# CAMMARANO V. WEAVER

> District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · January 5, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11236025

## Case

- **Full name:** Michael J. Cammarano, Jr. v. Detective Thomas M. Weaver, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** January 5, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11236025

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that in Pennsylvania, “the statute of limitations begins to run as soon as the right to institute and maintain the suit arises”
- affirming dismissal of case where dilatory conduct “made adjudication of the case impossible. Therefore, any lesser sanction would not have furthered the interests of justice.”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MICHAEL J. CAMMARANO, JR., :
Plaintiff, :
:
v. : CIVIL ACTION NO. 25-CV-2117
:
DETECTIVE THOMAS M. WEAVER, :
et al., :
Defendants. :

MEMORANDUM

HENRY, J. January 5th , 2026

Michael J. Cammarano, Jr., filed a pro se Complaint in April 2025, asserting civil rights
violations based on an arrest. Cammarano named as Defendants Detective Thomas M. Weaver,
District Attorney John T. Adams, and the County of Berks. For the reasons set forth below, this
matter will be dismissed with prejudice for failure to prosecute.
I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY1
The events that underlie Cammarano’s claims are alleged to have begun on August 29,
2022, when Cammarano was arrested “by officers from the Berks County District Attorney's
Office, including Detective Thomas Weaver.” (Compl. at 6.) Cammarano was, at that time, a
licensed attorney, and he asserts that “[t]he arrest was related to a dispute between a former
client of [Cammarano’s] and [the client’s] prior counsel over a contingency fee.” (Id.)
Cammarano was “charged with theft and conspiracy to commit theft.” (Id.) In brief,
Cammarano alleges that Defendants Weaver and Adams proceeded with Cammarano’s arrest
and prosecution, despite having knowledge that the dispute between his former client and the

1 The factual allegations set forth in this Memorandum are taken from Cammarano’s Complaint
(ECF No. 2). The Court adopts the sequential pagination assigned by the CM/ECF docketing
system.
client’s prior counsel had been settled in civil litigation prior to Cammarano’s arrest.2 (Id.)
Cammarano states that “[o]n April 26, 2023, a judge dismissed all charges against [him] with
prejudice in a habeas corpus proceeding, citing a lack of evidence and no probable cause. The
judge specifically found that the underlying fee dispute was civil in nature and that the [client’s

prior counsel] had refused multiple requests to substantiate their claimed entitlement [to the
contingency fee].” (Id.) Through this action, Cammarano asserts federal constitutional claims
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and various state tort claims, and he seeks damages and injunctive
relief for “reputational and emotional” injuries. (Id. at 7.)
In an Order dated June 5, 2025, the Court granted Cammarano in forma pauperis status
and appointed the Clerk of Court to send waivers of service to the Defendants pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d). (ECF No. 5.) The waivers of service were returned
executed by all three Defendants on June 30, 2025. (ECF Nos. 9, 10, 11.) On August 5, 2025,
the Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)
(ECF No. 12) (the “Motion”). Defendant Adams argues that he is entitled to absolute

prosecutorial immunity from the bulk of Cammarano’s claims against him. (See ECF No. 12-1
at 4-5 (citing, inter alia, Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 420, 431 (1976); Odd v. Malone, 538
F.3d 202, 207-08 (3d Cir. 2008)).) Defendant Berks County argues that Cammarano has not
stated a claim for municipal liability pursuant to Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658
(1978), either against the County itself or against Defendants Weaver and Adams in their official
capacities, because Cammarano “failed to plausibly identify any official policy or custom that

2 Although no record of the criminal proceedings is publicly available, the Court notes that
Cammarano was disbarred by Order of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania dated April 30, 2024.
See Off. of Disciplinary Counsel v. Cammarano, No. 147 DB 2021 (Pa. Apr. 30, 2024).
caused a constitutional violation.” (Id. at 10-12.) And all Defendants argued that Cammarano’s
remaining claims are untimely or fail to state a claim to relief. (Id. at 6-9.)
By Order dated August 5, 2025, Cammarano was directed to file a response to the
Motion by September 4, 2025. (ECF No. 13.) When Cammarano failed to timely file a

response, the Court issued an Order to Show Cause on December 1, 2025, directing Cammarano
to explain why this case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute and directing
Cammarano to file a response to the Defendants’ Motion if he intended to prosecute his case.
(See ECF No. 14.) Cammarano has not responded to that Order, either, and his time to do so has
now expired. For the reasons set forth below, Cammarano’s Complaint will be dismissed with
prejudice.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Given Cammarano’s failure to respond to the Court’s Orders, the Court will consider
whether it is appropriate to dismiss this case for failure to prosecute. Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 41(b) allows for the dismissal of an action when a plaintiff fails to prosecute the case,

fails to comply with the rules of procedure, or fails to comply with a court order. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 41(b). “A District Court has the authority to dismiss a suit sua sponte for failure to
prosecute by virtue of its inherent powers and pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
41(b).” See Sebrell ex rel. Sebrell v. Philadelphia Police Dep’t, 159 F. App’x 371, 373 (3d Cir.
2005) (per curiam) (citing Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962)). Ordinarily, a
court determining whether to sua sponte dismiss a case because of a plaintiff’s failure to
prosecute must consider several factors as set forth in Poulis v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co.,
747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir. 1984). See, e.g., Spain v. Gallegos, 26 F.3d 439, 454-55 (3d Cir. 1994).
However, an analysis under Poulis usually is not required when a plaintiff willfully abandons the
case or makes adjudication impossible. See Dickens v. Danberg, 700 F. App’x 116, 118 (3d Cir.
2017) (per curiam) (“Where a plaintiff’s conduct clearly indicates that he willfully intends to
abandon the case, or where the plaintiff’s behavior is so contumacious as to make adjudication of
the case impossible, a balancing of the Poulis factors is not necessary.”); Baker v. Accounts

Receivables Mgmt., Inc., 292 F.R.D. 171, 175 (D.N.J. 2013) (“[T]he Court need not engage in an
analysis of the six Poulis factors in cases where a party willfully abandons her case or otherwise
makes adjudication of the matter impossible.” (citing cases)).
In the context of a pending motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6),
granting a defendant’s motion to dismiss a case where the plaintiff has failed to respond thereto
is effectively akin to sanctioning the plaintiff for failing to comply with a local rule or court
order, and a “drastic” sanction like dismissal with prejudice requires a Poulis analysis. See
Stackhouse v. Mazurkiewicz, 951 F.2d 29, 29-30 (3d Cir. 1991). A court cannot grant a Rule 12
motion as “unopposed” or “uncontested” without a Poulis analysis. See, e.g., Washington v.
Wenerowicz, No. 21-2741, 2022 WL 39870, at *2 n.5 (3d Cir. Jan. 5, 2022) (per curiam); Adkins

v. Reynolds, 788 F. App’x 824, 828 (3d Cir. 2019) (per curiam); Wiggins v. MacManiman, 698
F. App’x 42, 43-44 (3d Cir. 2017) (per curiam); Jones v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 381
F. App’x 187, 189 (3d Cir. 2010) (per curiam); Shuey v. Schwab, 350 F. App’x 630, 632-33 (3d
Cir. 2009); Hernandez v. Palakovich, 293 F. App’x 890, 895-96 (3d Cir. 2008). That is so even
if, as here, the plaintiff has been ordered to respond and warned that failure to respond could
result in dismissal. Brzozowski v. Pennsylvania Tpk. Comm’n, 738 F. App’x 731, 734 (3d Cir.
2018) (per curiam) (remanding where “[t]he District Court did not acknowledge the Poulis
factors. Instead, in dismissing Brzozowski’s amended complaint, the District Court merely
noted that: (1) it directed Brzozowski to respond to the Commission defendants’ motion; (2) it
warned him that failure to respond might result in dismissal; and (3) Brzozowski nevertheless
failed to respond.”). Thus, the Court will consider the Poulis factors to determine whether it is
appropriate to dismiss Cammarano’s case for failure to prosecute.
III. DISCUSSION

In Poulis, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit articulated six factors
to consider when determining whether to dismiss an action due to a plaintiff’s failure to
prosecute:
(1) the extent of the party’s personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the
adversary . . . ; (3) a history of dilatoriness; (4) whether the conduct of the party or
the attorney was willful or in bad faith; (5) the effectiveness of sanctions other
than dismissal, which entails an analysis of alternative sanctions; and (6) the
meritoriousness of the claim or defense.

747 F.2d at 868 (emphasis omitted). When balancing the Poulis factors, there is no “magic
formula,” “no single Poulis factor is dispositive,” and all six factors need not be satisfied for a
court to dismiss a complaint. See Briscoe v. Klause, 538 F.3d 252, 263 (3d Cir. 2008). In this
case, an assessment of the Poulis factors weighs in favor of dismissing this action.
As to the first Poulis factor, the extent of the party’s personal responsibility, it is
Cammarano’s sole responsibility to prosecute his case and comply with Court orders. See id. at
258-59 (explaining that “a pro se plaintiff is personally responsible for complying with the
court’s orders” and “it is logical to hold a pro se plaintiff personally responsible for delays in his
case because a pro se plaintiff is solely responsible for the progress of his case”); Emerson v.
Thiel Coll., 296 F.3d 184, 191 (3d Cir. 2002) (where litigant was proceeding pro se, any failure
to comply with orders was attributable to him). Cammarano was given two opportunities to file
a response the Defendants’ Motion: the first when the Motion initially was filed and he was
directed to respond, and the second when the Order to Show cause was issued. (See ECF Nos.
13, 14.) Cammarano was expressly informed that if he failed to respond to the Court’s Order to
Show Cause and file a response, this case would be dismissed for failure to prosecute. (See ECF
No. 14.) Nonetheless, Cammarano failed to file a response to the Motion and did not
communicate with the Court in any other respect. Cammarano, as a self-represented litigant, is

solely responsible for complying with the Court’s orders. Further, as a former attorney,
Cammarano should be familiar with the requirement that he respond to motions and comply with
Court orders. This factor, therefore, weighs in favor of dismissal.
The second factor, prejudice to the defendants, is neutral here. “Examples of prejudice
include ‘the irretrievable loss of evidence, the inevitable dimming of witnesses’ memories, or the
excessive and possibly irremediable burdens or costs imposed on the opposing party.’” Adams v.
Trustees of New Jersey Brewery Employees’ Pension Tr. Fund, 29 F.3d 863, 874 (3d Cir. 1994)
(quoting Scarborough v. Eubanks, 747 F.2d 871 (3d Cir. 1984). Since this case is in its early
stage of litigation, there appears to be no prejudice to the Defendants at this point. However, as a
practical matter, it is unclear how the Defendants could be expected to defend against a case with

an unresponsive plaintiff if the case were to move forward.
The third factor, a history of dilatoriness, must be assessed over the lifetime of the case,
keeping in mind that “conduct that occurs one or two times is insufficient.” Briscoe, 538 F.3d at
261. However, “[e]xtensive or repeated delay or delinquency constitutes a history of
dilatoriness, such as . . . consistent tardiness in complying with court orders.” Adams, 29 F.3d at
874. On the one hand, this case is in the early stages of litigation. On the other hand, the
litigation cannot proceed beyond its initial stage due to Cammarano’s failure to comply with the
Court’s Orders to file his response. The delay is solely attributable to Cammarano and nothing
in the record provides a reasonable explanation as to why he is unable to comply with the
Court’s directives. For example, there is no indication on the docket that Cammarano failed to
receive the Court’s Orders directing him to file his response. Because the record shows
unexplained delays in Cammarano’s prosecution of the case, this factor weighs in favor of
dismissal.

The fourth factor, whether plaintiff’s conduct was willful or in bad faith, weighs in favor
of dismissal. As noted above, Cammarano has been expressly and repeatedly instructed on what
he was required to do to prosecute this case, namely respond to the pending Motion, and also has
been expressly informed of the consequences of the failure to comply with the Court’s Orders.
The Court’s most recent Order (ECF No. 14) made clear that if Cammarano failed to comply
with the Order, his case could be dismissed. On this record, Cammarano’s failure to file a
response may fairly be understood as willful. That conclusion is further supported by the
inference that Cammarano, a former attorney, would understand the consequence of failing to
oppose a motion to dismiss his complaint.
An examination of the fifth factor, the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal,

reveals that no other sanction would be effective. Cammarano is proceeding pro se and his
apparent refusal to respond to the pending Motion, if left unaddressed, would be a complete
barrier to this case proceeding beyond the pleadings stage. Given the procedural posture of this
case, Cammarano’s pro se and in forma pauperis status, and Cammarano’s apparent
unwillingness to prosecute his claims by responding to the pending Motion, it is difficult to
determine what lesser sanction might be available or appropriate in this context. See Adonai-
Adoni v. King, 506 F. App’x 116, 119 (3d Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (“Because Adonai-Adoni
proceeded pro se and in forma pauperis, monetary sanctions were not a viable form of
alternative sanction.”); Guyer v. Beard, 907 F.2d 1424, 1430 (3d Cir. 1990) (affirming dismissal
of case where dilatory conduct “made adjudication of the case impossible. Therefore, any lesser
sanction would not have furthered the interests of justice.”); King v. Galano, No. 14-1691, 2015
WL 6523459, at *3 (D.N.J. Oct. 28, 2015) (“Plaintiff’s history of nonparticipation and
noncompliance in this matter suggests that alternative sanctions would be futile.”). As such, no

other sanction would be effective. The fifth factor thus weighs in favor of dismissal.
Under the sixth Poulis factor, the Court must consider if the claims or defenses are
meritorious. See Poulis, 747 F.2d at 869-70 (“A claim or defense, will be deemed meritorious
when the allegations of the pleadings, if established at trial, would support recovery by plaintiff
or would constitute a complete defense.”). Here, the Defendants have advanced compelling
arguments as to prosecutorial immunity, lapse of the relevant statutes of limitations, and other
fatal deficiencies in Cammarano’s Complaint. (See generally ECF No. 12 at 4-12.) The Court
specifically notes that the Defendants appear to be correct that the majority of Cammarano’s
claims appear to be untimely. The timeliness of Cammarano’s § 1983 claims are governed by
Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitations. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524; Wallace v. Kato,

549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007); Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 634 (3d Cir. 2009). A claim accrues
“when a plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action, that is, when [he] can file suit and
obtain relief.” Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010) (quotations omitted).
In general, this means that the statute of limitations will start running at the time the plaintiff
“knew or should have known of the injury upon which [his] action is based.” Sameric Corp. of
Del. v. City of Phila., 142 F.3d 582, 599 (3d Cir. 1998).
Cammarano’s claims for false arrest, unreasonable seizure, and first amendment
retaliation all accrued on the date of his arrest, August 29, 2022, so the Court agrees that they
appear untimely.3 See Lloyd v. Ocean Twp. Counsel, 857 F. App’ x 61,64 (3d Cir. 2021) (per
curiam) (noting that false arrest and imprisonment claims begin to run at the time the plaintiff
was “ detained pursuant to legal process”); LeBlanc v. Snavely, 453 F. App’ x 140, 142 (3d Cir.
2011) (per curiam); Nguyen v. Pennsylvania, 906 F.3d 271, 273 (3d Cir. 2018) (illegal search

claims accrue at “the moment of the search”); Ojo v. Luong, 709 F. App’x 113, 116 (3d Cir.
2017) (per curiam) (“Most of [plaintiff's claims] accrued when defendants conducted their
searches and seizures on July 11, 2011, because [plaintiff] knew or should have known the basis
for these claims at that time.”); Sevast v. Kakouras, 915 A.2d 1147, 1153 (Pa. 2007) (explaining
that in Pennsylvania, “the statute of limitations begins to run as soon as the right to institute and
maintain the suit arises”). The Defendants have also made compelling arguments that
Cammarano’s allegations fail to state a Monell claim, a substantive due process claim, or a claim
for abuse of process under state law. (See ECF No 12-1 at 6-7, 9-12.)
As in Poulis, the Court can discern no allegations in Cammarano’s Complaint that would
avoid these compelling defenses, and Cammarano filed no answer to the motion to dismiss that

specifies which of his allegations would overcome the identified defenses. See Poulis, 747 F.2d
at 870 (explaining that the proffered defense was “on its face, compelling,” where plaintiffs

3 Cammarano asserts claims under state law for defamation and false light based on the
allegation that Defendant Adams made an “untrue” public statement after the arrest that
Cammarano’s license to practice law had been “suspended in connection with the matter.”
(Compl. at 6.) However, as noted above, it appears that Cammarano’s law license was
suspended in December 2021, and he was disbarred in April 2024. See Cammarano, No. 147
DB 2021. And in any event, as the Defendants argue, it appears that these claims would be
barred by Pennsylvania’s a one-year statute of limitations for such claims. See Oldham v. Pa.
State Univ., 138 F.4th 731, 750 (3d Cir. 2025) (citing Graham v. Today’ s Spirit, 468 A.2d 454,
457 (Pa. 1983)); see also McClenaghan v. Turi, 567 F. App’x 150, 154 (3d Cir. 2014) (per
curiam) (“The relevant triggering event for the statute of limitations in a defamation action under
Pennsylvania law, however, is the publication of the defamatory communication by the
defendant, not the point in time when the plaintiff first learns of the communication.”).
made no allegation in the complaint that would avoid the defense and did not respond to the
motion to dismiss, and concluding that “[w]hile we express no opinion on whether summary
judgment or dismissal would have been warranted on this ground, the existence of a prima facie
defense is a factor to be weighed along with the foregoing factors.”) (internal citations omitted).

Thus, even if Cammarano could maintain a meritorious claim under federal or state law based on
his arrest and prosecution, each Defendant has articulated a compelling defense to Cammarano’s
claims, which weighs in favor of dismissal. Even if the Court were to find the sixth Poulis factor
to be neutral at this stage of the litigation, the first, third, fourth, and fifth Poulis factors weigh in
favor of dismissal.
A plaintiff may have a meritorious claim, but he must prosecute that claim in accordance
with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and this Court’s orders to prove that claim and entitle
him to judgment, if warranted. Absent a plaintiff who is participating in the legal process, this
case cannot move forward.
IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the Poulis factors weigh in favor of
dismissing this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) for Cammarano’s failure
to prosecute. Simply put, there is no way for this litigation to proceed without Cammarano’s
participation. An appropriate order will be filed separately.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11236025. Public record. Not legal advice.