# TOROFIAS

> District Court, D. New Jersey · December 31, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11234519

## Case

- **Full name:** Christos T. v. Commissioner of Social Security
- **Court:** District Court, D. New Jersey
- **Decided:** December 31, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

CHRISTOS T.,1
Case No. 24–cv–10070–ESK
Plaintiff,

v.
OPINION
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.
KIEL, U.S.D.J.
THIS MATTER is before the Court on plaintiff Christos T.’s appeal (ECF
No. 1) from the final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration denying plaintiff’s application for Social Security Disability
Insurance Benefits (ECF No. 6–2 pp. 15–40). For the following reasons, the
Commissioner’s decision will be AFFIRMED.
I. BACKGROUND
Because the record is voluminous, I set forth only the facts necessary for
context and relevant to the issues on appeal.
On June 11, 2022, plaintiff filed an application for benefits and
supplemental security income. (Id. p. 18.) The application was denied
initially on November 22, 2022 and on reconsideration on February 9, 2023.
(Id.) Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) David Neuman held a hearing on
August 16, 2023, at which plaintiff and a vocational expert testified. (Id.

1 Due to the significant privacy concerns in Social Security cases, any
nongovernmental party will be identified and referenced solely by first name and last
initial in opinions issued in the United States District Court for the District of New
Jersey. See D.N.J. Standing Order 2021–10.
pp. 18, 41–70.) Thereafter, ALJ Robert Gonzalez2 held a supplemental hearing
on November 29, 2023, at which plaintiff, his representative, a medical expert,
and a vocational expert testified. (Id. pp. 19, 71–120.) On August 19, 2024,
ALJ Gonzalez issued a decision unfavorable to plaintiff, concluding that she
was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. (Id. pp. 18–
40.) On September 20, 2024, the Appeals Council denied plaintiff’s request for
review (id. pp. 2–7), making the August 2024 decision the Commissioner’s final
decision.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Standard Governing Benefits
The Act establishes a five-step sequential evaluation process for
determining whether a plaintiff is disabled within the meaning of the statute.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). “The claimant bears the burden of proof at steps
one through four, and the Commissioner bears the burden of proof at step five.”
Smith v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 632, 634 (3d Cir. 2010). The analysis
proceeds as follows:
At step one, the ALJ determines whether the claimant is
performing “substantial gainful activity.” 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i). If [the claimant] is,
[the claimant] is not disabled. Id. Otherwise, the ALJ
moves on to step two.

At step two, the ALJ considers whether the claimant has
any “severe medically determinable physical or mental
impairment” that meets certain regulatory requirements.
Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). A “severe
impairment” is one that “significantly limits [the
claimant’s] physical or mental ability to do basic work
activities.” Id. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). If the
claimant lacks such an impairment, [the claimant] is not
disabled. Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). If

2 From here on, “the ALJ” and “ALJ Gonzalez” both refer to ALJ Robert Gonzalez.
[the claimant] has such an impairment, the ALJ moves on
to step three.

At step three, the ALJ decides “whether the claimant’s
impairments meet or equal the requirements of an
impairment listed in the regulations” [(Listings)]. Smith,
631 F.3d at 634. If the claimant’s impairments do, [the
claimant] is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii),
416.920(a)(4)(iii). If [the claimant does] not, the ALJ
moves on to step four.

At step four, the ALJ assesses the claimant’s “residual
functional capacity” (RFC) and whether he can perform his
[or her] “past relevant work.” Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv),
416.920(a)(4)(iv). A claimant’s “[RFC] is the most [the
claimant] can still do despite [the claimant’s] limitations.”
Id. §§ 404.1545(a)(1), 416.945(a)(1). If the claimant can
perform … past relevant work despite [the claimant’s]
limitations, [the claimant] is not disabled. Id.
§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). If [the claimant]
cannot, the ALJ moves on to step five.

At step five, the ALJ examines whether the claimant “can
make an adjustment to other work[,]” considering his
“[RFC,] … age, education, and work experience.” Id.
§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v). That examination
typically involves “one or more hypothetical questions
posed by the ALJ to [a] vocational expert.” Podedworny
v. Harris, 745 F.2d 210, 218 (3d Cir. 1984). If the
claimant can make an adjustment to other work, [the
claimant] is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v),
416.920(a)(4)(v). If [the claimant] cannot, [the claimant]
is disabled.

Hess v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 931 F.3d 198, 201 (3d Cir. 2019).
B. Standard of Review
A reviewing court may enter “a judgment affirming, modifying, or
reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without
remanding the cause for a rehearing.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Factual findings,
“if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.” Id.; see also Appau
v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 847 F. App’x 149, 151 (3d Cir. 2021) (“Like the District
Court, we must uphold a final agency determination unless we find that it is
not supported by substantial evidence in the record.” (quoting Rutherford v.
Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 552 (3d Cir. 2005))). Review of an ALJ’s decision “is
highly deferential” and “[t]he substantial-evidence threshold ‘is not high.’”
Sisco v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 840 F. App’x 685, 687 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Biestek
v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 103 (2019)). “Substantial evidence ‘means—and
means only—“such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.’”” Id. (quoting Biestek, 587 U.S. at 103).
Courts are bound by an ALJ’s findings so long as they are supported by
substantial evidence even if the court would have decided the matter
differently. See Taylor v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 826 F. App’x 224, 226 (3d Cir.
2020).
An ALJ must sufficiently develop the record and explain findings in order
to permit meaningful review when the decision is read as a whole. Cosme v.
Comm’r Soc. Sec., 845 F. App’x 128, 132 (3d Cir. 2021). In so doing, an ALJ
need not use any particular language or format. Id. Though there is
deference afforded to the ALJ’s evaluation of evidence, witnesses, and expert
opinions, “remand is necessary ‘where we cannot ascertain whether the ALJ
truly considered competing evidence, and whether a [plaintiff’s] conditions,
individually and collectively, impacted’ his ability to work.” Grier v. Comm’r
Soc. Sec., 822 F. App’x 166, 170 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Diaz v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 577 F.3d 500, 506 (3d Cir. 2009)).
III. THE ALJ DECISION
At step one, the ALJ found that plaintiff had not engaged in any
substantial gainful activity. (ECF No. 6–2 p. 21.)
At step two, the ALJ determined that plaintiff had the following severe
impairments: multiple sclerosis, cervical spine spondylosis. (Id.)
At step three, ALJ Gonzalez considered various Listings and determined
that through the date last insured that plaintiff “did not have an impairment or
combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity” of any of
the impairments listed by the regulations. (Id. pp. 22–24.) Specifically, ALJ
Gonzalez determined that plaintiff’s depression “did not cause more than minimal
limitation in the claimant’s ability to perform basic mental work activities and
was therefore non-severe.” (Id. pp. 21, 22.) Further, plaintiff’s multiple
sclerosis did not result in plaintiff’s “disorganization of motor function in two
extremities” or leave plaintiff with a “marked” limitation in physical functioning.
(Id. pp. 22, 23.) Based on the totality of the evidence, ALJ Gonzalez found that
plaintiff had mild limitations in “understanding, remembering, or applying
information,” “interacting with others,” “concentrating, persisting, or maintain
pace, and “adapting or managing oneself.” (Id.) ALJ Gonzalez then
determined that there was no evidence to show that plaintiff’s cervical spine
spondylosis met Listing 1.15, which includes “[d]isorders of the skeletal spine
resulting in compromise of a nerve root(s).” (Id. pp. 23, 24.)
At step four, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff had the RFC to perform
sedentary work, with certain additional capabilities and limitations, including
that:
[H]e can occasionally climb ramps and stairs, balance, stoop,
kneel[ ], crouch[ ], crawl[ ]; never climb ladders, ropes, or
scaffolds; cannot work at unprotected heights, or with
machinery with moving mechanical parts; and must avoid
concentrated exposure to extreme cold, extreme heat,
wetness, humidity, vibrations, fumes[,] odors, dust, gases,
[and] poor ventilation; but [he] can work in areas of
moderate noise such as department stores, grocery stores,
and areas of light traffic.
Upon summarizing plaintiff’s testimony, ALJ Gonzalez determined that
plaintiff’s “statements concerning the intensity, persistence[,] and limiting effects
of these symptoms [were] not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and
other evidence in the record.” (Id. p. 25.) For example, ALJ Gonzalez noted
that plaintiff’s ability to cook, clean, do laundry, do minor repairs and yard work,
go to the store alone, bathe and dress himself, walk, do tai chi and yoga, and
exercise daily demonstrates that plaintiff’s “daily activities … are not limited to
the extent one would expect.” (Id.) Further, ALJ Gonzalez reviewed the “type,
dosage, effectiveness, and side effects” of plaintiff’s medication regimen and
concluded that it would not prevent plaintiff from engaging in the RFC. (Id.)
At step five, ALJ Gonzalez considered plaintiff’s background, RFC, and
vocational expert testimony to determine that plaintiff was “capable of
performing past relevant work” as a data processing manager as that work is
generally performed. (Id. pp. 32, 33.) Moreover, “there were other jobs that
existed in significant numbers in the national economy that the [plaintiff] also
could have performed.” (Id. p. 33.) These jobs consist of parimutuel ticket
checker, document preparer, and addresser. (Id. pp. 33, 34.) Accordingly,
ALJ Gonzalez found that plaintiff was not disabled pursuant to the Social
Security Act.
IV. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff raises three main challenges to the ALJ’s decision. (ECF No. 7
(Mov. Br.) p. 6.) First, plaintiff argues that ALJ Gonzalez’s step two
determination that plaintiff’s mental impairments—particularly depression—
were not “severe” is not supported by substantial evidence. (Id. pp. 9–10.)
Second, plaintiff argues that ALJ Gonzalez erred in finding the medical opinion
of Dr. Spisak-Mosher unpersuasive. (Mov. Br. pp. 14–15.). Third, plaintiff
argues that ALJ Gonzalez’s RFC finding is not supported by substantial
evidence and does not adequately reflect the impact of multiple sclerosis,
fatigue, and cognitive symptoms. (Id. pp. 11–14.) Last, plaintiff argues that
ALJ Gonzalez’s step-four (past work) and step-five (alternative work) conclusions
are not supported by substantial evidence because they rely on a flawed RFC and
improper weighing of the medical opinions. (Id. pp. 16–19.) The Commissioner
filed an opposition brief (ECF No. 9), in response to which, plaintiff filed a reply
brief (ECF No. 10 (Reply Br.).)
A. Step Two
Plaintiff argues that ALJ Gonzalez’s determination at step two that
plaintiff’s mental condition was not a “severe” impairment was not supported
by substantial evidence. (Mov. Br. pp. 9–10.)
At step two, the ALJ must determine whether plaintiff has any
impairments severe enough to limit his ability to work. Sykes v. Apfel, 228
F.3d 259, 262 (3d Cir. 2000). A severe impairment is “something beyond a
slight abnormality or a combination of slight abnormalities which would have
no more than a minimal effect on an individual’s ability to work.” McCrea v.
Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 370 F.3d 357, 360 (3d Cir. 2004). The burden is on the
plaintiff to show a severe impairment at step two, but the inquiry is de minimis
and used to filter out meritless claims. See id.; Newell v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
347 F.3d 541, 546 (3d Cir. 2003)). Nevertheless, “diagnoses alone are
insufficient to establish their severity at [s]tep [t]wo.” Salles v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 229 F. App’x 140, 145 (3d Cir. 2007).
I find that ALJ Gonzalez’s step two determination is supported by
substantial evidence. ALJ Gonzalez broadly assessed plaintiff’s mental
function with respect to the four “paragraph B” criteria, namely: (1)
understanding, remembering, or applying information; (2) interacting with
others; (3) concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace; and (4) adapting or
managing oneself. (ECF No. 6–2, pp. 21–22.) For each functional domain,
ALJ Gonzalez analyzed reports from psychological examinations, testimony of
medical experts, and plaintiff’s own statements and found only mild limitations,
thus concluding that plaintiff’s depression was non-severe. (Id.)
Plaintiff suggests that the ALJ gave too little weight to the report of Dr.
Theodore Brown. (Mov. Br. pp. 9, 10; see ECF No. 6–7 pp. 139–144.) Plaintiff
acknowledges that ALJ Gonzalez “note[d] the report of Dr. Brown” and
plaintiff’s hearing testimony but simply concluded that they indicated only a
mild impairment. (Mov. Br. p. 10; see ECF No. 6–2 p. 21.)
In short, ALJ Gonzalez specifically balanced Dr. Brown’s report with the
totality of the evidence to determine that although plaintiff does have certain
limitations, she is able to function sufficiently. (ECF No. 6–2 pp. 21–22.)
Given that a reviewing court “must not substitute [its] own judgment for that
of the fact finder,” I find plaintiff’s argument to be without merit. Zirnsak v.
Colvin, 777 F.3d 607, 611 (3d Cir. 2014.) Moreover, because ALJ Gonzalez
found in plaintiff’s favor at step two by finding at least one severe impairment
(here, multiple sclerosis and cervical spine spondylosis), “even if he had
erroneously concluded that some of [plaintiff’s] other impairments were non-
severe, any error was harmless.” Salles, 229 F. App’x at 145 n. 2.
B. RFC
Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ’s findings as to the RFC are not supported
by substantial evidence because the ALJ failed to consider plaintiff’s depression
or fatigue. (Mov. Br. pp.11–14.) Plaintiff implies that ALJ Gonzalez failed to
consider reports from Dr. Brown, Dr. Spisak-Mosher, and testimony from Dr.
Koenig. (Id.)
“To assess the RFC, the ALJ must consider all relevant evidence from the
record, which includes statements from medical sources and the claimant’s own
description of her limitations.” Morel v. Colvin, 14–02934, 2016 WL 1270758,
at *6 (D.N.J. Apr. 1, 2016). “The RFC assessment must be supported by a clear
statement of the facts upon which the finding is based.” Id. “If a claimant’s
symptoms “suggest a greater functional restriction than is demonstrated by the
objective evidence alone, the Commissioner considers evidence such as the
claimant’s statements, daily activities, duration and frequency of pain,
medication, and treatment.” Id. (quoting Landeta v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 191
F. App’x 105, 111 (3d Cir. 2006)).
Plaintiff offers no evidence in support of his position. Instead, I find that
when assessing plaintiff’s RFC, ALJ Gonzalez thoroughly discussed plaintiff’s
medical history, self-reported limitations and abilities, testimony, and medical
reports. (ECF No.6–2 pp. 24–32.) The ALJ provided a detailed summary of
plaintiff’s limitations and medical records and discussed in detail the opinions
of his medical providers. (Id.) For example, the ALJ noted, inter alia, that
plaintiff could cook, clean, wash laundry, bathe and dress himself, do yoga and
tai chi, and attend virtual classes. (ECF No. 6–2 p. 25.) To the extent plaintiff
takes issue with ALJ Gonzalez not having given proper weight to the reports of
Dr. Brown and Dr. Spisak-Mosher and the testimony of Dr. Koenig (see Mov.
Br. pp. 12, 13), an ALJ need not “defer or give any specific evidentiary weight,
including controlling weight, to any medical opinion(s) or prior administrative
medical finding(s), [ ] including those from [the plaintiff’s own] medical sources.”
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a). Instead of assigning weight to medical opinions, the
ALJ considers the persuasiveness of a medical opinion or finding. Id.
Consistent with this regulation, the ALJ did just that. See Wellington v.
Kijakazi, No. 22–05042, 2023 WL 5551030, at *6 (D.N.J. Aug. 29, 2023) (“[T]he
ALJ did not merely announce her RFC determination without providing any
support or explanation. She appropriately evaluated the objective medical
record.”); Jose v. Kijakazi, 19–19077, 2023 WL 5125533, at *4 (D.N.J. Aug. 9,
2023) (finding that the ALJ’s discussion of the objective medical evidence
“indicates that his RFC determination is supported by substantial evidence and
that it resulted from his ‘careful consideration of the entire record’”).
C. Medical Opinions
Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ erred by rejecting the opinion of Dr.
Spisak-Mosher. (Mov. Br. pp. 14–15.)
ALJs must assess the persuasiveness of the medical opinions and prior
administrative findings based on the five factors enumerated in 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520c. Lynch v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 23–1982, 2024 WL 2237961, at
*2 (3d Cir. May 17, 2024). Those factors are: (1) supportability; (2) consistency;
(3) relationship with the plaintiff; (4) specialization; and (5) other factors. 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c). Supportability and consistency are the two most
important factors when assessing persuasiveness. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a).
For supportability, “[t]he more relevant the objective medical evidence and
supporting explanations presented by a medical source are to support his or her
medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s), the more
persuasive the medical opinions or prior administrative medical finding(s) will
be.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(1). Likewise, “[t]he more consistent a medical
opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s) is with the evidence from
other medical sources and nonmedical sources in the claim, the more persuasive
the medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s) will be.” 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(2).
As stated above, an ALJ need not defer to any particular medical opinions
or findings. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a). Instead, the ALJ must articulate
how they considered supportability and consistency when determining the
persuasiveness of each medical opinion. Id.; Lynch, 2024 WL 2237961, at *2.
Here, I find that ALJ Gonzalez properly considered Dr. Spisak-Mosher’s
opinion. (See ECF No. 6–2 pp. 30–31.) ALJ Gonzalez concluded that Dr.
Spisak-Mosher’s opinions including, inter alia, that plaintiff experiences
frequent pain and fatigue that interferes with his attention and concentration,
that he would miss work more than four times per month, and that he could not
perform even low stress jobs, were unpersuasive. (Id.) ALJ Gonzalez
considered supportability, pointing to the lack of support for Dr. Spisak-
Mosher’s conclusions even from her own examination of plaintiff. (Id. p. 31.)
Further, ALJ Gonzalez cites to dozens of record documents as well as plaintiff’s
own testimony to demonstrate how Dr. Spisak-Mosher’s opinions are
inconsistent with the record as whole, “which shows that [plaintiff] regularly
exhibited full strength and reflexes in all extremities with a normal gate, and
no loss of sensation.” (Id.)
Accordingly, ALJ Gonzalez did not err in finding Dr. Spisak-Mosher’s
opinion unpersuasive.
D. Steps Four and Five
Plaintiff’s final challenge is to the ALJ’s step four and step five analysis.
Plaintiff argues that because the ALJ’s RFC analysis was deficient, the ALJ’s
corresponding finding that plaintiff could perform past work (step four) or other
work (step five) cannot be sustained. (Mov. Br. pp. 16–19.) Specifically,
plaintiff takes issue with the ALJ utilizing an RFC “that does not take into
account the fatigue and the missing work and the effects of cognitive loss.” (Id.
p. 16.) As to step four, plaintiff argues that the past work identified as possible
by the vocational expert using the RFC from ALJ Gonzalez—Manager, Data
Processing, DOT 169.167-030—should have been considered a composite job.
(Id.) At step five, plaintiff argues the alternative jobs named by the vocational
expert—Parimutuel ticket checker, DOT 219.587-010, Document preparer,
DOT 249.587-018, and Addresser, DOT 209.587-010—are obsolete in the
current economy and have a lower job incidence than stated. (Id. pp. 18–19.)
As a preliminary matter, since plaintiff did not object to the vocational
expert’s testimony during the hearing, any objection raised now is untimely.
Dionisio v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 23–22067, 2025 WL 428557, at *5 (D.N.J. Feb.
7, 2025). However, even if the challenge were timely, it is plaintiff’s burden to
show at step four that he could not perform his past relevant work. Smith,
631 F.3d at 634. Plaintiff has presented no evidence to show that Data
Processing Manager is a composite job or that plaintiff would not be able to
perform it. Moreover, although plaintiff takes issue with the vocational expert
relying on the alternative jobs of parimutuel ticket checker, document preparer,
and addresser, plaintiff has pointed to no errors made by ALJ Gonzalez or the
vocational expert, and in fact plaintiff credits ALJ Gonzalez for asking the
vocational expert about changes in the jobs of addresser and document
preparer. (Reply Br. pp. 11, 12.)
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Commissioner’s decision denying
plaintiff’s application for benefits is AFFIRMED.

/s/ Edward S. Kiel
EDWARD S. KIEL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: December 30, 2025

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11234519. Public record. Not legal advice.