Emergency
Services and was Martinez’s supervisor. Id. ¶¶ 4–5.
Martinez first began working at SIUH as a Senior Patient Care Assistant on

March 20, 1995 and, on February 22, 2011, became an Emergency Department
Technician (“EDT”) in trauma critical care, pediatric emergency, and urgent care, the
position she held until her termination. Id. ¶ 20; Def. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 1. In
December 2005, while assigned to monitor a suicidal patient in a locked unit,
Martinez experienced an anxiety attack, left the unit without permission, and
received a two-day suspension. Pl. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 21–23. She filed a grievance
contesting the suspension, and, in September 2006, SIUH agreed to remove it from

her record. Id. ¶¶ 24–25; Settlement Agreement executed Sep. 21, 2006, Pl. Ex. GG,
ECF No. 91-33.
Martinez has been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”),1
claustrophobia, and anxiety disorder since at least 2006. Def. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 5.

1 The record, at various points, contains references to Martinez being
diagnosed with “post-traumatic stress disorder” and “post-traumatic stress
syndrome.” The Court understands these to be different diagnoses. Because the
She has been treated by psychiatrists and prescribed medications, including
diazepam and other anxiety and sleep medications, since 2005. Id. ¶¶ 7–8, 10, 12–
14, 19. Her treating physicians described these as ongoing “serious medical

conditions” in 2005 and 2008. Id. ¶ 6. Martinez often wakes up with anxiety daily.
Id. ¶ 10. Martinez’s medical history includes panic attacks, intense palpitations,
sweating, and shortness of breath. Id. ¶ 19. From 2006 through 2011, SIUH
approved multiple FMLA leave requests by Martinez, including intermittent leave
for anxiety, PTSD, and other conditions. Pl. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 26–32; Def. Resp.
56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 20, 28–34. In 2011 and 2012, SIUH began denying Martinez’s FMLA

requests. Pl. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 33; Def. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 20, 38.
On November 7, 2018, Martinez reported for duty as an EDT, responsible for
cleaning and stocking emergency department units. Pl. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 41–42;
Def. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 49–51. Martinez discovered a pediatric critical care room
lacked vital supplies, began restocking, and became concerned about incoming critical
patients. Pl. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 43–44; Def. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 51–53. When a
triage nurse brought in a pediatric patient but found the room unprepared, she used

another room. Pl. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 45–46. Martinez then began experiencing
palpitations and left for the pediatric emergency department (“PED”) nurses’ lounge
to control her anxiety. Id. ¶ 47; Def. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 56–58.
What happened in the PED lounge is intensely disputed by the parties, as will
be addressed infra. It is undisputed that Martinez cried out and could not continue

parties more consistently refer to Martinez’s “post-traumatic stress disorder” or
“PTSD,” the Court uses this term for purposes of this motion.
to work. See Pl. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 51–58; Def. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 62–67. Following
the incident in the PED lounge, Marilyn Hayes, Martinez’s union representative,
assisted her in breathing exercises and escorted her out of the hospital through the

ambulance bay. Pl. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 62–63; Def. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 72–75.
Treval instructed that Martinez was to be suspended and told Martinez to
bring a union delegate to a meeting the next day, November 8, 2018. Pl. Resp. 56.1
Stmt. ¶¶ 59, 65–66; Def. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 76–83. On November 8, 2018, Martinez
met with Treval, Assistant Nursing Manager Nicholas Gennusa, and Hayes, her
union delegate. Pl. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 66; Def. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 77. At the meeting,

Martinez stated that, upon arriving for her shift on November 7, she noticed that
items on the room preparation checklist had not been completed, including an open
code cart/intubation box and supplies that had been left out and not discarded. Pl.
Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 67; Def. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 78. At the meeting, Treval also told
Martinez that lack of cleanliness in a room was not an excuse for her “behavior” and
informed her of her suspension pending investigation. Pl. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 72; Def.
Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 116. As discussed infra, what otherwise transpired at this meeting

is in dispute. See Pl. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 67, 69, 71, 74; Def. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 77–
81. After the meeting, Martinez was offered the contact number for SIUH’s
“Employee Assistance Program.” Pl. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 73; Def. Resp. 56.1 Stmt.
¶ 118.
Martinez’s employment was terminated on November 14, 2018. Pl. Resp. 56.1
Stmt. ¶ 83. When asked in deposition if she reviewed Martinez’s medical history,
prior accommodations, or FMLA records during the investigation from November 7
to November 14, 2018, Henderson responded “No” and stated she did not think it was
relevant. Def. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 109–11. Henderson testified it would not have

mattered if Martinez’s conduct was caused by her disability; Martinez would have
been terminated regardless. Id. ¶¶ 112–13, 210.
Martinez’s union, 1199 SEIU United Healthcare Workers East (the “Union”),
did not file a written grievance challenging her termination. Pl. Resp. 56.1 Stmt.
¶ 93; Def. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 168. Nonetheless, pursuant to the collective bargaining
agreement (“CBA”) between SIUH and the Union, a Step 3 grievance meeting was

held on November 27, 2018. Pl. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 94–95; Def. Resp. 56.1 Stmt.
¶¶ 87–93. At the meeting, Martinez apologized for her conduct, including any
“threatening feelings” she may have caused, and explained life stressors. Pl. Resp.
56.1 Stmt. ¶ 96; Def. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 88. Meeting notes reflect that Martinez
disclosed she had “FMLA,” had “tried twice” to obtain it but was “denied,” and that
she had “anxiety and panic.” Def. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 87–88. Martinez stated she
was “not physically or mentally fit to work” on November 7, 2018, that her “anxiety

was triggered” that day, and that she was “seeking and receiving professional help”
for anxiety. Id. ¶¶ 90–92. She asked that SIUH view her case as an anxiety attack
rather than intentional workplace violence. Id. ¶ 93. Martinez reminded SIUH of
her prior history of anxiety and PTSD and her prior FMLA approvals for the same
conditions. Id. ¶ 91. Hayes and contract administrator Kerry Johnston also asked
SIUH to allow Martinez to go out on disability, receive medical treatment, and then
return to work in lieu of termination. Id. ¶ 208. Defendants state that, by the time
of the Step 3 meeting, Martinez had already been terminated and was no longer
eligible for workplace accommodations. Id. ¶ 207. Martinez’s grievance was denied

and the decision to terminate her upheld. Pl. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 97.
Under the Union’s constitution and the collective bargaining agreement, the
contract administrators initially decide whether to take a grievance to arbitration.
Def. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 173–176. If they decline, the employee may appeal to the
Chapter Hearings and Appeals Board (“Chapter Board”). Id. ¶ 175. Martinez
appealed to the Chapter Board to take her grievance to arbitration, but the Chapter

Board declined. Pl. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 99–100. By letter dated January 7, 2019, the
Union informed Martinez of the Chapter Board’s decision and advised her of her right
to appeal to the Division Hearings and Appeals Board (“Division Board”) within 72
hours of receipt of the letter. Id. ¶ 101. Martinez received this letter but did not take
a further appeal to the Division Board. Id. ¶¶ 100, 102.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Martinez filed the instant suit on May 6, 2019. Compl., ECF No. 1. The Hon.
Carol Bagley Amon initially presided over this case. Shortly thereafter, on June 5,
2019, Martinez received a Notice of Right to Sue letter from the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), ECF No. 13-1, and Martinez filed an Amended

Complaint reflecting the administrative exhaustion of her claims before the EEOC.
First Amended Compl. (“First Am. Compl.”), ECF No. 13 (June 13, 2019). Martinez
further amended her Complaint on October 14, 2019. Second Amended Compl.
(“Second Am. Compl.”), ECF No. 24.
Martinez pleads 10 causes of action. However, one of the causes of action is

actually two separate claims, so Martinez is asserting 11 causes of action. They are:
(1) Discrimination under the ADA against SIUH; (2) Retaliation under the ADA
against SIUH; (3) Interference with FMLA rights against SIUH; (4) Discrimination
and retaliation under the NYSHRL against SIUH;2 (5) Aiding and abetting
discrimination under the NYSHRL against individual defendants Treval and
Henderson; (6) Discrimination under the NYCHRL against all defendants; (7)

Retaliation under the NYCHRL against all defendants; (8) Aiding and abetting
discrimination under the NYCHRL against individual defendants; (9) Vicarious
liability under the NYCHRL against SIUH; and (10) a hybrid claim for breach of the
CBA under § 301 of the LMRA against SIUH. Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 195–307.
This suit originally included the Union as an additional defendant. See
generally Compl; First Am. Compl.; Second Am. Compl. The Union moved to dismiss
the Second Amended Complaint in December 2019, Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 32 (Dec.

5, 2019), and Judge Amon granted in part and denied in part the motion on June 19,
2020. Mem. & Order, ECF No. 44. The Union then answered the Second Amended
Complaint on July 16, 2020, ECF No. 45, and the remaining Defendants answered on

2 The Court notes that, under the NYSHRL, discrimination and retaliation are
separate causes of action. See N.Y. Exec. L. § 296(1) (prohibiting discrimination); id.
§ 296(7) (prohibiting retaliation). Thus, while Martinez lists 10 causes of action in
her Amended Complaint, she actually advances 11.
July 20, 2020, ECF No. 46. On December 8, 2020, this case was reassigned to the
Hon. Diane Gujarati.
While discovery was ongoing, Martinez and the Union filed a stipulation of

dismissal with prejudice as to the Union. ECF No. 60 (June 30, 2022). This case was
then reassigned to the undersigned on November 8, 2022.
The parties informed the Court on April 3, 2024 that they had completed fact
discovery, Min. Entry dated Apr. 3, 2024, and Defendants requested a pre-motion
conference on their anticipated motion for summary judgment, Ltr., ECF No. 74 (July
31, 2024). In her response to Defendants’ pre-motion conference letter, Martinez

indicated that she intended to cross-move for partial summary judgment. Ltr., ECF
No. 75 (Aug. 14, 2024). The Court denied Defendant’s pre-motion conference request
as unnecessary and directed the parties to serve and file their cross-motions for
summary judgment. Dkt. Order dated October 7, 2024.
The parties’ cross-motions were fully submitted on January 24, 2025. Def. Mot.
for Summ. J. (“Def. Mot.”), ECF No. 97; Def. Mem. in Supp. (“Def. Mem.”), ECF No.
97-9; Pl. Mem. in Opp’n (“Pl. Opp’n”), ECF No. 93; Def. Reply Mem. in Supp. (“Def.

Reply”), ECF No. 97-13; Pl. Mot. for Partial Summ. J. (“Pl. Mot.”), ECF No. 88; Pl.
Mem. in Supp. (“Pl. Mem.”), ECF No. 90; Def. Mem. in Opp’n (“Def. Opp’n”), ECF No.
95; Pl. Reply in Supp. (“Pl. Reply”), ECF No. 92. Defendants cross-move for summary
judgment as to all of Martinez’s claims. Def. Mem. at 7.3 Martinez cross-moves for
summary judgment only as to (1) her discrimination claims under the ADA,

3 All page references are to ECF pagination unless otherwise noted.
NYSHRL, and NYCHRL against SIUH;4 (2) her hybrid claim pursuant to § 301 of the
LMRA against SIUH; and (3) her interference claim under the FMLA against SIUH.
Pl. Mem. at 6. Martinez also cross-moves for summary judgment as to (4) her

NYSHRL and NYCHRL aiding and abetting claims and her NYCHRL discrimination
claims against individual Defendants Treval and Henderson. Id. at 25–26.
LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A dispute about a ‘genuine issue’ exists for
summary judgment purposes where the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
decide in the non-movant’s favor.” Beyer v. Cnty. of Nassau, 524 F.3d 160, 163 (2d
Cir. 2008) (quoting Guilbert v. Gardner, 480 F.3d 140, 145 (2d Cir. 2007)). A fact is
material “when its resolution ‘might affect the outcome of the suit under the

governing law.’” SCW W. LLC v. Westport Ins. Corp., 856 F. Supp. 2d 514, 521
(E.D.N.Y. 2012) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).
In considering a summary judgment motion, the Court “is required to view the record
in the light most favorable to the party against which summary judgment is
contemplated and to resolve all ambiguities and draw all factual inferences in favor

4 Martinez’s papers are not a model of clarity. Throughout her briefing, she
makes reference to her “claims for disability discrimination under Title VII.” Pl.
Mem. at 6; see also id. at 19, 25. Elsewhere, however, Martinez accurately references
her claims arising under the ADA. See, e.g., id. at 19–24. Accordingly, the Court
construes references to Title VII as references to the ADA, because Martinez has at
no point in this proceeding advanced a claim pursuant to Title VII.
of that party.” NetJets Aviation, Inc. v. LHC Commc’ns, LLC, 537 F.3d 168, 178 (2d
Cir. 2008).

“The moving party has the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a
disputed issue of material fact.” Thorpe v. City of New York, No. 19-CV-5995 (CM),
2021 WL 3811238, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2021) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). “Once such a showing has been made, the non-moving party
must present ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Id.

(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). “The party opposing summary judgment ‘may not rely
on conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated speculation.’” Id. (quoting Scotto v.
Almenas, 143 F.3d 105, 114 (2d Cir. 1998)). “Finally, the nonmoving party ‘must do
more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material
facts.’” Id. (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
586 (1986)). “To withstand a summary judgment motion, sufficient evidence must
exist upon which a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmovant.” Id.

“[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving
party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S.
at 323.

DISCUSSION
I. Genuine Disputes of Material Fact

Before evaluating the legal sufficiency of Martinez’s claims, the Court notes
the existence of several genuine disputes of material fact that go to the heart of this
case. Specifically, the Court finds that the record contains key factual disputes as to
(1) what precisely transpired in the PED lounge on November 7, 2018, and whether
Martinez’s conduct constituted misconduct within SIUH’s policies; and (2) the extent
of Defendants’ knowledge of Martinez’s disability and whether her disability played

any role in the November 7, 2018 incident.
As discussed infra, these disputes go to the heart of this case. As then-Judge
Sotomayor explained, “the ADA does not immunize disabled employees from
discipline or discharge for incidents of misconduct in the workplace,” even when their
misconduct is a “manifestation of [their] disabilit[ies].” Valentine v. Standard &
Poor’s, 50 F. Supp. 2d 262, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), aff’d, 205 F.3d 1327 (2d Cir. 2000).

However, when an employee’s conduct does not constitute misconduct, but it is relied
upon by an employer which knows that the conduct is caused by a disability, the
employee may state a claim under the ADA. See McMillan v. City of New York, 711
F.3d 120, 129 (2d Cir. 2013) (“Here, it is undisputed that [plaintiff] was tardy because
of his disability and that he was disciplined because of his tardiness. In other words,
[plaintiff] was disciplined because of his disability.”). Martinez’s disability
discrimination claims may survive only if she has adduced evidence that a reasonable

jury could find proves (1) she did not commit misconduct warranting termination
under SIUH’s policies on November 7, 2018 and (2) her employer terminated her
despite knowing that her conduct was cause by her disability. These facts are
disputed on the record before the Court, and accordingly summary judgment is
inappropriate.
a. Genuine Disputes Exist as to the Nature of Martinez’s Conduct
on November 7, 2018 and Whether this Conduct Amounted to
Misconduct Within the Meaning of SIUH’s Policies Against
Workplace Violence

Some aspects of Martinez’s conduct in the PED lounge are not in dispute. For
example, it is undisputed that Martinez did not physically attack anyone in the PED
lounge. Def. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 66. Likewise, it is undisputed that Martinez did not
destroy or damage SIUH property. Id. ¶ 67; see also Dep. of Marilyn Hayes dated
July 15, 2021, Pl. Ex. B (“Hayes Dep.”) at 129:5–6, ECF No. 91-2 (“I took pictures of
the pediatric lounge showing there was no damage.”).5
Other aspects of Martinez’s conduct are heavily disputed. Defendants claim
that multiple witnesses reported Martinez screaming, crying, slamming doors,
punching walls, and making statements such as “I can’t do this anymore in this
fucking place,” as well as physically striking objects. Pl. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 51–55;
Def. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 62–64. Martinez denies that she cursed or engaged in any
violent conduct, claims that any yelling occurred in the PED lounge away from
patients, and asserts she only kicked a garbage can because it was in her way as she
fled the room while in the midst of her panic attack. Pl. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 51–58;
Def. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 63–67. There is conflicting evidence on what transpired with
the garbage can. Some witnesses indicated that Martinez threw a large garbage can
against a wall, while Martinez asserts otherwise. Compare Pl. Ex. HH (“Witness

Statements”) at 3, ECF No. 91-34 (“After [Martinez] walked to [the PED lounge]

5 Pincites to deposition transcripts are to the original pages and lines, not to
the ECF pagination.
bathroom and threw broom and garbage pail (environmental’s) against wall.”, and id.
at 4 (“I found [Martinez] in the lounge screaming, cursing, and throwing the large
environmental garbage can.”), with Dep. of Adelaida Martinez dated July 21, 2021,

Pl. Ex. A (“Pl. Dep.”) at 119:17–19, ECF No. 91-1 (“[T]here was a garbage can next to
me, so I kicked it with my foot to get it out of my way so I could go to my coat.”).
Defendants claim one witness reported one pediatric patient’s mother made a remark
implying distress; Martinez disputes that the incident occurred in front of patients.
Pl. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 52. As Hayes, Martinez’s union representative, was escorting
Martinez out through the ambulance bay, Defendants claim Martinez ran, screamed,

struck walls, and hit a glass door in the bay; Martinez disputes this, citing Hayes’s
review of surveillance video showing “distress” but no violence.6 Pl. Resp. 56.1 Stmt.
¶ 64; Def. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 73–75.
This record would permit a jury to draw different conclusions from the various,
conflicting descriptions of the incident. Though Henderson initially contended at her
deposition that Martinez’s “behavior was threatening,” she then conceded that
Martinez did not threaten anyone in the PED lounge. Dep. of Antoinette Henderson

dated July 29, 2021, Pl. Ex. C (“Henderson Dep.”) at 167:6–12, ECF No. 91-3. One
witness statement, written by an employee who was apparently present in the PED
lounge when Martinez entered, indicated that the employee was “startled” when

6 Video footage of Martinez’s conduct after exiting the PED lounge existed but
was not preserved by Defendants; the parties dispute the content and relevance of
the footage. Def. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 141–43. The parties do not dispute that Hayes
reviewed this footage before it was deleted, however, and Hayes testified as to her
recollection of the footage at her deposition. Hayes Dep. at 119:4–11, 133:16-137:19.
Martinez entered but that the employee “remained in the corner doing iLearns [an
online training program]” during the incident, permitting but not requiring a jury
inference that this employee was not fearful of remaining in Martinez’s vicinity and

continuing to complete her assigned trainings. See Witness Statements at 3. This
particular witness statement was characterized by Henderson at her deposition as
indicating the employee “was hiding behind the computer.” Henderson Dep. at
170:20–22. Henderson subsequently conceded, however, that none of the witness
statements contained claims that witnesses were afraid. Id. at 190:19–22.
Other record evidence would permit a jury to conclude that Martinez’s conduct

was contemporaneously perceived as non-threatening. Hayes, who overheard
Martinez’s conduct, described it as “frantic, despair, just loud.” Hayes Dep. at 63:11–
12. When Hayes arrived at the PED lounge bathroom, she saw Martinez “banging on
the mirror with her flat palms, fingers out. [Martinez] was saying, ‘Why? Why? I
can’t do this anymore. Why?’ And she was banging on the glass, on the mirror, like,
in despair it looked like. It was pretty sad to see that, actually.” Id. at 65:12–18.
One witness statement indicates that an employee overhead a patient’s parent

comment, after hearing the incident, that “Oh, something bad must have happened
to someone’s family,” Witness Statements at 10, which does not necessarily suggest
that the parent perceived the incident as threatening or violent. Further, after
Martinez exited the building, an SIUH Manager, Nicholas Genussa, sent Hayes alone
to inform Martinez that she was on administrative leave and to retrieve Martinez’s
badge if possible, Hayes Dep. at 77:6–13, which could lead a jury to conclude that
Genussa did not perceive Martinez as a threat to Hayes following the incident.
Moreover, the record does not establish conclusively that Martinez engaged in

misconduct within the meaning of the policies Defendants cite to justify Martinez’s
termination. SIUH’s policy addressing Aggression, Bullying, Hostility and Violence
in the Workplace permits the termination of any employee that “engages in
aggression, bullying, hostility and/or violence.” Decl. of Antoinette Henderson dated
Nov. 13, 2024 (“Henderson Decl.”) ¶ 6, ECF No. 97-6. SIUH’s Rules and Regulations
“prohibit harassment and work place [sic] violence of any form . . . as well as fighting

or engaging in heated arguments with co-workers, visitors, or others. Any form of
harassment, intimidating or threatening behavior towards another employee, patient
or visitor will not be tolerated.” Id. ¶ 7 (citation modified). SIUH’s progressive
discipline policy allows that “employees can be terminated without prior warning for
serious misconduct such as . . . fighting, harassing and/or intimidating
behavior . . . and actions endangering patient/employee welfare or disrupting
Hospital operations.” Id. ¶ 8 (citation modified). Finally, SIUH’s Employee

Handbook notes that SIUH “does not tolerate bullying, workplace violence,
intimidation, verbal threats, non-verbal threats or physical acts of violence against
any individual on [SIUH] property.” Id. ¶ 9 (citation modified). An alleged violation
of the prohibition against workplace violence was the sole grounds cited for
Martinez’s dismissal. Pl. Ex. L (“Termination Letter”) at 3, ECF No. 96-12. These
policies plainly prohibit fighting, bullying, and other forms of targeted violence and
harassment in the workplace. But it is not clear that they apply to the kind of conduct
Martinez exhibited on November 7, 2018. While Defendants assert that Martinez’s
conduct fell within SIUH’s prohibitions against workplace violence, a reasonable jury

could, but would not be required to, conclude otherwise.
The parties’ submissions underscore that genuine disputes exist as to
Martinez’s precise conduct and whether it constituted grounds for her termination.
See Pl. Mem at 10–12 (describing the November 7, 2018 incident); Pl. Opp’n at 18
(asserting that “[t]he facts support that Plaintiff was the very opposite of violent”);
Def. Mem. at 10–12 (describing the November 7, 2018 incident); id. at 19 (“Plaintiff’s

employment ended at the Hospital because of her violent misconduct on November 7,
2018.”). Resolving these questions is a task properly left to the jury. Accordingly, as
discussed further infra, these disputes preclude summary judgment on Martinez’s
disability discrimination claims.

b. Genuine Disputes Exist as to Defendants’ General Knowledge of
Martinez’s Disability, the Connection Between Martinez’s
Disability and Her Conduct on November 7, 2018, and
Defendants’ Specific Knowledge as to a Connection Between
Martinez’s Disability and Her Conduct

The record also precludes summary judgment because of genuine factual
disputes as to whether (1) Defendants were aware of Martinez’s disability at the time
they decided to terminate her; (2) Martinez’s conduct on November 7, 2018 was a
manifestation of her disabilities; and, if so, (3) Defendants were aware of the
relationship between Martinez’s disability and the November 7, 2018 incident.
First, as to Defendants’ knowledge of Martinez’s disabilities, Defendants assert
that SIUH decisionmakers were not aware of Martinez’s disability prior to her
termination. Henderson Decl. ¶ 12 (asserting that Henderson had no knowledge of

Martinez’s anxiety, depression, or PTSD prior to her termination); Dep. of Karyn
Treval dated June 30, 2021, Decl. of Daniel Gomez-Sanchez Ex. B (“Treval Dep.”) at
40:25–41:6, ECF No. 95-2 (same); Decl. of Terry Pando dated Nov. 13, 2024 ¶ 3, ECF
No. 95-8 (same). Martinez disputes this. Specifically, Martinez points to the multiple
occasions between 2006 and 2011 when she took FMLA leave for anxiety and PTSD,
and argues that this history reasonably imputes knowledge of her disability to

Defendants. Pl. Mem. at 21 (“SIUH granted Plaintiff FMLA benefits for multiple
years for her disabilities.”). Defendants concede that Martinez was granted FMLA
leave for these conditions between 2006 and 2010. Decl. of Mary Beth Springstead
dated Nov. 13, 2024 (“Springstead Decl.”) ¶¶ 4–7, ECF No. 95-5; Def. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 20.
Springstead, SIUH’s Associate Executive Director of Human Resources at all relevant
times, asserts that “Plaintiff’s supervisors were never notified of the nature of
Plaintiff’s medical or health condition[s] that caused Plaintiff to make the request[s]

for leave,” see Springstead Decl. ¶ 15, implying that no decisionmakers were aware
of Martinez’s disabilities. However, Springstead was personally briefed on the
investigation into Martinez’s conduct, and Henderson testified at her deposition that
Springstead was involved in making the determination that Martinez’s conduct
amounted to workplace violence. Henderson Dep. at 65:15–66:24. Additionally,
SIUH requires its employees to submit annual health assessments, and Martinez
disclosed in those assessments in 2016 and 2017 that she took medication for PTSD.
Def. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 40.7
Moreover, Martinez asserts that Henderson was personally aware of

Martinez’s anxiety diagnosis. After she stopped receiving FMLA leave in 2011,
Martinez alleges that she received an “accommodation by going to [Henderson’s]
office to seek refuge whenever I felt . . . an anxiety [attack] coming on.” Pl. Dep. at
185:8–11, 185:22–186:15. During these instances, Martinez asserts Henderson would
“console” her, give her water, help calm her down, and “express to [Martinez] that she
understood . . . how [Martinez] felt [and] that she, too, also suffered anxiety.” Id. at

185:12–18. Martinez testified at her deposition that she went to Henderson’s office
five or six times between 2011 and 2017. Id. at 185:23–186:3. Martinez further
testified that sometimes she “would end up going home” after going to Henderson’s
office. Id. at 188:24–25. Martinez alleges that having leave to remove to Henderson’s
office was an accommodation because “[t]hey don’t do that for everyone.” Id. at 219:6–
7. Henderson contests this, asserting that Martinez came to her office on one occasion
when she was “stressed out” but that, on the other occasions, Martinez came to her

office in Martinez’s capacity as a union delegate to “represent a member for [a]
contract violation or if [a member] had a concern.” Henderson Dep. at 94:5–96:14.

7 Defendants assert that these health assessments are not disclosed to
employees’ managers and are not used in making employment decisions. Henderson
Decl. ¶ 10. Martinez contends, however, that this disclosure “ke[pt] Defendant SIUH
on actual notice of her ongoing disabilities.” Pl. Mem. at 9. The extent to which
individual decisionmakers were aware of Martinez’s health assessments at the time
of the decision to terminate Martinez’s employment, notwithstanding SIUH
confidentiality policies, is a question properly left to a jury.
Accordingly, there are genuine disputes of material fact as to the extent of
Defendants’ knowledge of Martinez’s disabilities. Based on (1) Martinez’s
documented history of taking FMLA for her anxiety disorder and PTSD; (2) the

annual medical disclosures SIUH required Martinez to make; and (3) Martinez’s
testimony about her interactions with Henderson, a reasonable jury could find that
Defendants were aware of Martinez’s disabilities prior to terminating her.8
Second, as to whether Martinez’s conduct was caused by her disabilities,
Defendants neither concede nor meaningfully dispute this fact. However, the record
contains evidence that could lead a reasonable jury to find Martinez’s conduct was

caused by her disabilities. Martinez went to urgent care on November 8, 2018, the
day after the incident at work, and was prescribed a new medication for her anxiety.
Pl. Dep. at 157:14–159:4. Martinez was also directed to follow up with her primary
care physician. Id. at 158:14–16. Martinez saw a nurse practitioner in her primary
care physician’s office on November 12, 2018. Dep. of Dr. Noreen Tan-Chu dated Mar.
22, 2023, Pl. Ex. H (“Tan-Chu Dep.”) at 145:24–146:3, ECF No. 91-8. At this
appointment, Martinez reported objective symptoms of “palpitations” and “shortness

of breath.” Id. at 131:23–24. The nurse practitioner’s notes indicated that Martinez

8 The parties agree that Martinez was referred to SIUH’s “Employee
Assistance Program” following the November 8, 2018 meeting. Pl. Opp’n at 13; Def.
Mem. at 11. However, the record does not reveal what this Program entails, when
referrals to the program might be made, or whether the Program is related to
employees with disabilities. The only references to the program that the Court has
found in the record are in the table of contents of the Basic Human Resources Policies,
but the relevant section on the Program has not been submitted. See Henderson
Decl., Exs. E & F, at 44, 50. Accordingly, at the summary judgment stage, the Court
does not consider the fact that Martinez was referred to this Program to be probative
of Defendants’ knowledge of Martinez’s disabilities.
“had a panic attack at work.” Id. at 118:21–22. On November 20, 2018, Martinez
had a follow up appointment with her primary care physician. Id. at 145:15–23. At
this November 20 appointment, after discussing the November 7 incident, Martinez’s

physician assessed Martinez with “panic disorder without agoraphobia” and
“posttraumatic stress disorder.” Id. at 124:23–125:3, 145:24–146:3. Martinez’s
physician further noted that Martinez could not work in November 2018 because of
her panic disorder, specifically noting that Martinez was “unable to work in [the]
E.R., too much stress.” Id. at 143:10–14, 146:6–7, 148:17–21. Martinez’s physician
also extended the anxiety medication prescription Martinez was initially given at

urgent care. Pl. Dep. at 162:2–11. Finally, Martinez was referred to see a
psychiatrist. Tan-Chu Dep. at 120:14–19, 123:9–13. Based on this evidence, a
reasonable jury could, but would not be required to, conclude that Martinez’s conduct
was caused by her disability.
Third, as to Defendants’ awareness of a causal relationship between Martinez’s
November 7, 2018 conduct and her disabilities, by arguing that Treval and Henderson
were not aware of Martinez’s disabilities, Defendants implicitly assert that

decisionmakers were not aware that the November 7 incident was caused by
Martinez’s disability. However, a genuine dispute exists as to whether Martinez
informed her employer during the November 8, 2018 investigatory meeting that her
conduct the previous day was caused by her disability. Treval testified at her
deposition that Martinez did not tell her that she suffered from “[a]nxiety attacks,
depression, and/or post-traumatic stress disorder.” Treval Dep. 42:12–24. This
appears to be contradicted by the deposition testimony of Henderson, who stated that
“I am aware of the fact that Marilyn [Hayes] said [at the November 8, 2018 meeting]
she thought it was an anxiety attack.” Henderson Dep. 195:14–16. Martinez’s

deposition testimony indicates that her union representative informed SIUH
supervisors at the November 8 meeting that Martinez’s conduct was caused by her
anxiety disorder. Pl. Dep. at 173:10–17, 174:9–175:5. Contemporaneous notes from
the meeting indicate that Hayes stated that she “went to [Martinez] because I heard
her have an anxiety attack.” Pl. Ex. K (“11/8/18 Meeting Notes”) at 3, ECF No. 91-
11. Henderson discounted this statement by Martinez’s union representative Hayes

because “Marilyn[] [Hayes’s] interpretation doesn’t qualify her as a clinical person,”
meaning “the hospital does not have to act upon Marilyn’s thought that it was an
anxiety attack.” Henderson Dep. at 198:7–10, 18–21. Henderson further stated, in
relation to Hayes’s assertion that Martinez’s conduct was a manifestation of her
anxiety disorder, that “[w]e still don’t know what that means.” Id. at 198:22–23.
Based on this record evidence, a reasonable jury could, but would not be
required to, conclude that Defendants were both generally aware of Martinez’s

disability and specifically aware that her November 7, 2018 conduct may have been
caused by her disability (or, at least, that Martinez was contending as much when
she tried to explain the reasons for her actions). As discussed infra, these genuine
disputes all concern material facts that preclude summary judgment on Plaintiff’s
disability discrimination claims.
II. Disability Discrimination Claims under the ADA, NYSHRL, and
NYCHRL

The Court now turns to Martinez’s disability discrimination claims under the
ADA, NYSHRL, and NYCHRL. The ADA provides that:
No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual on
the basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring,
advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job
training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.

42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). “Disability discrimination claims may be brought under a
theory of failure to provide reasonable accommodation or of adverse employment
action.” Berger v. U.S. Dep’t of Com., No. 22-CV-10257 (GHW) (SDA), 2025 WL
1095419, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2025) (citing Balchan v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., No.
21-CV-10326 (JGK), 2025 WL 588021, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2025)), report and
recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 1094495 (Apr. 11, 2025).9 “Claims alleging
disability discrimination in violation of the ADA are subject to the burden-shifting
analysis originally established by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, [411 U.S. 792] (1973).” McMillan, 711 F.3d at 125 (quoting McBride v. BIC
Consumer Prods. Mfg. Co., 583 F.3d 92, 96 (2d Cir. 2009)). This framework, developed
in the Title VII context, is also applied to claims brought under the ADA. See Trane
v. Northrop Grumman Corp., 94 F. Supp. 3d 367, 376 (E.D.N.Y. 2015), aff’d, 639 F.

9 Berger concerned a claim under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29
U.S.C. § 794(a). See 2025 WL 1095419, at *7. However, Section 504 and the ADA
have “identical requirements.” Rodriguez v. City of New York, 197 F.3d 611, 618 (2d
Cir. 1999); see also Hodges v. Holder, 547 F. App’x 6, 7–8 (2d Cir. 2013) (“Because the
ADA and the Rehabilitation Act are very similar, we may look to caselaw interpreting
one statute to assist us in interpreting the other.” (citation modified)). Accordingly,
the Court refers to Berger and other Rehabilitation Act cases in evaluating Martinez’s
claims under the ADA here.
App’x 50 (2d Cir. 2016) (“[Courts] review[] ADA claims under the same burden-
shifting framework established for Title VII cases in McDonnell Douglas Corp. . . . .”).
Martinez also raises claims under the NYSHRL and NYCHRL. Unlike federal

law, which contains separate statutes protecting different groups of individuals from
discrimination, the NYSHRL and NYCHRL are general anti-discrimination statutes
applying to different protected classes. See N.Y. Exec. L. § 296(a) (NYSHRL
prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of “age, race, creed, color,
national origin, citizenship or immigration status, sexual orientation, gender identity
or expression, military status, sex, disability, predisposing genetic characteristics,

familial status, marital status, or status as a victim of domestic violence”); N.Y.C.
Admin. Code §§ 8–107(1)(a)(2), (3) (NYCHRL prohibiting employment discrimination
on the basis of “actual or perceived age, race, creed, color, national origin, gender,
disability, marital status, partnership status, caregiver status, sexual and
reproductive health decisions, sexual orientation, uniformed service, height, weight,
or immigration or citizenship status”).
The general McDonnell Douglas framework applies under the ADA, the

NYSHRL, and the NYCHRL, see Nieblas-Love v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 165 F. Supp. 3d
51, 72–73 (S.D.N.Y. 2016), but the state and municipal laws are not necessarily
coextensive with the federal law, see Wright v. White Plains Hosp. Med. Ctr., 232
N.Y.S.3d 594, 595–97 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2025) (discussing the standard for
evaluating NYSHRL claims at summary judgment and explaining that the NYSHRL
prohibits a wider array of discriminatory conduct than Title VII); McCarthy v.
Motorola Solutions Inc., No. 21-CV-4020 (RER), 2025 WL 2482247, at *2–4 (E.D.N.Y.
Aug. 28, 2025) (same for NYCHRL claims). “Given the close overlap [between the
three statutes], if a plaintiff can satisfy his or her burden under the ADA, a plaintiff

will also satisfy his or her burden under the [NYSHRL and NYCHRL].” I.M. by L.M.
v. City of New York, 111 N.Y.S.3d 273, 282 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2019) (citing
Williams v. City of New York, 121 F. Supp. 3d 354, 364 n.10 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)).
Here, genuine disputes of material fact preclude summary judgment on
Martinez’s ADA disability discrimination claim under both an adverse employment
action and a failure-to-accommodate theory. These genuine disputes include (1) what

the precise nature of Martinez’s conduct was and whether that conduct rendered her
inherently unqualified for her position; (2) whether Martinez’s conduct on November
7, 2018 was caused by her disability; (3) whether Defendants were aware that the
conduct was caused by the disability; and, as to a failure-to-accommodate theory, (4)
whether Martinez’s disability was sufficiently “obvious” to trigger an obligation on
the part of Defendants to initiate an informal interactive process.

a. Adverse Action Theory of Disability Discrimination

Under the “familiar standard” of McDonnell Douglas, to establish a prima facie
case ADA disability discrimination claim under an adverse action theory,
a plaintiff must show by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) [her]
employer is subject to the ADA; (2) [she] was disabled within the
meaning of the ADA; (3) [she] was otherwise qualified to perform the
essential functions of [her] job, with or without reasonable
accommodation; and (4) [she] suffered adverse employment action
because of [her] disability.
McMillan, 711 F.3d at 125 (quoting Sista v. CDC Ixis N. Am., Inc., 445 F.3d 161, 169
(2d Cir. 2006)). If a plaintiff demonstrates a prima facie case, “a rebuttable
presumption of discrimination arises, and the burden shifts to the defendant to set

forth some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.”
Stapleton v. Prince Carpentry, Inc., No. 22-CV-4044 (NCM), 2025 WL 2591519, at *13
(E.D.N.Y. Sep. 8, 2025) (citing Anderson v. Nat’l Grid, PLC, 93 F. Supp. 3d 120, 140
(E.D.N.Y. 2015)). “Where the employer has articulated such a reason, the burden
shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the employer’s proffered reason is a pretext for
discrimination.” Id. (citing Geer v. Gates Chili Cent. Sch. Dist., 577 F. Supp. 3d 147,

166 (W.D.N.Y. 2021)). If the reason offered by the employer was caused by the
employee’s disability, there is no need for a pretext inquiry. See McMillan, 711 F.3d
at 129 (finding that, where plaintiff is disciplined for a reason that his employ knows
is caused by his disability, “[p]retext is not an issue”).
As to the NYSHRL, the New York State Legislature amended the statute in
2019. Wright, 232 N.Y.S.3d at 595–96. Prior to this amendment, “[t]he standards for
establishing unlawful discrimination under the NYSHRL [] were the same as those

governing [T]itle VII cases.” Id. at 595 (citing Rainer N. Mittl, Ophthalmologist, P.C.
v. N.Y. State Div. of Hum. Rts., 794 N.E.2d 660 (N.Y. 2003) and Ferrante v. Am. Lung
Ass’n, 687 N.E.2d 1308 (N.Y. 1997)). “As a result of the amendment, the NYSHRL
now aligns with the standards of the [NYCHRL].” Id. at 596 (collecting cases);
Edelman v. NYU Langone Health Sys., 141 F.4th 28, 45 n.9 (2d Cir. 2025) (noting
that the New York Court of Appeals “constru[es] NYSHRL and NYCHRL claims
together” following the 2019 amendment (citing Syeed v. Bloomberg L.P., 235 N.E.3d
351, 354 (N.Y. 2024))).
However, “[t]hat amendment was effective August 12, 2019, and applies to

causes of action . . . that are filed on or after the effective date.” Wright, 232 N.Y.S.3d
at 596 (citations omitted); see also Ricciardo v. NYU Hosps. Ctr., No. 22-CV-4952
(MKB), 2025 WL 2208371, at *25 n.23 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2025) (“The amendments
apply to claims accruing after August 12, 2019.” (citing Edelman, 141 F.4th at 45
n.9)).10 Martinez’s Second Amended Complaint was filed on October 8, 2019, see ECF
No. 24, and relates back to May 6, 2019, the date of Martinez’s original Complaint,

see ECF No. 1. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(B); see also Krupski v. Costa Crociere S. p. A.,
560 U.S. 538, 553 (2010) (“[Rule 15(c)(1)] mandates relation back once the Rule’s
requirements are satisfied; it does not leave the decision whether to grant relation

10 There appears to have been some earlier confusion as to the effective date of
the 2019 amendment to Executive Law § 300, the Construction provision of the
NYSHRL. See Arazi v. Cohen Bros. Realty Corp., No. 20-CV-8837 (GHW), 2022 WL
912940, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2022) (“After that amendment, the standard for
NYSHRL aligns with the NYCHRL standard for claims that accrued on or after
October 11, 2019.”); Wellner v. Montefiore Med. Ctr., No. 17-CV-3479 (KPF), 2019 WL
4081898, at *5 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2019) (“[T]hese amendments only apply to
claims that accrue on or after the effective date of October 11, 2019.”). Other
provisions of 2019 amendments were effective 60 days after their enactment. See A.
8421/S. 6577, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess., ch. 160, § 16(b) (N.Y. 2019) (“This act shall take
effect immediately, provided, however . . . Sections one-a, two, three, four, five, seven,
eight and nine of this act shall take effect on the sixtieth day after it shall have
become a law.”). However, the section amending Executive Law § 300 was not
included in this 60-day effective date exception. Id. at § 6 (amending the NYSHRL
Construction provision); id. at § 16(d) (Section 6 effective immediately). In Edelman,
the Second Circuit resolved this issue by clarifying that August 12, 2019 was the
effective date for the amendments to Section 300. 141 F.4th at 45 n.9.
back to the district court’s equitable discretion.”). Accordingly, Martinez’s NYCHRL
claims are governed by the standards that applied before the 2019 amendment.
For pre-2019 amendment causes of action, “[t]raditionally, discrimination

claims under the ADA and the NYSHRL were analyzed similarly, using the burden-
shifting scheme set forth in [McDonnell Douglas].” Wright v. City of New York, No.
23-CV-3149 (KPF), 2024 WL 3952722, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2024). The “key
difference” between the ADA and the NYSHRL is that “the NYSHRL has a broader
definition of disability than does the ADA because it does not require any showing
that the disability substantially limits a major life activity.” Scarville v. Living Res.

Corp., No. 21-CV-0807 (GTS), 2022 WL 4365863, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Sep. 21, 2022)
(citing Ugcatz v. U.P.S., Inc., No. 10-CV-0124 (MKB), 2013 WL 1232355, at *14
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2013)).
As to the NYCHRL, the City law is recognized as providing more expansive
protections for the rights of a person with disabilities than its federal and pre-2019
amendment state counterparts. See McCarthy, 2025 WL 2482247, at *2 (“After the
2005 Restoration Act amendments, however, courts now interpret the federal and

state counterparts ‘as a floor below which the NYCHRL cannot fall.’” (quoting Ya-
Chen Chen v. City Univ. of N.Y., 805 F.3d 59, 75 (2d Cir. 2015))); Makinen v. City of
New York, 86 N.E.3d 514, 519 & n.1 (N.Y. 2017) (noting that the specific language of
the Restoration Act provided that “interpretations of New York state or federal
statutes with similar wording may be used to aid in interpretation of the NYCHRL,
viewing similarly worded provisions of federal and state civil rights laws as a floor
below which the NYCHRL cannot fall, rather than a ceiling above which the local law
cannot rise” (citation modified) (quoting Local L. No. 85 (2005) of City of N.Y. § 1)).
“Under the NYCHRL, unlawful discrimination must play ‘no role’ in an employment

decision.” Wright, 232 N.Y.S.3d at 596 (quoting Singh v. Covenant Aviation Sec.,
LLC, 16 N.Y.S.3d 611, 615 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2015)). “To effectuate the purpose
of the NYCHRL, courts apply the McDonnell Douglas framework with a mixed motive
standard to discrimination claims.” McCarthy, 2025 WL 2482247, at *3 (collecting
cases); see also Wright, 232 N.Y.S.3d at 596 (“[A] defendant’s motion for summary
judgment must be analyzed under both the familiar framework of [McDonnell

Douglas] and under the newer mixed-motive framework, which imposes a lesser
burden on a plaintiff opposing such a motion.” (citations omitted)).11 “A defendant
must make a prima facie showing that there is no evidentiary route that could allow
a jury to believe that discrimination played a role in their challenged actions.”
Wright, 232 N.Y.S.3d at 596 (citation modified). “A plaintiff may defeat summary
judgment by coming forward either with evidence that the defendant’s stated reasons

11 The Second Circuit previously questioned the continuing viability of the
McDonnell Douglas framework as applied to NYCHRL claims. See Mihalik v. Credit
Agricole Cheuvreux N. Am., Inc., 715 F.3d 102, 110 n.8 (2d Cir. 2013) (“[I]t is unclear
whether McDonnell Douglas continues to apply to NYCHRL claims and, if so, to what
extent it applies . . . .”). More recent caselaw, however, demonstrates that the
McDonnell Douglas framework, modified by a mixed-motive analysis, is the
appropriate vehicle for evaluating NYCHRL claims. See Uttarwar v. Lazard Asset
Mgmt. LLC, No. 24-1085-CV, 2025 WL 704278, at *2 (2d Cir. Mar. 5, 2025) (summary
order) (“NYSHRL and NYCHRL claims are both analyzed using the three-step
burden shifting framework established by the Supreme Court in [McDonnell
Douglas].” (citing Furfero v. St. John’s Univ., 941 N.Y.S.2d 639, 641 (N.Y. App. Div.
2d Dep’t 2012) and Melman v. Montefiore Med. Ctr., 946 N.Y.S.2d 27, 30–31 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2012))).
were a pretext for discrimination or with evidence that discrimination was one of the
motivating factors for the defendant’s conduct.” Id. at 596–97 (quoting Ellison v.
Chartis Claims, Inc., 115 N.Y.S.3d 53, 59 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2019)).

Here, the parties do not appear to dispute that (1) SIUH is an employer covered
by the ADA, NYSHRL, and NYCHRL or (2) Martinez is disabled within the meaning
of those statutes — specifically, because she has been diagnosed with PTSD and an
anxiety disorder. Accordingly, the Court turns to whether she “was otherwise
qualified to perform the essential functions of [her] job, with or without reasonable
accommodation.” McMillan, 711 F.3d at 125.

i. Genuine Disputes of Material Fact Preclude a Determination
at Summary Judgment as to Whether Martinez was
“Otherwise Qualified” for Her Position Despite Her
Disability.

An analysis of whether Martinez is qualified to perform the essential functions
of her positions requires the Court to determine (1) what functions were essential to
her position and (2) whether she was qualified to perform these functions. See
McMillan, 711 F.3d at 127–28 (performing this analysis in this order). Courts
generally “give considerable deference to an employer’s determination as to what [job]
functions are essential, [though] there are a number of relevant factors that may
influence a court’s ultimate conclusion as to a position’s essential functions.” Id. at
126. Here, Defendants have adduced a few essential functions they assert are
relevant to this suit. Martinez’s “essential duties included, among other things,
cleaning the emergency department units and preparing the units for incoming
patients by stocking them with supplies.” Decl. of Karyn Treval dated Nov. 13, 2024
(“Treval Decl.”) ¶ 5, ECF No. 97-7; see also Pl. Dep. at 60:17–62:9 (stating that
Martinez’s job included, inter alia, maintaining essential items in trauma cases,
assisting patients, taking vital signs, setting up trays, and assisting with crutches

and splinting).
As to whether she was qualified for the position she held, Martinez has
introduced performance reviews that indicate, in calendar year 2016, she
demonstrated an overall “Exceptional Performance” and specifically achieved a
“Consistent Demonstration” in the evaluation area of “Behavioral Expectations.” Pl.
Ex. I (“Performance Evaluations”) at 2, 6, ECF 91-9. In calendar year 2017, Martinez

demonstrated an overall “Consistent Performance” and specifically achieved a
“Consistent Demonstration” in the “Behavioral Expectations” area. Id. at 7, 10.
Moreover, Martinez asserts that she had previously received accommodations from
her employer that enabled her to perform her job despite her disability. As discussed
supra, Martinez was allegedly permitted to manage her anxiety by seeking “refuge”
in Henderson’s office and occasionally leaving work when her symptoms became
unmanageable. Pl. Dep. at 185:8–11, 185:22–186:15, 188:24–25. Additionally,

Martinez was first diagnosed with PTSD and anxiety following a 2005 panic attack
while at work. Id. at 101:9–17. Following this panic attack, Martinez was treated at
the SIUH Emergency Department where she usually works. Id. at 109:14–18. After
Martinez’s diagnosis, she received FMLA leave for these disabilities and her job
functions were adjusted so that she would not “be asked to transport patients [to
building 10, the in-patient psychiatric ward] anymore.” Id. at 104:21–105:8. The fact
that Martinez successfully performed her job for more than a decade after the
previous implementation of reasonable accommodations would be sufficient to meet
Martinez’s burden to show she “could have performed [the essential] functions [of her

position], with or without reasonable accommodation, at the time of the termination.”
McMillan, 711 F.3d at 127. Martinez has demonstrated this element of her prima
facie case. See id. (noting that “[t]his burden is not heavy”).
Defendants nonetheless argue that Martinez is inherently unqualified for her
position in light of the November 7, 2018 incident. In particular, they assert that
“Martinez was not able to work at [SIUH] without violating its policies against violent

events in the workplace” — making her “inherently unqualified to work in her
position as an EDT there.” Def. Opp’n at 17; see also id. at 18 (“That [Martinez] was
unable to [clean the emergency department units for incoming patients and stock
them with supplies] without having an extreme overreaction to having an incoming
patient directed to a unit she was preparing also renders her unqualified for her job.”);
Francis v. Runyon, 928 F. Supp. 195, 205 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (“A disabled individual
cannot be otherwise qualified for a position if he commits misconduct which would

disqualify an individual who did not fall under the protection of the statute.” (citation
modified)).
Defendants’ conclusion that Martinez violated SIUH’s prohibition against
workplace violence was the ultimate factor in the decision to terminate Martinez. At
her deposition, Henderson was asked, “[i]f [Martinez] or Ms. Hayes did indicate [at]
that November 8, 2018 meeting that [Martinez] was having a panic attack or an
anxiety attack [on November 7, 2018], how would that, if at all, influence your
decisions related to the investigation?” Henderson Dep. at 164:7–13. Henderson
answered that “the fact that she . . . alleged having panic attacks didn’t excuse the

behavior of workplace violence.” Id. at 164:14–17. Henderson was also asked, “if
[Martinez] was having [an] anxiety attack in the emergency department at the time
that she was exhibiting this behavior [on November 7, 2018], would that influence
your decisions regarding how to deal with her disciplinary matter going forward?”
Henderson Dep. at 165:3–9. Henderson responded, “No.” Id. at 165:11. Henderson
further stated that “[Martinez] alleges she had an anxiety or panic attack, yes, but

I’m saying that her actions were not dismissed by that, not condoned. That doesn’t
condone her behavior.” Id. at 165:24–166:4. Martinez interprets this to mean that
“Defendant Henderson was clear that it would not have made any difference if
Plaintiff has a medical defense, disabilities, or medical documents [because] Plaintiff
would have been suspended and terminated regardless.” Pl. Mem. at 15; see also Pl.
Opp’n at 12. Defendants appear to agree. See Def. Mem. at 17 (“Whether or not
Plaintiff’s violent behavior on November 7, 2018 was caused by her underlying

anxiety and alleged PTSD and other mental disabilities is immaterial.”).
In light of the above, ultimately, Defendants do not disclaim reliance on
Martinez’s disability when making the decision to terminate her. This may, in turn,
render their knowledge of that disability and the relationship between the disability
and Martinez’s conduct on November 7, 2018 irrelevant to the Court’s analysis. See
Teahan v. Metro-N. Commuter R. Co., 951 F.2d 511, 516 (2d Cir. 1991) (“But when
the employer does not disclaim reliance on the handicap, the ‘solely by reason of’
element is by definition satisfied. The question then becomes whether the employee
is qualified despite his or her handicap to perform the essential functions of the job.”

(citing Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cnty. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 n.17 (1987))).
In other words, Defendants assert that Martinez would have been terminated
regardless of whether her November 7 conduct was caused by (or otherwise a
symptom of) her disability. Thus, her disability discrimination claim succeeds or fails
depending on whether Martinez’s conduct constituted a violation of SIUH’s policies
against workplace violence. Indeed, even Martinez does not dispute that, if she had

violated SIUH’s policies against workplace violence, that would render her inherently
unqualified for her position. But she maintains that there is a factual dispute about
whether her conduct on November 7 in fact constituted “workplace violence,” or
whether her actions otherwise gave Defendants reasonable grounds to conclude that
she would be unable to follow SIUH’s policies going forward if she remained in her
current position.12
Accordingly, this inquiry into whether Martinez’s conduct made her inherently

unqualified is the crux Martinez’s disability discrimination claims. “‘Whether an
employee is otherwise qualified as of the date of termination is a highly fact-sensitive
forward looking’ inquiry [that requires] a prognostication concerning the likelihood

12 The Court notes that Defendants’ concession that Martinez would have been
terminated whether or not her conduct was caused by her disability means the Court
does not need to reach a pretext analysis under the McDonnel Douglas framework.
See McMillan, 711 F.3d at 124, 129 (noting that “[p]retext is not an issue” where an
employee is disciplined for conduct that is a manifestation of their disability, and the
employer is aware that the conduct was “due to” the disability).
that plaintiff’s impairment will result in similar conduct in the future.” Quinlan v.
Hofstra Univ., No. 03-CV-3883 (JS), 2006 WL 8441209, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 25, 2006)
(citation modified) (citing Teahan, 951 F.2d at 521). As discussed supra, genuine

disputes exist as to the precise nature of Martinez’s conduct and whether it fell within
SIUH’s prohibitions against workplace violence.
Defendants contend that they are “not claiming that Plaintiff posed a direct
threat to the health or safety of others that could not be eliminated by reasonable
accommodation,” which constitutes the “direct threat” defense against an ADA claim.
Def. Reply at 8; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (“[A]n individual shall not pose a direct

threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace.”). Instead, they
argue that she was inherently unqualified for her position “because of her
misconduct, whether caused by a disability or not, which violated [SIUH’s] policies.”
Def. Reply at 8. However, the main case Defendants rely on for this “inherently
unqualified” argument, Valentine v. Standard & Poor’s, principally concerned
employee conduct that the employee conceded “was threatening in nature.” 50 F.
Supp. 2d 262, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), aff’d, 205 F.3d 1327 (2d Cir. 2000); see also id. at

289 (citing “plaintiff's admission that he threatened a fellow employee's professional
reputation and well-being in the workplace”). Yet here, there is no indication in the
record that Martinez directly threatened another employee or anyone else during the
November 7, 2018 incident. Indeed, at her deposition, Henderson conceded Martinez
did not threaten anyone during the November 7, 2018 incident. Henderson Dep. at
167:2–11 (confirming that Martinez did not “speak to someone in that room” or
“threaten anybody that day . . . in the emergency department”). Valentine does stand
for the proposition that the ADA “does not immunize disabled employees from
discipline or discharge for incidents of misconduct in the workplace,” even if the

misconduct at issue is a “manifestation of [a] disability.” 50 F. Supp. 2d at 289
(emphasis added). But, as discussed supra, there is a dispute as to whether
Martinez’s conduct truly constituted misconduct at all.
In the other cases Defendants cite, the employee misconduct at issue was more
severe than even Defendants’ characterization of the conduct Martinez engaged in on
November 7, 2018. See Quinlan, 2006 WL 8441209, at *5 (finding that a university

employee with bipolar disorder was not otherwise qualified where (1) he jumped into
a hotel swimming pool fully clothed, returned to the hotel despite being previously
ejected, and was arrested for trespassing; (2) officials from other universities called
plaintiff’s employer concerning plaintiff’s conduct; and (3) the parties agreed that this
conduct would result in the termination of any employee); Francis, 928 F. Supp. at
200–02, 205 & n.4 (finding a postal worker was not otherwise qualified where she
misrepresented her physical capacity and ability to get to work in order to support

her claims for workers’ compensation and continued the misrepresentation when
confronted); Adams v. Rochester Gen. Hosp., 977 F. Supp. 226, 234 (W.D.N.Y. 1997)
(finding a hospital repair technician was not otherwise qualified where (1) he was
cited three times in less than three months for incorrectly repairing hospital
equipment used to care for patients and (2) the third instance involved failure to
properly repair a syringe pump used to feed infants, which led supervisors to conclude
he inability to perform his job posed a “direct threat” to the safety of patients);
McElwee v. Cnty. of Orange, 700 F.3d 635, 638–39, 643 (2d Cir. 2012) (finding a
volunteer janitor was not otherwise qualified where he sexually harassed five

colleagues, as well as nursing students and visitors, consistently over the course of
several years).13
Here, genuine disputes of material fact exist as to the nature of Martinez’s
conduct and whether it constituted “workplace violence.” These disputes preclude
the Court from deciding at summary judgment whether Martinez’s conduct violated
SIUH’s policies or otherwise rendered her inherently unqualified for her position. A

jury could reasonably find for either party on this issue. Accordingly, neither party
is entitled to summary judgment on the question of whether Martinez has proven her
disability discrimination claim under an adverse employment action theory under
state, City, or federal law.

13 The principal case Defendants cite that did not involve misconduct concerned
a city bus driver with color-blindness who could not distinguish the colors of traffic
lights. Shannon v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 332 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 2003). In Shannon, the
ability to distinguish between traffic light colors was a function essential to the safe
operation of a bus, and there was no accommodation that would enable plaintiff to
fulfill this role going forward. Id. at 99–103. The Second Circuit concluded there was
no evidence that the plaintiff “has or might regain the ability to distinguish the colors
of traffic lights.” Id. at 101. In other words, the Shannon plaintiff’s disability was a
permanent disability that meant he was and would forever be unable to perform a
core essential function of his position every time he got behind the wheel of a bus.
This circumstance is also distinguishable. Here, Martinez’s physician, Dr. Tan-Chu,
believed that, with psychotherapy, changes to her medication, some time away from
work, and workplace “adjustment,” Martinez would be able to continue her work at
SIUH. Tan-Chu Dep. at 143:13–22, 153:23–154:4; see also McElwee, 700 F.3d at 633–
34 (finding that whether “aberrant behavior” caused by disability was disqualifying
from plaintiff’s job “is perhaps more easily addressed by asking whether a reasonable
accommodation for [the] disability existed”).
b. Failure-to-Accommodate Theory of Disability Discrimination

Turning to Martinez’s second theory of liability, “[a]n employer may also
violate the ADA by failing to provide a reasonable accommodation.” McMillan, 711
F.3d at 125. To establish a prima facie case under a failure-to-accommodate theory,
a plaintiff must demonstrate,
(1) plaintiff is a person with a disability under the meaning of the ADA;
(2) an employer covered by the statute had notice of [her] disability; (3)
with reasonable accommodation, plaintiff could perform the essential
functions of the job at issue; and (4) the employer has refused to make
such accommodations.

Id. at 125–26. “If a plaintiff suggests plausible accommodations, the burden of proof
shifts to the defendant to demonstrate that such accommodations would present
undue hardships and would therefore be unreasonable.” Id. at 128. “In
discrimination claims based both on adverse employment actions and on failures to
accommodate, the plaintiff ‘bears the burdens of both production and persuasion as
to the existence of some accommodation that would allow [her] to perform the
essential functions of [her] employment.’” Id. at 126 (quoting McBride, 583 F.3d at
97). “[T]he ADA envisions an interactive process by which employers and employees
work together to assess whether an employee’s disability can be reasonably
accommodated.” Tafolla v. Heilig, 80 F.4th 111, 122 (2d Cir. 2023) (quoting McBride,
583 F.3d at 99). “Failure-to-accommodate claims do not require proof of
discriminatory intent.” Brooklyn Ctr. for Psychotherapy, Inc. v. Phila. Indem. Ins.
Co., 955 F.3d 305, 312 (2d Cir. 2020).
For Martinez’s failure-to-accommodate theory, the NYSHRL and NYCHRL use
the same standard as the ADA. Kleyman v. SUNY Downstate Med. Ctr., No. 18-CV-
3137 (PKC), 2020 WL 5645218, at * 8 n.11 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 21, 2020) (noting that “[t]he

same standards apply to claims under the NYSHRL [and under the ADA]” (citing
Sivio v. Vill. Care Max, 436 F. Supp. 3d 778, 790 (S.D.N.Y. 2020))); Einsohn v. N.Y.C.
Dep’t of Educ., No. 19-CV-2660 (RPK), 2022 WL 955110, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30,
2022) (“The same basic framework governs failure-to-accommodate claims under the
ADA and NYCHRL” (citing Frilando v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 463 F. Supp. 3d 501,
514 (S.D.N.Y. 2020))). However, as with a general disability discrimination claim,

“claims under the NYCHRL must be considered ‘independently from and more
liberally than their federal counterparts.’” Einsohn, 2022 WL 955110, at *6 (citation
modified) (quoting Wells v. Achievement Network, No. 18-CV-6588 (KPF), 2021 WL
810220, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2021)).
Martinez has made an initial showing as to each step of her prima facie case,
and genuine disputes of fact preclude summary judgment on Martinez’s failure-to-
accommodate theory. First, the parties do not dispute the first element of Martinez’s

prima facie case, that she has a disability within the meaning of the ADA. Second,
genuine disputes of material fact exist as to whether Defendants were on notice of
Martinez’s disability. Third, genuine disputes of material fact exist as to whether
Martinez was qualified to perform the essential functions of her job with reasonable
accommodations. The Court must now consider whether the record could permit a
jury to find that Defendants refused to accommodate Martinez.
i. Genuine Disputes of Material Fact Exist as to Whether
Martinez’s Disability was Obvious and Whether It Became
Obvious After Alleged Misconduct

Typically, the interactive process envisioned by the ADA is “initiated by the
employee’s request for an accommodation.” Tafolla, 80 F.4th at 122. “[G]enerally [it
is] ‘the responsibility of the individual with a disability to inform the employer that
an accommodation is needed.’” McElwee, 700 F.3d at 641 (quoting Brady v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 531 F.3d 127, 135 (2d Cir. 2008)). Some courts interpret this as a rule
that, “to make a claim premised on a failure to accommodate, a plaintiff must show
that she did, in fact, request an accommodation.” Turner v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 658
F. Supp. 3d 123, 137 (E.D.N.Y. 2023); see also id. at 138 (“Without Plaintiff's request
for an accommodation, it was not Defendant's responsibility to suggest an
accommodation of its own accord.” (citing McElwee, 700 F.3d at 641)); id. at 139
(“Again, without a request for accommodation, Defendant was not obligated to
provide one.”); Guerrero v. Constellation Health Servs., LLC, No. 22-CV-07736 (OEM),
2025 WL 2549936, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 4, 2025) (“As an initial matter, to maintain a
claim premised on a failure to accommodate, a plaintiff must show that she requested

an accommodation.” (citing Turner, 658 F. Supp. 3d at 137)); Hampson v. State Farm
Mut. Auto Ins. Co., No. 12-CV-00258 (BKS), 2015 WL 12733387, at *12 (N.D.N.Y.
Mar. 26, 2015) (holding that it is sufficient, under the ADA and NYSHRL, for an
employee “to make the employer aware of his or her disability and to ask whether an
accommodation can be made”).
However, the Second Circuit has held that, “under certain circumstances, an
employer is required to act proactively and engage in an interactive process to
accommodate the disability of an employee even if the employee does not request

accommodation.” McElwee, 700 F.3d at 642 (citing Brady, 531 F.3d at 135). The
Second Circuit has held “that an employer has a duty reasonably to accommodate an
employee’s disability if the disability is obvious — which is to say, if the employer
knew or reasonably should have known that the employee was disabled.” Brady, 531
F.3d at 135. Where an employee “does not request specific accommodation,” but the
employee’s disability is obvious, an employer is “obligated to engage in the []

interactive process” in order to “assess whether an employee’s disability can be
reasonably accommodated.” Id. at 135–36 (citing Jackan v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Labor,
205 F.3d 562, 566 (2d Cir. 2000)). This rule aligns with the regulations that
implement the ADA. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9(a) (“It is unlawful for a covered entity
[such as an employer] not to make reasonable accommodation to the known physical
or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified applicant or employee with a
disability, unless [the accommodation imposes an undue hardship].” (emphasis

added)); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) (“To determine the appropriate reasonable
accommodation it may be necessary for the covered entity to initiate an informal,
interactive process with the individual with a disability in need of the
accommodation.” (emphasis added)).
Here, for substantially the same reasons outlined in supra in relation to
whether Defendants had notice of Martinez’s disabilities, a genuine dispute of
material fact exists as to whether Martinez’s disability was sufficiently obvious to
trigger Defendants’ obligation to accommodate her. A reasonably jury could find that
some combination of (1) Martinez’s November 7, 2018 conduct, (2) Hayes’s statement

on November 8, 2018 that Martinez’s conduct was the result of a panic attack, (3)
Martinez’s alleged interactions with Henderson about her anxiety disorder, and (4)
Martinez’s earlier FMLA leave requests to address her anxiety and PTSD made
Martinez’s disability sufficiently obvious. See Glaser v. Gap Inc., 994 F. Supp. 2d 569,
580 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (holding that “whether [the employer] knew or should have
known [plaintiff] was disabled constitutes a genuine issue of material fact” precluding

summary judgment); cf. Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 313–14 (3d
Cir. 1999) (holding that, after an employee “became psychotic at work,” the employer
had sufficient information to trigger an “obligation to participate in the interactive
process” and to request additional information, despite the employer’s disclaiming all
knowledge of employee’s disability until after the start of the litigation), abrogated by
statute on other grounds as recognized in Rocco v. Gordon Food Serv., 998 F. Supp.
2d 422, 426 n.1 (W.D. Pa. 2014).

Defendants assert that they were “not required to excuse Plaintiff’s
misconduct, regardless of its cause” and cite McElwee, 700 F.3d at 641, for the
proposition that “[a] requested accommodation that simply excuses past misconduct
is unreasonable as a matter of law.” Def. Opp’n at 18. However, as discussed in
supra, there is a genuine dispute as to whether Martinez’s November 7, 2018 conduct
in fact constituted “misconduct” within the policies Defendants assert she violated.
This contrasts sharply with the other case Defendants cite, where it was undisputed
that the plaintiff had in fact committed misconduct. See Fahey v. City of New York,
No. 10-CV-4609 (ILG), 2012 WL 413990, at *2, *9 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2012) (finding

that a firefighter’s after-the-fact request for an accommodation was unreasonable as
a matter of law where he (1) was terminated for testing positive for cocaine in light
of the department’s zero-tolerance policy; (2) operated a fire truck with cocaine in his
system the morning after the party at which he ingested cocaine; and (3) refused to
voluntarily seek counseling services for his PTSD, which were available). This
genuine dispute of material fact precludes this Court from finding, at summary

judgment, that Defendants were relieved of any obligation to initiate an interactive
process with Martinez after the November 7 incident and determine if reasonable
accommodations of her disability were possible.14
Martinez is also not entitled to summary judgment on this issue. She has
asserted that Defendants had previously “offered accommodation” for her known
disability by permitting her to “seek refuge” in Henderson’s office when she felt the

14 Defendants do not argue in any of their submissions that accommodating
Martinez through a leave of absence — the accommodation Martinez requested
through her union representative at the November 27, 2018 Step 3 grievance meeting
— would impose an undue hardship on their business. See generally Def. Mem.; Def.
Opp’n; Def. Reply. The record supports that such an accommodation would not
impose an undue hardship, since (1) Martinez herself had taken FMLA leave in the
past and (2) at least one other employee was offered a leave of absence during an
investigation into alleged misconduct. See Def. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 20 (listing the
instances when Martinez took FMLA leave); Pl. Ex. KK, ECF No. 96-37 (anonymized
letter “confirm[ing] that the investigation is being held in abeyance” while the
employee took an approved, post-misconduct leave of absence). Accordingly, the
Court does not see the undue hardship element of a failure-to-accommodate claim as
posing any obstacle to denying Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
onset of anxiety. Pl. Dep. at 185:8–18. Defendants therefore have grounds to argue
to a jury that they did provide a reasonable accommodation to Martinez, but that she
failed to take advantage of the accommodation on November 7, 2018. See Noll v. Int’l

Bus. Machines Corp., 787 F.3d 89, 95 (2d Cir. 2015) (affirming a grant of summary
judgment for an employer where “[t]he summary judgment record establishes that
IBM provided Noll with several accommodations” that the court concluded were
reasonable); Fox v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 918 F.3d 65, 73 (2d Cir. 2019) (holding
that an employer had not failed to accommodate an employee where, inter alia, the
employee rejected as reassignment offer); Jacobson v. Cap. One Fin. Corp., No. 16-

CV-06169 (CM), 2018 WL 6817064, at*29 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2018) (granting an
employer summary judgment where “[t]he record demonstrates that every
accommodation request that [p]laintiff made with respect to [her disability] was
granted”); Gronne v. Apple Bank for Sav., No. 98-CV-6091 (JS), 2000 WL 298914, at
*7 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2000) (finding that, “because [plaintiff] rejected the reasonable
accommodations offered by [her employer], she cannot perform the essential
functions of her job” and therefore “is not a qualified person with a disability under

the ADA” (citation modified) (citations omitted)), aff’d, 1 F. App’x 64 (2d Cir. 2001).
Thus, as with Martinez’s adverse employment action theory, her failure-to-
accommodate theory raises genuine disputes that may only be resolved by a jury.

c. Disability Discrimination Claims Against Individual Defendants
Treval and Henderson under the NYCHRL

Martinez also seeks to hold Treval and Henderson individually liable under
the NYCHRL for disability discrimination. See N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8–107(1)(a)(3)
(making it unlawful for “an employee or agent” of an employer to discriminate on the
basis of protected characteristics “in compensation or in terms, conditions or
privileges of employment”). The New York Court of Appeals construes this provision

to extend direct liability to employees who have “some supervisory role over the
victim of their discrimination,” including “not just those with formal managerial or
titular authority over a plaintiff, but [also] those who wield any ability to dictate or
administer the compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of the plaintiff’s
employment.” Russell v. NYU, 246 N.E.3d 868, 877 (N.Y. 2024). “Individual liability
under the NYCHRL only exists if the individual actually participated in the conduct

giving rise to the discrimination claim,” and extends to employees who are involved
in discipline decisions. Goffe v. NYU Hosp. Ctr., 201 F. Supp. 3d 337, 358 (E.D.N.Y.
2016) (citation modified); see also Lee v. Riverbay Corp., 751 F. Supp. 3d 259, 291
(S.D.N.Y. 2024) (“Under this provision, individuals may incur liability only for their
own discriminatory conduct.” (citation modified)).
Here, the parties do not dispute that Treval was Martinez’s formal supervisor.
Pl. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 5. As to Henderson, the parties do not dispute that she “was

responsible for ensuring that staff and managers adhered to the collective bargaining
agreement,” id. ¶ 3, meaning she was responsible for administering Martinez’s terms
and conditions of employment. Both Treval and Henderson fit within the broad
definition of “supervisor” applicable under the NYCHRL.
However, while the parties agree that both Treval and Henderson participated
in the investigation into Martinez’s conduct and the decision to terminate her, they
disagree as to who made the ultimate decision to terminate Martinez. Pl. Resp. 56.1
Stmt. ¶ 81. Defendants claim Treval, Henderson, and Chief Nursing Officer Terry
Pando decided to terminate Martinez for workplace violence on November 14, 2018.

Id. ¶¶ 81–83; Def. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 100–03, 115. Martinez contends that Associate
Executive Director of Human Resources Mary Beth Springstead, Henderson’s
supervisor, made the decision to suspend and then terminate Martinez. Pl. Resp.
56.1 Stmt. ¶ 81. Henderson testified that she kept Springstead informed of the
disciplinary process and sought her guidance and that Springstead determined, based
on witness statements, that Martinez’s conduct constituted workplace violence. Def.

Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 100–03.
Henderson further testified that she did not disclose any information to
Springstead about Martinez’s medical conditions or disabilities, to the extent she had
knowledge of these conditions at all. Id. ¶ 105. Moreover, Springstead concedes that
she “ha[d] access to all records of the Hospital relative to any employee requests for
a leave of absence, medical or otherwise, including but not limited to leave taken
under the [FMLA], including any leave taken or requested by former employee

Adelaida Martinez, the Plaintiff, during her employment at the Hospital.”
Springstead Decl. ¶ 3. The extent to which Springstead may (or may not) have shared
information about Martinez’s disability with Henderson is a jury question. Thus, a
genuine dispute exists as to whether Treval and Henderson had knowledge of
Martinez’s disability.
A reasonable jury could find that one or both individual Defendants directly
participated in the decision to terminate Martinez’s employment and did so because
of her disability. Of course, that same jury would not be required to make such a

finding. Accordingly, considering these genuine disputes of material fact, both
parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment as to the individual liability claims
against Treval and Henderson under the NYCHRL are DENIED.
* * *
Defendants strenuously argue that Martinez committed workplace violence

that justified her termination. Workplace violence is a serious concern, and
employers have the right to make personnel decisions — including, in some
circumstances, to terminate disabled employees — that are reasonably necessary to
maintain a safe workplace. But the record before the Court does not conclusively
establish that, as a matter of law, Martinez’s conduct on November 7, 2018
constituted misconduct within the meaning of the policies Defendants cited to justify

her termination. That issue is properly left to a jury. There are genuine disputes of
material fact that are relevant to both Martinez’s adverse action and failure-to-
accommodate theories of disability discrimination. Accordingly, the parties’ cross-
motions for summary judgment on Martinez’s ADA, NYSHRL, and NYCHRL
disability discrimination causes of action are DENIED. Moreover, because the
NYCHRL claim against SIUH survives, and because genuine disputes of material
fact exist as to the extent of Treval’s and Henderson’s direct knowledge and

participation in these allegedly discriminatory actions, the parties’ cross-motion for
summary judgment on Martinez’s direct liability claims against the individual
Defendants is also DENIED.

III. Retaliation Claims under the ADA, NYSHRL, and NYCHRL

“The burden-shifting framework under McDonnell Douglas also applies to
retaliation claims under both the ADA and the NYSHRL.” Tafolla, 80 F.4th at 125
(citing Treglia v. Town of Manlius, 313 F.3d 713, 719 (2d Cir. 2002)). For these two
statutes, a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of retaliation by showing “(i) a
plaintiff was engaged in protected activity; (ii) the alleged retaliator knew that
plaintiff was involved in protected activity; (iii) an adverse decision or course of action
was taken against plaintiff; and (iv) a causal connection exists between the protected
activity and the adverse action.” Id. (quoting Natofsky v. City of New York, 921 F.3d
337, 353 (2d Cir. 2019) and Weissman v. Dawn Joy Fashions, Inc., 214 F.3d 224, 234
(2d Cir. 2000)). “‘Protected activity’ is ‘action taken to protest or oppose statutorily

prohibited discrimination.’” Natofsky, 921 F.3d at 354 (quoting Cruz v. Coach Stores,
Inc., 202 F.3d 560, 566 (2d Cir. 2000), superseded on other grounds by Local L. No. 85
(2005) of City of N.Y.). “While it is unnecessary for an individual to specifically invoke
the word discrimination when complaining in order to alert her employer to her
protected activity, there must be some basis to conclude that the employer was aware
that the plaintiff engaged in protected activity.” Lucio v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 575

F. App’x 3, 6 (2d Cir. 2014).
The standard under the NYCHRL is somewhat different. “The NYCHRL offers
retaliation victims, like discrimination victims, broader protection than its [pre-2019
amendment] NYSHRL counterpart.” Reichman v. City of New York, 117 N.Y.S.3d
280, 286 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2020) (citing Albunio v. City of New York, 947
N.E.2d 135, 136 (N.Y. 2011) and Brightman v. Prison Health Serv., Inc., 970 N.Y.S.2d

789, 791 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2013)). A retaliation claim under the NYCHRL
requires a plaintiff to make out a prima facie case that:
(1) he or she engaged in a protected activity as that term is defined under
the NYCHRL, (2) his or her employer was aware that he or she
participated in such activity, (3) his or her employer engaged in conduct
which was reasonably likely to deter a person from engaging in that
protected activity, and (4) there is a causal connection between the
protected activity and the alleged retaliatory conduct.

Id. (quoting Sanderson-Burgess v. City of New York, 102 N.Y.S.3d 678, 681 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2d Dep’t 2019)). Put another way, “to prevail on a retaliation claim under
NYCHRL, the plaintiff must show that she took an action opposing her employer’s
discrimination and that, as a result, the employer engaged in conduct that was
reasonably likely to deter a person from engaging in such action.” Mihalik, 715 F.3d
at 112 (citing Albunio, 947 N.E.2d at 138 and Williams v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 872
N.Y.S.2d 27, 33–34 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2009).
What constitutes “protected activity” differs under the statutes. Under the
ADA, protected activity includes requesting a reasonable accommodation. See Weixel
v. Bd. of Educ. of N.Y.C., 287 F.3d 138, 149 (2d Cir. 2002) (“First, plaintiffs do allege
that they were seeking reasonable accommodation of [student]’s disability — which
constitutes protected activity under [the ADA].” (citing Muller v. Costello, 187 F.3d
298, 311 (2d Cir. 1999))); Tafolla, 80 F.4th at 126 (discussing a request for
accommodation implicitly as protected activity under the ADA and noting that “[t]he
close temporal proximity between [plaintiff’s] requests for the accommodation and
the instruction that she would need to go on medical leave is sufficient to support an
inference of retaliation” (citing Gorman-Bakos v. Cornell Coop. Extension of

Schenectady Cnty., 252 F.3d 545, 555 (2d Cir. 2001)); Konieczny v. N.Y. State Div. of
Parole, 647 F. Supp. 2d 256, 264 (W.D.N.Y. 2009) (“Requesting reasonable
accommodations for a disability may also constitute protected activity.” (citations
omitted)).
Martinez’s retaliation claims, which were brought on May 6, 2019, predate
both the August 12, 2019 and November 11, 2019 effective dates of amendments to

the NYSHRL and NYCHRL, respectively. Martinez’s state and City law retaliation
claims are thus governed by their pre-2019 amendment standards.15 Before 2019, it

15 In 2019, the NYCHRL was explicitly amended to make it “an unlawful
discriminatory practice for [an employer subject to the NYCHRL] to retaliate . . .
against any person because such person has . . . requested a reasonable
accommodation under this chapter . . . .” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8–107(7)(v); see also
Local L. No. 129 (2019) of City of N.Y. § 1 (amending Section 8–107(7) effective
November 11, 2019); Simmons v. Vill. Plumbing & Heating NY Inc., 200 N.Y.S.3d
293, 298 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2023) (noting the “2019 amendment to the [NYCHRL] that
codified a request for a reasonable accommodation as protected activity”). In light of
the 2019 amendment to the NYSHRL that “align[ed]” the NYSHRL to the standards
of the NYCHRL, see Wright, 232 N.Y.S.3d at 596, it is not clear whether requesting a
reasonable accommodation constitutes protected activity under the NYSHRL at
present. See Jordan v. City of New York, No. 23-CV-4962 (DLC), 2024 WL 4872186,
at *2–3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2024) (observing that “[i]t is possible that [the] recent
amendment to the NYSHRL might change how New York courts would interpret the
state law” but concluding “the August 2019 amendment to the NYSHRL did not
change the NYSHRL to mean that a request for a reasonable accommodation is
protected activity” because, “[w]hile the New York City Council amended the
NYCHRL . . . the New York State Legislature did not similarly act”). The Court need
not prognosticate how New York courts might further reinterpret protected activity
under the NYSHRL, however, because Martinez’s retaliation claims pre-date these
2019 amendments.
appears that “a request for reasonable accommodation [was] not a protected activity
for purposes of a retaliation claim” under either the NYSHRL or the NYCHRL.
Witchard v. Montefiore Med. Ctr., 960 N.Y.S.2d 402, 403–04 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep’t

2013); see also Medina v. AAM 15 Mgmt. LLC, 750 F. Supp. 3d 332, 346 (S.D.N.Y.
2024) (“New York’s intermediate appellate courts have long made clear that under
the NYSHRL, a request for reasonable accommodation is not a protected activity for
purposes of a retaliation claim.” (citation modified)).
Under any of these standards — ADA, NYSHRL, or NYCHRL — Martinez has
failed to establish a prima facie case at the first step of the analysis because the record

evidence does not show that she engaged in protected activity prior to her
termination. Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to Martinez, the
closest she came to engaging in protected activity prior to her termination was when
her union representative Hayes indicated, at the November 8, 2018 investigatory
meeting, that Martinez’s conduct the previous day was the result of an anxiety attack.
See Henderson Dep. 195:14–16 (“I am aware of the fact that Marilyn [Hayes] said [at
the November 8, 2018 meeting] she thought it was an anxiety attack.”). But merely

alerting an employer that certain conduct was caused by a disability does not
constitute a request for a reasonable accommodation. See Turner, 658 F. Supp. 3d at
138–39 (E.D.N.Y. 2023) (holding that a plaintiff failed to make out a prima facie case
of retaliation under the ADA where, inter alia, she “explained that the cause [of a
missed deadline] was medical issues brought on by my new chemotherapy
medication” but “ma[de] no reference to any explicit request for an accommodation”).
And even if this statement were generously interpreted to constitute a request for an
accommodation, it still would not amount to protected activity under the pre-2019
amendments NYCHRL or NYSHRL. Nor does the record contain any other indication

that Martinez otherwise opposed, objected to, or protested any form of alleged
disability discrimination prior to her termination on November 14, 2018.
Instead, the earliest date on record at which Martinez clearly requested a
reasonable accommodation was at the November 27, 2018 Step 3 grievance meeting
— after she had been terminated from employment. See Pl. Dep. at 202:20–23 (“I
recall [union representative] Kerry Johnston requesting [at the Step 3 grievance

meeting] a reasonable accommodation in allowing me to seek medical attention and
get some medical treatment.”). Because this request for accommodation post-dates
the decision to terminate, it cannot satisfy the “causal connection” requirement under
the ADA, NYSHRL, or NYCHRL.
Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on these claims is
GRANTED.

IV. Aider and Abettor Claims Against Individual Defendants Treval
and Henderson under the NYSHRL and NYCHRL

Both the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL contain identical provisions that state,
“It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person to aid, abet, incite,
compel or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under this chapter, or to
attempt to do so.” N.Y. Exec. L. § 296(6); N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8–107(6). “The
NYSHRL permits an employee to be held liable for aiding and abetting a liable
employer.” Nanakumo v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., 23-CV-00314 (ALC), 2025
WL 919479, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2025). “To be liable under [the NYSHRL], an
individual employee need not have supervisory or hiring and firing power, but must
have ‘actually participated in the conduct giving rise to the claim.’” Malena v.

Victoria’s Secret Direct, LLC, 886 F. Supp. 2d 349, 367 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (quoting
Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138, 157 (2d Cir. 2004)). The NYCHRL also extends
aiding and abetting liability to employees. See Nankumo, 2025 WL 919479, at *9
(“[E]mployees may incur liability under the NYCHRL for their own discriminatory
conduct, for aiding and abetting such conduct by others, or for retaliation against
protected conduct.” (citation modified) (quoting Nezaj v. PS450 Bar & Rest., 719 F.

Supp. 3d 318, 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2024))). The same general standard applies to both
statutes. Malena, 886 F. Supp. 2d at 367 (“The [NYCHRL] also supports claims for
aiding and abetting, which are susceptible to the same standard as under the
NYSHRL, as [the] language of the two laws is virtually identical.” (citation modified)).
Aider and abettor liability under these two statues “extends to personal liability for
aiding and abetting allegedly unlawful discrimination by an employer even where an
individual defendant’s action serve as the predicate for the employer’s vicarious

liability, so long as the employer’s conduct has also been found to be discriminatory
under the NYSHRL.” McHenry v. Fox News Network, LLC, 510 F. Supp. 3d 51, 73
(S.D.N.Y. 2020) (citation modified).
Defendants advance two arguments against Martinez’s aider and abettor
claims. First, Defendants argue that Martinez’s “claim against both Treval and
Henderson fails because her underlying claims against [SIUH] fail.” Def. Mem at 25.
However, as detailed supra, Martinez’s disability discrimination claims against SIUH
under the NYSHRL and NYCHRL have survived summary judgment. Summary
judgment as to the derivative claim is thus unwarranted on this ground.

Second, Defendants argue that Martinez “cannot make any showing of ‘direct,
purposeful participation’ by the individual defendants [Treval and Henderson]” and
that this purported failure “requires dismissal of her claim.” Id. However, as
explained supra, there are genuine disputes as to who made the ultimate decision to
terminate Martinez’s employment and the respective roles played by Treval and
Henderson in that final decision. These disputes preclude a finding by this Court at

summary judgment that Martinez’s aider and abettor claims against Treval and
Henderson fail as a matter of law.
However, these genuine disputes of material fact also prevent the Court from
finding, as Martinez asserts, that the record indisputably demonstrates that
“Henderson and Treval were directly involved and responsible for discrimination
against Plaintiff.” Pl. Mem. at 26. Accordingly, both parties’ cross-motions for
summary judgment as to Martinez’s aider and abettor claims against Treval and

Henderson are DENIED.
V. Vicarious Liability Claim Against SIUH under NYCHRL

Because Martinez’s disability discrimination claim against SIUH under the
NYCHRL has survived summary judgment, her derivative claim for vicarious
liability against SIUH under the NYCHRL based on Treval’s and Henderson’s
conduct is duplicative of her non-derivative claim against SIUH for the same conduct.
See Singhal v. Doughnut Plant, Inc., No. 20-CV-3295 (ALC), 2022 WL 976885, at *6
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2022) (“[T]he vicarious liability claim against [the employer is]
dismissed as duplicative because Plaintiff also brings non-derivative, general

NYCHRL claims against [the employer], which the Court has upheld.”). Accordingly,
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on this vicarious liability claim is
GRANTED.

VI. Interference with FMLA Rights Claim Against SIUH

Martinez also claims that SIUH unlawfully interfered with her rights under
the Family and Medical Leave Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1) (“It shall be unlawful
for any employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to
exercise, any right provided under this subchapter.”). The FMLA entitles eligible
employees to take leave for certain qualifying reasons provided they follow certain
notice requirements. See generally 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (“Leave requirement”). To make
out a prima facie case of interference with FMLA rights, Martinez must establish:
1) that she is an eligible employee under the FMLA; 2) that the
defendant is an employer as defined by the FMLA; 3) that she was
entitled to take leave under the FMLA; 4) that she gave notice to the
defendant of her intention to take leave; and 5) that she was denied
benefits to which she was entitled under the FMLA.

Graziadio v. Culinary Inst. of Am., 817 F.3d 415, 424 (2d Cir. 2016). An employer’s
intent is not at issue in an FMLA interference claim, because “the question is simply
whether the employer in some manner impeded the employee’s exercise of his or her
right [under the FMLA].” Potenza v. City of New York, 365 F.3d 165, 168 (2d Cir.
2004); see also Hill v. City of New York, 136 F. Supp. 3d 304, 342 (E.D.N.Y. 2015)
(“The employer’s intent is irrelevant to a FMLA interference claim.” (citing Potenza,
365 F.3d at 167)), amended and supplemented by No. 13-CV-6147 (PKC), 2019 WL
1900503 (Apr. 29, 2019).

As an initial matter, the record reflects that Martinez was denied FMLA leave
three times between 2011 and 2012. Springstead Decl. ¶ 11. To the extent Martinez
predicates an FMLA interference claim on these denials, it is time-barred by the
FMLA’s statute of limitations. See §§ 2617(c)(1), (2) (providing for a general two-year
statute of limitations and a three-year statute of limitations for willful violations,
with a claim accruing on “the date of the last event constituting the alleged violation

for which the action is brought”). Martinez filed this case on May 6, 2019, more than
six years after the expiration of the limitations period for either an alleged willful or
non-willful violation of the FMLA.
Martinez also appears to assert an FMLA interference claim in relation to the
November 7, 2018 incident and her subsequent termination. See Pl. Opp’n at 29
(discussing a “request for FMLA” in relation to Plaintiff’s termination). Such a claim
would be timely under the FMLA’s statute of limitations. Defendants do not dispute

that, during the term of her employment, Martinez was an eligible employee within
the meaning of the FMLA. Nor do Defendants argue that SIUH was not an employer
within the meaning of the statute. Further, it appears that Martinez may in fact
have been qualified to take leave under the FMLA. Her disabilities — namely, an
anxiety disorder and PTSD requiring medication and ongoing treatment — could
qualify as a “serious health condition” as defined by the FMLA. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 2611(11)(b) (“The term ‘serious health condition’ means an illness, injury,
impairment, or physical or mental condition that involves . . . continuing treatment
by a health care provider.”). The Department of Labor has recently advised that “[a]

serious health condition can include a mental health condition.” U.S. Dep’t of Labor,
Fact Sheet #28O: Mental Health Conditions and the FMLA (May 2022),
https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/fact-sheets/28o-mental-health [https://perma.cc/
AXV7-LAAZ].16 The record supports, but does not conclusively establish, that
Martinez’s disability properly qualifies as a “serious health condition” entitling her
to FMLA leave.

However, Martinez’s prima facie case fails at the fourth element. The record
establishes beyond dispute that Martinez, before her November 14, 2018 termination,
did not either (1) request FMLA leave or (2) provide sufficient notice that any leave
taken was for an FMLA-qualifying reason.17 See 29 C.F.R. § 825.300(b)(1) (“When an

16 This Fact Sheet, which the Court finds persuasive though it is non-binding,
advises:
A serious mental health condition that requires continuing
treatment by a health care provider includes—
• Conditions that incapacitate an individual for more than three
consecutive days and require ongoing medical treatment, either
multiple appointments with a health care provider, including a
psychiatrist, clinical psychologist, or clinical social worker, or a
single appointment and follow-up care (e.g., prescription medication,
outpatient rehabilitation counseling, or behavioral therapy); and
• Chronic conditions (e.g., anxiety, depression, or dissociative
disorders) that cause occasional periods when an individual is
incapacitated and require treatment by a health care provider at
least twice a year.

17 The Court notes that the question of whether Martinez provided sufficient
notice under the FMLA is a separate inquiry from whether Martinez’s disability was
employee requests FMLA leave, or when the employer acquires knowledge that an
employee’s leave may be for an FMLA-qualifying reason, the employer must notify
the employee of the employee’s eligibility to take FMLA leave within five business

days, absent extenuating circumstances.”). Accordingly, she did not provide notice
“of her intention to take leave,” as required to make out an FMLA interference claim.
Graziadio, 817 F.3d at 424.
The regulations implementing the FMLA provide that “[a]n employee shall
provide sufficient information for an employer to reasonably determine whether the
FMLA may apply to the leave request.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.303(b). The regulation

presumes that there has been a request to take leave, or at least an indication that
leave is necessary. The record establishes that, at the November 8, 2018
investigatory meeting, Martinez’s union representative took the position that
Martinez’s conduct the previous day was a result of a panic attack. Henderson Dep.
195:14–16 (“I am aware of the fact that Marilyn [Hayes] said [at the November 8,
2018 meeting] she thought it was an anxiety attack.”). But nothing in the record
reflects that Martinez ever requested leave or indicated that leave was necessary at

this meeting. “Nothing in the FMLA places a duty on an employer to affirmatively
grant leave without such a request or notice by the employee. Rather, to invoke the
protection of the FMLA, an employee must provide notice and a qualifying reason for
requesting the leave.” Amley v. Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corp., No. 19-CV-3777
(CM), 2021 WL 4429784, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 27, 2021) (citation modified) (emphasis

sufficiently obvious to trigger her employer’s duty to engage in the interactive process
under the ADA, discussed supra.
added) (quoting Slaughter v. Am. Bldg. Maint. Co. of N.Y., 64 F. Supp. 2d 319, 326
(S.D.N.Y. 1999)). To the extent Martinez was on leave following the November 8
investigatory meeting, it was an involuntary administrative leave, not a leave that

she affirmatively requested pursuant to an FMLA qualifying reason.
Nor does the record establish that Martinez’s union representatives requested
that Martinez be permitted to take FMLA leave prior to the subsequent Step 3
grievance meeting on November 27, 2018. And by that point, Martinez had already
been terminated. Any post-facto request at the November 27 meeting would not have
put her employer on adequate notice of a need for leave prior to the end of her

employment relationship. See Brown v. The Pension Bds., 488 F. Supp. 2d 395, 409–
10 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (holding that a letter “did not constitute adequate notice” in part
because “the letter was received after [the plaintiff’s] termination”); Palmer v. Kaiser
Found. Hosps. Tech. Risk Off., No. 16-CV-2376 (WJM) (KMT), 2017 WL 6547344, at
*6 (D. Colo. Dec. 22, 2017) (adopting report and recommendation) (holding that,
“[b]ecause it is undisputed in the record that Defendant had already made the
decision to terminate [p]laintiff prior to her request for FMLA leave,” the plaintiff

“could not prevail on a claim of interference with her FMLA rights” (citation
modified)), aff’d, 753 F. App’x 590 (10th Cir. 2018); Staton v. Child.’s Nat’l Med. Ctr.,
No. 20-CV-03328 (DLF), 2022 WL 4446396, at *5 (D.D.C. Sep. 23, 2022) (holding that
a plaintiff’s FMLA interference claims failed where the plaintiff “did not make her
[FMLA leave] request until after her termination became effective”). Stated another
way, Martinez cannot argue that her termination interfered with her FMLA rights
when she had not sought to exercise those rights prior to her termination. See
Waltman v. United Servs., Inc., 635 F. Supp. 3d 86, 109–10 (D. Conn. 2022) (“The
Second Circuit has held that a terminated employee fails to prove interference where

he or she did not show that the employer ‘considered the protected activity a negative
factor in its decision to terminate him or her.’” (citation modified) (quoting Sista, 445
F.3d at 176)).
Thus, because Martinez has failed to prove an essential element of her FMLA
interference claim, see Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323, this claim must be dismissed.
Accordingly, Martinez’s cross-motion for summary judgment is DENIED, and

Defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment as to the FMLA interference claim
is GRANTED.
VII. Hybrid Claim Against SIUH under LMRA § 301

Martinez also asserts a “hybrid” claim under the LMRA against Defendant
SIUH. “Although formally comprised of two separate causes of action, a suit in which
an employee alleges that an employer has breached a CBA and that a union has
breached its duty of fair representation by failing to enforce the CBA is known as a
hybrid § 301/fair representation claim.”18 Bryant v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 550 F.
Supp. 2d 513, 529 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (quoting Acosta v. Potter, 410 F.Supp.2d 298, 308
(S.D.N.Y.2006)). “To establish a hybrid § 301/DFR claim, a plaintiff must prove both

18 “Section 301 of the LMRA governs the employer’s duty to honor the collective
bargaining agreement, and the duty of fair representation is implied from § 9(a) of
the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a).” White, 237 F.3d at 179 n.3
(citations omitted).
(1) that the employer breached a collective bargaining agreement and (2) that the
union breached its duty of fair representation vis-a-vis the union members.” White v.
White Rose Food, 237 F.3d 174, 178 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing DelCostello v. Int’l Bhd. of

Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 164–65 (1983)). “The plaintiff may sue the union or the
employer, or both, but must allege violations on the part of both.” Id. at 179 (citing
DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 165). A plaintiff is not required to exhaust her grievance and
arbitration remedies before bringing a hybrid claim. See Allen v. United Parcel Serv.,
Inc., 988 F. Supp. 2d 293, 298 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (“A hybrid § 301 claim pairs a claim
that the employer breached the CBA with a claim that the union’s breach of its duty

to fairly represent the employee prevented the employee from exhausting the
grievance process.” (citing DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 163–64 and Carrion v. Enter.
Ass’n, 227 F.3d 29, 34 (2d Cir.2000))).
To satisfy the breach of the duty of fair representation element of a hybrid
claim, Martinez must demonstrate (1) “that the union’s actions or inactions are either
arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith” and establish (2) “a causal connection
between the union’s wrongful conduct and [her] injuries.” Vaughn v. Air Line Pilots

Ass’n, Int’l, 604 F.3d 703, 709 (2d Cir. 2010). A union acts arbitrarily “only if, in light
of the factual and legal landscape at the time of the union’s actions, the union’s
behavior is so far outside a wide range of reasonableness as to be irrational.” Air Line
Pilots Ass’n, Int’l v. O’Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 67 (1991) (citation modified); see also Roy v.
Buffalo Philharmonic Orchestra Soc’y, Inc., 682 F. App’x 42, 46 (2d Cir. 2017)
(“[A]rbitrary conduct amounting to a breach is intentional conduct by union officials
or acts of omission which, while not calculated to harm union members, may be so
egregious, so far short of minimum standards of fairness to the employee and so
unrelated to legitimate union interests as to be arbitrary.” (quoting NLRB v. Local

282, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 740 F.2d 141, 147 (2d Cir. 1984))). “A union’s acts are
discriminatory when substantial evidence indicates that it engaged in discrimination
that was intentional, severe, and unrelated to legitimate union objectives.” Vaughn,
604 F.3d at 709–710 (citation omitted). “To demonstrate bad faith, [P]laintiff must
show that the union’s actions constitute fraud, deceitful action or dishonest conduct.”
Velasquez v. Metro Fuel Oil Corp., 12 F. Supp. 3d 387, 412 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (quoting

Nicholls v. Brookdale Univ. Hosp. & Med. Ctr., No. 05–CV–2666 (JBW), 2005 WL
1661093, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. July 14, 2005)); see also Spellacy v. Airline Pilots Ass’n-Int’l,
156 F.3d 120, 126 (2d Cir. 1998) (“A union acts in bad faith when it acts with an
improper intent, purpose, or motive.” (citation omitted)).
Here, Martinez has failed to present evidence that satisfies any of the claim’s
essential elements. First, Martinez has adduced no evidence that the Union engaged
in intentional and severe discrimination against her because of her disability. See

Vaughn, 604 F.3d at 709–710. Though Martinez claims “[t]he [U]nion’s intentional
refusal to assert Plaintiff’s disability defense, was discriminatory,” Pl. Mem. at 30,
this is conclusory. Martinez has not demonstrated that she produced medical
documentation to substantiate her disability defense to the Union. Cf. Vaca v. Sipes,
386 U.S. 171, 194 (1967) (“In a case such as this, when Owens supplied the Union
with medical evidence supporting his position, the Union might well have breached
its duty had it ignored Owens’ complaint or had it processed the grievance in a
perfunctory manner.” (emphasis added)). Johnston specifically raised Martinez’s
disability to Treval at the Step 3 grievance meeting. Dep. of Kerry Johnston dated

July 7, 2021, Pl. Ex. E at 64:12–65:9, ECF No. 96-5. Martinez concedes that the
Union raised disability defense to the employer. Pl. Mem. at 30 (“[T]he [U]nion spent
a lot of time (informally) begging SIUH to consider [Martinez’s disability defense].”).
No record evidence indicates the Union discriminated against Martinez because of
her disability or otherwise.
Second, there is no evidence that the Union acted deceitfully or dishonestly

towards Martinez in handling her grievance, or that Union officials acted with an
improper motive or purpose. Even viewing the record in the light most favorable to
Martinez, it demonstrates that the Union was forthright with her, communicating its
decisions concerning her grievance directly and advising Martinez of her appeal
rights. See, e.g., Ltr. dated Jan. 7, 2019, Pl. Ex. U at 2, ECF No. 91-21
(communicating the Chapter Board’s December 27, 2018 decision not to advance the
grievance). The Union specifically requested and received an extension of the 30-day

contractual time limit to advance a grievance to arbitration to permit Martinez to
avail herself of the Union’s appeal process. Email dated Dec. 18, 2018, Pl. Ex. FF at
2, ECF No. 96-32. The record contains no evidence that the Union’s decisions were
infected by an invidious or otherwise inappropriate intent.
Third, the record contains no evidence that the Union acted arbitrarily. Hayes
conducted an investigation into the November 7 incident. See generally Pl. Ex. X,
ECF No. 96-24 (notes from witness interviews conducted by Hayes). This
investigation produced few, if any, witnesses willing to testify on Martinez’s behalf.
See Hayes Dep. at 112:24–25 (“[P]eople just really didn’t want to get involved.”). To

the extent Martinez asserts the Union should have done more to preserve the video
footage of the incident, the record indicates the Union made a reasoned decision not
to pursue this evidence given SIUH’s position on the grievance. See id. at 138:16–
139:1 (“[The union’s contract administrators] thought that I just . . . didn’t
understand . . . that the videos weren’t going to help her.”). To the extent this
conclusion was incorrect, “tactical errors are insufficient to show a breach of the duty

of fair representation; even negligence on the union’s part does not give rise to a
breach.” Roy, 682 F. App’x at 47 (quoting Barr v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 868 F.2d
36, 43 (2d Cir. 1989)); see also Velasquez, 12 F. Supp. 3d at 415 (“[W]here the Union
investigates a member’s claim and reasonably determines that it is either meritless
or simply unwinnable, it has satisfied its duty.” (quoting Mazza v. Dist. Council of
N.Y., No. CV-00-6854 (BMC), 2007 WL 2668116, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 6, 2007))).
There is no dispute that the Union filed a grievance on Martinez’s behalf and

that a Step 3 grievance meeting was held at which Martinez and her Union
representatives made her case. Pl. Dep. at 192–93; see also Collective Bargaining
Agreement art. 31, Grievance Procedure, Pl. Ex. CC at 3, ECF No. 91-29 (“Anything
to the contrary herein notwithstanding, a grievance concerning a discharge or
suspension may be presented initially at Step 3 in the first instance . . . .”). The
Chapter Board made an individualized determination not to advance Martinez’s
grievance to arbitration and documented its conclusion. Greivance Determination
Form, Pl. Ex. T at 5, ECF No. 96-20 (documenting the Chapter Board’s decision). The
Union’s handling of Martinez’s grievance was not “perfunctory.” See Arnold v. 1199

SEIU, No. 09-CV-5576 (DLC), 2009 WL 4823906, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2009)
(“‘Although a union may not arbitrarily ignore a meritorious grievance or process it
in perfunctory fashion,’ members ‘do not have an absolute right to have their
grievances taken to arbitration.’” (citation modified) (quoting Spellacy, 156 F.3d at
128)), aff’d, 420 F. App’x 48 (2d Cir. 2011). Martinez’s assertion that the Union should
have specifically raised a defense based on the “No Discrimination” clause of the CBA,

assuming arguendo that this defense would have succeeded, also fails to show a
breach of the duty of fair representation. See Smith v. Drug, Chem., Cosm., Plastics
& Affiliated Indus. Warehouse Emps. Loc. 815, 943 F. Supp. 224, 241 (E.D.N.Y. 1996)
(“At most the union’s failure to raise certain arguments might be said to amount to
negligence, but proof that a union acted negligently or exercised poor judgment is not
enough to make out a claim of unfair representation.” (citation modified) (quoting
Jensen v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 477 F. Supp. 335, 350 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), rev’d on other

grounds, 625 F.2d 379 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 916 (1981))).
Finally, the Union here cannot be said to have “prevented [Martinez] from
exhausting the grievance process,” Allen, 988 F. Supp. 2d at 298, because Martinez
herself abandoned her grievance by failing to appeal to the Division Board. Martinez
concedes that she received the January 7, 2019 letter informing her of the Chapter
Board’s decision not to advance her grievance and forwarded that letter to her
attorneys. But Martinez failed to timely appeal to the Division Board. Her
grievance’s ultimate failure was not caused by any breach of the Union’s duty of fair
representation, but by her own inaction.

Because no reasonable jury could find that the Union acted egregiously and
thereby breached its duty of fair representation when Martinez herself abandoned
her grievance, her hybrid claim has suffered “a complete failure of proof concerning
an essential element.” See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. The Court thus need not
consider whether Defendants violated the CBA. See White, 237 F.3d at 183 nn.12 &
13 (declining to continue the hybrid claim analysis after concluding plaintiffs failed

to show a breach of the duty of fair representation). Martinez has failed to raise any
genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment on this claim.
Accordingly, as to her LMRA claim, Martinez’s cross-motion for summary judgment
is DENIED and Defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

/ / /
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Martinez’s cross-motion for summary judgment is
DENIED in its entirety, and Defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment is

GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Specifically, Defendants’ motion is decided
as to each claim as follows:
ADA disability discrimination Defendants’ motion is DENIED
NYSHRL disability discrimination Defendants’ motion is DENIED
NYCHRL disability discrimination Defendants’ motion is DENIED
NYCHRL individual liability Defendants’ motion is DENIED
ADA retaliation Defendants’ motion is GRANTED
NYSHRL retaliation Defendants’ motion is GRANTED
NYCHRL retaliation Defendants’ motion is GRANTED
NYCHRL aider and abettor liability Defendants’ motion is DENIED
NYCHRL vicarious liability Defendants’ motion is GRANTED
FMLA interference Defendants’ motion is GRANTED
LMRA hybrid claim Defendants’ motion is GRANTED

At trial, Martinez will be permitted to advance both an adverse employment action
theory and a failure-to-accommodate theory of liability as to her disability
discrimination claims under the ADA, NYSHRL, and NYCHRL.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Nina R. Morrison
NINA R. MORRISON
United States District Judge

Dated: January 6, 2026
Brooklyn, New York

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11236668. Public record. Not legal advice.