# Hernandez v. Thrasher

> Oregon Supreme Court · December 24, 2025 · 374 Or. 643

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11231447

## Case

- **Court:** Oregon Supreme Court
- **Decided:** December 24, 2025
- **Citations:** 374 Or. 643
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Judges:** Garrett
- **Cited by:** 5 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11231447

## Opinion text

No. 56 December 24, 2025 643

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF OREGON

NATALIA JOANNE HERNANDEZ,
Plaintiff,
v.
Charlotte THRASHER,
Superintendent, Coffee Creek
Correctional Facility,
Defendant.
(SC S072503)

En Banc
Original proceeding in habeas corpus.
Submitted on the record December 22, 2025.
Julia Yoshimoto, Oregon Justice Resource Center,
Portland, filed the filed the petition and the memorandum
in support of the petition for plaintiff.
Paul L. Smith, Interim Solicitor General, Salem, filed the
response to the petition for defendant. Also on the response
was Dan Rayfield, Attorney General.
GARRETT, J.
It is hereby ordered that plaintiff immediately be dis-
charged from her illegal imprisonment. Pursuant to ORAP
1.20(5) and notwithstanding ORAP 9.25 and ORAP 14.05
(3)(b), the State Court Administrator shall issue the appel-
late judgment immediately.
644 Hernandez v. Thrasher
Cite as 374 Or 643 (2025) 645

GARRETT, J.
Plaintiff was prosecuted in several cases in Marion
County for crimes, including delivery of methamphetamine
and attempted first-degree assault with a firearm. In 2021,
she pleaded guilty to Count 1 in Case No. 19CR78400 and
Counts 3 and 4 in Case No. 20CR62272. Plaintiff was sen-
tenced to a total term of incarceration of 85 months. That
term of incarceration was the result of three consecutive
sentences: First, the trial court imposed a 16-month sen-
tence on Count 3 in Case No. 20CR62272. With regard to
that count, the judgment stated, “Credit for time served is
pursuant to ORS 137.370 for case number[s] 19CR78400,
20CR52634, 19CR53050. [Plaintiff] may receive credit for
time served.” Second, the court imposed a 29-month sen-
tence on Count 4 in the same case, which was to be served
consecutively to Count 3. With regard to that count, the
judgment stated, “Credit for time served is pursuant to
ORS 137.370 for case numbers[s] 19CR78400, 20CR52634,
19CR53050. [Plaintiff] may receive credit for time served.”
Third, the court imposed a 40-month sentence on Count 1
in Case No. 19CR78400, which was to be served consecu-
tively to the sentences in Case No. 20CR62272. With regard
to that count, the judgment stated, “Credit for time served
pursuant to ORS[ ] 137.370 for case number[s] 20CR62272,
19CR78400, 20CR52634 and 19CR53050. [Plaintiff] may
receive credit for time served.”
In 2025, we issued a decision concerning the calcu-
lation of credit for time served under ORS 137.370(4). State
ex rel Torres-Lopez v. Fahrion, 373 Or 816, 572 P3d 1045
(Torres-Lopez I), adh’d to as modified on recons, 374 Or 423,
___ P3d ___ (2025) (Torres-Lopez II). Following our decision
in Torres-Lopez I, the Oregon Department of Corrections
(DOC) recalculated plaintiff’s credit for time served and
determined that plaintiff’s projected release date was in the
past. In August 2025, DOC released plaintiff from a cor-
rectional facility. According to a “State of Oregon Board of
Parole and Post-Prison Supervision Order of Supervision
Conditions” attached to plaintiff’s petition, she was released
onto post-prison supervision (PPS).
646 Hernandez v. Thrasher

Then, in late October, the district attorney’s office
filed a motion pursuant to ORS 137.172 to correct the judg-
ment of conviction to clarify the sentencing court’s intent in
Case No. 19CR78400. See ORS 137.172(1) (“The trial court
retains authority after entry of judgment of conviction * * *
to modify the judgment, including the sentence, to correct
any arithmetic or clerical errors or to delete or modify any
erroneous term in the judgment. The court may correct the
judgment either on the motion of one of the parties or on
the court’s own motion after written notice to all of the par-
ties.”). Thereafter, the trial court issued a notice of its intent
to amend the judgment of conviction, pursuant to ORS
137.172(1) and the court’s common-law authority, to add the
following statement to the judgment, “The court intends
that any credit under ORS 137.370(4) for one or more con-
secutive sentences in this judgment be applied a single time
towards the total term of incarceration imposed as a result
of those consecutive sentences.” (Boldface omitted.) The
notice informed plaintiff that she could object to the amend-
ment. On November 25, plaintiff’s attorney objected.
Around the same time, DOC recalculated plaintiff’s
credit for time served and “returned to the original calcula-
tion.” Based on that calculation, DOC determined that plain-
tiff still had time left to serve on her term of incarceration.
On November 22, DOC issued an “Order for Arrest
and Return of Prisoner,” which stated that plaintiff had
“escaped from custody or ha[d] not completed service of
[her] term of incarceration and is therefore a fugitive from
justice and subject to arrest and detention in accordance
with [ORS] 144.350.” The order directed any “Sheriff, Peace
Officer, Parole Officer, or Corrections Officer” to take plain-
tiff “into custody and have [plaintiff] detained until an
agent of [DOC] arrives and custody can be transferred to
the agent.”
After plaintiff received a call from the Clackamas
County Sheriff’s Office on November 24 informing her of
DOC’s order for her arrest, plaintiff turned herself into the
Marion County Jail on November 25. The district attorney’s
motion to correct the judgment remains pending in the trial
court.
Cite as 374 Or 643 (2025) 647

Thereafter, plaintiff petitioned for a writ of habeas
corpus, requesting that this court exercise its original juris-
diction and order her immediate release from prison. See
Or Const, Art VII (Amended), § 2 (“[T]he supreme court
may, in its own discretion, take original jurisdiction in * * *
habeas corpus proceedings.”).1 Plaintiff’s petition presents
the same legal issues decided this day in Arellano-Sanchez
v. Thrasher, 374 Or Or 623, ___ P3d ___ (Dec 24, 2025), and
the circumstances in this case are qualitatively indistin-
guishable from those in Arellano-Sanchez. Accordingly, for
the reasons stated in Arellano-Sanchez, we conclude that
ORS 144.350 did not authorize DOC to issue the order for
plaintiff’s arrest and return and that, as a result, plaintiff’s
present imprisonment is unlawful.
We order defendant to discharge plaintiff from
custody immediately. See ORS 34.700(1) (“If it appears
that the party detained is imprisoned or restrained ille-
gally, judgment shall be given that the party be discharged
forthwith[.]”). We further waive otherwise applicable appel-
late rules relating to reconsideration and the issuance
of the appellate judgment, and we direct the State Court
Administrator to issue the appellate judgment immediately.
See ORAP 1.20(5) (permitting the court, for good cause and
on its own motion, to waive any rule of appellate procedure);
ORAP 9.25 (providing for reconsideration); ORAP 14.05
(3)(b) (providing for the timing of the issuance of the appel-
late judgment).2
It is hereby ordered that plaintiff immediately be
discharged from her illegal imprisonment. Pursuant to
ORAP 1.20(5) and notwithstanding ORAP 9.25 and ORAP
14.05(3)(b), the State Court Administrator shall issue the
appellate judgment immediately.
1
See also ORS 34.310 (providing that every person who is “imprisoned or
otherwise restrained of liberty,” with exceptions, “may prosecute a writ of habeas
corpus to inquire into the cause of such imprisonment or restraint, and if illegal,
to be delivered therefrom”).
2
ORS 34.700(2) provides that a court “shall include in the judgment an order
that the defendant pay the attorney fees incurred by the petition, not to exceed
$100,” if “[t]he court enters a judgment requiring that the plaintiff be discharged”
and “[t]he court finds that the allegations or defenses in the return were frivo-
lous.” Under the circumstances, we do not find that the state’s position was frivo-
lous. For that reason, plaintiff is not entitled to attorney fees under the statute.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11231447. Public record. Not legal advice.