# Armstrong

> District Court, E.D. New York · December 31, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11234502

## Case

- **Full name:** Norrel Armstrong v. 781 Metropolitan JV LLC
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. New York
- **Decided:** December 31, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11234502

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- affirming a district court’s denial of a request to “enjoin summary eviction proceedings” as barred by the Anti-Injunction Act

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
--------------------------------------------------------X
NORREL ARMSTRONG,

Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM & ORDER
25-CV-7047 (NRM) (PK)
-against-

781 METROPOLITAN JV LLC,

Defendant.
--------------------------------------------------------X
NINA R. MORRISON, United States District Judge:
On December 23, 2025, Plaintiff Norrel Armstrong, proceeding pro se, filed the
above-captioned civil action seeking to stay a state court order of eviction. ECF No 1
(“Compl.”). Plaintiff also submitted a proposed Order to Show Cause seeking the
same relief. ECF No. 3 (“OTSC”).1 Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, ECF No. 2, is granted for the limited purpose of this
Order. For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed and the
proposed Order to Show Cause for immediate injunctive relief is denied.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges that he has succession rights in a Section 8 subsidized
apartment owned by Defendant, and that the New York City Housing Authority
issued a “Succession Letter confirming his status as the legal successor to the

1 On December 19, 2025, Plaintiff filed a similar action, along with a proposed
Order to Show Cause, seeking the same relief. On the same day, the Court denied
Plaintiff’s motion for immediate relief and dismissed the complaint without prejudice.
See Armstrong v. 781 Metropolitan JV LLC et al., No. 25-CV-6983 (NRM) (PK)
(E.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2025.)
tenancy.” Compl. at 5, 8. He asserts that “Defendant’s use of the State’s judicial
machinery to seize a federal subsidy without a pre-termination hearing violates the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 7.

In his motion for a temporary restraining order, he states: “An eviction is
scheduled for 12/31/2025 9:00AM, which will cause irreparable harm by terminating
a federal Section 8 subsidy and my 2-year vested residency . . . .” OTSC at 1. Plaintiff
requests an immediate temporary restraining order “staying the state court eviction
in 781 Metropolitan JV LLC v. Armstrong (Index No. L&T 323866-24KI).” Id.
Plaintiff attaches to the motion a partial copy of an unsigned stipulation of

settlement in the state court action, that would have required Plaintiff to pay more
than $15,000 in back rent plus the November rent in exchange for his signature on a
lease to commence November 1, 2025. Id. at 3. He also attaches a partial copy of an
order seeking a stay in the New York Appellate Division, Second Department of
unspecified proceedings; the partial copy is marked “Refused” by the Honorable
Joanne D. Quiñones. Id. at 6.

DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
Courts are required to give special consideration to pro se litigants, those
individuals who represent themselves in court. This means that pro se litigants are

not expected to meet the same standards required for formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Where a liberal reading of the
pleading “gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated,” the court must
grant leave to amend it at least once. Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir.
2000) (quoting Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999)).
A federal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915, allows indigent plaintiffs to file lawsuits

without paying the usual filing fee. This statute requires a district court to dismiss
a case if the complaint “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which
relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is
immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). To avoid dismissal, a complaint
must include facts that show that the defendants may be responsible for the harm to

the plaintiff. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Although “detailed factual allegations” are not
required, a complaint must include more than only “labels and conclusions” or a list
of the elements of a cause of action. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. A complaint fails to
state a claim if it includes only bare assertions with no factual details. Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678.

Moreover, a federal district court has the inherent power to dismiss a case, sua
sponte, if it determines that the action is frivolous, or the court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over the matter. An action is frivolous as a matter of law when, inter
alia, it is “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory” — that is, when it “lacks
an arguable basis in law or a dispositive defense clearly exists on the face of the
complaint.” Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998)
(citation omitted). For example, “[a] complaint will be dismissed as ‘frivolous’ when

‘it is clear that the defendants are immune from suit.’” Montero v. Travis, 171 F.3d
757, 760 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327
(1989)).
Additionally, if a court “determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter

jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); see Chestnut
v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 11-CV-5369 (JS) (ARL), 2012 WL 1657362, at *3
(E.D.N.Y. May 7, 2012) (“Notwithstanding the liberal pleading standard afforded pro
se litigants, federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and may not preside over
cases if subject matter jurisdiction is lacking.”).
A plaintiff seeking to invoke the Court’s jurisdiction must also establish that

he has standing, which requires him to demonstrate that he has suffered a “concrete
and particularized injury.” See TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 423
(2021). “If ‘the plaintiff does not claim to have suffered an injury that the defendant
caused and the court can remedy, there is no case or controversy for the federal court
to resolve.’” Id. (quoting Casillas v. Madison Ave. Assocs., Inc., 926 F.3d 329, 333 (7th
Cir. 2019).

II. The Anti-Injunction Act
Under the Anti-Injunction Act, “[a] court of the United States may not grant
an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by
Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate

its judgments.” 28 U.S.C. § 2283. Where, as here, none of the enumerated exceptions
apply, the Anti-Injunction Act functions as “an absolute prohibition against any
injunction of any state-court proceedings.” Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S.
623, 630 (1977); see Allen v. New York City Hous. Auth., No. 10-CV-168 (CM) (DCF),
2010 WL 1644956, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 2010) (“Courts in this Circuit have
repeatedly held that the Anti-Injunction Act bars a federal court from enjoining state-

court eviction proceedings.”); see also Watkins v. Ceasar, 88 F. App’x 458, 459 (2d Cir.
2004) (affirming a district court’s denial of a request to “enjoin summary eviction
proceedings” as barred by the Anti-Injunction Act).
In this case, Plaintiff is asking this Court to intervene in a landlord-tenant
proceeding in state court where it appears an order of eviction has already been
entered, and an appellate judge has declined to intervene. The Anti-Injunction Act

prohibits this Court from interfering in these state court proceedings. Accordingly,
the Court is unable to grant Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief.
III. Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Additionally, “Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to establish this Court’s

subject matter jurisdiction because simply referencing constitutional provisions or
federal statutes is insufficient to establish subject matter jurisdiction.” Espinoza v.
FBI, No. 21-CV-4749 (WFK), 2021 WL 6196810, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2021); see
also Perpetual Secs., Inc. v. Tang, 290 F.3d 132, 137 (2d Cir. 2002) (“Simply raising a
federal issue in a complaint will not automatically confer federal question
jurisdiction.”); Gaston v. Shelter, No. 24-CV-04386 (NCM) (LB), 2024 WL 3360365, at

*2 (E.D.N.Y. July 10, 2024) (“Because plaintiff has not alleged a valid basis for the
Court’s federal question or diversity jurisdiction, the Court must dismiss plaintiff’s
complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.”)
Furthermore, district courts do not have federal question jurisdiction over
state residential housing matters. See Ally v. Sukkar, 128 F. App’x 194, 195 (2d Cir.
2005) (“[Plaintiff’s] complaint arises out of a landlord-tenant dispute over which the

federal courts simply have no jurisdiction.”); Schmidt v. Am. Package Co., Inc., No.
23-CV-5821 (NRM) (JRC), 2023 WL 5952024, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2023); Nichols
v. Epstein, No. 22-CV-3187 (LDH) (CLP), 2023 WL 2305936, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 1,
2023); see also Johnson v. Ikezi, No. 20-CV-2792 (LDH) (CLP), 2021 WL 1091910, at
*2 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2021) (collecting cases); Bey v. Jones, No. 19-CV-2577 (RRM)
(PK), 2019 WL 2028703, at *2 (E.D.N.Y May 8, 2019) (“The Court lacks federal

question jurisdiction over [plaintiff’s] state law claims in this landlord-tenant
matter”); McMillan v. Dep’t of Bldgs., No. 12-CV-318 (ENV), 2012 WL 1450407, at *2
(E.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2012) (“Wrongful eviction claims, whether for a temporary or final
eviction, are state law claims, and this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over
them.”); Galland v. Margules, No. 05-CV-5639 (DC), 2005 WL 1981568, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2005) (“[T]his Court does not have federal question subject matter
jurisdiction over plaintiff’s housing law claims, even when such claims are dressed in

the garb of constitutional claims.”).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the action is dismissed. 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). Plaintiff’s request for immediate injunctive
relief by Order to Show Cause is denied.
The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from
this order would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is
denied for purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444–

45 (1962).
The Clerk of Court is requested to enter Judgment and mail a copy of this
Order and the Judgment to Plaintiff and note the mailing on the docket.
Finally, if Plaintiff requires legal assistance in his state-court proceedings, he
is encouraged to visit http://nyc.gov/site/hra/help/legal-services-for-tenants.page for
more information on free legal help for tenants.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Nina R. Morrison
NINA R. MORRISON
United States District Judge

Dated: December 31, 2025
Brooklyn, New York

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11234502. Public record. Not legal advice.