# Opinion

> District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania · November 26, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11231885

## Case

- **Full name:** Gina Rae Smith v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration
- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** November 26, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
GINA RAE SMITH, )
)
) Civil Action No. 2:25-23
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. )
) Magistrate Judge Patricia L. Dodge
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY )
ADMINISTRATION, )
)
)
Defendant. )

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. Recommendation
It is respectfully recommended that, pursuant to Sentence Four of Section 405(g), the
decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiff’s claims for benefits be reversed
and that this matter be remanded to the Commissioner for further review.
II. Report
Plaintiff Gina Rae Smith (“Smith”) commenced this action against the Commissioner of
Social Security (“Commissioner”), under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3). Smith seeks judicial
review of an unfavorable decision regarding her claims for Social Security Disability Insurance
Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”). Smith seeks to have the
Commissioner’s decision vacated and remanded for further review, while the Commissioner seeks
to have it affirmed. The parties have filed briefs in support of their respective positions.
For the reasons below, the Court should grant judgment in Smith’s favor, vacate the
decision of the Commissioner denying Smith’s claims for benefits and remand this matter to the
Commissioner for further review.
A. Procedural History
On May 18, 2022, Smith filed applications for both DIB under Title II of the Social Security
Act and SSI under Title XVI of the Act. (R. 197-98, 199-206.)1 She alleged disability beginning
on August 6, 2019 due to diabetes mellitus-Type 2, hypertension, osteoarthritis of the lower back

and bilateral shoulders, Bipolar I Disorder-manic depression and generalized anxiety disorder. (R.
70.) Her claims were initially denied on September 30, 2022 and again on reconsideration on
January 27, 2023. (R. 109-10, 114-17, 120-22, 124-26.) She appealed, seeking a hearing before an
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). A hearing was held on November 6, 2023 before ALJ Brady
Carter (R. 36-68.) ALJ Carter issued an unfavorable decision on March 14, 2024, finding that
Smith was not disabled under the Social Security Act. (R. 14-35.) Thereafter, Smith filed a request
for review of hearing decision/order to the Appeals Council, and her appeal was denied on
November 20, 2024. (R. 1-5.)
Here, Smith seeks judicial review of the denial of benefits. By order dated March 6, 2025,
Smith was required to move for summary judgment by April 6, 2025. After she obtained several

extensions of time, she filed a brief on August 5, 2025 (ECF No. 12). The Commissioner submitted
a brief in opposition on September 8, 2025 (ECF No. 13) and Smith filed a reply brief on
September 22, 2025 (ECF No. 14).2

1 Citations to the record (ECF No. 4) are referred to as “R.”
2 The Supplemental Rules for Social Security indicate that “The action is presented for decision
by the parties’ briefs.” (Supp. Rule 5.)
B. Factual Background
1. Medical Evidence
a. Dr. Patterson
On August 29, 2022, Kevin R. Patterson, M.D., a board-certified psychiatrist, submitted a

medical opinion based on his treatment of Smith since January 2020 for psychiatric conditions.
(R. 655-58.) As noted by Dr. Patterson, Smith’s diagnoses were Major Depressive Disorder,
Unspecified Attention-Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), and unspecified anxiety disorder.
(R. 655.) Her symptoms included but were not limited to difficulty concentrating or thinking,
memory impairment, emotional lability and recurrent severe panic attacks. (R. 655.)
Based on his analysis of Smith’s diagnoses and symptoms, Dr. Patterson opined that Smith
was markedly limited in her abilities to understand, remember, or apply information. (R. 656.) He
concluded that she would not be able to understand and carry out simple instructions or detailed
but uninvolved written or oral instructions. (R. 656.) He found that Smith could not “follow-
through with predictability due to memory, attention, distractibility,” and that her “unpredictability

of emotions/anxiety affect performance.” (R. 656.)
Dr. Patterson also concluded that Smith could not consistently work with co-workers or
supervisors since her interactions would be affected by her emotional state. (R. 657.) Regarding
her ability to concentrate, persist, or maintain pace, he found marked limitations on her ability to
concentrate, noting that her ability to maintain attention and concentration was limited to fifteen
minutes. (R. 657.) Thus, she would be off-task for more than 25% of the workday. (R. 657.) She
also lacked the ability to maintain regular attendance and punctuality and would require enhanced
supervision. (R. 657.) Thus, it was his belief that she would have four or more absences per month.
(R. 658.)
Dr. Patterson also stated that Smith was markedly limited in her ability to adapt or manage
herself (R. 657) and would have inappropriate reactions “if agitated emotionally.” (R. 658.) As a
result, he concluded, she could not respond appropriately to changes in a work setting and that her
“combination of poor focus and anxiety would be severe under this circumstance.” (R. 658.)

b. Shelbi Wood, PAC
Shelbi Wood, PAC3 has been treating Smith since February 3, 2020. In a September 7,
2023 statement (R. 900-04), Wood offered a fair prognosis for Smith as she had “very poor
psychosocial supports.” (R. 900.) Wood’s description of symptoms was similar to those noted in
Dr. Patterson’s first report. (R. 901.) Wood rated Smith’s abilities to understand, remember, or
apply information and maintain pace as moderately limited (R. 902), noting that “concentration,
focus, distractibility, and poor short-term memory all impact these.” (R. 902.) According to Wood,
Smith could not follow oral instructions (R. 903) and could only maintain attention and
concentration for less than two hours before needing redirection. (R. 903.) She would not be able
to maintain attention and concentration or be punctual within customary tolerances. (R. 903.)

Smith could not routinely interact with the public or consistently maintain socially appropriate
behavior. (R. 903-04.) Like Dr. Patterson, Wood concluded that Smith would be off-task more
than 25% of the workday and would miss four days of work per month. (R. 904.)
c. Lori Scheffer, CRNP
Lori Scheffer, CRNP,4 Smith’s treating family practitioner, completed a medical opinion
on her behalf on November 20, 2023. (R. 963-66.) Scheffer has treated Smith for years for her
anxiety and depression. (R. 963.) Scheffer opined that Smith would be off-task more than 25% of

3 Physician Assistant-Certified.
4 Certified Registered Nurse Practitioner.
the day and could only maintain attention and concentration for less than an hour before requiring
a break. (R. 963.) She also opined that Smith would be absent four days per month due to her
mental health conditions. (R. 963.)
Scheffer also rendered opinions about Smith’s physical abilities, noting that she could

occasionally lift up to ten pounds (R. 964), sit and stand/walk for up to three hours each and would
require a sit/stand option (R. 964) and occasionally use foot controls. (R. 965.) Scheffer also stated
that Smith could not balance, stoop, crouch or crawl, and rarely kneel or rotate her head and neck.
(R. 965.) She could frequently reach with her left arm but only occasionally reach laterally and
rarely overhead with her right arm. (R. 965.)
d. Virginia Pierce, MS, APRN-CNP
On December 17, 2023, Virginia Pierce, MS, APRN-CNP,5 drafted a medical opinion letter
regarding Smith. (R. 968-72.) Based on her review of the medical records, Pierce opined that Smith
could only reach or handle “with the right upper extremity for very little to 1/3 of an 8-hour
workday.” (R. 968.) Pierce noted specific medical records, including a January 26, 2021 x-ray of

her shoulder and an October 5, 2021 surgical procedure performed by Dr. Douglas.(R. 968.)
Pierce explained that:
The diagnostic studies and exam findings are consistent with Ms. Smith’s
subjective complaints, as well as support my opinion that she requires limitations
on her workday. Ms. Smith has chronic right shoulder pain. Shoulder pain may
arise from the shoulder joint itself of from any of the many surrounding muscles,
ligaments or tendons. Shoulder pain that comes from the joint usually worsens with
activities or movement in the arm or shoulder. Ms. Smith had an x-ray of the right
shoulder which revealed a type III acromioclavicular joint separation and an acute
avulsion fracture of the acromion. She underwent surgical repair of the shoulder
dislocation. Due to surgical intervention, Ms. Smith would be limited to reaching
or handling with her right upper extremity for very little up to one third of an 8-
hour workday.

5 Advanced Practice Registered Nurse-Certified Nurse Practitioner.
(R. 969.)
2. Hearing Testimony
a. Smith’s testimony
Smith testified at the hearing on November 6, 2023. She has a high school education (R.

43) and last worked in 2019 as a housekeeper at a motel. (R.44.) Her only past full-time work was
as a homecare worker. (R. 45.) She lives in a single-wide trailer by herself. (R. 50.) Her nephew
helps her with her finances and paying her bills and drives her to the grocery store because she
does not have a car. (R. 49-51.) She is able to cook, clean and do laundry. (R. 51.) When asked
about her chores around the home, she said that by the end of the day, she is sore, must lie down
and “pay[s] for it at the end of the day.” (R. 58.)
While she watches television, she testified that she cannot follow the plot of a show unless
she watches it multiple times. (R. 51-52.)
Smith stated that she does not stand or sit in one position for very long, and her most
comfortable position is lying down. (R. 53-54.) The heaviest thing she lifts is a vacuum cleaner.

(R. 54.) She estimated that she could walk about twenty minutes at a time. (R. 52.) She stated that
her right shoulder “wasn’t corrected right” and she would have to have more surgery. (R. 55.) She
cannot pick up small items like a paper clip or coin. (R. 56.) She takes medications for ADHD,
diabetes and issues with her shoulder and her back, but the pain medication for her shoulder only
“takes the edge off.” (R. 54.) She is also hard of hearing. (R. 58.)
Smith believes that her anxiety would keep her from working full-time. (R. 54.) According
to her testimony, it affected her at work because she would start crying and feeling overwhelmed.
When she was cleaning rooms at a hotel, her boss told her to pick up the pace but she could not do
it. Since she stopped working, her anxiety does not bother her as much. (R. 57.)
b. Vocational Expert
Testimony was also elicited from a vocational expert, Sherry Kristal-Turetzky (“VE”). (R.
59-66.) When asked to assume the restrictions which the ALJ ultimately adopted and included in
the residual functional capacity (“RFC”), the VE ruled out Smith’s past job because of frequent
contact with the public. (R. 61.)6 The VE testified, however, that if the exertional level of a

hypothetical person with Smith’s characteristics was reduced to sedentary, that person could
perform the jobs of document preparer and addresser or addressing clerk. (R. 62.) Such a person
could be off task no more than ten percent and could miss only eight days of work per year,
including leaving early or coming in late. (R. 63.)
When also asked to consider reaching ability being reduced to occasional due to upper right
extremity issues, the VE testified that the jobs she had identified would be excluded, but other jobs
would not be, specifically usher and furniture rental clerk. At the same time, the VE admitted that
these jobs would require frequent or continuous interaction with the public. (R. 64-65.)
3. ALJ’s Decision

Among other findings, the ALJ noted that Smith had not engaged in substantial gainful
activity since August 6, 2019, the alleged onset date. The ALJ also found that she had severe
impairments of degenerative disc disease of the cervical spine, degenerative disc disease of the
right shoulder, osteoarthritis of the right hand, substance use disorder, depression, anxiety, post-
traumatic stress disorder and ADHD. With respect to her mental impairments, the ALJ found her
ability to understand, remember and apply information, her ability to interact with others, her
ability to concentrate, persist and maintain pace and her ability to adapt or manage herself all to

6 The VE described Smith’s past work as: “home health attendant. The DOT Code is 354.377-014,
entry level, semi-skilled with an SVP of 3, classified as medium, performed at light.” (R. 60.)
be moderately limited. (R. 21.)
The ALJ concluded that Smith did not have an impairment or combination of impairments
that meets or medically equals the severity of a listed impairment and that she had the RFC to
perform light duty work with restrictions.7 The ALJ concluded that considering Smith’s age,

education, work experience and RFC, there were other jobs of light duty that exist in significant
numbers in the national economy that she could perform, including marker, collator operator and
router.
Based on these findings, the ALJ found that Smith was not disabled from August 6, 2019
through March 14, 2024. (R. 19-29.)
C. Standard of Review
“On judicial review, an ALJ’s factual findings . . . ‘shall be conclusive’ if supported by
‘substantial evidence.’” Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 102 (2019) (citing § 405(g)). The Court
recently explained that:
The phrase “substantial evidence” is a “term of art” used throughout administrative
law to describe how courts are to review agency factfinding. Under the substantial-
evidence standard, a court looks to an existing administrative record and asks
whether it contains “sufficien[t] evidence” to support the agency’s factual
determinations. Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S. Ct.
206, 83 L. Ed. 126 (1938) (emphasis deleted). And whatever the meaning of
“substantial” in other contexts, the threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not
high. Substantial evidence, this Court has said, is “more than a mere scintilla.” Ibid.
It means—and means only—“such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Consolidated Edison, 305 U.S. at 229,
59 S. Ct. 206. See Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 153, 119 S. Ct. 1816, 144 L.

7 Restrictions were as follows: she could not crawl or climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds; she could
occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch and climb ramps and stairs; she could have no exposure
to more than moderate noise; she could frequently reach and handle with the right upper extremity;
she could have occasional exposure to non-weather extreme temperature extremes of heat and
cold; she could understand, remember and carry out simple instructions; she could have frequent
interactions with supervisors, coworkers and/or the public; she could not perform work requiring
a specific production rate such as assembly line work or work that requires hourly quotas; and she
could deal with occasional changes in a routine work setting.
Ed. 2d 143 (1999) (comparing the substantial-evidence standard to the deferential
clearly-erroneous standard).

Id. at 102-03 (other citations omitted).
The term “disability” means the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by
reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to
result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less
than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). Further:
An individual shall be determined to be under a disability only if his physical or
mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to
do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work
experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the
national economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate area in
which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or whether he
would be hired if he applied for work.

42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).
To evaluate disability claims, the Commissioner uses a five-step sequential process. The
process requires an ALJ to consider: (1) whether the claimant is doing “substantial gainful
activity”; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment; (3) whether the impairment meets or
equals the listings in the regulations; (4) whether, considering the claimant’s residual functional
capacity (“RFC”)8 and past relevant work, the claimant can still perform past relevant work; and
(5) if not, whether considering the claimant’s RFC, age, education and work experience, the
claimant can make an adjustment to other work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). See
Zirnsak v. Colvin, 777 F.3d 607, 611-12 (3d Cir. 2014) (recounting the five-step process).
The claimant bears the burden of proof at steps one through four, including the
determination of the RFC, although the ALJ makes the ultimate disability and RFC determinations.

8 RFC is the most a claimant can do despite his or her physical and mental limitations. 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1545(a)(1), 416.945(a)(1).
Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987); Zirnsak, 777 F.3d at 611. At the fifth step, the
Commissioner bears the burden of demonstrating that the claimant is able to perform work that is
available in the national economy. Bowen, 482 U.S. at 146 n.5; Zirnsak, 777 F.3d at 612. See 20
C.F.R. § 404.1560(c)(2) (“we are responsible for providing evidence that demonstrates that other

work exists in significant numbers in the national economy that you can do, given your residual
functional capacity and vocational factors.”)
The Court of Appeals has explained that:
When, as in this instance, mental impairments are at issue, additional inquiries are
layered on top of the basic five-step disability analysis. Id. §§ 404.1520a(a),
416.920a(a). An ALJ assesses mental impairments in the following way.

As part of step two of the disability analysis, the ALJ decides whether the claimant
has any “medically determinable mental impairment(s).” Id. §§ 404.1520a(b)(1),
416.920a(b)(1); see also id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii) (providing that,
at step two, the ALJ determines whether the claimant has “a severe medically
determinable physical or mental impairment”). Then, as part of that same step and
also step three of the disability analysis, the ALJ determines “the degree of
functional limitation resulting from the impairment(s)[.]” Id. §§ 404.1520a(b)(2),
416.920a(b)(2); see also id. §§ 404.1520a(d), 416.920a(d), 404.1520(a)(4)(ii)-(iii),
416.920(a)(4)(ii)-(iii) (explaining that the ALJ uses “the degree of functional
limitation” in assessing “the severity of [the claimant’s] mental impairment(s)[,]”
which is considered at steps two and three). The ALJ does so in “four broad
functional areas ... : Activities of daily living; social functioning; concentration,
persistence, or pace; and episodes of decompensation.” Id. §§ 404.1520a(c)(3),
416.920a(c)(3). The first three of those areas are rated on a “five-point scale: None,
mild, moderate, marked, and extreme.” Id. §§ 404.1520a(c)(4), 416.920a(c)(4). The
fourth is rated on a scale of: “None, one or two, three, four or more.” Id.

The ALJ uses that degree rating in “determin[ing] the severity of [the] mental
impairment(s)[,]” which is considered at steps two and three. Id. §§ 404.1520a(d),
416.920a(d); see also id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii)-(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii)-(iii) (stating
that, at steps two and three, the ALJ “consider[s] the medical severity of [the
claimant’s] impairment(s)”). “If ... the degree of [the claimant’s] limitation in the
first three functional areas [is] ‘none’ or ‘mild’ and ‘none’ in the fourth area, [the
ALJ] will generally conclude that [the claimant’s] impairment(s) is not severe,
unless the evidence otherwise indicates that there is more than a minimal limitation
in [his] ability to do basic work activities.” Id. §§ 404.1520a(d)(1), 416.920a(d)(1)
(citation omitted).
At step three, if the ALJ has found that a mental impairment is severe, he “then
determine[s] if it meets or is equivalent in severity to a listed mental disorder.” Id.
§§ 404.1520a(d)(2), 416.920a(d)(2); see also id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii),
416.920(a)(4)(iii) (explaining that, at step three, the ALJ determines whether the
claimant has “an impairment(s) that meets or equals” a listed impairment). That
analysis is done “by comparing the medical findings about [the claimant’s]
impairment(s) and the rating of the degree of functional limitation to the criteria of
the appropriate listed mental disorder.” Id. §§ 404.1520a(d)(2), 416.920a(d)(2). For
example, the claimant may have the equivalent of a listed impairment if, inter alia,
he has at least two of “1. Marked restriction of activities of daily living; or 2.
Marked difficulties in maintaining social functioning; or 3. Marked difficulties in
maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace; or 4. Repeated episodes of
decompensation, each of extended duration[.]” Id. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1.

Finally, to complete steps four and five of the disability analysis, if the ALJ has
found that the claimant does not have a listed impairment or its equivalent, the ALJ
“will then assess [the claimant’s mental RFC].” Id. §§ 404.1520a(d)(3),
416.920a(d)(3); see also id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv)-(v), 416.920(a)(4)(iv)-(v)
(providing that, at steps four and five, the ALJ considers the claimant’s RFC).

Hess v. Commissioner Soc. Sec., 931 F.3d 198, 202-03 (3d Cir. 2019).
D. Discussion
Smith raises one issue in her appeal. She contends that the ALJ improperly evaluated the
supportability and consistency of the disabling medical opinions. In doing so, she argues, the ALJ
failed to comply with 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(2) and § 416.920c(b)(2), which imposes a
requirement to “explain how we considered the supportability and consistency factors for a
medical source’s medical opinions or prior administrative medical findings in your determination
or decision.”
“Supportability” is an internal check: “The more relevant the objective medical evidence
and supporting explanations presented by a medical source are to support his or her medical
opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s), the more persuasive the medical opinions or
prior administrative medical finding(s) will be.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(1), § 416.920c(c)(1).
“Consistency” is an external check: “The more consistent a medical opinion(s) or prior
administrative medical finding(s) is with the evidence from other medical sources and nonmedical
sources in the claim, the more persuasive the medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical
finding(s) will be.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(2), § 416.920c(c)(2).

In support of her contention that the ALJ failed to comply with 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(2)
and § 416.920c(b)(2), Smith points to the findings of the ALJ regarding the opinions of Shelbi
Wood and Virginia Pierce. As to these opinions, the ALJ made the following conclusion:
The opinion of Shelbi Wood, PAC, is generally persuasive (C16F). This opinion is
generally supported by Ms. Wood’s examination findings [which] generally note
that the claimant’s symptoms has [sic] been stable without hospitalization for years
(C16F). Additionally, this opinion is generally consistent with the longitudinal
record which generally describes the claimant as alert, oriented, cooperative, and
calm with normal mood, affect, thought process, memory, attention, concentration,
thought content, insight, and judgment (C2F/38; C6F/3, 8, 12; C11F/1, 4, 7;
C19F/3, 10, 27; C3F/4, 12, 16, 104). However, the opinion that the claimant could
maintain attention and concentration for less than 2 hours, would be off [task] 25%,
and would be absent from work 4 days per month is not persuasive (C16F). This
opinion is not supported by Ms. Wood’s examination findings which generally
describe the claimant as alert and oriented, with normal memory, attention,
concentration, and thought process and content (C11F). Additionally, this opinion
is not consistent with the longitudinal [record] noting the claimant as alert, oriented,
cooperative, and calm with normal mood, affect, thought process, memory,
attention, concentration, thought content, insight, and judgment (C2F/38; C6F/3, 8,
12; C11F/1, 4, 7; C19F/3, 10, 27; C3F/4, 12, 16, 104). Furthermore, this opinion is
not consistent with the claimant’s own statements that she was able to help care for
her mother.

. . .

The opinion of Virginia Pierce, MS, APRN-CNP is unpersuasive (C21F). This
opinion is not supported by reference to relevant clinical evidence, as Ms. Pierce
stated reliance [was] on the claimant’s subjective complaints and not objective
medical findings (C21F). Additionally, this opinion is inconsistent with the
longitudinal evidence which generally describes the claimant as in no acute distress
with normal gait, strength, range of motion, sensation, and neurological functioning
(C2F/38; C6F/3, 8, 12; C11F/4, 7; C19F/3, 10, 13; C5F/21, 26, 46; C3F/4, 16, 104-
105). Specifically, treatment records from University Orthopedics Center noting no
acute distress, normal ambulation, no weakness in the upper or lower extremities,
and only some discomfort with full cervical range of motion (C22F).
(R. 26.)
The ALJ found that the opinion of Shelbi Wood, PAC was generally persuasive and
generally supported by her examination findings and the longitudinal record regarding mental
health matters such as memory, concentration and judgment.9 The ALJ also concluded, however,
that Wood’s opinion that the claimant could only maintain attention and concentration for less than
2 hours, would be off task 25% of the time and would be absent from work 4 days per month was
not persuasive.
Smith contends that the ALJ’s decision does not provide sufficient explanation to allow for
appropriate judicial review. As she notes, while finding Wood’s opinion “generally persuasive,”

the ALJ rejected only those portions that would lead to a determination that Smith was disabled
based on the VE’s testimony. Smith also argues that the fact that she appeared alert, oriented,
cooperative and calm during a mental therapy appointment is not inconsistent with findings that
she could not maintain attention and concentration for more than two hours before needing
redirection, could not routinely interact with the public and could not consistently maintain
appropriate behavior, or that she would be off-task more than 25% of the workday and would miss
four days of work per month.
Smith also highlights the fact that Wood’s opinion about her abilities is consistent with the
findings by Dr. Patterson and Lori Scheffer, both of which were rejected by the ALJ. While the

Commissioner asserts that Smith’s reference to these opinions is improper because it suggests that

9 Smith claims that the findings about her mental condition were not as “normal” as the ALJ
suggested. For example, on August 29, 2022, she was observed to be tearful and possessing an
“okay” mood and only fair attention, concentration, insight and judgment. (R. 708.) On September
20, 2021, “affect was tearful, her mood was frustrated, judgment, insight and impulse control were
only fair.” (R. 711.)
the Court should reweigh evidence that the ALJ already considered, the Court concludes that Smith
is not asking the Court to reweigh this evidence. Rather, the decision of the ALJ must be evaluated
based on his consideration of all the evidence. In finding that Smith is not disabled, the ALJ
rejected opinions from four separate medical providers. At the same time, he relied on these

opinions to the extent that they supported his own conclusions. This runs contrary to the ALJ’s
statutory requirement to evaluate the supportability and consistency of medical opinions. “The
ALJ is not entitled to ‘cherry pick’ favorable evidence and ignore records that run counter to [his]
findings.” Piper v. Saul, 2020 WL 709517, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 12, 2020).
As it relates to Pierce’s opinion, the ALJ concluded that it was based only on Smith’s
subjective complaints. This is a mischaracterization of Pierce’s findings, however, in which
objective medical evidence was cited, including, among other things, an x-ray of Smith’s shoulder
and an operation which did not successfully restore her the normal function of her shoulder.10 In
addition, the ALJ’s reliance on records from University Orthopedics Center, “noting no acute
distress, normal ambulation, no weakness in the upper or lower extremities, and only some

discomfort with full cervical range of motion” (R. 26), is misplaced. That record is dated August
13, 2019 (R. 973). This is long before Smith’s shoulder injury in January 2021 that led to surgery
in October 2021.11
The ALJ’s conclusions about the facts underlying Pierce’s opinion are at odds with the
manner in which evidence must be considered. An ALJ “cannot reject evidence for no reason or
for the wrong reason.” Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1066 (3d Cir. 1993). See also Platt v.

10 As Smith notes in her reply brief, the Commissioner’s only response to this evidence is that
Pierce “never mentions atrophy.”
11 Although Smith reported shoulder pain previously, on January 25, 2021, she fell and sustained
a fracture to the shoulder. (R. 397, 400.)
O’Malley, 2024 WL 3401329, at *4 (W.D. Pa. July 12, 2024) (“ALJs may not mischaracterize or
overlook evidence.”)
Thus, and contrary to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(1), § 416.920c(c)(1), 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520c(c)(2) and § 416.920c(c)(2), the ALJ failed to properly evaluate the consistency and

supportability of the evidence about Smith’s physical health by rejecting without explanation
relevant portions of the findings of four medical providers. Moreover, the ALJ mischaracterized
the evidence about Smith’s mental health and by doing so, improperly minimized her condition.
Therefore, the ALJ’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence.
For these reasons, the decision of the Commissioner denying benefits should be reversed,
and the case should be remanded to the Commissioner for further review.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons explained above, it is respectfully recommended that, Sentence Four of
Section 405(g), the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiff’s claims for
benefits be reversed and that this matter be remanded to the Commissioner for further review.

Litigants who seek to challenge this Report and Recommendation must seek review by the
district judge by filing objections by December 10, 2025. Any party opposing the objections shall
file a response by December 24, 2025. Failure to file timely objections will waive the right of
appeal.

Dated: November 26, 2025 /s/ Patricia L. Dodge
PATRICIA L. DODGE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11231885. Public record. Not legal advice.