# Ross

> District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · December 23, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11231015

## Case

- **Full name:** Tarahjay M. Ross v. Captain Steve Smith, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** December 23, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11231015

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that “we have also made it clear that ‘not all of the Poulis factors need be satisfied in order to dismiss a complaint’” (quoting Mindek, 964 F.2d at 1373)

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

TARAHJAY M. ROSS, :
Plaintiff : No. 1:21-cv-01994
:
v. : (Judge Kane)
:
CAPTAIN STEVE SMITH, et al., :
Defendants :

MEMORANDUM
The Court ordered pro se Plaintiff Tarahjay M. Ross (“Ross”) to show cause why the
Court should not dismiss this action for lack of prosecution. For the reasons set forth below, the
Court will dismiss this case with prejudice for lack of prosecution.
I. BACKGROUND
Ross commenced this action by filing a complaint, an application for leave to proceed in
forma pauperis (“IFP Application”), a prisoner trust fund account statement, and a motion to
appoint counsel, all of which the Clerk of Court docketed on November 23, 2021. (Doc. Nos. 1–
3, 6.)1 In the complaint, Ross names several Dauphin County Prison (“DCP”) employees as
Defendants, including: (1) Warden Gregory Briggs (“Briggs”); (2) Warden Brian Clark
(“Clark”); (3) Captain Steve Smith (“Smith”); (4) Lieutenant Greg Mendenhall (“Mendenhall”);
(5) Lieutenant Richard Armermann (“Armermann”); (6) Scott; (7) Danner; (8) Weaver; (9)
Correctional Officer Chaz (“Chaz”); and (10) Correctional Officer George Bell (“Bell”). (Id. at
1–6.)2 Ross’s allegations against Defendants pertain to events that allegedly occurred while he

1 At the time he filed his complaint, Ross was a pretrial detainee incarcerated in the Franklin
County Jail. (Doc. No. 1 at 2.)

2 Ross indicates in his complaint that he does not know Chaz’s first name. (Id. at 14.) Ross also
mistakenly identifies Scott’s first name as “John” and Weaver’s first name as “Cameron” in the
complaint. See (id. at 4).
was incarcerated as a pretrial detainee at DCP between February 20, 2021, and late March/early
April 2021 (Id. at 2, 7–14.)3 Based on these factual allegations, Ross raises claims against
Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his rights under the Fourth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. (Id. at 1, 4, 15.) Ross also references

18 U.S.C. §§ 241–42 and Pennsylvania’s Protection from Abuse Act, 23 Pa. C.S. § 6102 in his
complaint. (Id. at 15.) For relief, Ross seeks monetary damages and an injunction terminating
Defendants from their employment at DCP. (Id.)
After reviewing the IFP Application and screening Ross’s complaint pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B), this Court issued a Memorandum and Order on December
3, 2021, which, inter alia: (1) granted the IFP Application; (2) dismissed with prejudice Ross’s
claims (a) pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 241–42, (b) against Smith and Briggs regarding their denial
of his grievances and request slips, (c) against Mendenhall pertaining to the denial of a phone
call, (d) under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, and (e) under the Fourteenth Amendment
relating to the temporary denial of recreation and loss of property; (3) permitted Ross to proceed

on his excessive force claims against Scott, Weaver, Chaz, and Danner; (4) dismissed Ross’s
other claims without prejudice to him reasserting them in an amended complaint that he could
file within thirty (30) days; and (5) denied without prejudice Ross’s first motion for appointment
of counsel. (Doc. Nos. 7, 8.) Ross did not file an amended complaint. As such, the Court issued
an Order on April 5, 2022, which, inter alia: (1) deemed all claims that the Court dismissed

3 Ross’s allegations include that, inter alia: (1) Smith and Briggs wrongfully denied his
grievances and inmate request slips; (2) he was confined to his cell (and refused recreational
time) against his will for thirty-two (32) hours from February 20–21, 2021; (2) Scott hit his left
shoulder with a broom on February 23, 2021; (3) Scott, Weaver, Chaz, and Danner assaulted him
on February 25, 2021; (4) Mendenhall did not permit him to make a phone call following the
February 25, 2021 assault. (Id. at 7–8.)
without prejudice to be dismissals with prejudice; (2) directed the Clerk of Court to terminate
Smith, Mendenhall, Armermann, Briggs, Clark, and Bell as Defendants on the docket; (3)
directed the Clerk of Court to send waiver of service forms to Scott, Weaver, Danner, and Chaz;
and (4) pointed out that the only surviving claims were Ross’s Section 1983 Fourteenth

Amendment excessive force claims against Scott, Weaver, Danner, and Chaz relating to the acts
that allegedly occurred in DCP on February 23, 2021, and February 25, 2021. (Doc. No. 9.)
Scott, Danner, and Weaver waived service (Doc. No. 11),4 and they filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint along with a brief in support of the motion on June 3, 2022. (Doc. Nos.
15, 16.) Ten (10) days later, on June 13, 2022, Ross filed his second motion for appointment of
counsel (Doc. No. 17), to which Defendants5 filed a response in opposition on June 14, 2022
(Doc. No. 18). Ross then filed a brief in opposition to the motion to dismiss on June 24, 2022
(Doc. No. 19), and Defendants filed a reply brief in further support of their motion to dismiss on
June 29, 2022 (Doc. No. 20).
On August 31, 2022, Ross filed a motion for discovery (Doc. No. 21), to which

Defendants filed a response in opposition on September 14, 2022 (Doc. No. 22). On October 12,
2022, Ross filed an “Omnibus Motion,” in which he moved for appointment of counsel for a
third time and moved for an order compelling Defendants to produce discovery to him. (Doc.
No. 23.) Defendants filed a response in opposition to Ross’s “Omnibus Motion” on October 17,

4 In their waiver, Defendants noted that Ross misidentified Scott’s first name as “John” in his
complaint, when it should have been “Jake.” See (Doc. No. 11 at 1). In addition, Chaz did not
waive service, and when counsel noticed their appearances on behalf of Scott, Danner, and
Weaver, they did not mention Chaz in those notices. (Id.; Doc. Nos. 12, 13.) The Court also
notes that the envelope containing the waiver of service form sent to Chaz was returned as
undeliverable because the DCP said it had “no such employee.” See (Doc. No. 14).

5 Unless otherwise noted, “Defendants” refers to only Scott, Weaver, and Danner.
2022. (Doc. No. 24.) Ross then filed his fourth motion for appointment of counsel on
November 9, 2022 (Doc. No. 25), to which Defendants filed a response in opposition on
November 17, 2022 (Doc. No. 28). Defendants also filed a motion to stay discovery pending
resolution of their motion to dismiss, along with a supporting brief, on November 14, 2022.

(Doc. Nos. 26, 27.)
This Court issued a Memorandum and Order resolving Defendants’ motion to dismiss
and Plaintiff’s various motions on December 12, 2022. (Doc. Nos. 29, 30.) The Court denied
Defendants’ motion to dismiss without prejudice and directed them to file a motion for summary
judgment on the limited issue of whether Ross exhausted his administrative remedies under the
Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). (Doc. No. 30 at 1.) The Court also deemed Ross’s
motions seeking discovery withdrawn due to his failure to file a supporting brief in accordance
with Local Rule 7.5, denied without prejudice Ross’s three (3) motions for appointment of
counsel, and denied as moot Defendants’ motion seeking a stay of discovery. (Id. at 1–2.)
Ross filed another “Omnibus Motion” in which he moved for the appointment of counsel

for the fifth time and asserted various arguments in response to Defendants’ prior filings on
January 4, 2023. (Doc. No. 32.) On January 9, 2023, the Court issued an Order denying Ross’s
fifth motion for appointment of counsel for the reasons stated in the December 12, 2022
Memorandum. (Doc. No. 33.)
Defendants filed a motion for a stay of discovery until the Court ruled on their upcoming
motion for summary judgment along with a supporting brief on January 9, 2023. (Doc. Nos. 34,
35.) Two (2) days later, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, statement of material
facts in support of the motion, and a supporting brief. (Doc. Nos. 36–38.) Ross filed a brief in
opposition to the motion for summary judgment, a response to Defendants’ statement of material
facts, and supporting exhibits on February 6, 2023. (Doc. Nos. 39–42.) Defendants then filed a
reply brief in further support of their motion for summary judgment on February 16, 2023. (Doc.
No. 43.)
On February 27, 2023, the Court issued an Order granting Defendants’ motion to stay

discovery until the resolution of their motion for summary judgment. (Doc. No. 44.) On
October 4, 2023, the Court entered a Memorandum and Order resolving Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment. (Doc. Nos. 49, 50.) The Court granted the motion as to Ross’s Fourteenth
Amendment excessive force claim against Scott for allegedly pushing him as Ross walked to his
cell on February 25, 2021, but denied the motion in all other respects. (Doc. No. 50 at 1.)
Consequently, Ross’s remaining claims are Fourteenth Amendment excessive force claims for
(1) Scott allegedly hitting him with a broom on February 23, 2021, and (2) Defendants using
excessive force against him while in his cell to conduct the strip search on February 25, 2021.
(Id.)
On October 31, 2023, Ross submitted a letter titled “Name Correction for Following

Defendants,” in which he sought to change John Scott’s name to “Jake Scott,” Cameron
Weaver’s name to “Austin Weaver,” and Chaz to “Jason Shay.” (Doc. No. 51.) Almost a month
later, Ross filed his sixth motion for appointment of counsel and a supporting brief. (Doc. Nos.
52, 53.) Defendants filed a response in opposition to Ross’s sixth motion for appointment of
counsel on December 12, 2023. (Doc. No. 54.)
On March 26, 2024, Ross filed a letter in which he requested a ninety (90)-day extension
of time to complete discovery, which was scheduled to close on April 4, 2024. (Doc. No. 55.)
On April 1, 2024, the Court issued an Order directing Defendants to file a response to Ross’s
motion. (Doc. No. 56.) The following day, Defendants submitted a letter in which they
indicated that they did not oppose Ross’s request for a ninety (90)-day extension of the discovery
deadline. (Doc. No. 57.)
On April 3, 2024, new counsel entered appearances on behalf of Scott and Danner (Doc.
Nos. 58–61), which meant that they were now proceeding with different counsel than Weaver.

On April 5, 2024, Scott and Danner filed a response to the Court’s April 1, 2024 Order in which
they indicated that they did not oppose the extension of the discovery deadline by ninety (90)
days and requested a similar extension of the dispositive motions deadline. (Doc. No. 62.) They
also filed a motion for additional time to file their answer to the complaint. (Doc. No. 64.) On
the same date, Weaver filed a letter in which he also requested an extension of the dispositive
motions deadline. (Doc. No. 63.)
Weaver filed an answer and affirmative defenses to the complaint on April 12, 2024.
(Doc. No. 65.) Four (4) days later, the Court issued two Orders. (Doc. Nos. 67, 68.) In the first
Order, the Court granted Scott and Danner’s motion for an extension of time to file an answer to
the complaint and extended the time for them to file their answer until May 13, 2024. (Doc. No.

67.) In the second Order, the Court granted the parties’ letter requests to extend the discovery
and dispositive motions deadlines by ninety (90) days and established a new schedule in
accordance with the extensions of those deadlines. (Doc. No. 68.)
On April 18, 2024, the Court issued an Order denying without prejudice Ross’s sixth
motion for the appointment of counsel. (Doc. No. 69.) On the same date, Weaver filed a motion
to take Ross’s deposition (Doc. No. 70), which the Court granted the following day (Doc. No.
71.)
On May 3, 2024, Ross filed a letter in which he pointed out that he filed a request to
change the names of three (3) of Defendants, which had not been addressed. (Doc. No. 72.)
Ross requested that the Court resolve this issue. (Id.)
On May 13, 2024, Scott and Danner filed their second motion for an extension of time to

file an answer to the complaint. (Doc. No. 73.) Three (3) days later, Ross filed a “Formal
Request to Change the Following Defendants [sic] Names,” in which he again sought to change
the full names of Scott, Weaver, and Chaz. (Doc. No. 74.) Ross also filed a request for an
extension of time to file responses to Defendants’ written discovery. (Doc. No. 75.)
The Court issued an Order on May 29, 2024, which, inter alia, granted Scott and
Danner’s second motion for an extension of time to file their answer to the complaint, directed
Defendants to file responses to Ross’s request to change three (3) of their names, and denied
Ross’s request for an extension of time to file responses to Defendants’ written discovery
without prejudice to him refiling it should he still need an extension closer to the discovery
deadline (which was not until July 3, 2024). (Doc. No. 76.)

Scott and Danner filed their answer and affirmative defenses to the complaint on June 3,
2024. (Doc. No. 77.) Two (2) days later, Defendants separately filed responses to Ross’s
requests to change names. (Doc. Nos. 78, 79.) Weaver also filed a motion to dismiss Ross’s
claims against Chaz (Doc. No. 80), for which he filed a supporting brief on June 7, 2024 (Doc.
No. 81).
On August 7, 2024, Danner and Scott filed a motion seeking additional time to file
responses to Ross’s written discovery as well as an extension of the deadline for filing
dispositive motions. (Doc. No. 82.) The Court issued an Order on August 28, 2024, granting
this motion, extending the time for Danner and Scott to respond to Ross’s written discovery to
October 4, 2024, and extending the dispositive motions deadline to November 15, 2024. (Doc.
No. 83.)
Ross filed his seventh motion to appoint counsel on September 23, 2024 (Doc. No. 87),
and Defendants filed a brief in opposition to the motion on October 7, 2024 (Doc. No. 88).

Then, on November 15, 2024, Defendants separately filed their motions for summary judgment,
statements of material facts, and supporting briefs. (Doc. Nos. 90–95.) In support of their
motions, Defendants also separately filed exhibits consisting of thumb drives containing video
recordings of what occurred in Ross’s cell on February 25, 2021. (Doc. Nos. 97–98.)
On February 4, 2025, counsel for Danner and Scott docketed a letter in which they
informed the Court that Ross had not received the video recordings they attached as exhibits to
their motion for summary judgment. (Doc. No. 99.) As such, they requested that the Court
delay resolving their motion for summary judgment until they could arrange with officials at
Ross’s place of incarceration—Pennsylvania State Correctional Institution Waymart—to have
Ross view the exhibits. (Id. at 1.) Though a letter dated March 5, 2025, Danner and Scott’s

counsel informed the Court that Ross viewed their video exhibits, and they attached to the letter
a signed verification from Ross indicating that he viewed those video exhibits. (Doc. No. 100.)
They also requested that the Court treat March 5, 2025, as the filing date for their motion, which
would give Ross until March 24, 2025, to file a response in opposition to their motion pursuant
to Local Rule 7.6. (Id. at 1.)
On March 24, 2025, this Court entered an Order which, inter alia: (1) construed Ross’s
letter requests to amend his complaint to change the full names of Scott, Weaver, and Chaz as
motions to amend his complaint and deemed them withdrawn due to Ross’s failure to file briefs
in support of the requests in accordance with Local Rule 7.5; (2) amended the complaint to
change Scott’s first name to Jake and Weaver’s first name to Austin, and directed the Clerk of
Court to note these changes on the docket; (3) provided Ross with thirty (30) days to file a proper
motion to amend his complaint to the extent he wanted to change Chaz’s name and admonished
him that if he did not file such a motion, the Court would dismiss his excessive-force claim

against Chaz; (4) denied without prejudice Weaver’s motion to dismiss Ross’s excessive-force
claim against Chaz; (5) denied without prejudice Ross’s seventh motion for appointment of
counsel; and (6) directed Defendants to inform the Court whether the deadline for Ross to file
responses to their motions for summary judgment should be extended. (Doc. No. 101.) In
response to this Order, Scott and Danner indicated that no further extension of time beyond
March 24, 2025 was needed, and Weaver responded that no further extension of time was
needed. (Doc. Nos. 102, 103.)
Danner and Scott filed a reply brief in further support of their motion for summary
judgment on July 15, 2025. (Doc. No. 107.) Although it was titled as a reply brief, Danner and
Scott argued in their brief that Ross’s failure to file a response to their statement of material facts

and supporting brief demonstrated that he did not oppose their motion for summary judgment
and, as such, it should be granted as uncontested. (Id. at 6–7.) They also argued that, in the
alternative, the Court should dismiss Ross’s claims against them under Rule 41(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure for his failure to prosecute. (Id. at 7–13.)
On August 1, 2025, Ross filed a motion for an extension of time to file a brief in response
to Defendants’ motions for summary judgment along with his eighth motion to appoint counsel.
(Doc. No. 108.) In his motion, Ross represented that he would secure his release from state
incarceration within the next thirty (30) days and, as such, he requested that the Court extend “all
deadlines” for forty-five (45) days so he could secure counsel after his release. See (id. at 2).
Ross also argued that the Court should not dismiss his claims for failure to prosecute under Rule
41(b). (Id.) Defendants separately filed briefs in opposition to Ross’s joint motion on August
15, 2025, and September 3, 2025. (Doc. Nos. 109, 110.)
On October 16, 2025, the Court issued an Order denying without prejudice Ross’s eighth

motion to appoint counsel. (Doc. No. 111.) The Clerk of Court sent this Order to Ross at his
address of record, which was at Pennsylvania State Correctional Institution Waymart (“SCI
Waymart”). (Id.); see also M.D. Pa. L.R. 83.18 (“Service of any notices, copies of pleadings,
motions or papers in the action at the address currently maintained on file in the clerk’s office by
a party shall be deemed to be effective service upon such party.”). The envelope containing this
Order was returned to the Clerk of Court as undeliverable on October 29, 2025, and the front of
the envelope states that Ross was paroled on September 24, 2025. (Doc. No. 112.)6
On November 20, 2021, the Court issued an Order which, inter alia, pointed out that Ross
had not updated his mailing address with the Clerk of Court as required by the Local Rules.
(Doc. No. 114 at 2 (citing M.D. Pa. L.R. 83.18; Doc. No. 5 at 1)). The Court also explained that

because of this failure, it appeared that Ross did not intend to continue prosecuting this lawsuit.
As such, the Court ordered him to show cause why the Court should not dismiss the case with
prejudice for lack of prosecution after balancing the six (6) factors set forth in Poulis v. State
Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir. 1984). (Id. at 2, 3.) The Court provided Ross
with a period of twenty-one (21) days from the date of the Order, i.e. until Thursday, December
11, 2025), to file a response, and admonished him that if he did not file a response, the Court

6 The Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole’s Supervised Individual Locator
(https://inmatelocator.cor.pa.gov) also indicates that Ross was paroled on September 24, 2025.
would deem him to be unopposed to the dismissal of this action with prejudice for his failure to
prosecute. (Id. at 2–3.)
The deadline for Ross’s response has passed without him filing a response or seeking an
extension of time to do so. As such, the issue of whether this action should be dismissed with

prejudice for Ross’s failure to prosecution is ripe for disposition.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) allows for the dismissal of an action for failure of a
plaintiff “to prosecute or to comply with these rules or a court order[.]” See Fed. R. Civ. P.
41(b). District courts also have the inherent power to dismiss an action sua sponte for failure to
prosecute. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44 (1991); see also R & C Oilfield
Servs. LLC v. Am. Wind Transp. Grp. LLC, 45 F.4th 655, 661 (3d Cir. 2022) (stating that
“[c]ourts possess inherent power to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and
expeditious disposition of cases” and that “[t]his includes the authority to dismiss a case for lack
of prosecution” (citation, internal citation, and internal quotation marks omitted)).

When determining whether to dismiss an action with prejudice for a plaintiff’s failure to
prosecute under Rule 41(b), the Court considers and balances the following six (6) factors set
forth by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Poulis v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company,
747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir. 1984):
(1) the extent of the party’s personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the
adversary caused by the failure to meet scheduling orders and respond to discovery;
(3) a history of dilatoriness; (4) whether the conduct of the party or the attorney was
willful or in bad faith; (5) the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal, which
entails an analysis of alternative sanctions; and (6) the meritoriousness of the claim
or defense.

See id. at 868–70; see also Spain v. Gallegos, 26 F.3d 439, 454–55 (3d Cir. 1994) (“Ordinarily,
when a court is determining sua sponte or upon motion of a defendant whether to dismiss
because of a plaintiff's failure to prosecute” the court must consider the Poulis factors).7
However, no single factor is dispositive, and not all factors must be satisfied for the Court to

7 In a nonprecedential opinion, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals explained that even though
district courts should ordinarily apply Poulis when considering whether to dismiss an action with
prejudice for failure to prosecute, “when a litigant’s conduct makes adjudication of the case
impossible, such balancing under Poulis is unnecessary.” See McLaren v. N.J. Dep’t of Educ.,
462 F. App’x 148, 149 (3d Cir. 2012) (unpublished) (citing Guyer v. Beard, 907 F.2d 1424,
1429–30 (3d Cir. 1990) and Spain, 26 F.3d at 454–55). The Third Circuit identified a plaintiff’s
failure to provide the court with an up-to-date address as an example of a litigant’s conduct
making a case impossible to adjudicate. See id. In these circumstances,

although courts are normally required to consider whether a lesser sanction would
be appropriate (when applying Poulis), “[t]he district court could not contact [the
plaintiff] to threaten [them] with some lesser sanction. An order to show cause why
dismissal was not warranted or an order imposing sanctions would only find itself
taking a round trip tour through the United States mail.”

See id. (quoting Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1441 (9th Cir. 1988)) (alterations in original).
Following this reasoning, the Third Circuit concluded that it was not an abuse of discretion for a
district court to dismiss a “case as a sanction for [the plaintiff’s] failure to provide the Court with
an accurate mailing address.” See id.

Several district courts have adopted the Third Circuit’s reasoning and dismissed actions with and
without prejudice for failure to prosecute without considering Poulis where the plaintiff failed to
update their address. See, e.g., Patel v. Benjamin, No. 23-cv-00972, 2023 WL 11983380, at *2
(M.D. Pa. Nov. 2, 2023) (explaining that because of “the plaintiff’s failure to provide the court
with an appropriate current address . . ., neither the court nor the defendant has any way to
communicate with the plaintiff making it impossible to move this litigation forward” and
determining that dismissal of the action without prejudice was warranted “because the plaintiff
abandoned her affirmative obligation of updating the court as to her address” (citing Capozzi v.
Catering By Marlins, Inc., No. 17-cv-02413, 2021 WL 5504753, at *1–2 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 20,
2021), report and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 5494317 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 23, 2021));
Welch v. City of Philadelphia, No. 11-cv-04670, 2012 WL 1946831, at *4 (E.D. Pa. May 30,
2012) (dismissing action with prejudice for lack of prosecution and explaining that “when
neither the Court nor opposing counsel can reach the plaintiff because he has not furnished an
up-to-date address . . ., and when plaintiff has not responded to his opponents’ allegations
regarding his failure-to-prosecute . . ., we have no choice but to act on the information before us;
Plaintiff has, in essence, made adjudication of the case impossible.”). Here, even assuming the
persuasiveness of this line of reasoning, the Court would consider the Poulis factors before
dismissing this case for lack of prosecution because of the possible application of the statute of
limitations if Ross were to try to refile this case. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Palakovich, 293 F.
App’x 890, 894 n.8 (3d Cir. 2008) (unpublished) (explaining that district courts must apply
Poulis where “a pro se litigant’s right to bring suit may well be irretrievably lost if the dismissal
dismiss an action. See Mindek v. Rigatti, 964 F.2d 1369, 1373 (3d Cir. 1992); Briscoe v. Klaus,
538 F.3d 252, 263 (3d Cir. 2008) (stating that “we have also made it clear that ‘not all of the
Poulis factors need be satisfied in order to dismiss a complaint’” (quoting Mindek, 964 F.2d at
1373)). Nevertheless, because “‘dismissals with prejudice . . . are drastic sanctions’ . . . it is

imperative that the District Court have a full understanding of the surrounding facts and
circumstances pertinent to the Poulis factors before it undertakes its analysis.” See Briscoe, 538
F.3d at 258 (quoting Poulis, 747 F.2d at 867–68).
III. DISCUSSION
As indicated above, Ross has not responded to the Court’s Order directing him to show
cause why the Court should not dismiss this action with prejudice for lack of prosecution. He
has also not updated his mailing address with the Clerk of Court. Therefore, the Court deems
Ross to be unopposed to the dismissal of this action with prejudice for lack of prosecution and
will dismiss this action with prejudice.
Although the Court will dismiss this action because of Ross’s failure to respond to the

Order to Show Cause, dismissal of this action with prejudice would be appropriate even if the
Court reviewed and balanced each of the six Poulis factors. The first factor is the extent of the
party’s personal responsibility. Here, Ross is personally responsible for his failure to prosecute.
He is prosecuting this matter in a pro se capacity and has no one else to blame for his failure to
act in this case. See Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 258–59 (“[I]t is logical to hold a pro se plaintiff
personally responsible for delays in [their] case because a pro se plaintiff is solely responsible for

stands”); Davis v. Giorla, No. 14-cv-06629, 2016 WL 6905387, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 22, 2016)
(explaining that balancing Poulis factors was needed because any dismissal would be with
prejudice due to statute of limitations bar).
the progress of [their] case . . . .”); see also Clarke v. Nicholson, 153 F. App’x 69, 73 (3d Cir.
2005) (unpublished) (“[U]nlike a situation where dismissal is predicated upon an attorney’s
error, the plaintiff here was pro se and directly responsible for her actions and inaction in the
litigation.”). In addition, upon filing his complaint in this case, Ross received notice of his

obligation to update his address and the possibility that this case could be dismissed if he failed
to do so:
Change-of-address notice. Local Rule of Court 83.18 requires pro se plaintiffs to
keep the court informed of their current address. If your address changes while
your lawsuit is being litigated, you must immediately inform the court of the change
in writing. By signing and submitting the complaint form, you agree to provide the
Clerk’s Office with any changes to your address where case-related papers may be
served, and you acknowledge that your failure to keep a current address on file with
the Clerk’s Office may result in dismissal of your case.

See (Doc. No. 2-2 at 3–4).8 Therefore, since Ross is personally responsible for failing to
prosecute this case, agreed to update his address with the Clerk of Court, and had notice that he
risked dismissal of this case if he failed to update his address, this first factor weighs heavily in
favor of dismissal.
The second factor is the extent of prejudice to Defendants caused by Ross’s failure to
prosecute. “Generally, prejudice includes the irretrievable loss of evidence, the inevitable
dimming of witnesses’ memories, or the excessive and possibly irremediable burdens or costs
imposed on the opposing party.” Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 259 (citation and internal quotation marks

8 Local Rule 83.18 states in pertinent part as follows:

Whenever a party by whom or on whose behalf an initial paper is offered for filing
is not represented in the action, such party shall maintain on file with the clerk a
current address at which all notices and copies of pleadings, motions or papers in
the action may be served upon such party.

See M.D. Pa. L.R. 83.18.
omitted). Prejudice, however, “is not limited to irremediable or irreparable harm. It also
includes the burden imposed by impeding a party’s ability to prepare effectively a full and
complete trial strategy.” See id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Here,
Defendants are prejudiced by Ross’s failure to update his address because, if the Court were to

deny their motions for summary judgment in their entirety or in part, it would be impossible for
them to proceed with this case. See Dorsey v. Marsh, No. 23-cv-01390, 2023 WL 8259259, at
*1 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 29, 2023). Moreover, it would be a waste of their counsel’s time to prepare
for a trial without a plaintiff. Thus, the second factor weighs in favor of dismissal.
The third factor is whether Ross has a history of dilatoriness. A court can find a pattern
of dilatoriness where there has been “extensive or repeated delay or delinquency . . . such as
consistent non-response to interrogatories, or consistent tardiness in complying with court
orders.” See Adams v. Trustees of N.J. Brewery Emps.’ Pension Trust Fund, 29 F.3d 863, 873–
74 (3d Cir. 1994). Here, Ross generally continued to prosecute this case for almost four (4)
years, until his state parole on September 24, 2025. However, the only action Ross has taken in

this case in more than a year is when he filed his out-of-time omnibus motion for an extension of
time to file briefs in opposition to the motions for summary judgment along with his eighth
motion to appoint counsel. As such, Ross’s diligent efforts in prosecuting his case over most of
the duration of the case is balanced against his lack of activity over the past year. Therefore, the
Court finds this factor to be neutral.
The fourth factor is whether Ross’s conduct was willful or in bad faith. In evaluating this
factor, the Court must determine whether the conduct at issue reflects mere inadvertence or
negligence, or conversely, whether it is “the type of willful or contumacious behavior which [can
be] characterized as ‘flagrant bad faith.’” See Scarborough v. Eubanks, 747 F.2d 871, 875 (3d
Cir. 1984) (citing Nat’l Hockey League v. Metro. Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 643 (1976)).
There is nothing in the record to indicate that Ross’s failure to update his address constitutes
mere inadvertence or negligence, but the Court cannot similarly ascertain whether this conduct
demonstrates flagrant bad faith. Ross has been “silent, and . . . silence is ambiguous.” See El-

Hewie v. Paterson Pub. Sch. Dist., No. 13-cv-5820, 2015 WL 5306255, at *4 (D.N.J. Sept. 10,
2015). As such, the Court finds that this factor is neutral.
The fifth factor is the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal. “[S]anctions less
than dismissal [are] ineffective when a litigant . . . is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis.”
Lopez v. Cousins, 435 F. App’x 113, 116 (3d Cir. 2011) (unpublished); see also Briscoe, 538
F.3d at 262–63 (“[W]here a plaintiff is proceeding pro se, and moreover, is proceeding in forma
pauperis, we have upheld the District Court’s conclusion that no alternative sanctions existed
because monetary sanctions, including attorney’s fees, ‘would not be an effective alternative.’”
(quoting Emerson v. Thiel Coll., 296 F.3d 184, 191 (3d Cir. 2002))). Here, Ross is proceeding in
forma pauperis (Doc. No. 17), so the threat of monetary compliance (including fines, costs, or

payment of attorney’s fees) is unlikely to prompt compliance. Therefore, this factor weighs in
favor of dismissal.
The sixth and final factor is the meritoriousness of Ross’s claims in his complaint. When
evaluating this factor, courts generally apply the Rule 12(b)(6) standard for addressing motions
to dismiss, and this Court already determined that Ross’s Eighth Amendment excessive force
allegations against Defendants are sufficient to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. See
(Doc. No. 50 at 1). Thus, this factor weighs at least in part against dismissal even though
Defendants’ briefs in support of their motions for summary judgment raise strong arguments in
favor of the Court granting them summary judgment on Ross’s Eighth Amendment claims.
After this review of the Poulis factors, the Court must balance them in determining
whether dismissing this action with prejudice for lack of prosecution is warranted. When
balancing the Poulis factors, there is no “magic formula” or mathematical calculation used to
direct a particular result. See Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 263. Also, as stated above, “no single Poulis

factor is dispositive,” and that “not all of the Poulis factors need be satisfied in order to dismiss a
complaint.” See Ware, 322 F.3d at 222; Mindek, 964 F.2d at 1373. In balancing the factors
here, the Court is mindful that dismissal “is only appropriate in limited circumstances and doubts
should be resolved in favor of reaching a decision on the merits.” See Liggon-Reading v. Est. of
Sugarman, 659 F.3d 258, 260 n.1 (3d Cir. 2011) (citations omitted).
In this case, the first, second, and fifth factors weigh heavily in favor of dismissal. The
third and fourth factors are neutral, and the only factor weighing against dismissal, at least in
part, is the sixth factor. Although the Court recognizes that Ross has alleged claims with
possible merit and was actively involved in this case for a few years, there are simply no
alternative sanctions that would adequately punish him, and the case cannot proceed without his

participation and an address to which Defendants and the Court can communicate with him. The
Court has endeavored not to dismiss this action by searching for Ross’s current mailing address
through docket searches and other websites. Unfortunately, this search has been unsuccessful.
Overall, since he was paroled, Ross has shown no intent to prosecute this case, despite him
lacking any of the limitations that accompanied him while he was incarcerated. Therefore, the
Court finds that even if the Poulis factors were considered, dismissal with prejudice is warranted
and appropriate in this case.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court will dismiss this action with prejudice for lack of
prosecution and will direct the Clerk of Court to close this case. An appropriate Order follows.

s/ Yvette Kane
Yvette Kane, District Judge
United States District Court
Middle District of Pennsylvania

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11231015. Public record. Not legal advice.