# Doe v. Coronado Unified School District CA4/1

> California Court of Appeal · January 2, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11234878

## Case

- **Court:** California Court of Appeal
- **Decided:** January 2, 2026
- **Precedential status:** Unpublished
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

Filed 1/2/26 Doe v. Coronado Unified School District CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

JANE DOE, D084342

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v. (Super. Ct. No. 37-2021-
00006011-CU-PO-CTL)
CORONADO UNIFIED SCHOOL
DISTRICT,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEALS from a judgment and order of the Superior Court of
San Diego County, Kevin A. Enright, Judge. Affirmed in part, reversed in
part, and remanded.

Winet Patrick Gayer Creighton & Hanes and Randall L. Winet for
Defendant and Appellant Coronado Unified School District.
Law Offices of Brandon M. Smith and Brandon M. Smith for Plaintiff
and Appellant Jane Doe.
Coronado Unified School District (CUSD) appeals from the posttrial
amended judgment on special verdict and posttrial motions, raising 10
grounds for relief. Jane Doe (Doe) cross appeals, challenging the court’s
reallocation of the jury’s fault allocations.
We affirm the jury’s finding that CUSD was negligent, its recognition of
Jordan Bucklew’s culpability, and the amount of the award of damages. But
we conclude the trial court erred in excluding Doe’s parents from the special
verdict form’s list of individuals and entities to whom the jury could assign a
percentage of fault for purposes of apportioning noneconomic damages.
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a limited retrial on the
apportionment of fault.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
Doe played on the varsity girls basketball team during her junior and
senior years at Coronado High School. Toler Goodwin served as the head
varsity coach for the team, and Bucklew was the assistant coach.
By the end of her junior season, Doe considered Bucklew to be a friend,
and she, a teammate, and Bucklew had a private online chat group. Starting
over the summer, Doe’s parents paid for her to participate in group and one-
on-one training sessions at the high school with Bucklew, who also worked as
a personal trainer. Doe’s mother knew that Doe would be alone with
Bucklew during some of these sessions, but she was not concerned because
she had met Bucklew and was aware that other girls were taking private
sessions with him. Neither parent ever went to watch any of the private
training sessions.

2
During Doe’s junior and senior years, teammates Lauren and Allison

White1 reported frequently seeing Doe sitting in Bucklew’s personal vehicle
on the street next to the school. According to several girls on the team,
during practice, Bucklew would discuss that he and Doe had gone together to
scout other teams. Lauren and Allison explained that Goodwin was present
at these times and would have witnessed the same incidents.
One day in September 2019, Bucklew gave Doe a long hug during a
private training session that she described as “feeling super weird.” Starting
that day, Bucklew told her he would like to take a picture together every day
to show her that he was there for her. From then on, they took photographs
together around campus, and Doe said they did not try to hide what they
were doing from others. They took several of the photos after training
sessions. They began arriving early for team practice on a daily basis as well
as staying after practices to talk. According to Doe, Goodwin was usually in
the coaches’ office before team practices and would join them in the gym just
before the practice started. On a few occasions, she said Goodwin left before
they did in the evening. She also recalled Robin Nixon, the athletic director,
stopping by the weight room on a handful of occasions when Doe was training
alone with Bucklew and reminding them to lock up and turn off the lights
before they left.
On December 6, 2019, Bucklew picked Doe up in front of the school
after practice in his personal vehicle and drove her to watch a competitor’s
basketball game. Doe did not tell her parents she was going. After the game,
he drove her to a park in a different part of town. They got out of the car, and
he hugged her and massaged her shoulders. Once back in the car, he kissed

1 We refer to Lauren and Allison White by their first names to avoid
confusion.

3
her. They drove back to the school in silence. Bucklew parked right outside
the school parking lot and made her promise not to tell anyone what had
occurred. He taught her a “hand hug” that was intended as an unspoken way
of signifying that they trusted each other. From then on, Bucklew initiated
the special handshake every time he saw her. He also kissed her every time
they were alone, which was almost every day. Often this was before or after
practice. She said she also usually saw him on Sundays for small group
trainings.
Bucklew also started touching her breasts on a daily basis, including
sometimes when they were on campus. On December 26, 2019, he drove her
to a residential neighborhood outside of Coronado, parked, and told her to get
in the backseat. He removed her sweater and bra and moved her around on
top of his lap while kissing her. Although she felt extremely uncomfortable,
she did not tell him she did not want to do these things because she “was
scared” and “didn’t really see a way out of it.”
In early January 2020, the team participated in a basketball
tournament in Los Angeles. While there, the team wanted to attend a Lakers
game but was unable to secure tickets. After speaking with Goodwin, Doe
and Bucklew instead went alone to watch the game at a restaurant across the
street. On the way back from the restaurant, Bucklew pushed her against
the wall of the hotel and kissed her.
After breakfast the next morning, they kissed in his hotel room.
Lauren, Allison, and another teammate, Jenevieve Joseph, saw Doe in
Bucklew’s hotel room, although none of them observed the kiss.
On January 25, 2020, Doe went to Bucklew’s apartment. Bucklew
carried her to his bedroom and removed all their clothing except for their
underwear. He kissed her all over and then digitally penetrated her. About

4
a week later, he touched her vaginal area again while they were in his car in
the school parking lot. She got out of the car while his hand was still in her
pants.
On January 31, 2020, Allison wrote in a class journal that whatever
was happening between Bucklew and Doe made her want to “hurl.” Another
student read the entry and commented out loud that it was “gross” and that
it was obvious to everyone that something inappropriate was happening
between a coach and her friend on the basketball team. The teacher
overheard the comment and immediately reported the incident to the
principal.
CUSD put Bucklew on administrative leave that same day. The
principal then left a voicemail at Doe’s home asking to speak to her parents
about something related to basketball. Doe overheard the message, thought
it sounded strange, and texted Bucklew. He immediately called and told her
to delete everything on her phone. She deleted their messages and social
media content, but not the photographs. Her mother asked to speak with
her, having just learned from the school that there were rumors about her
and Bucklew. After initially denying the rumors, Doe started crying and
admitted she had been spending time with him. Doe’s father contacted the
Coronado Police Department, and Doe spoke with a detective the following
day. The police arrested Bucklew a few days later. He subsequently pled
guilty to engaging in an act of unlawful sexual contact with a minor who was
more than three years younger.
B. Procedural Background
Doe filed a complaint against CUSD and Bucklew in February 2021.
The complaint alleged causes of action against CUSD for negligence and
negligent hiring, supervision and retention; and against Bucklew for sexual

5
battery and sexual assault. CUSD responded and filed a cross-complaint
against Bucklew. However, neither party managed to personally serve
Bucklew, and Doe dismissed him prior to trial.
At trial, Doe’s counsel explained the primary theory of the case in his
opening statement. Although counsel presented some evidence supporting
his argument that CUSD was negligent during the process of hiring Bucklew,
he primarily focused on CUSD’s negligence in supervising Bucklew. He said
that Bucklew frequently violated the school’s code of conduct with Doe and
that, although Goodwin and Nixon observed or were aware of many of these
violations, they never questioned Bucklew or investigated the circumstances.
The code of conduct prohibited, absent exigent circumstances, meeting
individually with a student behind closed doors, remaining on campus with
students after the last administrator has left the school site, transporting a
student in a personal vehicle unless there was a parent authorization form on
file, taking students off campus, and communicating by phone with a student.
Counsel submitted that the evidence would show Goodwin and Nixon
repeatedly saw Bucklew and Doe alone together or observed Doe sitting in
Bucklew’s personal vehicle, in addition to being aware of other violations.
Doe also argued Nixon did not take the sexual harassment training seriously
so as to ensure that the athletic staff was truly informed as to what to watch
for with student-staff interactions. In Doe’s view, had these individuals done
their jobs and investigated Bucklew’s code of conduct violations—in other
words, had they properly supervised Bucklew—they would have discovered
that something was going on with Doe and could have intervened to prevent
the harm to her.
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a special verdict finding
Bucklew posed a risk of sexual misconduct towards students; CUSD knew or

6
should have known Bucklew posed a risk of sexual misconduct toward
students and this risk created a particular risk to others; Bucklew’s risk of
sexual misconduct toward students harmed Doe; and CUSD’s negligence in
hiring, retaining or supervising Bucklew was a substantial factor in causing
Doe harm. It awarded Doe $2.5 million in past noneconomic damages and
$2.5 million in future noneconomic damages, assigning 10 percent of the fault
to Bucklew and the remaining 90 percent to CUSD.
CUSD filed a motion for a new trial, or alternatively remittitur of the
verdict, and a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV). The
court found that substantial evidence did not support the jury’s
apportionment of fault and changed the distribution to allocate 60 percent of
the fault to Bucklew and 40 percent to CUSD. It otherwise denied the motion
for JNOV and denied the motion for a new trial. The amended judgment on
special verdict and posttrial motions was filed on May 30, 2024.
DISCUSSION
A. Doe’s Parents Should have been Named on the Special
Verdict So That the Jury Could Consider Their Conduct in
Apportioning Fault.
CUSD contends the court erred by refusing to include Doe’s parents on
the special verdict for purposes of apportionment of the damages. It argues
Doe’s mother negligently supervised Doe by (1) not verifying Doe’s claims
regarding why she repeatedly came home late, (2) not asking why Doe turned
off her “Find My Friends” application on her phone, which allowed the
parents to track her location, (3) not checking Doe’s phone, where she would
have seen inappropriate photos of Doe and Bucklew, and (4) agreeing to sign
Doe up to participate in private, one-on-one training sessions with Bucklew
after hours at the school gym. As to Doe’s father, CUSD highlights his

7
testimony that he disliked Bucklew from day one and his statement after
learning of the inappropriate relationship that he “knew it.” There is no
evidence Doe’s father followed up in any way on his dislike for Bucklew.
We agree it was error to exclude the parents from the special verdict
form.
1. Additional Facts
During Doe’s mother’s deposition, she described her telephone
conversation with Bucklew about the proposed training sessions. When
counsel asked, “Did you ask Jordan Bucklew if the sessions would be
individual or group?” she responded, “Yes. And he said both.” She said she
did not have or express any concern about her daughter being alone with
Bucklew. As to the tracking app on Doe’s phone, when asked if she looked at
it from time to time, she said “No.” When Doe turned it off, she did not ask
why she had turned it off, she just told her to turn it back on. She
acknowledged that Doe started coming home late in December 2019. When
the mother asked why, Doe lied and said she was with two friends, but the
mother did not confirm Doe’s story with the girls or their parents. She also
did not check Doe’s phone in 2019 or 2020 to look at any of the photos she
was taking.
Doe’s father did not recall whether his wife told him it would be
individual or group training, and he did not discuss it with his daughter, but
he was under the impression that it would be group training. He said he was
not “a fan” of Bucklew because Bucklew never looked him in the eye and did
not talk to him, and he just did not like his demeanor. During his recorded
interview with the police, the father said:
“And I watch, I said this last night, I’ve been watching this entire
season the interaction between her and him because I don’t like it. I

8
don’t like their relationship. I don’t know what that is. I’ve never ever
ever seen on the court, like when she goes to the bench, or you know, no
weird touching. No weird like. And I’m intently watching because I
don’t trust what’s going on. I just don’t trust. I told you so. I knew it.
I knew it. I knew it. The damn parents justify to me that this guy’s a
good guy. My wife telling me, and you know and I knew it. 20
something year old and 30 something year old man don’t spend that
kind of time. I don’t care if its with one or if its with four high school
girls. You just don’t. Whether your fat or skinny or tall or short they
just don’t do it. I don’t care it is. Guys are pigs. It is what it is. Guys
are pigs. 95% of them. There’s just no way.”
Doe filed a motion in limine seeking to preclude opinion or argument
that Doe’s parents were negligent. She argued the parents’ deposition
testimony showed they did not have any actual knowledge of the threat that
Bucklew would molest Doe and that, accordingly, no comparative fault could
be allocated to them. For this reason, Doe asked that the court exclude her
parents from the special verdict form.
In response, CUSD asserted that the law does not require parents to
have actual knowledge to be found negligent. In CUSD’s view, the parents
negligently supervised Doe because her mother agreed to one-on-one training
sessions, did not check Doe’s phone, knew Doe was staying out late at night
with her tracking app off, did not ask Doe why she had turned off the
tracking feature on her phone, and never checked the tracking feature once
Doe turned it back on. The father did not like Bucklew, but did not act upon
his suspicions and let Doe go to trainings with him.
The court deferred ruling on the motion until after both parents had
testified. At trial, Doe’s mother testified that she “had some concerns” during

9
Doe’s senior year that something was bothering Doe, and she noticed that
Doe was less social with friends, did not go to homecoming, and did not play
club soccer. But the mother said she chalked it up to Doe being a senior and
did not mention having discussed any of it with Doe. She also acknowledged
that she had stated during her deposition that Bucklew told her Doe would
participate in both individual and group training sessions. She testified she
and her husband argued about whether to pay for the personal training
sessions because he said he did not like Bucklew. Nonetheless, after they
signed her up, neither she nor her husband ever observed any of her
daughter’s training sessions, and the mother never watched the practices.
The mother reiterated that when she found out the tracking app was
off, she asked Doe to activate it again. She did not ask why Doe had turned it
off. She otherwise never checked Doe’s phone during her junior or senior
year and never checked the tracking app when Doe started coming home late.
She also did not confirm with the friends or their parents that Doe had
actually been with them on the nights she was out late.
Doe’s father testified that he did not care for the basketball coaches
because they did not interact with the parents as his children’s prior coaches
had done. He said he was not initially in favor of the private training
sessions and did not like Bucklew, but that he eventually agreed. He
explained that he did not understand that some of the training sessions
would be one-on-one—he thought two other girls were participating. He
acknowledged Doe stayed out late during winter break but did not think it
was late enough to be at the point of concern.
The father confirmed that he never attended any of Doe’s training
sessions or asked her about them. CUSD’s counsel played a video recording
of the above-referenced portion of the father’s police interview. The father

10
denied that when he said, “I knew it” he meant that he knew his daughter
was being sexually abused by a coach. But he confirmed that he did not say
anything to anyone at CUSD about his dislike for Bucklew.
The court granted the motion in limine, concluding that “there is
nothing unreasonable about the conduct or lack thereof of either [parent]
such that they should be named as potentially ‘others’ that were negligent or
liable in terms of their responsibility for what occurred in this case.” As to
Doe’s mother, the court noted that she was anxious and very emotionally
distraught at times during her testimony, but it did not find sufficient
evidence to put her on the verdict form. As for Doe’s father, the court viewed
his statement after learning of the inappropriate relationship that he “knew
it” as being an expression of intuition. The court explained that to place him
on the verdict form would just invite the jury to speculate as to whether he
really knew something.
2. Analysis
We ordinarily analyze a special verdict de novo. (Rodriguez v. Parivar,
Inc. (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 739, 751.) “A special verdict is ‘fatally defective’ if
it does not allow the jury to resolve every controverted issue.” (Saxena v.
Goffney (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 316, 325.) Here, CUSD contends there was
substantial evidence in the record that the parents could be at fault and that
the special verdict was, therefore, incomplete because it did not include them
for purposes of allocating the damages among potentially responsible parties.
Civil Code section 1431.2 requires that anyone potentially liable should
be included on the verdict form, even non-parties, so that the jury can assign
comparative fault. (See, e.g., Scott v. Bard (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 763, 785.)
“A defendant may attempt to reduce his or her share of liability for
noneconomic damages by seeking to add nonparty joint tortfeasors. But

11
unless there is substantial evidence that an individual is at fault, there can
be no apportionment of damages to that individual.” (Wilson v. Ritto (2003)
105 Cal.App.4th 361, 367) (Wilson). Within this context, “ ‘fault’ is a breach
of a duty imposed by law or contract.” (Id. at p. 369.)
As the first step in our analysis, we acknowledge that Doe’s parents
may be found to be at fault for purposes of apportionment only if they
breached a legal duty owed to Doe. The parties do not dispute that parents
have a “special relationship” with their children and, thus, an affirmative
legal duty to protect them. (See Brown v. USA Taekwondo (2021) 11 Cal.5th
204, 216 (Brown).) Thus, in this case, Doe’s parents had a duty to use
reasonable measures to protect her from foreseeable injury at Bucklew’s
hands.
Our legal determination that the parents owed Doe a duty of care in
this case does not end the matter. Although the decision as to whether the
parents breached their duty to their daughter should be left to the jury (see,
e.g., American Motorcycle Association v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 578,
607 [allowing defendants to file a cross complaint against plaintiff’s parents
for negligent supervision]), for purposes of this appeal, we must determine
whether the record contains substantial evidence of breach such that the
parents should have been placed on the special verdict form. (See Wilson,
supra [substantial evidence of fault must be found before damages can be
apportioned to a non-party joint tortfeasor].)
We do not offer an opinion as to whether a jury would conclude that
any fault should be allocated to the parents. But, under the particular facts
of this case, there was evidence from which the jury could have concluded
that one or both of Doe’s parents knew or should have known that Bucklew
posed a risk of sexual misconduct toward Doe and that a reasonable parent

12
would have taken additional steps to investigate Doe’s unusual behaviors
and/or her contact with and relationship with Bucklew. The evidence that
the parents may have known or should have known that Doe was
participating in one-on-one training with Bucklew, combined with evidence
as to their lack of follow-up on red flags, is sufficient substantial evidence to
support placing the parents on the special verdict form as potentially sharing
fault with the defendants.
In asking the jury to consider that question, we recognize that every
parent-child relationship is different, and that supervision, especially
supervision of older teenagers, is not a one-size-fits-all proposition. Parents
must balance appropriate standards and verification of the teen’s behavior
with demonstration of trust. Every child is unique, and every parent must
necessarily exercise discretion in deciding how closely to supervise their
teenage child. As our high court described the issue in Gibson v. Gibson
(1971) 3 Cal.3d 914, 921 (Gibson):
“ ‘[A] parent has a wide discretion in the performance of his
parental functions, but’ . . . although a parent has the prerogative and
the duty to exercise authority over his minor child, this prerogative
must be exercised within reasonable limits. The standard to be applied
is the traditional one of reasonableness, but viewed in light of the
parental role. Thus, we think the proper test of a parent’s conduct is
this: what would an ordinarily reasonable and prudent parent have
done in similar circumstances?” (Gibson, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 921,
quoting Emery v. Emery (1955) 45 Cal.2d 421, 429.)
Accordingly, by denying CUSD’s request to include Doe’s parents on the
special verdict form, the trial court denied the jury the opportunity to
consider the standard articulated in Gibson; and because substantial

13
evidence supported a potential finding of parental fault, the jury should have
had the opportunity to consider the apportionment of fault to the parents.
Finally, we conclude the error was prejudicial, because the jury might have
allocated some portion of the fault to the parents, thereby decreasing the
damages CUSD was required to pay.
3. Actual Knowledge is Not Required.
We are not persuaded by Doe’s contention that her parents cannot be
found at fault in a negligence action unless they had actual knowledge of the
threat of sexual abuse. Doe relies on Conti v. Watchtower Bible & Tract
Society of New York, Inc., 235 Cal.App.4th 1214 (2015) (Conti) and Chaney v.
Superior Court (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 152 (Chaney) for this proposition. In
Conti, a church member, whom church elders knew had been convicted of a
misdemeanor for molesting his stepdaughter, repeatedly molested the minor
plaintiff during church field service events. (Conti, at pp. 1218–1219.)
Applying the special relationship doctrine and the factors set forth in
Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108 (Rowland), the court concluded
the church defendants had a legal duty to exercise reasonable due care to
restrict and supervise the offending church member during field service to
prevent him from molesting children in the community and in the
congregation during church-sponsored field service. (Conti, at pp. 1233,
1235.) However, in addressing the defendants’ claim that the jury also
should have been allowed to consider whether the plaintiff’s parents were
partially liable for negligently supervising the plaintiff and for entrusting her
to the offending member’s care, the court neither considered their duty under
the special relationship doctrine and the Rowland factors, nor addressed
whether breach of their duty to exercise reasonable due care in supervising
their daughter could have resulted in the harm. (Id. at p. 1237.) Rather,

14
without analysis, it cited to Chaney as holding that “parent must have actual
knowledge of threat of molestation to be liable for negligent supervision of the
victim.” (Conti, at p. 1237.)
In Chaney, the minor plaintiff alleged that a family friend sexually
assaulted her in his home and that the assailant’s wife negligently
supervised her. (Chaney, supra, 39 Cal.App.4th at p. 155.) Specifically, the
complaint alleged that the husband “paid ‘excessive attention’ to her and was
‘excessive’ in his gift giving,” and that the wife was negligent in “failing to
recognize these ‘signs’ as indicative of the possibility that her husband was
sexually molesting [the minor] which caused her to fail to investigate the
situation.” (Id. at p. 156–157.) As a result, the wife “ ‘unintentionally
provided unchecked access to [the minor] for [her husband],’ which caused
[the minor] to suffer ‘serious and lasting injury.’ ” (Id. at p. 157.)
Although the court determined that the wife assumed a special
relationship with the dependent child when she invited her into her home, it
concluded “that public policy requires that where a child is sexually assaulted
in the defendant wife’s home by her husband, the wife’s duty of reasonable
care to the injured child depends on whether the husband’s behavior was
reasonably foreseeable.” (Chaney, supra, 39 Cal.App.4th at p. 157, citing to
Uccello v. Laudenslayer (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 504, 514, fn. 4.) The court
concluded that a wife is not required to assume her husband is likely to
molest a child and that, without knowledge of her husband’s deviant
propensities, a wife cannot foresee that he poses a danger and thus does not
have a duty to take measures to prevent the assault. (Chaney, at pp. 157–
158.)
We read Chaney as having applied the Rowland factors and engaged in
an appropriate consideration of whether public policy weighed against

15
holding the defendant to the duty otherwise imposed by her special
relationship with the victim, even though it came to a different conclusion
based on the circumstances of the claim. (See Chaney, supra, 39 Cal.App.4th
at p. 157.) Contrary to the court in Conti, we do not read Chaney as
establishing a bright-line rule that parents can never be at fault unless they
actually knew of prior misconduct by a third person who interacted with their
child.
Under current precedent, we disagree that parental liability should be
assessed under a different framework than any other defendant. Whatever
the appropriate standard may have been 30 years ago for a parent
supervising someone else’s child in their home, we conclude that numerous
recent cases have shown that sexual misconduct is foreseeable when one
sends their child into situations where they may be alone with an adult at a
school, a church, a sports competition, or a youth organization—regardless of
whether the defendant has knowledge of prior misconduct by the individual.
(See Roe v. Hesperia Unified School Dist. (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 13, 28
[declining to follow a case applying the Chaney rule in a matter where a
janitor molested students and noting that, “ ‘[s]imply put, the school grounds
provide a different setting than an adult’s home’ ”]; Doe v. Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Los Angeles (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 657, 676 [based on evidence
the Archdiocese was well aware of numerous priests having sexually abused
minors around the country, “it was reasonably foreseeable that minors
attending catechism classes in 1988 might be sexually molested by a priest,
even though the Archdiocese did not have knowledge of prior sexual
misconduct by [that priest] specifically”]; Brown v. USA Taekwondo (2019) 40
Cal.App.5th 1077, 1097–1098 [because evidence showed sexual abuse of
youth athletes by credentialed coaches was “rampant,” “it was foreseeable

16
youth athletes attending Olympic qualifying competitions with their coaches
might be sexually molested by their coaches, regardless of whether
[defendant] had knowledge of prior sexual misconduct by [the coach]”]; Doe v.
United States Youth Soccer Assn., Inc. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 1118, 1132–1133
[concluding “it was reasonably foreseeable to defendants that a child
participating in their soccer program would be sexually abused by a coach”
given that the soccer programs adopted a KidSafe Program based on evidence
of past abuse and evidence showing that sexual abusers “are drawn to places
where there are children”]; Juarez v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc. (2000) 81
Cal.App.4th 377, 404 (Juarez), disapproved on other grounds by Brown,
supra, 11 Cal.5th 204 [concluding “that it should be reasonably foreseeable to
the Scouts that a child participating in scouting might fall prey to a sexual
predator, with no documented history of such proclivities, who is serving as
an adult volunteer in the child’s scouting troop”].) As the Juarez court noted
in discussing a 1962 case where a girl was raped while staying at an
overnight camp, “in the almost 40 years since these words were written, the
scourge of sexual molestation of children has not abated; and the danger that
a child who participates in organized youth activities will encounter a sexual
predator certainly is at least as foreseeable now as it was then.” (Juarez,
supra, 81 Cal.App.4th at p. 404.) And, as Doe’s expert, Dr. Billie-Jo Grant-
Ghanotakis (Dr. Grant), testified in this case, “[i]n 2019 and today, sexual
misconduct is a known foreseeable risk in schools.” All these categories of
molestation cases have been widely publicized and have resulted in schools,
churches, and youth organizations adopting policies to avoid future harm to
children. As a result, an ordinarily reasonable and prudent parent must also
have an awareness of the risks and a responsibility to keep these risks in
mind when undertaking their affirmative legal duty to protect their children,

17
even in the absence of knowledge of prior sexual misconduct by a specific
coach.
Here, the court declined to include the parents on the special verdict
form because it concluded their conduct was reasonable and there was
insufficient evidence of guilt. In the court’s view, the father’s comments that
he “knew it” reflected intuition and including him on the verdict would invite
the jury to speculate that he really knew something. But the jury did not
need to speculate that father “really knew something”; as we discussed above,
actual knowledge that abuse is occurring is not required for a finding of fault.
(Juarez, supra, 81 Cal.App.4th at p. 404 [“it should be reasonably
foreseeable . . . that a child participating in scouting might fall prey to a
sexual predator, with no documented history of such proclivities”].) Thus,
under the facts of this case and for the reasons discussed above, the trial
court’s decision to exclude the parents from the special verdict usurped the
jury’s role. For this reason, we conclude the court erred in refusing to name
Doe’s parents on the verdict form.
B. CUSD Forfeited its Challenge to Testimony Regarding Sarah
Barns.
CUSD contends the court erred by allowing Doe to introduce evidence
about the inappropriate relationship between former CUSD student Sarah
Barns and Bucklew and that this evidence was highly prejudicial.
1. Additional Facts
In support of her contention that CUSD knew or should have known
that Bucklew posed a risk to her, Doe planned to call Barns to testify at trial.
Barns was one year older than Doe. In 2022, two years after Bucklew’s
interactions with Doe came to light, Barns told police and others that

18
Bucklew had engaged in very similar conduct with her when she was a senior
at Coronado High School.
CUSD filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude any reference to the
inappropriate relationship between Barns and Bucklew, arguing it was not
relevant and was highly prejudicial. In support of its motion, CUSD provided
excerpts from Barns’s deposition wherein she testified that she and Bucklew
did their best to keep the relationship a secret, and that she was not aware of
anyone from the school district having any idea about their relationship
before she disclosed it in March 2022.
After hearing several offers of proof by Doe’s counsel, the court denied
the motion in limine and allowed Barns to testify at trial to show CUSD’s
negligent supervision and retention of Bucklew. Specifically, Doe’s counsel
told the court that Barns, Joseph, and Lauren would testify that Goodwin
saw Barns and Bucklew practicing alone together in the gym, but that he did
nothing about it. He also said Lauren and Joseph would testify that they
observed Barns and Bucklew alone in his personal vehicle, and he submitted
that since Goodwin said he was always around and never missed a practice,
there is a definite inference that he saw it too. In summarizing the argument
by Doe’s counsel, the court stated, “[Doe’s counsel] has represented to me that
he has three witnesses that are coming forward that are going to say that
Mr. Goodwin, the head coach, was in a position where he was present, where
things were apparent to those present that may allow, that could cause, that
to reasonable people would cause a suspicion of what was taking place
between Barns and Bucklew.” Based on counsel “as an officer of the Court
telling me what he plans to do, refuting [CUSD’s] position that Goodwin and
the district knew nothing, nor should they have known anything[,]” the court

19
made its ruling “without hearing any testimony” and “without hearing any
opening statements.”
Doe’s counsel had also argued that learning about Bucklew’s
relationship with Barns caused Doe significant emotional distress and set
back her mental health treatment. As to this point, the court expressed that
it did not know how to “surgically dissect” the evidence about the effect
Barns’s disclosure had on Doe’s damages claim from Barns’s testimony
regarding what happened to her. As a result, it concluded it could not limit
Barns’s testimony to only that relevant to damages.
CUSD argues the court should not have relied upon Doe’s counsel’s
assertions and that counsel misrepresented to the court what the evidence
would show. Doe disputes that her counsel misrepresented the evidence and
asserts Barn’s testimony was relevant to prove the foreseeability of Bucklew’s
potential threat of sexual misconduct, CUSD’s liability for negligent retention
and supervision of Bucklew, and Doe’s damages.
2. Analysis
CUSD submits that Doe’s counsel misrepresented what the testimony
of Barns, Lauren, and Joseph would show and that the court erred in relying
on this offer of proof. Even if we assume CUSD is correct—an issue we do not

reach—we conclude CUSD forfeited this issue.2
“A party desiring to preserve for appeal a challenge to the admission of
evidence must comply with the provisions of Evidence Code section 353,
which precludes reversal for erroneous admission of evidence unless: ‘There
appears of record an objection to or a motion to exclude or to strike the
evidence that was timely made and so stated to make clear the specific

2 The parties did not address forfeiture in their opening briefs. We
requested and received supplemental briefing on the issue.

20
ground of the objection or motion.’ ” (People v. Morris (1991) 53 Cal.3d 152,
187 (Morris), quoting Evid. Code, 353, subd. (a).) “Under appropriate
circumstances, a motion in limine can serve the function of a ‘motion to
exclude’ under Evidence Code section 353 by allowing the trial court to rule
on a specific objection to particular evidence.” (Morris, at p. 188.) But
“[g]enerally[,] when an in limine ruling that evidence is admissible has been
made, the party seeking exclusion must object at such time as the evidence is
actually offered to preserve the issue for appeal. [Citations.] The reason for
this rule is that until the evidence is actually offered, and the court is aware
of its relevance in context, its probative value, and its potential for prejudice,
matters related to the state of the evidence at the time an objection is made,
the court cannot intelligently rule on admissibility.” (People v. Jennings
(1988) 46 Cal.3d 963, 975, fn. 3 (Jennings).)
The Morris court further clarified when a motion in limine is adequate
by focusing on the precise provisions of Evidence Code section 353. (Morris,
supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 189.) Specifically, it directed that “a motion in limine
to exclude evidence is a sufficient manifestation of objection to protect the
record on appeal when it satisfies the basic requirements of Evidence Code
section 353, i.e.: (1) a specific legal ground for exclusion is advanced and
subsequently raised on appeal; (2) the motion is directed to a particular,
identifiable body of evidence; and (3) the motion is made at a time before or
during trial when the trial judge can determine the evidentiary question in
its appropriate context.” (Morris, at p. 190; see also 3 Witkin, Cal. Evid. (6th
ed. 2025) § 394.)
Here, CUSD brought a motion in limine to prevent Doe, her attorneys,
witnesses, and experts from offering or eliciting any evidence of a prior
inappropriate relationship between Barns and Bucklew. It sought to exclude

21
the evidence as irrelevant—because Barns testified that no one at the high
school knew about her relationship with Bucklew—and because any
probative value of the evidence was far outweighed by its prejudicial impact.
CUSD renewed these arguments on appeal. Thus, the motion in limine
satisfied the first two prongs of the Morris test above.
It is the third prong that points to forfeiture. Prior to trial, the court
had not heard any testimony and had only Doe’s attorney’s offer of proof that
Barns would testify to more than she had during her deposition and that two
of her teammates would testify that Goodwin had been in a position to
observe inappropriate conduct and code of conduct violations. In other words,
at that stage, counsel had made an offer of proof that the trial court, in
exercising its broad discretion, found adequately demonstrated the relevance
and admissibility of the evidence. (See People v. Morrison (2004) 34 Cal.4th
698, 724.)
CUSD appears to contend an offer of proof was not sufficient at this
stage. CUSD argues the proponent of proffered evidence, in this case Doe,
has the burden of producing sufficient evidence to sustain a finding of the
preliminary fact under Evidence Code section 403. In its view, the trial court
erred by not requiring Doe to produce evidence that a district employee saw
Barns in Bucklew’s car, or that any CUSD employee was aware of the
inappropriate relationship between the two. However, CUSD does not
provide authority indicating that counsel’s offer of proof was insufficient to
sustain a finding that Barns, Lauren, and Joseph would testify to facts
showing a CUSD employee knew or should have known of Barns and
Bucklew’s interactions, and authority appears to state otherwise. (C.f.,
People v. Dworak (2021) 11 Cal.5th 881, 898–899 [concluding a trial court did
not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence under section 403 where

22
defendant made no offer of proof that he had read the newspaper articles he
was seeking to introduce]; People v. Rodriguez (1969) 274 Cal.App.2d 770,
777 [affirming trial court’s refusal to allow witness to testify over hearsay
objection because appellant’s trial counsel did not lay a foundation for the
admissibility of the testimony and failed to make an offer of proof as to what
the witness would have stated had she been permitted to answer].)
Furthermore, section 403 allows the court to conditionally admit the
proffered evidence “subject to evidence of the preliminary fact being supplied
later in the course of the trial.” (Evid. Code, § 403, subd. (b).) If it does so, it
“[m]ay, and on request shall, instruct the jury to determine whether the
preliminary fact exists and to disregard the proffered evidence unless the
jury finds that the preliminary fact does exist.” (Id., subd. (c)(1), italics
added.) Although the court here did not expressly indicate it was
conditionally admitting testimony by and about Barns, neither did counsel
request an instruction after it contends the evidence failed to demonstrate
the foundational preliminary facts. The court did, however, imply its ruling
was subject to change if the testimony did not play out as counsel anticipated.
Specifically, it acknowledged in summarizing the parties’ positions on the
motion in limine: “I can’t resolve that dispute. I—I don’t know what’s going
to happen. I don’t know what people are going to be testifying, don’t know
who’s going to be called.” It then implied its ruling was tentative, explaining,
“[s]o I’m accepting as true what Mr. Smith told me, and if it’s not true. Then
we’ll reconsider” (italics added).
Nonetheless, after Barns, Lauren, and Joseph testified, CUSD did not
renew its objection in any way, nor did it move to strike the evidence at that
time under Evidence Code section 353. Our high court addressed a similar
scenario in People v. Champion (1995) 9 Cal.4th 879. There, the defendant

23
objected in limine to the admissibility of a deputy’s testimony immediately
before the deputy testified. (Id. at p. 925.) The trial court overruled the
defendant’s objections after hearing the prosecution’s offer of proof regarding
the deputy’s proposed testimony. (Ibid.) The defendant argued the
prosecutor’s offer of proof was misleading. (Ibid.) But the Champion court
explained that “[t]o the extent that there were variations between the offer of
proof and [the deputy’s] testimony, defendants should have brought them to
the court’s attention and should have requested that [the deputy’s] testimony
be stricken. Because they failed to do so, they may not now complain of any
such variations.” (Ibid.)
The same is true here. This was a significant issue for CUSD, the court
addressed it at length during the motion in limine hearing, and CUSD made
clear that it disagreed with the court’s ruling on the motion in limine. Thus,
it was reasonable to expect CUSD’s counsel to object after the witnesses did
not testify quite as Doe’s counsel represented they would in his offer of proof.
It is not uncommon for a witness to testify differently than anticipated.
Indeed, the Morris court expressly recognized the exact scenario that CUSD
contends occurred here in explaining that a motion in limine may not satisfy
Evidence Code section 353’s requirements because “[a]ctual testimony
sometimes defies pretrial predictions of what a witness will say on the stand.”
(Morris, supra, 53 Cal.3d at pp. 189–190.) Had CUSD’s counsel timely
reinforced the arguments he makes here—that no one testified that Goodwin
was in a position to have seen Barns and Bucklew alone such that he should
have intervened—the court may have struck the evidence and admonished
the jury. In other words, the context within which the court would have been
weighing the prejudice to CUSD would have been different at that juncture.
(See Jennings, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 975, fn. 3.)

24
CUSD argues in its supplemental briefing that a party need not renew
its objection where the court has made clear its ruling is final and definitive.
It relies on Paige v. Safeway, Inc. (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 1108 and Morris,
supra, 53 Cal.3d 152. We find these cases distinguishable. In Paige, the
court ruled an expert witness could not be asked about the content of certain
materials and testing standards because he had not relied upon them, but the
court said the plaintiff could ask foundational questions such as whether he
was aware of the standards. (Paige, supra, 74 Cal.App.5th at p. 1116.) The
court said it would reconsider its ruling if the expert testified differently at
trial than he had at his deposition. (Id. at p. 1117.) Paige did not ask any
foundational questions, and it does not appear the expert testified differently
than anticipated. (Id. at p. 1120.) Had the expert testified at trial that he
relied on the materials and testing standards in forming his opinions, the
appellate court would have had the opportunity to consider whether Paige
should have renewed his objection to the court’s ruling under Evidence Code
section 353 and Champion. He did not, and thus the case is of little
relevance. We do not read it as standing for a categorical principle that a
renewed objection is not required if the in limine ruling is “final” even if the
circumstances have changed.
We explained above the Morris court’s holding as to when a motion in
limine satisfies the requirements of Evidence Code section 353 and when it
does not. Suffice it to say, in Morris, unlike here, the court found defendant’s
in limine motion satisfied the three requirements set forth above. (Morris,
supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 191.)
Finally, CUSD argues that objecting after the jury had heard all the
testimony regarding Barns would have been futile. It cites to People v. Hill
(1998) 17 Cal.4th 800 where our high court explained that failure to timely

25
object to prosecutorial misconduct or to request admonishment will not result
in forfeiture of an argument on appeal if the objection would have been futile
or the admonishment would not have cured the harm. (Id. at p. 820.)
Assuming this principle applies outside the prosecutorial misconduct realm,
we decline to join CUSD in speculating that the trial court would not have
reconsidered the ruling on the motion in light of the actual trial testimony or
that the trial court would not have fashioned an appropriate remedy, such as
by striking the testimony and adequately admonishing the jury.
Accordingly, we find this issue forfeited.
C. CUSD Has Not Demonstrated it was Prejudiced by the Trial
Court’s Order Denying its Motion in Limine to Exclude
Evidence of Bucklew’s Misdemeanor Conviction.
CUSD argues the court erred in denying its motion in limine to exclude
evidence of Bucklew’s 2006 misdemeanor reckless driving conviction. But
although the court denied the motion in limine, when Doe attempted to
introduce evidence of the conviction at trial, the court sustained CUSD’s
objections, so the jury never learned of the conviction.
The only references to the conviction were during Doe’s opening
statement. Counsel stated, “on his employment application, there was a
question about whether or not he had been convicted of any—any crimes,
misdemeanor or felony, . . . and he says no, which it turns out not true” and
on his second application, “[h]e, again, says no. It’s, again, false.” As the
court instructed the jury, “opening statement is not evidence. . . . You cannot
use it to make any decisions in this case.” We assume the jury followed the
court’s instructions. (See, e.g. People v. Thornton (2007) 41 Cal.4th 391, 441.)
CUSD’s citation to Mudrick v. Market Street Ry. Co. (1938) 11 Cal.2d
724, is not helpful to its position. In Mudrick, the plaintiff’s attorney in his

26
opening statement “represented to the jury the existence of certain facts
which plaintiff was prepared to prove, but which plaintiff did not attempt to
prove, and which he knew at the time they were made could not be proved.”
(Id. at p. 737.) Here, by contrast, Doe did attempt to prove the misdemeanor,
and its existence was readily provable and not disputed. (See also Smith v.
Covell (1980) 100 Cal.App.3d 947, 958 [“[C]ounsel in opening statements
should not, of course, include testimony which they know will not be received”
and for which there is no factual basis].)
We conclude that regardless of whether the trial court erred in denying
its motion in limine, the jury never heard evidence of Bucklew’s misdemeanor
conviction and therefore CUSD has not shown any prejudice from the ruling
or from the brief comments of counsel during opening statements.
D. CUSD Has Not Demonstrated Reversible Error as to the Trial
Court’s Admission of Evidence Regarding Bucklew’s Prior
Period of Employment.
CUSD contends the court erred by denying its motion in limine to
exclude evidence implying CUSD acted negligently in its hiring process. It
argues this evidence had nothing to do with Doe because it occurred before
Bucklew met her and that it was highly prejudicial.
1. Additional Facts
Bucklew served as a volunteer assistant coach at Coronado High School
during the 2013–2014 and 2014–2015 school years. The following year,
CUSD paid him for working as an assistant coach. Thereafter, Bucklew
resigned and moved to Montana for a year. He then returned as the
assistant coach in December 2017, at which time he met Doe.
As to the first three years, Doe introduced evidence showing that CUSD
did not follow its normal procedure of requiring volunteers to fill out a form

27
or obtain an activity clearance certificate if the volunteer had not been
fingerprinted, which Bucklew had not. For the 2015–2016 season, Doe
presented witness testimony explaining that CUSD did not obtain fingerprint
clearance for Bucklew until after the coaching season ended.
CUSD moved in limine to preclude Doe, her counsel, and her witnesses
from making any reference to Bucklew’s earlier periods of association and
employment with CUSD. In CUSD’s view, none of this evidence was relevant
because it all occurred before he met Doe and because any deficiencies in the
earlier hiring process had been cured. Specifically, human resources
witnesses indicated that CUSD obtained Bucklew’s fingerprints before he
returned in 2017 and otherwise followed proper procedures in hiring him at
that time. CUSD argued the evidence was prejudicial because it could cause
the jury to form the false impression that CUSD had not properly onboarded
Bucklew before he met Doe and to determine liability accordingly.
The court denied CUSD’s motion, finding the evidence relevant as
showing his “entire period of employment, his relationship with Coronado
Unified School District, his familiarity with the programs there, what he did
there, what he didn’t do,” and as “contextual as to his relationship from an
employment or volunteer point of view with the defendant.”
2. Analysis
Evidence is only relevant and admissible if it has a “tendency in reason
to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action.” (Evid. Code, §§ 210, 350.) Even if evidence is
relevant, the court may exclude it “if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue
consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of
confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.” (Id., § 352.)

28
We agree that CUSD’s pre-2017 procedural omissions had little to do
with harm or potential harm to Doe. However, the evidence was at least
minimally relevant to show Nixon was lax in following hiring procedures. A
member of CUSD’s human resources staff testified that during the
2015–2016 school year, Nixon allowed Bucklew to work as a coach even
though human resources staff told her he had not completed the paperwork
and fingerprinting process. And, although another staff member stated that
the human resources department improved its compliance with hiring
procedures prior to Bucklew’s return, it was not clear that Nixon initiated
any changes. On the other hand, the evidence was prejudicial in that it
effectively invited the jury to punish CUSD for past deficiencies in its hiring
procedures that had been remedied before he was rehired and met Doe.
That being said, our task on appeal is not to decide whether we would
have weighed the evidence differently. Whether or not the trial court abused
its discretion in denying the motion in limine, we may only reverse because of
the erroneous admission of evidence where the error caused a miscarriage of
justice. (Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (b).) A miscarriage of justice has occurred
only if “it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing
party would have been reached in the absence of the error.” (People v.
Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.) In this context, a “probability” means “ ‘a
reasonable chance, more than an abstract possibility.’ ” (Cassim v. Allstate
Ins. Co. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 780, 800.) In this case, even if the court erred in
admitting the evidence, we cannot conclude there is a reasonable chance the
jury would have ruled more favorably for CUSD had this evidence about the
deficient hiring processes in place between 2013 and 2016 been excluded.
First, the evidence was only tangentially relevant to whether CUSD’s
negligence led to Bucklew’s sexual misconduct. Moreover, CUSD’s counsel

29
elicited testimony and put forth arguments significantly mitigating its
impact. Dr. Edward Brand, CUSD’s educational expert, confirmed the
human resources witnesses’ testimony that Bucklew was properly onboarded
when he returned in 2017, and Doe’s counsel did not challenge any of this
testimony. Then CUSD’s counsel addressed the issue in his closing,
acknowledging CUSD’s hiring process was not perfect prior to 2017,
reminding the jury that the system had been fixed prior to Bucklew’s
rehiring, and noting that Dr. Grant provided no basis for her view that CUSD
negligently hired Bucklew. More importantly, he pointed out that no
evidence had been presented indicating that anything in Bucklew’s
fingerprint results disqualified him from working at the school.
Second, it is not reasonably probable that bureaucratic deficiencies
were a deciding factor in the jury’s minds given the other evidence presented.
Such deficiencies paled in comparison to the supervision failures presented at
trial. Among other things, the jury heard that Goodwin was present when
Bucklew talked about scouting other teams alone with Doe, that Goodwin
authorized Doe and Bucklew to go alone to a restaurant to watch the Lakers
game, and that Nixon saw Bucklew and Doe alone in the weight room and
left them there (with instructions to turn off the lights). Looking at the
record as a whole, we conclude CUSD has not demonstrated that any error in
admitting the evidence resulted in a miscarriage of justice, such that reversal
is warranted.
E. The Trial Court did not Abuse its Discretion in Allowing
Dr. Grant to Testify About Negligent Hiring, Retention, and
Supervision Within an Educational Setting.
CUSD contends Dr. Grant never should have been able to provide
opinions about negligent hiring, retention, or supervision within an

30
educational setting because she had no experience, training, or expertise in
these areas. Doe responds that CUSD forfeited this issue by not presenting a
fair summary of Dr. Grant’s qualifications. Furthermore, Doe argues the
court did not abuse its discretion in finding her qualified to offer an opinion
and in denying the motion to exclude her testimony.
“A person is qualified to testify as an expert if he has special
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education sufficient to qualify him
as an expert on the subject to which his testimony relates.” (Evid. Code,
§ 720, subd. (a).) The expert’s opinion is limited to “matter (including his
special knowledge, skill, experience, training, and education) perceived by or
personally known to the witness or made known to him at or before the
hearing, whether or not admissible, that is of a type that reasonably may be
relied upon by an expert in forming an opinion upon the subject to which his
testimony relates . . . .” (Id., § 801, subd. (b).)
We will not reverse a trial court’s determination that a witness
qualifies as an expert unless the court manifestly abused its discretion.
(People v. Nelson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 513, 536.) Such abuse exists only if “ ‘ “the
evidence shows that a witness clearly lacks qualification as an expert . . . .” ’ ”
(People v. Chavez (1985) 39 Cal.3d 823, 828 (Chavez).) If the witness
demonstrates sufficient knowledge of the subject for the opinion to go to the
jury, the degree of the witness’s knowledge goes more to the weight of the
evidence than to its admissibility. (People v. Morales (2020) 10 Cal.5th 76,
97.)
As an initial matter, we agree CUSD’s opening brief did not include a
recitation of all significant facts as required by California Rules of Court, rule
8.204(a)(2)(C), including those supporting the judgment. This court must
consider all the evidence presented regarding her qualifications to determine

31
whether Dr. Grant was qualified to testify on the challenged topics.
Nevertheless, we decline to decide this issue based on forfeiture.
Turning to the merits, CUSD contends Dr. Grant was not qualified to
opine as to the standard of care related to hiring, supervision, or human
resources policy within a school setting because she has never worked as a
teacher, administrator, or human resources employee within a school district.
However, CUSD fails to acknowledge Dr. Grant’s testimony during the
Evidence Code 402 hearing that her company provides consulting services to
school districts’ human resources departments and “also provide[s] risk
assessments for school districts where we will come in and review what
policies they have in place, hiring, prevention, training, investigation,
monitoring, and supervision, and we’ll outline for them areas of concern and
recommendations for improvement.” They identify “best practices for hiring,”
do third-party investigations for school districts, and provide consulting on
proper hiring procedures. She has personally serviced over 200 school
districts, working primarily with human resources directors,
superintendents, Title IX coordinators, and principals. She also worked as a
principal investigator on a department of justice comprehensive school safety
initiative that involved analyzing what policies and procedures five U.S.
school districts had in place prior to cases of employee sexual misconduct and
then evaluating what changed or did not change after those incidents
occurred. In light of this evidence, the court allowed her to testify on the
challenged topics because, although “[s]he is not an employee . . . the Court
finds that that is not required in terms of her ability to opine.”
The court did not abuse its discretion in so concluding. Dr. Grant has
special knowledge and experience training school districts on proper
standards for hiring, supervising, and investigating, and CUSD has offered

32
no authority for the proposition that such experience may only come from
working within a school district. CUSD is correct that “the trial court acts as
a gatekeeper to exclude speculative or irrelevant expert opinion” (Sargon
Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747,
770; Jennings v. Palomar Pomerado Health Systems, Inc. (2003) 114
Cal.App.4th 1108, 1117), but it has not identified why her in depth
experience working with schools from the outside makes her opinion any less
supported than it would be had she worked for a school district. Accordingly,
because the evidence does not show that Dr. Grant clearly lacks qualification
as an expert (Chavez, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 828), we find no abuse of
discretion.
F. CUSD Has Not Demonstrated the Trial Court Erred in
Refusing to Give its Proposed Jury Instructions.
CUSD contends the trial court erred by refusing to provide two special
jury instructions it requested. It argues this failure to clarify CUSD’s
liability is likely why the jury found CUSD nine times more at fault than the
actual perpetrator.
1. Additional Facts
The trial court instructed the jury with a modified version of CACI
No. 426. This instruction read:
“[Doe] claims that she was harmed by Jordan Bucklew and that
Coronado Unified School District is responsible for that harm because
Coronado Unified School District negligently hired, supervised or retained
Jordan Bucklew. To establish this claim, [Doe] must prove all of the
following:

33
“1. That Coronado Unified School District hired Jordan Bucklew;
“2. That Jordan Bucklew posed a risk of sexual misconduct toward
students;
“3. That Coronado Unified School District knew or should have known
that Jordan Bucklew posed a risk of sexual misconduct towards students and
that this risk of sexual misconduct towards students created a particular risk
to others;
“4. That Jordan Bucklew’s risk of sexual misconduct toward students
harmed [Doe]; and
“5. That Coronado Unified School District’s negligence in supervising
and/or retaining Jordan Bucklew was a substantial factor in causing [Doe’s]
harm.”
CUSD proposed instructions targeted at ensuring the jury did not hold
CUSD vicariously liable for Bucklew’s actions. These instructions provided
that (1) sexual misconduct was considered outside the course and scope of
employment and (2) CUSD’s liability was based on negligence, not a
presumption of responsibility for the employee’s sexual misconduct. The
court declined to give the instructions, explaining that “[t]he way . . . that the
jury is going to find liability against the district or not is solely 426, and if
it’s—those elements aren’t met, it’s a defense verdict. If those elements are
met, it’s going to be a plaintiff’s verdict.” In the court’s view, the proposed
instructions essentially were argument, and the court was not comfortable
“putting [its] thumb on the scale.”
2. Legal Principles
“A party is entitled upon request to correct, nonargumentative
instructions on every theory of the case advanced by him which is supported

34
by substantial evidence.” (Soule v. General Motors Corp. (1994) 8 Cal.4th
548, 572 (Soule).) “The trial court may not force the litigant to rely on
abstract generalities, but must instruct in specific terms that relate the
party’s theory to the particular case.” (Ibid.) But “[i]nstructions should state
rules of law in general terms and should not be calculated to amount to an
argument to the jury in the guise of a statement of law.” (Fibreboard Paper
Products Corp. v. East Bay Union of Machinists, Local 1304, United
Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO (1964) 227 Cal.App.2d 675, 718
(Fibreboard).) “[I]t is error to give, and proper to refuse, instructions that
unduly overemphasize issues, theories or defenses either by repetition or
singling them out or making them unduly prominent although the
instruction may be a legal proposition.” (Ibid.; see also Ghezavat v. Harris
(2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 555, 558–559, 561 [concluding trial court properly
refused to give special instructions that were argumentative and unduly
emphasized party’s theory of the case].) “It is not error . . . to refuse to give
an instruction requested by a party when the legal point is covered
adequately by the instructions that are given.” (Arato v. Avedon (1993)
5 Cal.4th 1172, 1189 fn. 11 (Arato).)
We review the propriety of jury instructions de novo. (Cristler v.
Express Messenger Systems, Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 72, 82.) “When a
party challenges a particular jury instruction as being incorrect or
incomplete, ‘we evaluate the instructions given as a whole, not in isolation.’ ”
(Ibid.)
3. Analysis
CUSD has not addressed the trial court’s contention that CACI No. 426
adequately covered the elements of Doe’s negligent hiring, supervision, and
retention claim or its concern that CUSD’s proposed instructions were

35
argumentative. It argues only that its proposed jury instructions were
correct statements of law.
Regardless of whether the instructions were accurate statements of
law, the court did not err if CACI No. 426 adequately covered the legal points.
(Arato, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 1189 fn. 11.) Here, it was apparent from CACI
No. 426 that sexual misconduct was considered outside the course and scope
of employment from the fact that CUSD could be held liable if it knew of
Bucklew’s sexual misconduct and did nothing about it. The evidence also
showed Bucklew was arrested and pled guilty to a crime because of his
conduct. Likewise, CACI No. 426 did not permit liability to be imposed on
CUSD unless it found both that (1) CUSD knew or should have known that
Bucklew posed an unreasonable risk, and (2) its negligence in supervising or
retaining Bucklew as a coach was a substantial factor in causing the harm to
Doe from Bucklew’s misconduct. Thus, under this instruction, the jury could
not have found CUSD vicariously liable simply because, unbeknownst to
district staff, its employee engaged in sexual misconduct.
CUSD nonetheless contends the jury was not provided the necessary
instruction as to its liability in relation to the liability of the actual
perpetrator. But its proposed jury instructions also do not clarify how the
jury should allocate fault between the parties. CUSD’s proposed jury
instructions stated as follows:
“An individual school employee’s sexual misconduct with a student is
considered outside the course and scope of the individual school employee’s
employment with the school district. This means the school district is not
liable simply because an individual school employee commits sexual
misconduct with a student. [And]

36
“[t]he fact that an individual school employee committed sexual
misconduct with a student does not establish or raise a presumption that the
employing school district bears responsibility for those acts or resulting
injuries. A school district’s liability must be based on evidence of the school
district’s own negligent hiring, retention, or supervision.”
As CACI No. 426 does, these instructions only address when CUSD
may be held liable and when it may not. They do not explain theories of the
case or elements not addressed by CACI No. 426, nor do they address
allocation of damages between two tortfeasors. Rather, by repeating that a
“school district is not liable” and there is no presumption of liability just
because a school employee commits sexual misconduct, the instructions
unduly overemphasize the defense’s existing position. (See Fibreboard,
supra, 227 Cal.App.2d at p. 718.) And ultimately, the second instruction
largely duplicates CACI No. 426. CUSD is not entitled to argumentative
instructions (Soule, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 572), and it has not persuaded this
court that the trial court erred in finding the proposed instructions
argumentative and unnecessary.
G. The Trial Court did not Abuse its Discretion in Excluding
Bucklew’s Statements.
CUSD sought to admit portions of Bucklew’s video statements to police,
apparently through officer Jade Gutzmer. It argued Bucklew’s statements
were admissible under Evidence Code section 1224. However, the court
ultimately excluded the evidence, relying on Doe’s counsel’s representation
that Labis v. Stopper (1970) 11 Cal.3d 1003 (Labis) held that Evidence Code
section 1224 only applied to situations in which there was a “unity of
interest” between the declarant and party, which it said was not the case

37
here. CUSD contends Doe’s counsel misrepresented the language of the
Labis case, and that the court erred in excluding Bucklew’s statements.
Regardless of the holding in Labis, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in concluding that Bucklew’s statements to the police were not
admissible under Evidence Code section 1224, because they were not offered
against CUSD; instead CUSD itself sought their admission.
Moreover, we will not reverse a judgment absent a showing that the
appealing party suffered prejudice. (F.P. v. Monier (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1099,
1107–1108.) It is appellant’s burden to establish prejudice by supplying the
reviewing court with cogent argument supported by citation to the record and
legal analysis. (Audish v. Macias (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 740, 751.) In this
case, CUSD does not make clear exactly what evidence it sought to admit or,
more importantly, why it was prejudiced by the court’s exclusion of the
evidence.
The record reflects that Doe objected to CUSD’s proposed exhibits
based on hearsay. The court sustained the objections only as to trial exhibit
numbers 242 through 248, which CUSD describes as containing “evidence
about Bucklew’s background, coaching, interactions with members on the
team and a background regarding the events involving the team.” But CUSD
does not explain how it was prejudiced by the exclusion of Bucklew’s
statements or why the outcome of the case would have been different had the
trial court admitted this evidence, and the answer is not self-evident based on
review of the cited exhibits. Instead, the nine transcript pages that CUSD
references seem only marginally relevant, covering generalities about
Bucklew’s career path and career interests, touching very generally on
coaching challenges involving parents at the school, and denying that he had

38
kissed Doe on the mouth, but then conceding that she had kissed him on the
mouth. He generally denied any improper conduct with Doe.
Bucklew’s conduct with Doe was not a disputed issue at trial, and
therefore we cannot discern the value of the excluded evidence to CUSD.
Absent a showing that it is reasonably probable CUSD would have achieved a
more favorable result absent the purported error (Cassim, supra, 33 Cal.4th

at pp. 800–801), we find no basis for reversing the judgment on this basis.3
H. CUSD Has Not Demonstrated it was Prejudiced by
Dr. Deborah Cresswell’s Refusal to Provide her
Psychological Testing Data.
CUSD contends that the trial court erred by denying its motion in
limine to preclude Doe’s psychology expert, Dr. Cresswell, from testifying as
to her psychologic testing raw data, because she did not turn over in
discovery certain testing results. CUSD brought its motion pursuant to Code
of Civil Procedure section 2034.300. That section provides that subject to
certain conditions not relevant here, the trial court shall exclude the expert
testimony of any witness who unreasonably fails to produce reports and
writings made by the expert in the course of preparing the expert’s opinion.
(Id., subd. (c).)
At her deposition, Dr. Cresswell testified that she would not provide
her raw testing data to counsel. She had used that data in preparing her
report. After the deposition, Doe’s attorney told CUSD’s counsel that he
would, in fact, provide the data; but by the time of the motion in limine, he

3 We note that the likelihood of CUSD demonstrating prejudice is
lessened further by the fact that some of the same facts came in via Barns’s
testimony. She said that Bucklew admitted to her that he kissed Doe once.
He otherwise denied ever inappropriately touching Doe.

39
had not done so. At the motion in limine hearing, Doe’s counsel proposed
that the issue could be resolved if CUSD would enter a protective order or
confidentiality agreement.
Thereafter, Doe’s counsel drafted a protective order that contemplated
that the data would be released to CUSD’s expert, Dr. Dominick Addario, and
he would make the determination as to whether the data would need to be
produced for cross-examination. CUSD’s counsel objected as to the form of
the protective order, and the court agreed with his concern. Because jury
selection was about to begin, the court requested briefing on the issue. Later,
during trial, the court heard further argument and then ordered that
Dr. Cresswell produce the raw data to Dr. Addario; that in Dr. Addario’s
discretion, he was allowed to produce the data to CUSD’s attorney; that the
data was subject to a protective order; and that the data would be destroyed
at the conclusion of the case. During her testimony, Dr. Creswell testified
that she provided the data directly to Dr. Addario, as ordered by the court.
Counsel for CUSD cross-examined her, asking her to compare the details in
the raw data with the information that she had included in her report, and
suggesting that she had “cherry-picked” the raw data in preparing her report.
CUSD’s own expert, Dr. Addario, also testified as to his view of the
limitations of the raw data as support for Dr. Cresswell’s expert report.
We review the trial court’s ruling on a motion to exclude expert
testimony for abuse of discretion, including its determination that a party
“unreasonably” failed to comply with an expert witness demand. (Staub v.
Kiley (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1437, 1445 (Staub).) As noted in Staub, a
party’s failure to produce discoverable reports and writings “can have drastic
consequences.” (Ibid.) Here, the raw data prepared by Dr. Cresswell was
discoverable and had not been timely produced. Therefore, under the plain

40
language of section 2034.300, the only issue for determination by the trial
court was whether the failure to produce it was unreasonable. Here, no party
requested such a finding as to reasonableness of the failure to produce, and
the court made no such finding.
But even if the absence of the finding constituted error by the trial
court, we cannot find that such error prejudiced CUSD. Pursuant to Code of
Civil Procedure section 475, “[n]o judgment . . . shall be reversed . . . by
reason of any error . . . unless it shall appear from the record that such
error . . . was prejudicial, and also that by reason of such error . . . the said
party . . . sustained and suffered substantial injury, and that a different
result would have been probable if such error . . . had not occurred . . . .”
Further, as discussed infra, Evidence Code section 353 provides that a
judgment may not be reversed because of erroneous admission of evidence
unless the admitted evidence “resulted in a miscarriage of justice.” Here,
CUSD ultimately obtained the raw data and was able to cross-examine Doe’s
expert as to the data and to present Dr. Addario’s direct testimony as to his
opinion of it. CUSD asserts that it was not able to depose Dr. Cresswell
about the raw data, and that Doe’s main witnesses had testified by the time
the data was received. But CUSD fails to explain what, if anything, could
have been addressed in the deposition of Dr. Cresswell that was not covered
by her cross-examination at trial; nor does it explain what it might have
raised with any other witness in light of the raw data. Further, to the extent
that CUSD hoped to discredit Dr. Cresswell’s conclusion that Doe suffered
from PTSD, such evidence had also come in through the testimony of a
different witness, namely her treating psychologist, Dr. Jada Cade.

41
In short, CUSD has failed to demonstrate prejudice or a miscarriage of
justice arising from the trial court’s ruling on its motion in limine as to Dr.
Cresswell’s raw data.
I. The Trial Court Did not Abuse its Discretion in Denying
CUSD’s Motion for a New Trial Based on Alleged Misconduct
of Doe’s Counsel and the Jury.
After Dr. Cresswell, an expert witness for Doe, testified as to the
likelihood of Doe’s need for hundreds of hours of future therapy at three
hundred dollars per hour, but prior to closing argument, Doe’s counsel
informed the court that Doe was withdrawing her claim for future economic
losses. After the jury verdict, CUSD moved for a new trial, relying on the
declarations of two jurors that they had included the expenses of future
therapy in the jury award. CUSD asserted that Doe’s counsel engaged in
misconduct by offering evidence of future economic damages and then
withdrawing its claim, thereby confusing the jury and leading the jury to
improperly incorporate future economic damages into its award of
noneconomic damages. The court denied the motion, concluding that to the
extent the declarations were admissible, they fell short of establishing that
the jurors had added in the cost of future therapy to its award of noneconomic
damages.
In considering the denial of a motion for new trial, we note that the
trial court has broad discretion. “A new trial motion ‘is addressed to the
judge’s sound discretion; [the judge] is vested with the authority, for example,
to disbelieve witnesses, reweigh the evidence, and draw reasonable inferences
therefrom contrary to those of the trier of fact; on appeal, all presumptions
are in favor of the order as against the verdict, and the reviewing court will
not disturb the ruling unless a manifest and unmistakable abuse of discretion

42
is made to appear.’ ” (Horsford v. Board of Trustees (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th
359, 379, citing Mercer v. Perez (1968) 68 Cal.2d 104, 112–113.)
On appeal, CUSD argues that Doe’s counsel committed misconduct,
leading to misconduct by the jury in its assessment of damages.
As to misconduct of counsel, we agree with Doe that CUSD has failed to
explain in what sense a waiver of damages constitutes misconduct. Further,
the trial court considered the extent of Dr. Cresswell’s testimony, the
relatively small amount of the costs that she testified to, and the overall
proceedings, and concluded that CUSD had not established sufficient
prejudice to warrant a new trial for the alleged misconduct. The trial court
did not abuse its discretion in arriving at this conclusion.
As to misconduct by the jury, the trial court specifically found that
“[n]othing in the declarations offered by CUSD indicates the jurors factored
in or added the estimated $103,200.00 [i.e. 344 hours at $300 per hour] in
future therapy costs as part of the award of future non-economic damages . . .
[n]or do these declarations or the jury questions submitted to the Court
indicate the jury agreed to disregard or violate the Court’s instructions.” The
court further acknowledged the jury’s discretion in reaching a verdict as to
noneconomic damages, citing Phipps v. Copeland Corp. (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th
319, 338 (noting that the calculation of non-economic damages is a question
of fact, which in the first instance is determined by the jury in its discretion).
We find no abuse of discretion in the court’s reasoning.
CUSD asserts that the jurors improperly discussed and considered the
cost of future therapy as part of their deliberations, and that she suffered
prejudice as a result. To the extent CUSD implies the court should have
factored in statements in the declarations from either party reflecting their
subjective mental processes, the court properly determined these statements

43
were inadmissible. Evidence Code section 1150, subdivision (a) provides that
“[u]pon an inquiry as to the validity of a verdict, any otherwise admissible
evidence may be received as to statements made, or conduct, conditions, or
events occurring, either within or without the jury room, of such a character
as is likely to have influenced the verdict improperly. No evidence is
admissible to show the effect of such statement, conduct, condition, or event
upon a juror either in influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict
or concerning the mental processes by which it was determined.”
But, as Evidence Code section 1150 makes clear, the court
appropriately considered the admissible portions of the declarations that
showed objective facts of the jury’s statements and conduct. For instance, one
juror whose declaration CUSD offered said, “there were discussions about the
fact that [Plaintiff] would need future therapy . . . [w]e agreed that our
verdict should take into consideration the expense of future therapy, and this
issue was discussed as part of our juror deliberations.” As the court noted,
the fact that this topic was discussed does not establish that the cost of future
therapy was included in the final verdict. Moreover, a counter declaration
indicates it was not. That declaration explained that after the discussion
about including the need for future therapy, another juror “stated that the
instructions and verdict form said we were only to decide the Plaintiff’s non-
economic damages and that we were not allowed to include the cost of the
Plaintiff’s future economic damages, such as the cost of future therapy.
[¶] . . . there was no additional discussion about the cost of the Plaintiff’s
future therapy.” These descriptions of objective and verifiable statements
(see People v. Hutchinson (1969) 71 Cal.2d 342, 350 [“the only improper
influences that may be proved under section 1150 to impeach a
verdict . . . [are] those open to sight, hearing, and the other senses and thus

44
subject to corroboration”]) provide reasonable and solid evidence supporting
the court’s conclusion. (See Nissan Motor Acceptance Cases (2021) 63
Cal.App.5th 793, 811.)
J. CUSD Did Not Establish that the Damage Award was the
Result of Passion or Prejudice, and Therefore the Trial Court
Did Not Err in Denying its Motion for a New Trial Based on
Excessive Damages.
CUSD contends the jury’s award of $5 million dollars for past and
future non-economic damages was excessive and that the court should have
granted its motion for a new trial on that basis. Doe responds that CUSD
waived its challenge to the damages by failing to fairly summarize the
evidence or provide any legal citations.
“[I]t is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that a trial court
judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is on an
appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to the
appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that justifies reversal
of the judgment.” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608–609.) In so
doing, the appellant is “ ‘required to set forth in their brief all the material
evidence on the point and not merely their own evidence’ ” or the error is
deemed forfeited. (Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon (1971) 3 Cal.3d 875, 881;
see also Delta Stewardship Council Cases (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 1014, 1072
[concluding an appellant forfeits its claim when it fails to summarize and
discuss the record that supports the challenged decision].) Moreover, “ ‘[i]n
order to demonstrate error, an appellant must supply the reviewing court
with some cogent argument supported by legal analysis and citation to the
record.’ ” (United Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC (2019)

45
36 Cal.App.5th 142, 146.) Failure to do so may result in the claim being
forfeited. (Id. at p. 163.)
Although CUSD did not provide this court with any of the relevant
standards, “[a] new trial shall not be granted upon . . . the ground of
excessive or inadequate damages, unless after weighing the evidence the
court is convinced from the entire record, including reasonable inferences
therefrom, that the court or jury clearly should have reached a different
verdict or decision.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 657.) On appeal, the court “must
determine every conflict in the evidence in respondent’s favor, and must give
him the benefit of every inference reasonably to be drawn from the record.”
(Seffert v. Los Angeles Transit Lines (1961) 56 Cal.2d 498, 508 (Seffert).)
In this case, CUSD has entirely omitted significant facts that support
the noneconomic damages award. For example, it fails to include in its
briefing that Doe’s treating psychologist of four years diagnosed her as
suffering from chronic PTSD and that an expert clinical psychologist
diagnosed PTSD as well as major depressive disorder as a result of her
interactions with Bucklew. CUSD also does not reference Doe’s testimony
that since the sexual misconduct was discovered, she has felt anxious,
embarrassed to go out in her community, and scared. She also expressed
experiencing difficulty sleeping, trust issues, fear of being alone, and a fear of
intimacy. We cannot determine every conflict in Doe’s favor when CUSD has
omitted a significant portion of the relevant evidence.
Likewise, we are unable to give Doe the benefit of every reasonable
inference when CUSD has drawn the inferences in its own favor in reciting
the facts. For instance, CUSD asserts that Doe’s “own testimony
acknowledged that she never felt forced, threatened or abused at the time the
events were occurring.” Yet, it would be reasonable to infer otherwise from

46
her testimony that during the incident in the backseat of Bucklew’s car, she
“was scared” and did not tell him she did not want to do those things because
she “didn’t really see a way out of it.”
As previously noted, “a trial judge is accorded a wide discretion in
ruling on a motion for new trial and . . . the exercise of this discretion is given
great deference on appeal.” (City of Los Angeles v. Decker (1977) 18 Cal.3d
860, 871–872.) Although “we must fulfill our obligation of reviewing the
entire record, including the evidence, so as to make an independent
determination as to whether the error was prejudicial” (Id. at p. 872), an
appellate court may not reverse a damages verdict unless “is so out of line
with reason that it shocks the conscience and necessarily implies that the
verdict must have been the result of passion and prejudice.” (Seffert, supra,
56 Cal.2d at p. 508; Major v. Western Home Ins. Co. (2009) 169 Cal.App.4th
1197, 1213.) CUSD did not cite or attempt to apply this standard in its
briefing or provide authority demonstrating why the verdict here must have
been the result of passion or prejudice. “We may disregard conclusory
arguments that are not supported by pertinent legal authority or fail to
disclose the reasoning by which the appellant reached the conclusions he
wants us to adopt.” (City of Santa Maria v. Adam (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th
266, 287.) Here, even if we did not find CUSD’s argument forfeited, we
conclude it failed to demonstrate that reversal is warranted.
K. Scope of Retrial
Our conclusions above do not disturb the jury’s finding that CUSD was
negligent or the amount of the jury’s award of damages. There also is no
basis for disturbing the jury’s conclusion that Bucklew is at fault.
Accordingly, the portions of the judgment recognizing the culpability of
CUSD and Bucklew are affirmed. However, because we conclude the parents

47
should have been included on the special verdict form for purposes of
apportioning damages, remand for a limited retrial is necessary.
“It is a firmly established principle of law that ‘[t]he appellate courts
have power to order a retrial on a limited issue, if that issue can be
separately tried without such confusion or uncertainty as would amount to a
denial of a fair trial.’ ” (Torres v. Automobile Club of So. California (1997)
15 Cal.4th 771, 776.)
In Collins v. Plant Insulation Co. (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 260, the First
District found a limited retrial appropriate under circumstances very similar
to those presented in this case. The family of a worker who died from
mesothelioma because of workplace exposure to asbestos sued his employer
and multiple other entitles. (Id. at p. 264.) The court granted a directed
verdict for the United States Navy, finding it was immune, and that fault
could not be allocated to it. (Ibid.) One of the defendants appealed,
challenging the ruling to the extent it excluded the Navy from the list of
entities that could be found at fault. The appellate court agreed, concluding
that although the Navy was in fact immune from suit, it should nonetheless
have been included on the verdict form for apportionment among the other
parties at fault. Because the defendant had not challenged the jury’s liability
verdict, the court concluded it could remand for a retrial limited to
apportionment of fault, including the Navy, without causing “confusion or
uncertainty.” (Id. at pp. 276–277.)
The same is true here. As another court pointed out in ordering a
limited retrial, “[i]t is true that, in order to make a proper allocation of
damage, the jury on the new trial will have to hear, and weigh, anew, all of
the evidence dealing with the conduct of the parties.” (O’Kelly v. Willig
Freight Lines (1977) 66 Cal.App.3d 578, 583.) But the jury may be told when

48
the case is submitted that (1) they must find as a matter of law in this case
that both CUSD and Bucklew are culpable to some degree—CUSD for
negligence and Bucklew for his intentional conduct, and (2) the total damages
award to be allocated is $2.5 million in past noneconomic damages and $2.5
million in future noneconomic damages. The court should instruct the jury
that their sole function is to determine how to apportion the damages to one
or both parents, if at all; and to Bucklew and CUSD.

DISPOSITION4
The judgment is reversed as to the apportionment of fault. In all other
respects, it is affirmed. The matter is remanded for a retrial limited to a
jury’s apportionment of fault among Doe’s parents, if any, and CUSD and
Bucklew, for the past and future noneconomic damages that have been found
by the jury. Each party shall bear its own costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.278(a).)
KELETY, J.

WE CONCUR:

DATO, Acting P. J.

CASTILLO, J.

4 Because we find it necessary to reverse and remand for a new
allocation of fault that includes the parents, we need not address Doe’s
challenge on cross-appeal to the trial court’s partial granting of CUSD’s
motion for JNOV and its reallocation of fault.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11234878. Public record. Not legal advice.