# Doe

> District Court, E.D. New York · December 22, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11230331

## Case

- **Full name:** John Doe, on behalf of his minor child, Jane Roe1 v. Oceanside Union Free School District, Dr. Phyllis S. Harrington, Julie McGahan, Dr. J. Derosa, and Antwan Haskoor, M.D.
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. New York
- **Decided:** December 22, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11230331

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- declining to issue injunction due to “undeveloped state of the record”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
--------------------------------X
JOHN DOE, ON BEHALF OF HIS MINOR
CHILD, JANE ROE1,
ORDER
Plaintiff, 25-CV-06214(JS)(SIL)

-against-

OCEANSIDE UNION FREE SCHOOL
DISTRICT, DR. PHYLLIS S.
HARRINGTON, JULIE MCGAHAN, DR. J.
DEROSA, and ANTWAN HASKOOR, M.D.,

Defendants.
--------------------------------X
APPEARANCES
For Plaintiff: Chad A. Davenport, Esq.
Davenport Law PLLC
6384 Deanna Drive
Hamburg, New York 14075

For Defendants: Brian S. Sokoloff, Esq.
Chelsea Ella Weisbord, Esq.
Sokoloff Stern LLP
179 Westbury Avenue
Carle Place, New York 11514

Lisa M. Griffith, Esq.
Steven E. Smith, Esq.
LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C.
290 Broadhollow Road
Suite 305
Melville, New York 11747

SEYBERT, District Judge:

1 Hearing no opposition to Plaintiff’s Letter Motion to Amend the
Caption to identify the minor child as “Jane Roe” (see ECF No.
12), said Letter Motion is GRANTED.
Presently before the Court is the Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction brought by Plaintiff
John Doe (“Plaintiff”), on behalf of his minor child Jane Roe
(“Jane”), against Defendants Oceanside Union Free School District
(“Oceanside” or the “District”), Dr. Phyllis S. Harrington, Julie
McGahan, Dr. J. DeRosa (collectively with the District the

“Oceanside Defendants”), and Antwan Haskoor, M.D. (“Dr. Haskoor”)
(collectively with the Oceanside Defendants, the “Defendants”).
(See ECF No. 5, hereinafter, the “TRO Motion,” see also “Compl.”,
ECF No. 1; “Reply,” ECF No. 14.) Plaintiff filed the TRO Motion
after the District denied Jane’s request for a medical exemption
from New York State’s school immunization requirements. (TRO
Motion at 1); see also N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 2164 (“§ 2164”).
Consequently, Jane has been barred from school since September 29,
2025. (TRO Motion at 7.) Plaintiff seeks an injunction (1)
enjoining and restraining Defendants from barring Jane from
school, and (2) compelling Defendants to approve Jane’s medical

exemption. (Id. at 25.) Plaintiff argues the District’s denial
violates § 2164(8), Title II of the Americans with Disabilities
Act (the “ADA”), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and the
First and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. (TRO
Motion at 12-23.) Defendants oppose the TRO Motion. (See “Dr.
Haskoor Opp’n”, ECF No. 10; “Oceanside Opp’n”, ECF No. 11.) For
the reasons stated below, the TRO Motion is DENIED in its entirety.
BACKGROUND
I. Relevant Factual Background
Jane is a five-year-old enrolled at Oceanside’s School
#6 Early Learning Center (the “School”). (Compl. ¶ 10; TRO Motion
at 22.) Since September 29, 2025, she has been barred from School
because the District denied her request for a medical exemption
from New York State’s DTAP, Varicella, MMR, and Polio immunization
requirements; she is consequently not receiving instruction or the
specialized educational services the District would have provided
in connection with her autism spectrum disorder (“ASD”) diagnosis.

(Compl. ¶¶ 3, 20, 23; TRO Motion at 2-4; the Denial Letter, Ex. G,
ECF No. 5-9, attached to the “Davenport Declaration”, ECF No. 5-
1); see also § 2164 (8).
Plaintiff registered Jane for kindergarten in early
2025, without documentation of any immunization or doctor-approved
exemption. (Oceanside Opp’n at 4; DeRosa Declaration at ¶ 12, ECF
No. 11-14, attached to the “Sokoloff Declaration”, ECF No. 11-1.)
On February 18, 2025, the District emailed Plaintiff, stating it

did not have Jane’s required immunization paperwork. (Oceanside
Opp’n at 4; DeRosa Declaration ¶ 13; February 18, 2025 Registration
Email, Ex. H, ECF No. 11-9, attached to the Sokoloff Declaration.)

2 Because neither the TRO Motion nor the Reply include page numbers,
the Court will consider the pages beginning with “Preliminary
Statement” on each respective filing as Page No. 1. For ease of
citation, best practice is to include page numbers in submissions.
When the February 18 email did not prompt any action from
Plaintiff, the District sent Plaintiff additional emails on March
6, March 19, August 1, and August 6, 2025, which similarly prompted
no action. (Oceanside Opp’n at 4; DeRosa Declaration ¶ 13.) On
August 26, 2025, a School nurse called Jane’s mother, informing
her Jane would be barred from the School starting on September 16,

2025 if Plaintiff could not show Jane: (1) had received all
required vaccinations; (2) was in the process of receiving them;
or (3) was approved for a valid medical exemption. (Oceanside
Opp’n at 4-5; Cohen Declaration ¶¶ 5-7, ECF No. 11-16, attached to
the Sokoloff Declaration.) Jane’s mother indicated over the phone
that she would send a medical exemption request, because of Jane’s
ASD diagnosis. (Cohen Declaration ¶ 7.) Despite her unresolved
immunization status, Jane was temporarily admitted to the School
in September. (Compl. ¶ 46; TRO Motion at 9.)

On September 5, 2025, Plaintiff submitted a medical
exemption request signed by Dr. Eric Goldstein (the “Exemption
Request”), which identified the following contraindications:
(a) Re: DTAP: A genetic MTHFR mutation impairing detoxification,
increased risk of contraindication due to ASD, and a prior
severe reaction of “muscular ticks/seizing” (Compl. ¶ 23; TRO
Motion at 4; Exemption Request Packet, Ex. B at 5, ECF No. 5-
3, attached to the Davenport Declaration);
(b) Re: Varicella: Reduced immune function and recurring
infections attributed to ASD and a prior vaccine-induced
pneumonia;
(c) Re: MMR: Immune deficiency and suppression associated with
ASD, prior vaccine-induced “muscular twitches and seizure”,
and a family history of seizures; and
(d) Re: Polio: Chronic eczema linked to an ingredient
contraindication, a family history of asthma, ASD-related
ingredient hypersensitivity, and a “severe reaction to the
last dose” (Compl. ¶ 23; TRO Motion at 4; Exemption Request
Packet at 6.)3
Although § 2164 (8) does not recognize non-medical
exemptions, Plaintiff has indicated he has religious objections to
vaccinations as well. § 2164 (8); (see also Compl. ¶¶ 115-24; TRO
Motion at 16-17; Religious Exemption Request, Ex. N, ECF No. 5-
15, attached to the Davenport Declaration.) Plaintiff’s religious-
based objection to vaccinations is informed by his personal
religious experiences and interpretation of the Bible, which are
rooted in his Catholic faith. (Id.) An undated exhibit shows a
letter purportedly authored by Plaintiff, in which he appears to
request a religious exemption from the District, although it is
unclear whether this letter was ever actually sent. (Religious
Exemption Request.)
On September 11, 2025, Dr. Haskoor, the District’s
medical director, recommended the District deny the Exemption
Request. (Compl. ¶¶ 36-37; TRO Motion at 5-6; DeRosa Decl. ¶ 15.)
Dr. Haskoor believed the asserted contraindications were not

3 The Complaint and TRO Motion indicate the Exemption Request was
submitted on September 11, 2025, but the Exemption Request
Packet is dated September 5, 2025, and the DeRosa Declaration
indicates Defendants received the Exemption Request on September
5, 2025. (See DeRosa Declaration ¶ 14.)
recognized under the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices
(“ACIP”) standards. (Id.) After discussing Jane’s Exemption
Request with Dr. Goldstein, his conclusion remained unaltered.
(TRO Motion at 5-6; DeRosa Decl. ¶ 16.) On September 15, 2025,
School Principal Julie McGahan denied the Exemption Request,
because it did not “contai[n] sufficient information to identify

a medical contraindication to a specific immunization and
specifying the length of time the immunization is medically
contraindicated”. (Compl. ¶¶ 26-27; TRO Motion at 11; Initial
Rejection Letter, Ex. C, ECF No. 5-4, attached to the Davenport
Declaration.) Later that evening, Dr. Goldstein submitted a
clarifying addendum, representing the contraindications may be
permanent but would be re-evaluated annually. (Compl. ¶¶ 30-31;
TRO Motion at 4-5; Exemption Request Addendum, Ex. D, ECF No. 5-
5, attached to the Davenport Declaration.) On September 22, 2025,
Principal McGahan requested additional details on Jane’s purported
adverse reactions. (Compl. ¶¶ 32-33; TRO Motion at 5; Supplemental

Request, Ex. E, ECF No. 5-6, attached to the Davenport
Declaration.) On September 24, 2025, Plaintiff’s counsel sent the
District a letter demanding the Exemption Request be granted,
adding: “we are prepared to immediately file for a Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction in the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of New York.” (Compl. ¶¶ 41-43;
TRO Motion at 6; Demand Letter, Ex. H, ECF No. 5-7, attached to
the Davenport Declaration.) On September 26, 2025, Principal
McGahan issued a final denial of the Exemption Request, effective
September 29, 2025, citing insufficient evidence of a valid
contraindication and Plaintiff’s lack of cooperation with the
District’s September 22 request. (Compl. ¶¶ 44-46; TRO Motion at
7; Final Denial Letter, Ex. G, ECF No. 5-8, attached to the

Davenport Declaration.)
II. Administrative Appeal & Relevant Procedural Background
On October 7, 2025, Plaintiff filed an administrative
appeal of the District’s decision with the New York State

Commissioner of Education (the “Commissioner”), as provided for by
N.Y. Education Law § 310 (hereinafter, the “Administrative
Appeal”). (Compl. ¶¶ 48-49; TRO Motion at 7; Administrative Appeal
Motion, Ex. H, ECF No. 5-9, attached to the Davenport Declaration.)
As part of the Administrative Appeal, Plaintiff also requested a
stay of the District’s denial pending resolution of the appeal.
(Id.) On October 10, 2025, the District filed an opposition to the
stay request; the stay request was denied on October 15, 2025.
(Compl. ¶¶ 49-50; Administrative Appeal Opp’n, Ex. I, ECF No. 5-
10, attached to the Davenport Declaration; Stay Denial, Ex. K, ECF
No. 5-12, attached to the Davenport Declaration.) The Commissioner
subsequently extended the District’s time to respond to the appeal,

moving its deadline from November 10 to December 10, 2025. (Compl.
¶ 52; TRO Motion at 7-8; Extension Letter, Ex. P, ECF No. 5-17,
attached to the Davenport Declaration.)

Plaintiff filed the Complaint on November 7, 2025, and
the TRO Motion on November 11, 2025. (See Compl.; TRO Motion.)
The Complaint and TRO Motion allege the District’s denial violates:
(1) § 2164(8), on grounds the District improperly rejected the
Exemption Request; (2) Title II of the Americans with Disabilities
Act, on grounds the Exemption Request is a protected disability-
based “reasonable accommodation”; (3) Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act, on similar “reasonable accommodation” grounds;
(4) the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, on grounds
Defendants’ conduct violates Plaintiff’s substantive due process
rights; (5) the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, based on
Plaintiff’s religious objection to vaccination; and (6) Monell

liability against the District, on grounds its exemption denial
policies are illegal.4 (Compl. at 20-33; TRO Motion at 9-19.)
Throughout the TRO Motion, Plaintiff also alleges the District’s
denial defies the injunction issued in Doe v. Oceanside Union Free
School District, No. 25-CV-2304 (GRB)(ST) (E.D.N.Y. 2025) (“Doe
I”), a separate vaccine exemption case involving an Oceanside High
School student. (See TRO Motion at 6.) Plaintiff also argues the
public interest and balance of equities favor an injunction, as

4 Plaintiff asserts the latter three claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.
Jane’s need for education and services should take precedence over
any burden the District bears in admitting Jane. (TRO Motion at
21-25.) On November 12, 2025, this Court declined to immediately
issue a TRO and set a briefing schedule. (See Nov. 12, 2025
Order.) The Oceanside Defendants and Dr. Haskoor filed separate
oppositions on November 21, 2025, and Plaintiff filed his Reply on

December 1, 2025.
In their Opposition, the Oceanside Defendants stress the
high burden a movant must clear to obtain a preliminary injunction,
which is even higher for “mandatory” injunctions altering the
parties’ status quo positions and for injunctions affecting
“government action taken in the public interest under a statutory
or regulatory scheme.” (Oceanside Opp’n at 7-8 (citing, e.g.,
Monserrate v. N.Y. State Senate, 599 F.3d 148, 154 (2d Cir. 2010)

(“[a] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never
awarded as of right”); Mastrovincenzo v. City of N.Y., 435 F.3d
78, 89 (2d Cir. 2006) (“mandatory” injunctions “alter the status
quo by commanding some positive act” and accordingly require movant
to “demonstrate a greater likelihood of success”)).) In the
Oceanside Defendants’ view, any showing of irreparable harm is
diminished, because of Plaintiff’s delay in filing the TRO Motion.
(Oceanside Opp’n at 9-12.) The Oceanside Defendants also argue
Plaintiff has not shown a likelihood of success on the merits of
any claim, and that the District’s interest in public health tips
the balance of hardships and public interest in their favor. (Id.
at 13, 24-25.) Dr. Haskoor’s Opposition raises several
individualized defenses purportedly applying to him, as an outside
consultant not formally employed by the District. (Dr. Haskoor
Opp’n at 1-2.)

DISCUSSION
I. Applicable Law
“A party seeking a preliminary injunction must show (1)
irreparable harm; (2) either a likelihood of success on the merits
or both serious questions on the merits and a balance of hardships
decidedly favoring the moving party; and (3) that a preliminary
injunction is in the public interest”. N. Am. Soccer League, LLC
v. U.S. Soccer Fed’n, Inc., 883 F.3d 32, 37 (2d Cir. 2018) (citing

N.Y. ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 650 (2d
Cir. 2015)). “The typical preliminary injunction is prohibitory
and generally seeks only to maintain the status quo pending a trial
on the merits. A mandatory injunction, in contrast, is said to
alter the status quo by commanding some positive act . . . [and]
thus alters the traditional formula by requiring that the movant
demonstrate a greater likelihood of success”. Mastrovincenzo, 435
F.3d at 89 (quoting Tom Doherty Assocs. v. Saban Entm’t, Inc., 60
F.3d 27, 34 (2d Cir. 1995) (emphasis in original)); see also N.
Am. Soccer League, 883 F.3d at 37 (citing N.Y.C.L. Union v. N.Y.C.
Transit Auth., 684 F.3d 286, 294 (2d Cir. 2012) (instructing party
seeking mandatory injunction to show “a clear or substantial
likelihood of success on the merits”). The “‘[s]tatus quo’ to be
preserved by a preliminary injunction is the last actual, peaceable
uncontested status which preceded the pending controversy”.
Mastrio v. Sebelius, 768 F.3d 116, 120 (2d Cir. 2014) (citing

LaRouche v. Kezer, 20 F.3d 68, 74 n.7 (2d Cir. 1994); see also
Caviezel v. Great Neck Pub. Sch., 701 F. Supp. 2d 414, 426
(E.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d, 500 F. App’x 16 (2d Cir. 2012) (“Caviezel
I”) (injunction requiring school to register unvaccinated student
would “affect government action taken in the public interest
pursuant to a statutory or regulatory scheme” and “alter the status
quo”)). “It is well established that the standard for entry of a
temporary restraining order is the same as for a preliminary
injunction”. Cooper v. Fire & Ice Trucking, Corp., 783 F. Supp.
3d 744, 746 (E.D.N.Y. 2025) (quoting Spencer Trask Software & Info.
Servs., LLC v. RPost Int’l, Ltd., 190 F. Supp. 2d 577, 580

(S.D.N.Y. 2002).) “[H]earsay evidence may be considered by a
district court in determining whether to grant a preliminary
injunction.” Mullins v. City of N.Y., 626 F.3d 47, 52 (2d Cir.
2010).
II. Application
1. The Sought Injunction is Mandatory

Plaintiff contends the “last actual, peaceable
uncontested status” was “[Jane’s] position as an enrolled
kindergarten student permitted to attend” the School. (TRO Motion
at 8-9.) But Jane’s temporary admission was anything but peaceable;
the parties engaged in adverse communications throughout this
period. (See infra at 4-6 (“Relevant Factual Background” section.)
In contrast with Jane’s fraught and temporary admission, Plaintiff
seeks an indefinite injunction “[d]irecting Defendants to
immediately accept [Jane Roe’s] valid medical exemption[.]” (TRO
Motion at 25 (emphasis added).) Such an injunction can only be
categorized as mandatory, as it commands positive conduct. See
Mastrovincenzo, 435 F.3d at 89.
The positive conduct Plaintiff seeks to compel mirrors
the relief sought in Caviezel I. 701 F. Supp. 2d at 426. In
Caviezel I, the plaintiff sought an injunction requiring a school

district to register a student “without being required to be
vaccinated.” Id. at 425-26. The Court determined such an
injunction “w[ould] alter the status quo” and accordingly applied
the “clear or substantial” likelihood of success standard to
Plaintiff’s claims. Id. As an injunction in this matter would
similarly alter the status quo, in addition to disrupting New
York’s action taken in the public interest under a statutory or
regulatory scheme, Plaintiff must show “a clear or substantial
likelihood of success on the merits” of his claims to obtain the
sought relief. N. Am. Soccer League, 883 F.3d at 37.
2. Plaintiff’s Delays Diminish Showing of Harm

Irreparable harm is “the single most important
prerequisite for the issuance of a preliminary injunction . . .
the moving party must first demonstrate that such injury is likely
before the other requirements for the issuance of an injunction
will be considered”. Rodriguez ex rel. Rodriguez v. DeBuono, 175
F.3d 227, 233-34 (2d Cir. 1999) (citations omitted).
“[I]rreparable harm exists ‘where, but for the grant of equitable
relief, there is a substantial chance that upon final resolution
of the action the parties cannot be returned to the positions they
previously occupied.’” State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Tri-Borough
NY Med. Prac. P.C., 120 F.4th 59, 80 (2d Cir. 2024) (quoting
Brenntag Int’l Chems., Inc. v. Bank of India, 175 F.3d 245, 249
(2d Cir. 1999)). Loss of education has been held to be a form of

irreparable harm. See, e.g., NM v. Hebrew Acad. Long Beach, 155
F. Supp. 3d 247, 257 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (“school-aged children have
been deemed irreparably injured as a result of being excluded from
attending classes”); Caviezel I, 701 F. Supp. 2d at 426 (court is
“satisfied” precluding child from school amounts to irreparable
harm). However, delay in seeking relief can mitigate against a
finding of irreparable harm. See, e.g., Fisher–Price, Inc. v.
Well–Made Toy Mfg. Corp., 25 F.3d 119, 124 (2d Cir.1994) (quoting
Citibank, N.A. v. Citytrust, 756 F.2d 273, 276 (2d Cir. 1985))
(“‘[p]reliminary injunctions are generally granted under the
theory that there is an urgent need for speedy action to protect
the plaintiffs’ rights,’ and a delay in enforcement ‘tends to
indicate at least a reduced need for such drastic, speedy

action.’”); Garland v. N.Y.C. Fire Dep’t, 574 F. Supp. 3d 120, 132
(E.D.N.Y. 2021) (“Plaintiffs’ claimed need for injunctive relief
is belied by their own delay in seeking that relief”).
The Complaint and TRO Motion detail Jane’s need for
education and specialized services, which she is not receiving
while she is excluded from school. (See Compl. ¶ 20; TRO Motion
at 20-21.) Without these services, it is possible Jane could
developmentally regress. These conditions, coupled with the

precedents finding education-based irreparable harm, tend to
support Plaintiff’s position. See NM, 155 F. Supp. 3d at 257;
Caviezel I, 701 F. Supp. 2d at 426.
However, Plaintiff’s position is undercut by his delay
in seeking relief, leading the Court to conclude this factor weighs
only slightly in Plaintiff’s favor. The delay analysis in Garland
v. N.Y.C. Fire Department is instructive. On October 21, 2021,
several New York City firefighters were informed they would be

barred from facilities if they did not receive a COVID-19
vaccination dose by October 29, 2021. 574 F. Supp. 3d at 123. On
November 24, 2021, several firefighters sought to enjoin the
action. Id. The Court denied this request because “Plaintiffs’
claimed need for injunctive relief is belied by their own delay in
seeking that relief”. Id. at 132.

A similar approach is warranted here. From February to
August 2025, the District repeatedly contacted Plaintiff about
Jane’s vaccination records, including by warning that Jane would
eventually be barred from school if she remained noncompliant.
(See infra at 3-4.) After several months of inaction, Plaintiff
did not submit the Exemption Request until September 5, 2025. (See
infra at 4-5.) Even after the District issued its final denial on
September 26, 2025, Plaintiff did not initiate the Administrative
Appeal until October 7, 2025, and did not file the instant

Complaint until several weeks after the Commissioner’s October 15
denial of the stay. (See infra p. 7.) This is so despite counsel’s
representation in his September 24, 2025 demand letter that
Plaintiff was “prepared to immediately file for a Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction in the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of New York.” (Demand Letter at 1
(emphasis added).) These delays undermine Plaintiff’s claim of
irreparable harm, although this factor is not dispositive because
Plaintiff has also failed to demonstrate a “clear or substantial
likelihood of success” on the merits of any claim. N. Am. Soccer
League, 883 F.3d at 37.

3. Plaintiff Has Not Shown A Likelihood of Success on the Merits
Although Plaintiff is free to raise his claims in the
ordinary course of litigation, he has not demonstrated a
preliminary injunction is warranted for any of them, for the
reasons discussed below.
A. Plaintiff Has Not Shown Likelihood of Success on New York
Public Health Law § 2164(8) Claim
The parties disagree on whether § 2164(8) gives
discretion to school districts in handling exemption requests.
Under Plaintiff’s interpretation, § 2164(8) requires schools to
automatically accept any physician-certified exemption request.
(TRO Motion at 9-10 (citing N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 2164(8); Miller
v. McDonald, 130 F.4th 258, 269 (2d Cir. 2025), cert. granted,
judgment vacated on other grounds, Miller v. McDonald, No. 25-133,
2025 WL 3506969 (U.S. Dec. 8, 2025) (“the authority conferred to
physicians [under § 2164(8)] is not discretionary [and] is limited
by the statute and regulations”); Doe I Tr. 55:24-56:04).) Under

the Oceanside Defendants’ interpretation, § 2164(8) gives school
districts discretion to ascertain whether a request is consistent
with ACIP standards before accepting it. (Oceanside Opp’n at 13-
15 (citing 10 NYCRR §66-1.1(1) (regulation requiring exemption to
be “consistent with ACIP guidance or other nationally recognized
evidence-based standard of care”)).)

The parties also disagree as to whether Plaintiff has
administratively exhausted his § 2164(8) claim and, as a result,
whether the Court can reach the statutory interpretation question
at all. Because the Administrative Appeal is pending, the
Oceanside Defendants argue Plaintiff must exhaust this process, as
required under New York law. (Oceanside Opp’n at 13-14 (citing
Walker v. N.Y.S. Dep’t of Health, 788 F. Supp. 3d 427, 508
(E.D.N.Y. 2025); Watkins-El v. Dep’t of Educ., No. 16-CV-2256,
2016 WL 5867048, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2016); 10 NYCRR §66-1.1,
1.3(c)); see also “Doe v. Kellenberg Tr.,” Ex, L, ECF No. 11-13,
attached to the “Sokoloff Declaration” (transcript of bench ruling
in Doe v. Kellenberg Mem’l High Sch., No. 25-CV-06013 (E.D.N.Y.

Nov. 10, 2025).) Plaintiff alternatively contends: (1) the state
administrative process is futile because the Commissioner extended
the District’s time to respond (see TRO Motion at 7-8); (2)
Plaintiff “diligently exhausted the futile state administrative
process” by seeking an emergency stay; (Reply at 1-2), and (3)
exhaustion is not required by New York state law (see Id. at 7-8
(citing N.Y. Educ. L. § 310)).
Because “[c]ourts in this Circuit have held that, as a

prerequisite to bringing a state claim in federal court,
individuals suing school districts and their employees for denying
a[n] exemption from Section 2164’s school immunization mandate
must first exhaust administrative remedies by appealing that
decision to the Commissioner of Education”, the Court agrees
Plaintiff has failed to administratively exhaust his claim.
Walker, 788 F. Supp. 3d at 517 (citing Caviezel I, 701 F.Supp 2d

at 425.) For example, in Walker, plaintiffs were denied an
injunction to reinstate unvaccinated students because they failed
to file an administrative appeal. 788 F. Supp. 3d at 517. In
Watkins-El, the Court also deemed a failure to administratively
appeal a school’s exemption decision as a failure to exhaust. 2016
WL 5867048, at *3. In Doe v. Kellenberg Memorial High School, the
Court also denied a preliminary injunction brought on behalf of an
unvaccinated student with a pending administrative appeal. (See
Doe v. Kellenberg Tr.) In ruling from the bench, Judge Choudhury
explained “failure to exhaust is a serious issue, and I haven’t
seen an argument or a demonstration that the failure to exhaust

would permit me to even rule on the [§ 2164(8)] claim”. (Doe v.
Kellenberg Tr. 96:13-22.) Throughout her ruling, the Judge also
emphasized the heightened showing on the merits a plaintiff must
make to obtain extraordinary injunctive relief, especially where
the injunction is mandatory and disrupts state enforcement of a
regulatory regime, such as here, as opposed to the comparatively
lower standard needed to survive a motion to dismiss. (Id. at
88:07-16; 92:05-93:08.) Plaintiff counters by citing to Caviezel
v. Great Neck Public Schools, 739 F. Supp. 2d 273, 282 (E.D.N.Y.
2010) (“Caviezel II”), which Plaintiff says supports the
proposition that “exhaustion is excused where the remedy is
futile,” although Caviezel II did not address the futility of
administrative processes. (Reply at 8.)

In light of the caution this Court must exercise in
granting a mandatory injunction—especially where the injunction
affects a state regulatory regime—the Court finds the exhaustion
issue warrants against granting the injunction. Walker, 788 F.
Supp. 3d at 517; Watkins-El, 2016 WL 5867048, at *3; (Doe v.
Kellenberg Tr. 88:07-16; 92:05-93:08; 96:13-22). To the extent
Plaintiff wishes to show this claim does not need to be exhausted,
he may do so at a later stage, but he cannot currently demonstrate

the “clear or substantial likelihood of success” needed to obtain
the sought injunction. N. Am. Soccer League, LLC, 883 F.3d at 37.
Plaintiff also repeatedly asserts Defendants “willfully”
defied the Doe I injunction by denying Jane’s Exemption Request.
(See, e.g., TRO Motion at 11.) This is incorrect. While Judge
Brown did issue a preliminary injunction on behalf of a separate
Oceanside High School student with an immunization exemption
claim, his decision was “based on a very limited set of facts, and
it’s very specific to this case”. (Doe I Tr. at 53:1-54:21.)
Defendants have no obligations to Plaintiff or Jane under Doe I.

Doe I is also factually distinguishable. The Doe I
plaintiff sought an exemption from the final of three required
Hepatitis B vaccinations due to a history of vaccine-related
injuries, hospitalizations, near-death experiences, and other
related contraindications. (Doe I Tr. at 3:15-5:03.) Seven
doctors represented the plaintiff could not receive the vaccine;
some indicated she could even die upon receiving it. (Id. at
15:19-16:04.) In weighing the injunction’s public interest
factor, Judge Brown also observed the plaintiff was partially
inoculated against Hepatitis B which, in any event, carried a low
risk of transmission in schools. (Doe I Tr. at 59:15-23.)

By contrast, Jane is missing four vaccines and does not
have similar corroboration to extreme contraindications. (Compl.
¶ 23; TRO Motion at 4; Final Denial Letter.) To the contrary,
Plaintiff failed to provide additional corroborative information
when the District requested it. (Compl. ¶¶ 44-46; TRO Motion at
7; Final Denial Letter.) The record also does not contain
information showing, as the Doe I Court found, the missing
vaccinations do not pose a substantial risk to other students and
faculty. Thus Plaintiff has not shown a likelihood of success on
the § 2164(8) claim at this stage.5

B. Plaintiff Has Not Shown Likelihood of Success on the ADA
or Rehabilitation Act Claims
Plaintiff has additionally failed to establish a
likelihood of success on the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims.
To establish a failure to make a “reasonable accommodation” under
the ADA or Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must demonstrate: “(1)
that she is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) that she
was excluded from participation in a public entity’s services,
programs or activities or was otherwise discriminated against by
a public entity; and (3) that such exclusion or discrimination was
due to her disability”. Davis v. Shah, 821 F.3d 231, 259 (2d Cir.
2016) (quoting Fulton v. Goord, 591 F.3d 37, 43 (2d Cir.2009)).
One of the two cases Plaintiff relies upon to establish the
“reasonable accommodation” element, Tsombanidis v. West Haven Fire
Department, 352 F.3d 565, 565 (2d Cir. 2003), is factually
inapposite. (TRO Motion at 15.) Tsombanidis held a city failed to
reasonably accommodate the owners and residents of an addiction
recovery home by denying a zoning variance. Id. Plaintiff cites
this case in support of his assertion that the District

5 Because the exhaustion issue precludes a finding of a clear
likelihood of success on the merits, the Court declines to address
the parties’ supplemental jurisdiction arguments under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367.
discriminated against Jane “by reason of her disability”, but he
offers no explanation as to how the decision establishes a
likelihood of success on the merits of his claim. (TRO Motion at
15 (citing Tsombanidis, 352 F.3d at 580).)

Plaintiff’s citation to Doe I seems more availing as to
the ADA claim, but nonetheless fails to demonstrate a “clear or
substantial” likelihood of success. (TRO Motion at 15); N. Am.
Soccer League, 883 F.3d at 37. In Doe I, ruling from the bench,
Judge Brown stated, “I do think that under the ADA, there is a
cognizable claim here” but he did not elaborate further upon the
ADA claim. (Doe I Tr. at 54:08-10.) As discussed above, the
remainder of Judge Brown’s ruling primarily rested on New York
State law and a distinguishable set of facts. (See infra at 19-
20).

These authorities contrast with the Second Circuit’s
explanation that a medical exemption denial does “not bar students
with disabilities from schools because of their disabilities.
Children who cannot be safely vaccinated because of their
disability will receive a medical exemption and may attend school,
so long as they can demonstrate a medical need, based on a national
evidence-based standard, for an exemption”. Goe v. Zucker, 43
F.4th 19, 36 (2d Cir. 2022) (emphasis in original). “[T]o the

extent there is a disagreement on whether the requirements are met
in any particular case”, the Second Circuit explains “parents can
appeal to the Commissioner of Education and seek judicial review
in the state court system through an Article 78 proceeding”. Id.;
see also D.A.B. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 45 F. Supp. 3d 400, 400-
403 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (denial of medical exemption for autistic
student does not violate Rehabilitation Act). Plaintiff

accordingly cannot demonstrate a likelihood of success on these
claims.6
C. Plaintiff Has Not Shown Likelihood of Success on the
Substantive Due Process Claim

Plaintiff also posits the District’s initial denial,
request for additional information, and final denial are “the
antithesis of a rational, good-faith application of the law [and
amount to] a bad-faith, arbitrary campaign against a
five‑year‑old child”, such that the conduct violates the
Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive due process protections.
(TRO Motion at 16.) Plaintiff contends this conduct satisfies
the “shocks the contemporary conscience” standard because it was
“undertaken in willful defiance of” the injunction in Doe I.

6 As to the individual Defendants, the ADA and Rehabilitation Act
claims are unlikely to succeed because “[n]either Title II of the
ADA nor § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act provides for individual
capacity suits against state officials”. Garcia v. S.U.N.Y. Health
Scis. Ctr. of Brooklyn, 280 F.3d 98, 107 (2d Cir. 2001).
(Id. (citing County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847
(1998); (Doe I) (emphasis in original)).)
“[O]nly the most egregious official conduct can be said
to be ‘arbitrary’ in the constitutional sense,” and “the scope of
substantive due process is very limited”. County of Sacramento v.
Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847 (1998); Soundview Assocs. v. Town of

Riverhead, 725 F. Supp. 2d 320, 333 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (collecting
cases). Given substantive due process’s narrow scope, it is
difficult to conclude Defendants’ denial and request for
additional information—done in consultation with a medical doctor—
amount to “the most egregious official conduct”. County of
Sacramento, 523 U.S. at 847. Plaintiff cites to no case making
such a finding and, as discussed above, Defendants did not engage
in “willful defiance of” the Doe I injunction. (See infra at 19-
20.) Thus, Plaintiff has not shown a likelihood of success on this
claim.

D. Plaintiff Has Not Shown Likelihood of Success on the
Free Exercise Claim
In addition to the medical claims, Plaintiff argues the
District’s denial unconstitutionally burdens his First Amendment
Free Exercise rights. (TRO Motion at 16-17.) While addressing
this claim, both parties cited to Miller v. McDonald, 130 F.4th
258 (2d Cir. 2025), which upheld New York’s repeal of § 2164’s
religious exemption provision. Plaintiff argued Miller only
allowed for a strictly “mandatory” and nondiscretionary medical
exemption regime, which the District failed to provide when it
reviewed the Exemption Request with an “unwritten” “ACIP-only”
standard. (TRO Motion at 17 (citing Miller, 130 F.4th 258).) By
contrast, the Oceanside Defendants argued the Free Exercise claim
cannot be maintained because Miller upheld the immunization law.

(Oceanside Opp’n at 19 (citing Miller, 130 F.4th 258).)
After the parties briefed the TRO Motion, the Supreme
Court vacated Miller in a December 8, 2025 grant, vacate, and
remand order (the “GVR Order”). Miller v. McDonald, No. 25-133,
2025 WL 3506969 (Dec. 8, 2025) (Mem.). The GVR Order granted
certiorari on Miller and remanded the case to the Second Circuit
“for further consideration in light of Mahmoud v. Taylor, 606 U.
S. 522 (2025)”. Id. The Second Circuit’s Miller opinion is thus

no longer binding precedent. See Russman v. Bd. of Educ. of
Enlarged City Sch. Dist., 260 F.3d 114, 121-22 n.2 (2d Cir. 2001)
(“[w]hen imposed by the Supreme Court, vacatur eliminates an
appellate precedent that would otherwise control decision on a
contested question throughout the circuit.”)
Despite the GVR Order, the factual record and the
parties’ legal positions as to the Free Exercise claim are too
underdeveloped to demonstrate Plaintiff has a “clear or

substantial likelihood” of success. N. Am. Soccer League, 883
F.3d at 37; see also Upjohn Co. v. Medtron Lab’ys, Inc., 751 F.
Supp. 416, 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (declining to issue injunction due
to “undeveloped state of the record”). To date, Plaintiff has not
filed a Notice of Supplemental Authority or made any arguments
about the GVR Order, and it is Plaintiff’s burden to show
entitlement to the “extraordinary” relief of a mandatory

injunction with a “greater likelihood” of success on the merits.
Monserrate, 599 F.3d at 154; Mastrovincenzo, 435 F.3d at 89.
Moreover, although Plaintiff alleges his vaccine-related religious
beliefs in the Complaint (Compl. ¶¶ 115-24), most of the briefing
and pre-litigation correspondence address a medical exemption. It
is unclear whether Plaintiff ever raised his religious beliefs
with the District. Given Plaintiff’s burden and the extraordinary
nature of a mandatory injunction, the Court cannot grant relief at
this juncture. N. Am. Soccer League, 883 F.3d at 37; Monserrate,
599 F.3d at 154; Sebelius, 768 F.3d at 120.

E. Plaintiff Has Not Shown Likelihood of Success on the
Monell Claim
Because Plaintiff has not shown a likelihood of success
on the underlying claims, he is unable to show a likelihood of
success on his Monell claim. See Morales v. City of N.Y., 752
F.3d 234, 238 (2d Cir. 2014) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.
of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978))(no Monell liability where
Plaintiff’s “underlying constitutional claims” were dismissed).

4. The Balance of Hardships & Public Interest is a Neutral
Factor
Plaintiff argues the hardships Jane faces in being
excluded from school—as she is not receiving instruction,
specialized services, or daily socialization—pale in comparison to
the District’s burdens in admitting her. (TRO Motion at 21-23
(citing A.A.C. on behalf of G.C. v. Starpoint Cent. Sch. Dist.,
No. 24-CV-1047, 2025 WL 1201971, at *21 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2025).))
Plaintiff similarly asserts the public interest “is served by
ensuring children have access to education” and that the “public
interest includes protecting child health by respecting the entire
statutory mechanism for medical exemptions”. (TRO Motion at 24
(emphasis in original).) The Oceanside Defendants maintain Jane’s
admission risks exposing “medically vulnerable individuals in or
near [Jane’s] classroom” to disease, including a student with brain
cancer. (Oceanside Opp’n at 24-25 (citing Doe v. Zucker, 520 F.
Supp. 3d 217, 250 (N.D.N.Y. 2021); Goe, 43 F.4th at 36 (further
citation omitted)) see also McGahan Declaration, ¶19, ECF No. 11-
15 (identifying the School’s medically vulnerable students and
employees).)

The Court finds the parties’ asserted interests are
respectively important. If Jane is admitted to school, third
parties could be placed at additional risk of infection. If Jane
is barred from school, she will not receive the education or
socialization she has an interest in receiving.7 Given the
significant societal interests implicated on both sides—public
health and access to education—the Court concludes that these
considerations offset one another and, further, do not favor either

party.
5. Claims Against Dr. Haskoor
Because Plaintiff has not shown a likelihood of success
on the merits on the aforementioned claims, the Court need not

reach the individualized defenses asserted by Dr. Haskoor.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the stated reasons, IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s TRO Motion (ECF No. 5) is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
/s/ JOANNA SEYBERT
Joanna Seybert, U.S.D.J.

Dated: December 22, 2025
Central Islip, New York

7 While the Court will not compel any action at this stage, it
encourages the District to ascertain whether any alternative
services can be offered to Jane while she is excluded from
attending the School, given “[p]ublic education has a pivotal role
in maintaining the fabric of our society and in sustaining our
political and cultural heritage”. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,
203 (1982). For example, perhaps the parties could agree to a
pendency placement agreement for Jane, under which some of Jane’s
educational needs could be met.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11230331. Public record. Not legal advice.