# King

> District Court, S.D. New York · November 18, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11235321

## Case

- **Full name:** Kevin King, et al. v. Habib Bank Limited
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. New York
- **Decided:** November 18, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11235321

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- reasoning that privilege logs must “identify each document and the individuals who were parties to the communications, providing sufficient detail to permit a judgment as to whether the document is at least potentially protected from disclosure.”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
--------------------------------------------------------------x
KEVIN KING, et al., :
:
Plaintiffs, : 20-CV-4322 (LGS) (OTW)
:
-against-
: OPINION & ORDER
:
HABIB BANK LIMITED,
:
Defendant. :
--------------------------------------------------------------x
ONA T. WANG, United States Magistrate Judge:
Pending before the Court is the parties’ dispute as to various of Habib Bank Limited’s
(“HBL’s”) privilege log entries. Plaintiffs contest tens of thousands of HBL’s privilege log entries
and seek an order directing HBL to produce documents for each deficient entry. The Court
previously ordered the parties to agree to a sampling process and submit a sample of contested
entries for in camera review. Having review the sample of contested entries in camera, and for
the reasons discussed below, Plaintiffs’ request is GRANTED in part, DENIED in part.
I. BACKGROUND
In the parties’ April 26, 2024, joint status letter, Plaintiffs identified a brewing privilege
dispute concerning as many as 9,000 privilege log entries that they identified as deficient.
(ECF 241 at 3-4). The dispute carried on for several months, (see ECF Nos. 263, 274), and in the
parties’ July 12, 2024, joint status letter, Plaintiffs requested that the Court review in camera a
sample of the disputed entries. (ECF 274). The Court memo endorsed the parties’ July 12 joint
status letter and directed the parties to meet and confer on a methodology and schedule for
sampling the contested privilege log entries. (ECF 281). The Court adopted the parties’
proposed sampling methodology on July 31, 2024, and directed the parties to submit 3-page
briefs and the sample of documents to Chambers by email by August 8, 2024. (ECF 286). The
parties’ submissions were received by email on August 8, 2024.
Ahead of the status conference scheduled for October 9, 2024, the parties filed a joint

agenda on October 4, 2024. (ECF 317). The parties’ joint agenda identified, among other things,
the parties’ ongoing privilege dispute and in camera submissions. Construing the parties’
inclusion of the privilege dispute in the joint agenda as a new request, which was already fully
briefed, the Court then issued an Order on October 8, 2024, denying ECF 317 as moot based on
the parties’ already agreed-upon sampling methodology for contested privilege-log entries.

(ECF 318). The Court’s October 8 Order did not rule on the parties’ ongoing privilege log
dispute.
On April 21, 2025, I directed the parties to file the letters briefs that have been
previously submitted in camera on the docket. (ECF 403). The parties filed their briefs on
April 22, 2025, (ECF 404), and April 23, 2025. (ECF 405).
II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Privilege Logs Under the Local and Federal Rules
“When a party withholds information otherwise discoverable by claiming that the
information is privileged …, the party must … describe the nature of the documents,
communications, or tangible things not produced or disclosed—and do so in a manner that,
without revealing information itself privilege or protected, will enable other parties to assess
the claim.” WCA Holdings III, LLC v. Panasonic Avionics Corp., 20-CV-7472 (GHW), 2025 WL

1434375, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 17, 2025) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5)(A)(ii)). Local Rule 26.2 also
sets out the specific information that must included in a privilege log, including: (1) the type of
document; (2) the general subject matter; (3) the date; and (4) the author of the document, the
addresses, and any other recipients. L. Civ. R. 26.2(a)(2)(A).1 A privilege log should also contain
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“a brief description or summary of the contents of the document” and “the privilege or
privileges asserted with respect to the document, and how each element of the privilege is met
as to that document.” WCA Holdings, 2025 WL 1434375, at *3 (citing Sulaymu-Bey v. City of
New York, 372 F. Supp. 3d 90, 93 (E.D.N.Y. 2019)).
When assessing the adequacy of a privilege log, a court must determine whether each
element of the privilege or immunity that is claimed has been met. Id. (citing Norton v. Town of
Islip, 04-CV-3079 (PKC) (SIL), 2017 WL 943927, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2017)). See also Bowne of

N.Y. City, Inc. v. AmBase Corp., 150 F.R.D. 465, 474 (S.D.N.Y 1993) (reasoning that privilege logs
must “identify each document and the individuals who were parties to the communications,
providing sufficient detail to permit a judgment as to whether the document is at least
potentially protected from disclosure.”). “[T]he burden of establishing the elements of the
purported privilege rests on the party asserting the protection from disclosure.” WCA Holdings,

2025 WL 1434375, at *3. If a privilege log entry is too vague, the party asserting privilege may
waive privilege. See McNamee v. Clemens, 2014 WL 1338720, at *4-5 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2014)
(holding that “‘unhelpful’ and ‘vague’ descriptions were insufficient to sustain burden of
showing documents were privileged). However, courts typically reserve a finding of waiver for
“flagrant” violations. See Dey, L.P. v. Sepracor, Inc., 07-CV-2353 (JGK) (RLE), 2010 WL 5094406,
at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 2010).

1 Where not apparent, the party asserting privilege must also include the relationship of the author, addresses, and
recipients to each other. L. Civ. R. 26.2(a)(2)(A).
B. Attorney-Client Privilege
Generally, parties may obtain discovery on any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to
any party’s claim or defense. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Communications that are protected by the

attorney-client privilege, however, are shielded from discovery. Hayden v. Int’l Bus. Machs.
Corp., 21-CV-2485 (VB) (JCM), 2023 WL 4622914, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 2023). “Attorney-client
privilege protects ‘communications (1) between a client and his or her attorney (2) that are
intended to be, and in fact were, kept confidential (3) for the purpose of obtaining or providing
legal advice.’” Id. (quoting U.S. v. Mejia, 655 F.3d 126, 132 (2d Cir. 2011)). Where, as here, a

case contemplates federal and state law claims, federal law governs assertions of privilege.
Fresh Del Monte Produce, Inc. v. Del Monte Foods, Inc., 13-CV-8997 (JPO) (GWG), 2015 WL
3450045, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 28, 2015).
Attorney-client privilege only applies where the communication in question is “primarily
or predominantly of legal character.” Egiazaryan v. Zalmayev, 290 F.R.D. 421, 428 (S.D.N.Y.
2013). “Fundamentally, legal advice involves the interpretation and application of legal

principles to guide future conduct or to assess past conduct.” In re County of Erie, 473 F.3d 413,
419 (2d Cir. 2007). Where a party only asserts privilege over a limited portion of a document,
courts in this Circuit “routinely consider the predominant purpose of [the] isolated portion.” In
re Google Digital Advertising Antitrust Litigation, 21-MD-3010 (PKC), 2023 WL 196146, at *2
n. 1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2023). “The burden is on a party claiming the protection of a privilege to
establish those facts that are the essential elements of the privileged relationship,” and they

“must do so by competent and specific evidence, rather than by conclusory or ipse dixit
assertions.” Hayden, 2023 WL 4522914, at *3 (emphasis added).
III. DISCUSSION
A. HBL’s Identification of Counsel on Its Privilege Log
First, Plaintiffs assert that by failing to properly “identify the counsel whose advice

and/or work product is supposedly at issue,” HBL has failed to sustain its burden of showing
privilege over 10,312 various entries, and request that HBL be compelled to produce
documents pertaining to each deficient entry. (ECF 404-1) (Plaintiffs’ 3-page letter brief).
Plaintiffs’ chief complaint is that HBL failed to identify who, among the several individuals listed
among the “From Email,” “To Email,” or “CC Email” columns is the attorney whose advice

and/or work product is the basis of the privilege. (ECF 404-1 at 1). Plaintiffs also suggest that
they cannot “detect which, if any, email domains correspond with law firms,” and that such
“guess work” improperly shifts the burden to Plaintiffs to disprove HBL’s privilege assertions.
(Id.).
The primary case that Plaintiffs rely on, In re Rivastigmine Patent Litig., does not support
such a finding. 237 F.R.D. 69, 84 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). In that case, Judge Francis explained that the

plaintiffs failed to support their privilege claims when they identified “the legal professionals
whose participation g[ave] rise to the privilege claim” as a “department.” Id. at 83. Here, the
entries at issue list a number of individuals, not just a “department” of HBL. Still, the parties’
stipulated protective order sets out that for each entry on a privilege log, the party asserting
the privilege should identify which individual(s), if any, are counsel, (see ECF 88 at 11), and the
sample entries from HBL’s privilege log does not appear to specifically identify which individuals

are counsel. This violation is not so “flagrant,” however, to justify a finding that HBL has failed
to establish privilege over these 10,000+ privilege log entries, see Dey, L.P., 2010 WL 5094406,
particularly given that Plaintiffs could examine the names and emails that HBL has provided and
make a reasoned determination after a simple search to see if any of those individuals are legal
counsel.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs motion is DENIED in part with respect to these entries, but HBL is
directed to revise these privilege log entries to clearly identify the counsel whose advice is at
issue.
B. Documents Withheld on the Basis of Work-Product Protection
Next, Plaintiffs suggest that HBL has failed to carry its burden with respect to 9,023

privilege log entries that claim work-product protection, and ask that HBL be compelled to
produce these documents. (ECF 404-1 at 2). First, Plaintiffs assert that HBL has “broadly claimed
that any communication ‘concerning regulation compliance’ qualifies for work-product
protection, without identifying any anticipated litigation.” (Id.).
“The work-product doctrine is distinct from and broader than the attorney-client
privilege.” Ramchandani v. CitiBank Nat’l Ass’n, 19-CV-9124 (VM) (SDA), 2022 WL 2156225, at

*5 (S.D.N.Y. June 15, 2022). A party asserting work-product protection must show that the
withheld information: (1) is a document “or a tangible thing;” (2) that was prepared in
anticipation of litigation; and (3) by or for a party, or by their representative. Id. The Second
Circuit has adopted a broad definition of “in anticipation of litigation:” “[i]n anticipation of
litigation means that in light of the nature of the document and the factual situation in the
particular case, the document can fairly be said to have been prepared or obtained because of

the prospect of litigation.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
While general regulatory advice may not qualify for work-product protection since such
documents would be prepared in the ordinary course of business, see Durling v. Papa John’s
Int’l, Inc., 16-CV-3592 (CS) (JCM), 2018 WL 557915, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2018),2 documents
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created in response to a regulatory investigation that carries the threat of future litigation may
well qualify for work-product protection. See In re Cardinal Health, Inc. Sec. Litig., C2-04-575
(ALM) (JP), 2007 WL 495150, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2007) (“[T]he Second Circuit has held that
the work product doctrine applies when outside counsel is retained to determine the
vulnerability of the corporation in general to criminal and civil sanctions.”).3 HBL asserts that
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the documents in question are attachments that were created, collected, and sent to outside
counsel for review “as part of the counsel-directed transaction review process” in response to
regulatory investigations. (ECF 405 at 2). The documents that HBL submitted for in camera
review confirm as much—each appear on their face to be related to one or more regulatory
investigations by U.S. federal or state regulatory agencies, and thus covered by the work-
product protection.

In the alternative, Plaintiffs suggest that by destroying the custodial files of Sima Kamil,
a former employee, HBL has engaged in spoliation which justifies disclosure of the 9,023
documents. While some courts have found that, for the purposes of a spoliation analysis, a
party asserting work-product protection implicitly admits that they reasonably anticipated

2 “If, regardless of the prospect of litigation, the document would have been prepared anyway, in the ordinary
course of business or in essentially similar form, it is not entitled to work product protection.” Durling, 2018 WL
557915, at *7.
3 See also In re Woolworth Corp. Secs. Class Action Litig., 1996 WL 306576, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 7, 1996) (“All
participants knew when Paul, Weiss became involved [to investigate serious allegations of securities violations]
that litigation—civil, and possibly criminal—as well as regulatory action were virtually certainties.”).
litigation, see Anderson v. Sotheby’s Inc. Severance Plan, 04-CV-8180 (SAS), 2005 WL 2583715,
at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 2005), the Court declines to find that production of these documents is
an appropriate remedy for the loss of Kamil’s documents. Plaintiffs have failed to explain how

the destruction of an unknown number of certain custodial files (whether intentional or not) is
appropriately remedied by stripping work-product protections from 9,023 documents under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e)(1), or produce any evidence suggesting that the destruction of documents
was done with the “intent to deprive” necessary under 37(e)(2). See Charlestown Capital
Advisors, LLC v. Acero Junction, Inc., 337 F.R.D. 47, 60 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ motion is DENIED without prejudice with respect to documents
withheld on the basis of work-product protection. The parties are directed to meet and confer
regarding the loss of Kamil’s documents and what remedies, if any, are appropriate.
C. Documents Withheld on the Basis of the Suspicious Activity Report
(“SAR”) Privilege
Plaintiffs assert that for 4,808 entries on HBL’s privilege log, HBL has over-redacted
and/or over-withheld factual and other information not properly subject to a legal privilege or
other protection. (ECF 404-1 at 3). HBL contends that it only redacted or withheld information
regarding the identity and nature of the subject of a SAR, and that the underlying facts,
transactions, and documents have been produced “where that information exists outside the

SAR determination itself.” (ECF 405 at 2).
Under the Bank Secrecy Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311 et seq. (“BSA”), and implementing
regulations promulgated by the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”)—the agency
with which SARs are filed—national banks are required to file SARs “when they detect a known
or suspected violation of Federal law or a suspicious transaction related to a money laundering
activity or a violation of the [BSA].” 12 C.F.R. § 21.11 (2022). “To create an environment that
encourages a national bank to report suspicious activity without fear of reprisal, the regulations
hold that SARs and any information that would reveal the existence of a SAR, are confidential,

and shall not be disclosed, with limited exceptions.” Trott v. Deutsche Bank, AG, 20-CV-10299
(DEH), 2024 WL 1994342, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 6, 2024) (internal citations omitted). The
“underlying facts, transactions, and documents upon which a SAR is based” are not protected
from disclosure. Id. For instance, in Trott, Judge Ho determined that Deutsche Bank’s
“Suspicious Activity Information Forms,” internal documents used to evaluate whether to file a
SAR, were not covered by the SAR Privilege and should be produced. Id. at 2-3.

Having reviewed the sample documents in camera, the Court concludes that HBL has
not over-redacted or over-withheld information. The information redacted is not simply factual
information upon which a SAR is or may be based—rather, the redactions are applied to
information pertaining to SARs themselves or that could be readily used, in combination with
other assumedly available information, to identify a SAR. This information falls squarely under

FinCEN regulations. See 12 C.F.R. § 21.11 (k). HBL’s redactions also appear narrowly tailored.
For example, in log entry 7745, HBL makes a small number of redactions to eight out of 135
pages, all of which appear proper on their face. Moreover, HBL represents that they have
already produced the underlying facts, transactions, and documents on which SARs are based,
outside of the SAR itself.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ motion is DENIED with respect to documents redacted and/or

withheld on the basis of the SAR privilege.
D. Documents Concerning Communications to Third Parties
Plaintiffs also assert that HBL has improperly asserted privilege over communications
with five third parties: (1) Accume Partners (“Accume”); (2) Aga Khan Development Network

(“Aga Khan”); (3) Alvarez and Marsal (“A&M”); (4) Institute of Business Administration – Karachi
(“IBA”); and (5) Ernst & Young (“EY”).
1. EY and IBA
HBL asserts that communications with EY and IBA are protected under the Kovel4
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doctrine as communications made in connection with and to help facilitate the provision of
legal advice. (ECF 405 at 3). EY was retained by HBL to assist HBL’s outside counsel, Debevoise &
Plimpton, in connection with improving HBL’s compliance programs and ongoing regulatory
examinations. (Id.). HBL asserts that IBA was retained to facilitate and provide “technical
assistance” for a compliance training provided to HBL’s Board of Directors by Shearman &
Sterling. (Id.).
Under the Kovel doctrine, courts in this Circuit have extended the attorney-client

privilege to communications between a client and a third party that “clarifies or facilitates
communication between attorney and client in confidence for the purpose of obtaining legal
advice from the attorney.” Gucci Am., Inc. v. Guess?, Inc., 271 F.R.D. 58, 70-71 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Courts have construed Kovel to include communications
with “investigators, interviewers, technical experts, accountants, physicians, patent agents, and
other specialists in a variety of social and physical sciences.” Id. at 71. For the Kovel doctrine to

4 See U.S. v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961).
apply, “the attorney must have been relying on the third party advisor to translate or interpret
information given to the attorney by his client, not to provide information that the client did
not already have.” Monterey Bay Military Housing, LLC v. Ambac Assurance Corp., 19-CV-9193

(PGG) (SLC), 2023 WL 315072, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2023).
Having reviewed the documents submitted in camera, the Court concludes that the
communications made between HBL, their counsel, and EY were made for the purpose of
clarifying or facilitating the communication of legal advice. Thus, attorney-client privilege does
apply to these communications under the Kovel doctrine. However, nothing about the sampled
communications with IBA submitted in camera suggest that these communications were made

with the purpose of facilitating or clarifying legal advice. The sampled communications with IBA
appear to be related to administrative work (e.g., scheduling)—these communications would
not be privileged if they were sent by HBL’s counsel, and thus there is no privilege to extend to
under Kovel.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ motion is GRANTED as to communications with IBA and DENIED

as to communications with EY.
2. A&M and Accume
HBL asserts that communications with A&M and Accume are protected under the
functional-equivalent doctrine as communications with third parties that “perform a corporate
function that was necessary in the context of a government investigation.” (ECF 405 at 3) (citing
In re Copper Market Antitrust Litig., 200 F.R.D. 213, 220 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)).

As Plaintiffs recognize, the Second Circuit has yet to adopt the functional-equivalent
doctrine, and where courts in this Circuit have considered its application, they have done so
with skepticism and cautioned that its application should be construed narrowly, if at all. See
Monterey Bay Military Housing, 2023 WL 315072, at *9; see also Walsh v. CSG Partners, LLC,
544 F. Supp. 3d 389 (S.D.N.Y. 2021) (“The Second Circuit has not yet adopted that doctrine; and

some district courts have expressed skepticism about whether it would do so. This Court will
not attempt to divine the answer to that question here, because even if the doctrine applied, its
requirements would not be met.”); In re Restasis (Cyclosporine Opthalmic Emulsion) Antitrust
Litig., 352 F. Supp. 3d 207, 213 (E.D.N.Y. 2019) (same). Where courts do apply the doctrine, six
factors should be considered:

(1) Whether the consultant had a primary responsibility for a key
corporate job; (2) whether the consultant had a continuous and
close working relationship with the company’s principals on
matters critical to the company’s position in litigation; (3) whether
the consultant is likely to possess information possessed by no one
else at the company; (4) whether the consultant exercised
independent decision-making on the company’s behalf; (5)
whether the consultant served as a company representative to
third parties; and (6) whether the consultant sought legal advice
from corporate counsel to guide his or her work for the company.
Walsh, 544 F. Supp. 3d at 392. “[T]he proponent of the functional equivalent doctrine bears the
burden of establishing that it applies.” Monterey Bay Military Housing, 2023 WL 315072, at *9.
For example, in In re Copper Market, “the court deemed employees of a ‘crisis management’
public relations firm retained by a Japanese company faced with a trading scandal to be
functionally equivalent to the company’s employees. The company hired the firm because it
lacked experience with the Western media, … as well as experience with the publicity that
accompanies high-profile litigation.” In re Restasis, 352 F. Supp. 3d at 213 (citing In re Copper
Market, 200 F.R.D. at 215, 220)). Notably, the public relations firm was authorized to make
decisions on the company’s behalf and “sought advice from corporate counsel to formulate a
public relations strategy.” Id.
HBL has failed to provide a sufficient basis from which the Court can conclude that A&M

and Accume were acting as functional equivalents of the company. For instance, HBL has not
alleged, nor does in camera review of the sample documents suggest, that A&M or Accume
performed a “key corporate job.” While HBL suggests that A&M and Accume were retained to
“address issues raised in the regulatory examinations for which HBL lacked sufficient resources
in-house to manage on its own,” (ECF 405 at 3), HBL has failed to describe its own corporate

structure in relation to the regulatory investigations or what A&M and Accume were even
retained to do. See Walsh, 544 F. Supp. 3d at 393. Nor has HBL asserted that A&M and Accume
were in possession of information that nobody else at HBL possessed, or that they were
empowered to make decisions on behalf of HBL.
Accordingly, HBL has not established that communications with A&M and/or Accume
are protected under attorney-client privilege and the functional equivalent doctrine, and

Plaintiffs’ motion is GRANTED with respect to these documents. HBL is directed to produce
communications with A&M and Accume that were previously withheld on the basis of privilege
and the functional-equivalent doctrine.
3. Aga Khan
Finally, HBL asserts that communications with Aga Khan are privileged because they
were sent by HBL’s general counsel, Nausheen Ahmad, to Shaffiq Dharamshi (“Dharamshi”), a

member of HBL’s Board of Directors who happens to hold a role in Aga Khan.
Generally, communications between an in-house attorney and their client regarding
legal matters is privileged. See In re Signet Jewelers Ltd. Secs. Litig., 332 F.R.D. 131, 137 (S.D.N.Y.
2019). However, in cases involving corporations and in-house counsel, “courts have maintained

a stricter standard for determining whether to protect confidential information through the
attorney-client privilege.” TIG Ins. Co. v. Swiss Reinsurance Am. Co., 21-CV-8975 (NSR) (JCM),
2023 WL 6058649, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2023). Ipse dixit assertions are insufficient to carry a
party’s burden of establishing that a legal privilege applies. Hayden v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp.,
21-CV-2485 (VB) (JCM), 2023 WL 4622914, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 2023).

Here, even assuming that communications between in-house counsel and a member of
HBL’s Board of Directors to a board member’s e-mail maintained at a separate organization
could still be a privileged communication, review of the documents submitted in camera does
not suggest that these communications are indeed privileged. HBL merely asserts that the
communications are “privileged emails” sent by in-house counsel to Dharamshi in his role as a
director. (ECF 405 at 3). However, none of the sampled documents appear on their face to

provide or relate to the provision of legal advice. Conclusory assertions that the
communications are privileged are insufficient to carry HBL’s burden of demonstrating that the
attorney-client privilege attaches. Hayden, 2023 WL 4622914, at *3.
Accordingly, HBL has not established that communications with Aga Khan are protected
under the attorney-client privilege, and Plaintiffs’ motion is GRANTED as to these documents.
E. Other Categories of Documents

Lastly, Plaintiffs allege that (1) for 15,616 entries on HBL’s privilege log, HBL failed to
identify the author, sender, and/or recipients of the documents; and (2) for 7,196 entries, HBL
failed to describe the nature of the privileged communication and withheld the attachment
because it was attached to a privileged email. (ECF 404-1 at 3). HBL contends that its privilege
log complies with the stipulated protective order and includes metadata such as the author,

sender, and recipients, where available. (ECF 405 at 1). None of the documents submitted for in
camera review pertain to these purportedly deficient categories of privilege log entries, and the
parties agree that in camera review is not necessary for these documents.
Plaintiffs’ motion is DENIED without prejudice to these two remaining categories of
privilege log entries. HBL is directed to re-review and revise its privilege logs to include the

metadata required by the stipulated protective order, and to meet and confer with Plaintiffs.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ motion is GRANTED with respect to
communications made to IBA, Aga Khan, A&M, and Accume, and DENIED in all other respects.
HBL is directed to produce communications with IBA, Aga Khan, A&M, and Accume that were
previously withheld on the basis of privilege.

With respect to privilege log entries where Plaintiffs allege HBL failed to identify
counsel, (see Section III.A. supra), HBL is directed to provide Plaintiffs with an exhaustive list of
its lawyers and to re-do its privilege log accordingly to highlight which individual on each entry
is counsel. The parties are encouraged to meet and confer on how to streamline this process.
With respect to the privilege log entries described in Section E above, (see Section III.E.
supra), HBL is directed to re-do its privilege log to include the missing information identified by

Plaintiffs. HBL is reminded that attachments to emails, even where the parent email is
privileged, are only privileged if the attachment itself contains or refers to legal advice. See
Astra Aktiebolag v. Adrx Pharmas., Inc., 208 F.R.D. 92, 103 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“Attachments which
do not, by their content, fall within the realm of the privilege cannot become privileged by
merely attaching them to a communication with an attorney.”) (internal quotation marks

omitted).
The parties are directed to continue meeting and conferring on HBL’s revised privilege
log and to discuss ways to prioritize and streamline HBL’s re-review and supplemental
production.

SO ORDERED.

s/ Ona T. Wang
Dated: November 18, 2025 Ona T. Wang
New York, New York United States Magistrate Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11235321. Public record. Not legal advice.