# Ganesh

> District Court, S.D. New York · November 10, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11235082

## Case

- **Full name:** Vidyartie Ganesh v. Doctor Srinivas Kesanakurthy, M.D.; Montefiore The University Hospital for Albert Einstein College of Medicine; John Doe Defendant Assistant Doctor; John and Jane Does Montefiore Hospital Employees; John Doe Insurance Companies; John or Jane Doe Defendant Montefiore CEO; Defendant Alicia Gerez
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. New York
- **Decided:** November 10, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11235082

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- affirming sua sponte dismissal of complaint as frivolous on statute of limitations grounds

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
VIDYARTIE GANESH,
Plaintiff,
-against-
DOCTOR SRINIVAS KESANAKURTHY,
M.D.; MONTEFIORE THE UNIVERSITY
25-CV-2652 (LLS)
HOSPITAL FOR ALBERT EINSTEIN
COLLEGE OF MEDICINE; JOHN DOE
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
DEFENDANT ASSISTANT DOCTOR; JOHN
WITH LEAVE TO REPLEAD
AND JANE DOES MONTEFIORE HOSPITAL
EMPLOYEES; JOHN DOE INSURANCE
COMPANIES; JOHN OR JANE DOE
DEFENDANT MONTEFIORE CEO;
DEFENDANT ALICIA GEREZ,
Defendants.
LOUIS L. STANTON, United States District Judge:
Plaintiff, who is appearing pro se, is a citizen and resident of Guyana. He brings this
action under the Court’s federal question jurisdiction and diversity of citizenship jurisdiction. By
order dated August 20, 2025, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis
(“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons set forth below, the Court dismisses
the complaint, but grants Plaintiff 30 days’ leave to replead his claims in an amended complaint.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is
frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary
relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see
Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also
dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to
construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret
them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470
F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in

original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits –
to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.
BACKGROUND
The Defendants named in this complaint are: (1) “Montefiore the University Hospital for
Albert Einstein College of Medicine” (“the Hospital”); (2) Dr. Srinivas Kesanakurthy, a surgeon;
(3) John Doe Assistant Doctor; (4) John and Jane Does Hospital employees; (5) John or Jane
Doe Hospital CEO; (6) John Doe Insurance Companies; and (7) Judge Alicia Gerez. Plaintiff’s
complaint contains the following factual allegations.
On an unspecified date, Plaintiff’s brother, Vishnu Ganesh, died after Dr. Kesanakurthy

“performed one or two heart surgeries on” him. (ECF 1 at 5.) On December 16, 2021, Dr.
Kesanakurthy negligently and “fraud[ulently] performed heart surgery on Plaintiff, and
“torture[d]” him. (Id. at 18.). Plaintiff claims that Dr. Kesanakurthy did the “wrong” procedure
on him, stopped before completing it, and said that the did not have “the right tools to finish and
disappeared.” (Id. at 1.) As a result, Plaintiff has suffered, among other things, “illness and
injury” to his heart; economic injuries, physical pain, emotional pain, permanent disability,
inconvenience, and “loss of family and friends.” (Id. at 20.) Plaintiff claims that the Hospital
bears “vicarious liability” for the “acts and conduct” of its doctors, nurses, and assistants. (Id.)
Plaintiff alleges that after these events, on January 8, 2025, Judge Alicia Gerez “illegally,
unlawfully, and unconstitutionally . . .blocked” a lawsuit that he filed in a New York State court,
presumably about his claims against the Hospital and its staff. (Id. at 16.) Plaintiff claims that she
did so because she is “racially biased.” (Id.) Plaintiff seeks $50 million in damages. (Id. at 20.)

Plaintiff claims that he will “provide a Florida address which will constitute diversity as
Plaintiff will be living in the state of Florida. Plaintiff is a former resident of the state of Florida,
and had own[ed] properties in Florida.” (Id. at 3.) According to Plaintiff, Dr. Kesanakurthy
resides in the Bronx. (Id. at 1.) There are no allegations about the citizenship of any other
individual Defendant.
DISCUSSION
A. Federal claims
To invoke federal question jurisdiction, a plaintiff’s claims must arise “under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. A case arises under
federal law if the complaint “establishes either that federal law creates the cause of action or that
the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal

law.” Bay Shore Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Kain, 485 F.3d 730, 734-35 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting
Empire Healthchoice Assur., Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 690 (2006)). Mere invocation of
federal jurisdiction, without any facts demonstrating a federal law claim, does not create federal
subject matter jurisdiction. See Nowak v. Ironworkers Local 6 Pension Fund, 81 F.3d 1182,
1188-89 (2d Cir. 1996).
The Court construes Plaintiff’s claims that Defendants violated his constitutional rights as
arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege both
that: (1) a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the
right was violated by a person acting under the color of state law, or a “state actor.” West v.
Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988). A plaintiff asserting a claim for relief under Section 1983
must allege facts showing that each defendant acted under the color of a state “statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom or usage.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Private parties therefore generally are not liable
under the statute. Sykes v. Bank of America, 723 F.3d 399, 406 (2d Cir. 2013) (citing Brentwood

Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001)); see also Ciambriello v.
Cnty. of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 323 (2d Cir. 2002) (“[T]he United States Constitution regulates
only the Government, not private parties.”).
With the exception of Judge Gerez, all the other Defendants–the Hospital and its
employees, and insurance companies–are private parties or entities that are not alleged to work
for any state or other government body. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not stated a claim against any
of these defendants under Section 1983, and the Court dismisses those claims for failure to state
a claim on which relief may be granted.
The Court must also dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against Judge Gerez. Judges are absolutely
immune from suit for damages for any actions taken within the scope of their judicial

responsibilities. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991). Generally, “acts arising out of, or
related to, individual cases before the judge are considered judicial in nature.” Bliven v. Hunt,
579 F.3d 204, 210 (2d Cir. 2009). “Even allegations of bad faith or malice cannot overcome
judicial immunity.” Id. (citations omitted). This is because, “[w]ithout insulation from liability,
judges would be subject to harassment and intimidation . . . .” Young v. Selsky, 41 F.3d 47, 51
(2d Cir. 1994).
Judicial immunity does not apply when the judge takes action “outside” of her judicial
capacity, or when the judge takes action that, although judicial in nature, is taken “in absence of
jurisdiction.” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 9-10; see also Bliven, 579 F.3d at 209-10 (describing actions
that are judicial in nature). But “the scope of [a] judge’s jurisdiction must be construed broadly
where the issue is the immunity of the judge.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978).
In addition to being immune from actions for damages, federal judges are also immune
from any civil action seeking injunctive or declaratory relief. Although judicial immunity does

not absolutely bar a claim for prospective injunctive and declaratory relief, Shtrauch v. Dowd,
651 F. App’x 72, 73 (2d Cir. 2016) (summary order), a court’s ability to award injunctive relief
against a judicial officer under Section 1983 is strictly limited. Under Section 1983, “in any
action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial
capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or
declaratory relief was unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Here, Plaintiff fails to allege any facts showing that Judge Gerez acted beyond the scope
of her judicial responsibilities or outside her jurisdiction. Plaintiff instead sues Judge Gerez for
actions taken in the course of Plaintiff’s state-court civil proceedings. Judicial immunity
therefore applies.

Plaintiff is not entitled to injunctive relief against Judge Gerez because Plaintiff has not
alleged either the violation of a declaratory decree, or the unavailability of declaratory relief. See
Montero v. Travis, 171 F.3d 757, 761 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam). Declaratory relief against a
judge for actions taken within her judicial capacity is ordinarily available by appealing the
judge’s order. See Berlin v. Meijia, No. 15-CV-5308, 2017 WL 4402457, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Sept.
30, 2017) (“Here, no declaratory decree was violated and declaratory relief is available to
plaintiffs through an appeal of the state court judges’ decisions in state court.”), appeal
dismissed, No. 17-3589 (2d Cir. May 22, 2018); Davis v. Campbell, No. 13-CV-0693, 2014 WL
234722, at *9 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2014).
The Court dismisses Plaintiff’s claims against Judge Gerez based on absolute judicial
immunity. Plaintiff claims against Judge Gerez are frivolous, and therefore fail to state a claim
on which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii); Mills v. Fischer, 645 F.3d
176, 177 (2d Cir. 2011) (“Any claim dismissed on the ground of absolute judicial immunity is

‘frivolous’ for purposes of [the IFP statute].”).
B. State-law claims
Diversity of citizenship jurisdiction
Plaintiff asserts claims of medical malpractice, negligence, and fraud, which arise under
state law. To show that the Court has diversity of citizenship jurisdiction to consider any state
law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, a plaintiff must first allege that the plaintiff and the
defendant are citizens of different states. Wis. Dep’t of Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 388
(1998) (“A case falls within the federal district court’s ‘original’ diversity ‘jurisdiction’ only if
diversity of citizenship among the parties is complete, i.e., only if there is no plaintiff and no
defendant who are citizens of the same State.”). “An individual’s citizenship, within the meaning
of the diversity statue, is determined by his domicile.” Johnson v. Smithsonian, 4 F. App’x 69, 70

(2d Cir. 2001) (citing Palazzo v. Corio, 232 F.3d 88, 42 (2d Cir. 2000)). Domicile is “ the place
where a person has his true fixed home and principal establishment, and to which, whenever he
is absent, he has the intention of returning.” Linardos v. Fortuna, 157 F.3d 945, 948 (2d Cir.
1998) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In addition, the plaintiff must allege to a “reasonable probability” that the claim is in
excess of the sum or value of $75,000.00, the statutory jurisdictional amount. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(a); Colavito v. N.Y. Organ Donor Network, Inc., 438 F.3d 214, 221 (2d Cir. 2006)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Diversity exists between “citizens of a [U.S.] State and citizens or subjects of a foreign
state,” unless the foreign citizen is “lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United
States and . . . domiciled in the same State” as the U.S. citizen. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2); see
Windward Bora LLC v. Browne, 110 F.4th 120, 127 (2d Cir. 2024) (explaining that the limiting

clause in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) “prevent[s] diversity jurisdiction in cases between a U.S. citizen
and a permanent resident domiciled in the same state,” even though the permanent resident
remains a “citizen or subject of a foreign state” (alterations adopted and citation omitted)). The
limiting clause in Section 1332(a)(2) “affects only the status of those aliens with ‘green cards’—
admitted to the United States for permanent residence,” whereas “aliens present in this country
on any lesser status will still be considered aliens, able to invoke alienage jurisdiction against a
citizen of a state.” Ming Li v. Colonial BT, LLC, No. 14-CV-999 (CSH), 2014 WL 3579469, at
*3 (D. Conn. July 21, 2014) (quoting 1 James W. Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 0.75 [1.–5],
at 800.56 (1991)) (alterations adopted); see also Kato v. Cnty. of Westchester, 927 F. Supp. 714,
716 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“[A]liens who have been accorded lawful permanent resident status under

the immigration laws are considered aliens ‘admitted for permanent residence,’ while aliens
admitted to the United States on temporary nonimmigrant visas are not.”).
Plaintiff’s assertions fail to satisfy both prongs of the diversity statute. He asserts that he
is a citizen of Guyana, where he currently resides, that he once lived and owned property in
Florida, and that he might return to Florida. He does not state where he is domiciled, whether he
is a permanent resident, a naturalized United States citizen, or neither. If Plaintiff has been
lawfully granted permanent residence or citizenship in the United States, under Section
1332(a)(2), he qualifies as a citizen of the state where he resides for purposes of the Court’s
diversity jurisdiction. If he will be residing in the United States on a visa or some other basis and
has not been conferred either permanent residency status or citizenship, he is considered an alien
for purposes of diversity jurisdiction.
Plaintiff also does not specify the states of citizenship of any of the individual
Defendants, with the exception of Dr. Kesanakurthy. For these reasons, he has not established

that complete diversity exists between him and the individuals he seeks to sue. Finally, although
Plaintiff purports to seek $50 million in damages, he does specify the legal basis for that amount.
Rule 8
Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is
plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially
plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that
the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must
accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79
(2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating
legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those

facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id.
Even if diversity jurisdiction exists, Plaintiff’s complaint does not comply with Rule 8.
He alleges that Dr. Kesanakurthy committed medical malpractice and acted negligently, but his
allegations–that Dr. Kesanakurthy performed the “wrong” procedure and left before completing
it are vague and insufficient to state a plausible claim.1 Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that Dr.

1 ‘Under New York law, the requisite elements of proof in a medical malpractice action
are (1) a deviation or departure from accepted practice, and (2) evidence that such departure was
a proximate cause of injury or damage.’” Brown v. Cnty. of Jefferson, No. 9:20-CV-1192, 2021
WL 2941919, *3 (N.D.N.Y. June 11, 2021) (quoting Melvin v. Cnty. of Westchester, No. 14-CV-
2995 (KMK), 2016 WL 1254394, *19 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2016)). Under New York law, a
negligence claim has three elements: “(1) the existence of a duty on defendant’s part as to
Kesanakurthy committed “fraud,” but there no facts in the complaint suggesting that Plaintiff can
state such a claim.2
With respect to all the other individual Defendants, Plaintiff names them in the caption of
the complaint, but there are no allegations in the body of the complaint explaining what they did

or failed to do that violated Plaintiff’s rights under state law. Cf. Iwachiw v. New York State
Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 299 F. Supp. 2d 117, 121 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (“[W]here the complaint
names a defendant in the caption but contains no allegations indicating exactly how the
defendant violated the law or injured the plaintiff, a motion to dismiss the complaint in regard to
that defendant should be granted” ) (citations omitted)), aff’d, 396 F.3d 525 (2d Cir. 2005).
Statute of limitations
Plaintiff’s complaint appears to be untimely with respect to any claims of negligence or
medical malpractice.3 Under New York Civil Procedure Law and Rules § 214(5), a three-year

plaintiff; (2) a breach of this duty; and (3) injury to the plaintiff as a result thereof.” Alfaro v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 210 F.3d 111, 114 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing Akins v. Glens Falls City Sch.
Dist., 53 N.Y.2d 325, 333 (1981).
2 To state a claim for fraud under New York law, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) a
misrepresentation or omission of material fact; (2) which the defendant knew to be false;
(3) which the defendant made with the intention of inducing reliance; (4) upon which the
plaintiff reasonably relied; and (5) which caused injury to the plaintiff.” Wynn v. AC Rochester,
273 F.3d 153, 156 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing Lama Holding Co. v. Smith Barney, Inc., 88 N.Y.2d
413, 421 (1996)). These allegations must meet the heightened pleading standard of Rule 9(b) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that, “[i]n alleging fraud or mistake, a party
must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.” “To satisfy this
requirement, a complaint must ‘specify the time, place, speaker, and content of the alleged
misrepresentations,’ [and] ‘explain how the misrepresentations were fraudulent.” Cohen v. S.A.C.
Trading Corp., 711 F.3d 353, 359 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Caputo v. Pfizer, Inc., 267 F.3d 181,
191 (2d Cir. 2001)).
3 The limitations period in New York for claims of fraud is generally six years. Cohen,
711 F.3d at 361 & n.3 (noting that under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(8), the limitations period is “ the
greater of six years from the date the cause of action accrued or two years from the time the
plaintiff or the person under whom the plaintiff claims discovered the fraud, or could with
reasonable diligence have discovered it” ). Plaintiff’s complaint is, therefore, not untimely with
statute of limitations applies to state law negligence actions, and a limitations period of two years
and six months applies to “medical, dental or podiatric malpractice” claims. C.P.L.R §§ 214,
214-a. See Razzoli v. Richmond Univ. Med. Ctr., No. 23-CV-6697, 2023 WL 7017105, at *15
(E.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2023) (citing Idiakheua v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, No.

20-CV-4169, 2022 WL 10604355, at *15 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2022)). Here, regardless of whether
the Court construes Plaintiff’s allegations as giving rise to a claim of negligence, to which a
three-year state of limitations applies, or a claim of medical malpractice, to which a limitations
period of two years and six months applies, Plaintiff’s complaint, which he filed on March 28,
2025, in connection with events occurring on December 16, 2021, appears to be untimely.
The doctrine of equitable tolling permits a court, “under compelling circumstances, [to]
make narrow exceptions to the statute of limitations in order ‘to prevent inequity.’” In re U.S.
Lines, Inc., 318 F.3d 432, 436 (2d Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). The statute of limitations may be
equitably tolled, for example, when a defendant fraudulently conceals from a plaintiff the fact
that the plaintiff has a cause of action, or when the plaintiff is induced by the defendant to forego

a lawsuit until the statute of limitations has expired. See Pearl v. City of Long Beach, 296 F.3d
76, 82-83 (2d Cir. 2002). In addition, New York law provides that where a person “is under a
disability because of . . . insanity at the time the cause of action accrues,” the applicable statute
of limitations will be tolled. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 208; Gardner v. Wansart, No. 05-CV-3351 (SHS),
2006 WL 2742043, at *5 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2006) (although mental illness is on its own
insufficient for equitable tolling purposes, tolling is appropriate if a plaintiff is insane at the time
the cause of action accrues and is “unable to protect [his] legal rights because of an overall

respect to any fraud claims. As previously discussed, however, he does not provide facts
explaining how any Defendant engaged in fraud.
inability to function in society”). New York also provides by statute for other circumstances in
which a limitations period may be tolled. See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 204 (where commencement
of an action has been stayed by court order).
Plaintiff does not provide any facts suggesting that the statute of limitations should be

equitably tolled in this case. Because the failure to file an action within the limitations period is
an affirmative defense, a plaintiff is generally not required to plead that the case is timely filed.
See Abbas, 480 F.3d at 640. Dismissal is appropriate, however, where the existence of an
affirmative defense, such as the statute of limitations, is plain from the face of the pleading. See
Walters v. Indus. and Commercial Bank of China, Ltd., 651 F.3d 280, 293 (2d Cir. 2011)
(“[D]istrict courts may dismiss an action sua sponte on limitations grounds in certain
circumstances where the facts supporting the statute of limitations defense are set forth in the
papers plaintiff himself submitted.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Pino v.
Ryan, 49 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1995) (affirming sua sponte dismissal of complaint as frivolous on
statute of limitations grounds); see also Abbas, 480 F.3d at 640 (concluding that district court

should grant notice and opportunity to be heard before dismissing complaint sua sponte on
statute of limitations grounds).
LEAVE TO AMEND GRANTED
Plaintiff proceeds in this matter without the benefit of an attorney. District courts
generally should grant a self-represented plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to cure its
defects, unless amendment would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir.
2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). Indeed, the Second Circuit has
cautioned that district courts “should not dismiss [a pro se complaint] without granting leave to
amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid
claim might be stated.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Gomez v.
USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999)). The Court grants Plaintiff 30 days’
leave to replead his state-law claims in an amended complaint that: (1) establishes the Court’s
diversity jurisdiction to consider any state-law claims; (2) plausibly alleges a state-law claim
against any properly named Defendant; and (3) shows that his claims are not time-barred or that
equitable tolling of the statute of limitations 1s warranted.
If Plaintiff does not file an amended complaint within the time allowed, the Court will
direct the Clerk of Court to enter judgment in this action.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff's complaint, filed IFP under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), is dismissed, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)@)-(i), Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3), with 30 days’ leave to replead. The Court
declines, under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, to exercise supplemental jurisdiction of any state law claims.
The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would
not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See
Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).
The Court directs the Clerk of Court to hold this matter open on the docket until a civil
judgment is entered.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: November 10, 2025
New York, New York
Louis L. Stanton
U.S.D.J.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11235082. Public record. Not legal advice.