# State of Tennessee v. Tyler Christian

> Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee · December 23, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11230460

## Case

- **Court:** Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee
- **Decided:** December 23, 2025
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion of the court
- **Judges:** Judge Matthew J. Wilson
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

12/23/2025
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
Assigned on Briefs November 18, 2025

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. TYLER CHRISTIAN

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Knox County
No. 127872 Steven W. Sword, Judge
___________________________________

No. E2025-00557-CCA-R3-CD
___________________________________

A Knox County Jury convicted Defendant, Tyler Christian, of two counts of carjacking
and one count of driving on a revoked license. The trial court merged the carjacking
convictions and imposed an effective sentence of sixteen years’ confinement as a Range II
offender. On appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his
convictions, the trial court’s decision to supplement the pattern jury instructions with
definitions of “force” and “violence,” and the trial court’s denial of Defendant’s motion for
new trial. After review, we affirm.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Criminal Court Affirmed

MATTHEW J. WILSON, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ROBERT W.
WEDEMEYER, P.J., and CAMILLE R. MCMULLEN, J., joined.

George Edward S. Pettigrew, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Tyler Christian.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Lacy E. Wilbur, Senior Assistant
Attorney General; Charme Allen, District Attorney General; and Takisha Fitzgerald,
Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

Factual and Procedural Background

Defendant and his co-defendant, Elizabeth Terry, were indicted on carjacking by
force (Count One) and one count of carjacking by intimidation (Count Two), from their
taking a motor vehicle from the victim, Tina McFall, on March 20, 2024. Defendant was
also charged with driving on a revoked license (Count Three). Defendant’s case proceeded
to trial in August 2024, during which the following evidence was presented.

On March 20, 2024, at 12:39 p.m., a passerby called Knox County 911 to report that
a woman was “getting beat up and her car . . . stolen” on Locust Street, near Summit Towers
in downtown Knoxville. The caller reported that two people, a man and woman, were
dragging another woman out of her car, which the caller described as a white sedan. The
caller then reported that the man and woman drove away in the white sedan down a one-
way street known as Cafego Place. When the caller approached the woman whose car had
just been stolen, the woman identified herself as the victim, Tina McFall. The victim can
be heard on the recording of the 911 call describing the attack in the background while the
caller relayed the victim’s information from the victim to the dispatcher. On the call, the
victim described her car as a white Kia Forte. The victim said that she knew her attackers,
that “she thought they were her friends,” and that “she was trying to give them a ride.” The
victim identified the man by name as Defendant, adding that his mother lived in Summit
Towers. She described Defendant as having tattoos on his face and long brown hair and
carrying a backpack. The victim identified the woman simply as “Beth” and described her
as a biracial female, weighing around 200 pounds and standing five feet, five inches. The
victim reported that she never saw a weapon. The 911 caller added that she observed the
female attacker wearing a gray sweatshirt with a jacket over it.

Knoxville Police Department (“KPD”) Officers Dylan Noble and Jason Boston
responded to the scene. Officer Noble testified that he spoke with a security guard at
Summit Towers about the incident. The guard confirmed that a man named Tyler
Benjamin Christian and a woman named Elizabeth Nicole Terry had recently been
trespassed from Summit Towers. The guard provided photographs of both people to
Officer Noble. Having confirmed the descriptions and names given by the victim to KPD,
Officer Noble issued a “Be On the Look-Out” or “BOLO” for both Defendant and Ms.
Terry and relayed this information to Officer Boston.

Officer Boston testified that he recovered surveillance video from a nearby school
that showed the attack. He recorded the video on his cell phone and body-worn camera,
both of which were admitted into evidence at trial. The video showed a man and a
woman—each matching the general description given by the victim in the initial 911 call—
exit Summit Towers and approach a white car from behind. The man, who was wearing a
backpack, opened the car’s driver’s door and dragged the victim from the driver’s seat.
The man got into the driver’s seat while the woman held the victim on the ground. The
victim got up, fighting to regain control of the car. Defendant then exited the car and
pushed the victim a second time. The woman slammed the victim to the ground before
entering the car’s back seat. The man and woman then sped away, turning right from Locust
Street onto Cafego Place.
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At trial, the victim testified that, prior to the carjacking, she received a phone call
from Ms. Terry, whom she knew only as “Beth” at the time. Ms. Terry asked the victim
to give her and Defendant a ride to a bus stop. The victim agreed to pick the pair up from
Summit Towers. The victim had known Defendant for many years and had given him and
Ms. Terry a ride “just about every day that week.” The victim drove her Kia Forte—a
white four-door sedan—to Summit Towers and parked on the corner of Locust Street and
Cafego Place. She scrolled on her cell phone as she waited for the pair to come out.

After a few minutes of waiting, the victim noticed Defendant and Ms. Terry in her
side-view mirror, approaching her sedan from behind. She testified that she had no cause
for concern and that nothing seemed abnormal. She said that Defendant opened her
driver’s door, but she did not understand what was happening until she was “hit and pulled
out of the car.” The victim described the attack, saying, “I got thrown on the ground. I
was punched . . . I just remember going back to the car, trying -- I just didn’t want to lose
my car. [O]ne of them would hit me. The other one would hit me. It was a lot of
commotion.” She further described being thrown to the ground multiple times, testifying,
“[t]he last time I got thrown down it was really, really hard.” She then watched as the pair
“jumped in the car and pulled off.” She testified that Defendant was in the driver’s seat
and Ms. Terry was in the back seat as they sped away. Using the photographs recovered
by Officer Noble from the security guard at Summit Towers, the victim identified
Defendant and Ms. Terry as her attackers.

The victim further testified that she had known Defendant since he was ten or twelve
years old and that they had had a brief romantic relationship when her mother died in
August of 2021. The romance ended after only a week, but the two remained friends. She
testified that she was aware of his relationship with Ms. Terry and had helped them both,
explaining that she previously had allowed the couple to live in her car and provided food
for them. The victim said she was not affected by Defendant’s relationship with Ms. Terry,
explaining, “I was so over him. I liked her more than I liked him.”

Over the next seven hours, Knox County 911 received an additional eight calls from
various people about the suspects and their movements throughout Knox County. Audio
recordings of all the 911 calls were admitted into evidence. At 1:54 p.m., the victim called
911, saying that she was tracking her stolen Kia using the “Find My iPhone” app on her
goddaughter’s cell phone. During the melee of the incident, she had left her iPhone in the
Kia. She relayed to the dispatcher that the car was currently at Zaxby’s on East Emory
Road in Knox County. The victim testified that she tracked the Kia to four separate
locations, relaying each successive location directly to law enforcement officers. She
described the route being taken by the Kia as “heading up to . . . the Halls location.”

-3-
At 2:22 p.m., Rebecca Hamock called 911 to report a motor vehicle crash in the
Halls area of Knox County at the intersection of East Emory Road and Andersonville Pike.
She reported that a man and woman in a white car struck another man in a black pick-up
truck, totaling both vehicles. She further reported that the man and woman were attempting
to flee the scene of the crash on foot after asking nearby motorists to give them a ride. At
trial, Ms. Hamock testified that she witnessed the woman exit the driver’s seat and the man
exit the passenger’s seat. The woman had a noticeable limp, and Ms. Hamock could tell
“she was hurt pretty bad.” She testified that after the man stepped out, he reached back
into the white car and retrieved a backpack. She observed the man attempt to enter the
back seat of a Ford Taurus at the intersection, but when the elderly driver of the Taurus
recognized what was happening, she sped away. The pair then began walking towards
Halls School on Andersonville Pike. Two photographs showing the pair leaving the scene
of the crash were admitted into evidence, and both Ms. Hamock and the victim identified
Defendant as the male portrayed in the photographs.

The driver of the black pick-up truck, John David Sneed, testified that he was
traveling on Andersonville Pike when he was struck by a white Kia at the intersection of
East Emory Road. Mr. Sneed testified that he had the green light and that the white Kia
struck the front driver’s side of his 2019 Ford F-150 as he was driving through the
intersection. As a result of the crash, Mr. Sneed’s truck was totaled, and he suffered a
broken arm, which required surgery to install a steel plate. At the time of trial, Mr. Sneed
continued to suffer from numbness in his hand as a result of the injury.

At 2:55 p.m., a caller, who identified herself as “Amber,” phoned 911 and reported
“a black guy with a white shirt and a book sack,” and a white heavyset female running into
the woods near the intersection of East Emory Road and Andersonville Pike. The caller
stated that she observed the pair enter the woods about fifteen minutes before she called
911.

KPD Officer Morgan Walton testified that she was on her way to work when she
heard a report of a motor vehicle crash on her radio. Officer Walton stopped to assist Knox
County deputies with the crash scene. Once she was there, she learned that a man and
woman had fled on foot, so she repositioned her unit near the Halls Greenway, just
northwest of the crash site, to search for the suspects. Having no success with her search,
Officer Walton left the scene and started her regular patrol. Eventually, deputies realized
that the white Kia involved in the crash in Halls had been reported stolen from downtown
Knoxville earlier that afternoon. Officer Walton returned to the crash site to tow the Kia,
accompanied it to the impound lot, and took photographs of the Kia. At trial, the victim
identified the Kia as belonging to her.

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At 7:20 p.m. that same day, Pamela Smith called 911 and reported that she had been
approached by a man and woman on Northgate Drive, approximately one-quarter mile
from the crash site. The pair urged her to give them a ride to the hospital, with the man
telling Ms. Smith that they had been searching for a lost dog and that his girlfriend had
injured her knee during the search. Ms. Smith described the woman as a heavyset, light-
skinned black female, wearing gray pants with a dirty white shirt. She described the man
has having tattoos “everywhere” with a skinny build and long hair and wearing a white
shirt and black pants. Ms. Smith agreed to take the woman to the emergency room at
Tennova North Hospital but refused to take the man. When the man persisted in asking
for a ride, Ms. Smith stated that she would either take the woman alone or call an
ambulance for both of them. The man agreed to stay behind. Ms. Smith reported that this
had occurred approximately thirty to forty-five minutes prior to her calling 911. She stated
that she called her daughter after dropping the woman off at the hospital. Her daughter
told her about the carjacking and car wreck, and after realizing the connection, Ms. Smith
reported the encounter to 911. Ms. Smith further reported that she last saw the man walking
down East Emory Road towards Tennova North Hospital.

Four minutes prior to Ms. Smith’s 911 call, Rebecca Hamock, who witnessed the
crash and called 911 earlier in the day, called the Knox County Sheriff’s non-emergency
number. She reported that she had just left her place of work, a Weigel’s convenience store
located on the corner of East Emory Road and Dry Gap Pike, when she noticed a man
“skipping” down the shoulder of East Emory Road. She reported that he was heading in
the direction of the Weigel’s, which was located between Northgate Drive and Tennova
North Hospital. Ms. Hamock told the dispatcher that this was the same man she saw flee
the scene of the car wreck earlier that afternoon. She described the man as wearing a white
shirt with long hair pulled into a ponytail and carrying a brown and black backpack. At
7:26 p.m., Ms. Hamock again called 911 to report that the man was now inside the Weigel’s
and asking directions to Tennova North Hospital. Knox County deputies responded to the
Weigel’s and placed Defendant into custody. At trial, Ms. Hamock identified Defendant
as both the man she saw get out of the white car and flee the scene of the collision earlier
in the day and the man who was arrested at Weigel’s later that evening.

KPD Officer Walton was again dispatched to assist Knox County deputies when
they arrested Defendant at the Weigel’s. When she arrived on scene, Defendant was sitting
in the back of a deputy’s vehicle. Officer Walton testified that Defendant asked her about
“his girl,” whom he identified as “Elizabeth Terry,” and whether “she was okay.”

KPD Officer Hayden Marshall testified that he received information from Officer
Walton that Ms. Terry may be at Tennova North Hospital. Upon arriving at Tennova
North, Officer Marshall provided a description of Ms. Terry to the nursing staff, and they
confirmed that a woman matching that description had come into the emergency
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department. The woman identified herself only as “Elizabeth” and refused to give a last
name. Officer Marshall then contacted the woman, who initially told him that her name
was Elizabeth Turner. He was able to confirm that she was, in fact, Elizabeth Terry and
placed her under arrest.

The parties entered a written stipulation that Defendant’s driver’s license had been
revoked on the day in question. After the State rested its case in chief and following a
Momon hearing, Defendant decided against testifying on his own behalf. He submitted no
proof.

Following the close of proof, the trial court informed the parties that it had added
definitions of “force” and “violence” to the pattern jury instructions as related to the charge
of carjacking by force. Defendant objected to the court’s use of the definitions, arguing
that the jury should rely only on the plain, ordinary meaning of those words because the
definitions were not included in the pattern instructions. The trial court overruled the
objection and included the definitions in the final jury instructions, which read in pertinent
part:

Any person who commits the offense of carjacking is guilty of a
crime. For you to find the defendant guilty of this offense, the state must
have proven beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of the following
essential elements:

(1) that the defendant took a motor vehicle from the possession of another:

As to Count 1: by force

As to Count 2: by intimidation;

and

(2) that the defendant acted either intentionally or knowingly.

The trial court defined “force” as “compulsion by the use of physical power or violence,”
and “violence” as “evidence of physical force unlawfully exercised so as to damage, injure,
or abuse. Physical contact is not required to prove violence.”

The jury convicted Defendant on all three counts as charged in the indictment. The
trial court merged Counts One and Two and imposed a sentence of sixteen years’

-6-
confinement with a concurrent sentence of six months on Count Three. 1 Defendant filed a
motion for new trial and a motion for judgment of acquittal, in which he challenged the
sufficiency and weight of the evidence and the jury instructions on force and violence. The
trial court denied the motions, and this appeal timely followed.

Analysis

On appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence on all
three counts, as well as the trial court’s supplemental definitions in the jury instructions.
He also challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion for new trial. The State argues that
the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions. The State further argues that
Defendant has waived his challenge to the jury instructions and the denial of the motion
for trial due to inadequate briefing and that Defendant otherwise failed to establish any
error in the jury instructions.

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the convicting evidence to determine
whether, “after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution” and
providing the State with “the strongest legitimate view of the evidence as well as all
reasonable and legitimate inferences which may be drawn therefrom,” “any rational trier
of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (citations omitted); State v. Davis, 354
S.W.3d 718, 729 (Tenn. 2011) (citations omitted); Tenn. R. App. P. 13. Our review “is
identical whether the conviction is predicated on direct or circumstantial evidence, or a
combination of both.” State v. Williams, 558 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tenn. 2018) (citing State
v. Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d 370, 379 (Tenn. 2011)). Importantly, a guilty verdict removes
the presumption of innocence and replaces it with one of guilt on appeal, shifting the burden
to the defendant to demonstrate why the evidence is legally insufficient to support the
conviction. Davis, 354 S.W.3d at 729 (citing State v. Sisk, 343 S.W.3d 60, 65 (Tenn.
2011)).

The jury, not this court, resolves all questions involving the credibility of the
witnesses, the weight and value to be given to evidence, and the factual disputes raised by
such evidence. See Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d at 379 (citing State v. Campbell, 245 S.W.3d
331, 335 (Tenn. 2008)). Accordingly, this court will neither re-weigh nor reconsider the
evidence when evaluating the sufficiency of the convicting proof. State v. Stephens, 521
S.W.3d 718, 724 (Tenn. 2017).

1
Defendant does not challenge his sentences on appeal.
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Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-404(a) defines carjacking as “the
intentional or knowing taking of a motor vehicle from the possession of another by use of:
(1) A deadly weapon; or (2) Force or intimidation.” From “the possession of another” is
defined in pertinent part as “the person from whom the motor vehicle was taken was in,
on, or adjacent to the motor vehicle at the time of the taking . . . .” State v. Edmondson,
231 S.W.3d 925, 932 (Tenn. 2007). “Force” is defined as “compulsion by the use of
physical power or violence.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-106(a)(14). “Violence” is defined
in Tennessee case law as “physical force that is unlawfully exercised or exerted so as to
injure, damage, or abuse.” State v. Fitz, 19 S.W.3d 213, 215 (Tenn. 2000) (quoting Black’s
Law Dictionary, 6th ed. (1990)). “Compulsion by the use of physical power may indeed
be force but it need not be violence.” Id. at 217 (citation modified).

Defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the convicting evidence goes largely to
its weight. He asks this court to second-guess the jury’s credibility determination as to the
victim’s trial testimony, suggesting that the victim’s prior romantic relationship caused her
to falsely accuse Defendant and arguing that her testimony conflicts with Ms. Hamock’s
testimony about who was driving the stolen car. We decline any invitation to revisit the
victim’s credibility when assessing sufficiency of the evidence because the jury, not this
court, resolves all questions involving the credibility of witnesses, the weight and value to
be given to evidence, and the factual disputes raised by such evidence. See Dorantes, 331
S.W.3d at 379. The jury heard the victim testify about the carjacking and her prior
relationship with Defendant, and defense counsel challenged the victim’s credibility on
both cross-examination and in closing arguments. Despite this, the jury accredited the
victim’s version of events and rejected the defense theory with its guilty verdicts.
Additionally, Ms. Hamock’s testimony that Ms. Terry, not Defendant, was driving the car
when it wrecked in Halls was more than an hour after the carjacking.

When viewed in a light most favorable to the State, the evidence presented at trial
established that Defendant colluded with Ms. Terry to lure the victim to Summit Towers
under the guise of helping a friend in need. The pair then forcibly removed the victim from
her car by dragging, punching, and pushing her away. Ms. Terry held the victim down
while Defendant was gaining control of the car. The victim testified that Defendant urged
Ms. Terry to “get” the victim while he entered the driver’s seat after they dragged her out
of the car. Defendant then drove away in the victim’s car with Ms. Terry in the backseat.
The victim positively identified both Defendant and Ms. Terry as her attackers and
identified her stolen and damaged car after the pair abandoned it after wrecking it in Halls.
The victim’s testimony was corroborated by the surveillance video, which showed a man
and woman leaving Summit Towers and approaching the victim’s car before ripping her
from the driver’s seat. The video also showed Defendant’s dragging victim to the ground
and shoving her, Ms. Terry’s holding the victim on the ground, and Defendant fleeing in

-8-
the driver’s seat of the victim’s car on a public roadway. 2 Given these facts, a rational jury
could have found that Defendant was guilty of carjacking by force and carjacking by
intimidation.

Defendant also was charged with driving on a revoked license. Tennessee Code
Annotated section 55-50-504(a)(1) provides: “A person who drives a motor vehicle within
the entire width between the boundary lines of every way publicly maintained that is open
to the use of the public for purposes of vehicular travel . . . at a time when the person’s
privilege to do so is . . . revoked commits a Class B misdemeanor.” At trial, Defendant
stipulated that his driver’s license was revoked on the day of the carjacking, so the State
had only to prove that Defendant was driving a motor vehicle on a public roadway. As
outlined above, the same facts support Defendant’s conviction for driving on a revoked
license.

II. Jury Instructions

Defendant also challenges the trial court’s decision to define “force” and “violence”
in the final jury instructions, arguing their inclusion constitutes reversible error because the
definitions were not included in the Tennessee Pattern Jury Instructions. The State argues
that Defendant’s challenge to the jury instructions has been waived due to insufficient
briefing because Defendant failed to cite to the record or supporting authorities.
Alternatively, the State argues that Defendant is not entitled to relief on the merits of his
challenge because the instructions were not erroneous. Initially, we read Defendant’s
briefing as sufficient to avoid waiver because he clearly identifies the specific jury
instructions being challenged and includes some citation to case law in his briefing. As to
the merits, we agree with the State that the trial court did not err in instructing the jury on
the definitions of “force” and “violence.”

We review the completeness and correctness of jury instructions de novo with no
presumption of correctness. State v. Clark, 452 S.W.3d 268, 295 (Tenn. 2014). “It is well-
settled that a defendant has a constitutional right to a complete and correct charge of the
law, so that each issue of fact raised by the evidence will be submitted to the jury on proper
instructions.” State v. Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d 370, 390 (Tenn. 2011); see also Tenn. R.
Crim. P. 30 (discussing procedure for requesting, objecting, and charging jury
instructions). Indeed, “it is the duty of the trial judge without request to give the jury proper
instructions as to the law governing the issues raised.” Id. (citation modified). As part of
their instructions, trial courts must describe and define each element of the offense or
offenses charged. See Clark, 452 S.W.3d at 295; State v. Cravens, 764 S.W.2d 754, 756

2
We note the jury was also instructed on flight, permitting jurors to consider evidence of
Defendant’s fleeing the scene to infer guilt.
-9-
(Tenn. 1989). Pattern jury instructions, while commonly used by trial courts across the
state, are merely suggestions and “not officially approved by this Court or by the General
Assembly.” State v. Rimmer¸ 250 S.W.3d 12, 30 (Tenn. 2008) (citation modified). Thus,
pattern jury instructions are not entitled to greater deference than other instructions given
by the trial court. Id.

Here, the trial court used the statutory definition of “force” and the plain meaning
definition of “violence” to describe and define an essential element of Count One, as
required by Tennessee precedent. See Clark, 452 S.W.3d at 295; Cravens, 764 S.W.2d at
756. Count One required the jury to find that Defendant took the victim’s car from her
possession by force. Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-11-106 provides, in relevant
part: “‘force’ means compulsion by the use of physical power or violence and shall be
broadly construed to accomplish the purposes of this title.” Code section 106(a) is clear
that this definition applies to all of Title 39, including the carjacking provision in Code
section 39-13-404. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-106(a); § 39-13-404(a).

Because the statutory definition of “force” includes “violence,” the trial court
defined “violence” as “evidence of physical force unlawfully exercised so as to damage,
injure, or abuse” and made clear that “[p]hysical contact is not required to prove violence.”
Although “violence” is not among the definitions listed in Code section 39-11-106(a), the
definition provided in the final jury instructions has been cited with approval by our
supreme court in the context of our robbery statute. See State v. Fritz, 19 S.W.3d 213, 214
Tenn. 2000) (citing with approval the Black’s Law Dictionary definition of violence as
“physical force that is unlawfully exercised or exerted so as to injure, damage or abuse.”)
“When the legislature does not provide a specific definition for a statutory term, [we] may
look to other sources, including Black’s Law Dictionary, for guidance.” Edmondson¸ 231
S.W.3d at 928 (citing as example Fritz). The definition of “violence” used in the jury
instructions below mirrors the language approved in Fritz. Although all violence includes
the exertion of force, not all exertions of force rise to the level of violence. See Fritz, 19
S.W.3d at 217. Because the definition of force applicable to the carjacking statute
encompasses acts of violence, it was appropriate for the trial court to instruct the jury on
its plain meaning.

We note that while these definitions may not have been included in the pattern jury
instructions at the time of Defendant’s trial in August 2024, both definitions have since
been added to the pattern instruction for carjacking. Even so, trial courts are not bound by
pattern jury instructions. See Rimmer, 250 S.W.3d at 30. Instead, trial courts are obliged
only to give a complete and correct charge as to the law in a given case. See Dorantes, 331
S.W.3d at 390. This is precisely what the trial court did here. Accordingly, we discern no
error in the trial court’s use of these definitions in the final jury instructions.

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III. Motion for New Trial

Finally, Defendant challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion for new trial.
The State argues that the challenge is waived for inadequate briefing. In his brief,
Defendant refers to his arguments from his sufficiency and jury instruction challenges as
bases for the trial court’s perceived errors. As stated above, we have concluded that there
was sufficient evidence for Defendant’s convictions, and that the trial court did not err in
instructing the jury. As such, the trial court properly denied Defendant’s motion for new
trial, and he is not entitled to relief.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

s/ Matthew J. Wilson
MATTHEW J. WILSON, JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11230460. Public record. Not legal advice.