# Urrutia-Diaz

> District Court, W.D. Tennessee · December 19, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11228810

## Case

- **Full name:** Marlon Geovanny Urrutia-Diaz v. Scott Ladwig
- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Tennessee
- **Decided:** December 19, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION

MARLON GEOVANNY URRUTIA-DIAZ, )
)
Petitioner, )
) No. 2:25-cv-03098-TLP-atc
v. )
)
SCOTT LADWIG, )
)
Respondent. )

ORDER GRANTING IN PART PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner Marlon Geovanny Urrutia-Diaz, an alien detained in the West Tennessee
Detention Facility in Mason, Tennessee, petitions for a Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. §
2241. (ECF No. 1.) On December 4, 2025, the Court entered an Order directing Respondent to
show cause why the Writ should not be granted. (ECF No. 6.) Respondent responded. (ECF
No. 7.) But Petitioner did not reply.1 For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS IN
PART the Petition.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner, a Honduran citizen, first entered the United States unlawfully in December
2023. (ECF No. 7 at PageID 23.) But authorities “encountered [him] at the border” and
“returned [him] to Mexico via expedited removal.” (Id.) Petitioner reentered the United States
without lawful status around January 10, 2025. (Id.) Authorities detained him again. (See ECF

1 The Parties consented to the Court ruling without a hearing. See emails from Chelsea P.
Sparkman, Petitioner’s Counsel, and Stuart Canale, Respondent’s Counsel, to the Court. (Dec.
9–10, 2025) (on file with the Court).
No. 7-2.) And on February 14, 2025, the United States Department of Homeland Security
(“DHS”) provided Petitioner a Notice to Appear. (Id.) They allege that he entered the country
as an immigrant without “a valid unexpired [] visa, reentry permit, border crossing card, or other
valid entry document” in violation of 8 U.S.C. §1182 (a)(7)(A)(i)(I).2 (ECF No. 7-1 at PageID
46.)

Authorities released Petitioner afterward and reset his hearing until June 22, 2026, for
Petitioner to return with an attorney. (ECF No. 7 at PageID 23.) In October 2025, Petitioner
applied to the Memphis Immigration Court for Asylum and Withholding of Removal. (ECF No.
1-3 at PageID 13.) And on November 20, 2025, authorities detained Petitioner near Memphis,
Tennessee, for violating the Alternatives to Detention (“ATD”) program. (ECF No. 7 at PageID
24.) Petitioner remains in United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) custody
at the West Tennessee Detention Facility in Macon, Tennessee. (Id.)
DHS and the Executive Office of Immigration Review (“EOIR”) have not held a bond
hearing for Petitioner. (See ECF No. 1-3 at PageID 14.) They determined that he is subject to

mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), a change from a decades-long practice of
affording aliens in Petitioner’s position with bond hearings. (See id. at PageID 16.) The change
came in July 2025, when DHS, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”), and ICE issued a new
policy.3 See, e.g., Monge-Nunez v. Ladwig, No. 25-3043, 2025 WL 3565348, at *1 (W.D. Tenn.
Dec. 12, 2025). This new policy subjects aliens who have resided in the United States and who

2 The United States Code here codifies the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) §
212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I). Petitioner’s Notice to Appear cites the INA section.
3 American Immigration Lawyers Association, ICE Memo: Interim Guidance Regarding
Detention Authority for Applications for Admission, AILA (July 8, 2025),
https://www.aila.org/ice-memo-interim-guidance-regarding-detention-authority-for-applications-
for-admission (“For custody purposes, these aliens are now treated in the same manner that
‘arriving aliens’ have historically been treated.”) (last visited Dec. 15, 2025).
are apprehended in the interior of the country to mandatory detention. Id. In the past, those
same persons were detained and afforded bond hearings under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Id.; Godinez-
Lopez v. Ladwig v., No. 25-2962, 2025 WL 3047889, at *1 (W.D. Tenn. Oct. 31, 2025). (ECF
No. 1-3 at PageID 13–17.) The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) later upheld this new
policy in the case of In re Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). So now,

immigration judges are bound by precedent which denies aliens like Petitioner bond hearings
under § 1225(b)(2)(A).
Petitioner asserts that Respondent’s failure to provide him a bond hearing amounts to
“indefinite detention without a meaningful custody review.” (ECF No. 1-3 at PageID 13.) And
he alleges that his detention violates the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the United States
Constitution and “deviates from established circuit court precedent, valuable Supreme [C]ourt
dictum, and the clear intent of Congress.” (ECF No. 1 at PageID 6.) He asks for the Court to
grant his Petition and “Order Respondent[] to release Petitioner on reasonable bond or parole, or,
alternatively, to provide a meaningful bond hearing before an impartial adjudicator within a

reasonable time.” (Id. at PageID 7.) Petitioner also seeks attorney’s fees and costs under the
Equal Access to Justice Act. (Id.)
LEGAL STANDARD
A petition for habeas corpus enables a person to challenge the legality of their custody.
See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 745 (2008) (quoting Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475,
484 (1973)). And “the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.”
Preiser, 411 U.S. at 484; see 28 U.S.C. 2241(c)(3) (“The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend
to a prisoner unless . . . [h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States[.]”). Petitioner here asserts that his custody under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) is
unlawful.
Detention of noncitizens during removal proceedings is typically governed by
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) §§ 1225 and 1226. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225, 1226.

Section 1225(b)(2)(A) governs the mandatory detention of “applicant[s] for admission” after an
immigration officer has determined that an applicant is not entitled to admission in the United
States.
(b) Inspection of applicants for admission
. . .
(2) Inspection of other aliens
(A) In general
Subject to subparagraphs (B) and (C), in the case of an
alien who is an applicant for admission, if the examining
immigration officer determines that an alien seeking
admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be
admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding under
section 1229a of this title.
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). An “applicant for admission” is an alien “present in the United States
who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1).
“[A]dmission” and “admitted” are defined as “the lawful entry of the alien into the United States
after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A). And
again, detention is mandatory under this section. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).
On the other hand, § 1226(a) provides for discretionary detention:
(a) Arrest, detention, and release
On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and
detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the
United States. Except as provided in subsection (c) and pending such
decision, the Attorney General—
(1) may continue to detain the arrested alien; and
(2) may release the alien on—
(A) bond of at least $1,500 with security approved by, and
containing conditions prescribed by, the Attorney General .
. . .
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Known as the Laken Riley Act, subsection (c) of § 1226 provides for the
mandatory detention of aliens found inadmissible or deportable under specific provisions and
who have been “charged with,” “arrested for,” “convicted of,” or admit to “having committed”
certain listed crimes. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). Aliens arrested and detained under this section “have
a right to request a custody redetermination (i.e., bond hearing) before an Immigration Judge.”

Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, 797 F. Supp. 3d 771, 777 (E.D. Mich. 2025) (citing 8 C.F.R. §
1236.1(c)(8), (d)(1)). That immigration judge “evaluates whether there is a risk of
nonappearance or danger to the community.” Id. (citing Matter of Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37,
40 (BIA 2006)). With that in mind, the Court now turns to the Parties’ arguments.
ANALYSIS
The Court must determine whether § 1225(b)(2)(A) or § 1226(a) applies to Petitioner’s
detention. This is not an issue of first impression before this Court. And Respondent detaining
Petitioner under § 1225(b) instead of § 1226(a) is not an isolated event. Indeed, the Court
recently considered this same question and held that Ҥ 1226 governs the arrest and detention of

an alien without a criminal history who has been residing in the United States.” See, e.g.,
Monge-Nunez, 2025 WL 3565348, at *6; Padilla-Ugsha v. Ladwig, No. 25-3045, 2025 WL
3638007 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 15, 2025). Because of the increasing frequency of these habeas
petitions, other district courts in this circuit have also been asked to consider which statutory
provision governs. For the most part, they too have determined that § 1226(a) fits in this
scenario. See, e.g., Godinez-Lopez, 2025 WL 3047889. Other district courts across the country
have concluded the same. As one court just observed:
By a recent count, the central issue in this case – the administration's new position
that all noncitizens who came into the United States illegally, but since have been
living in the United States, must be detained until their removal proceedings are
completed – has been challenged in at least 362 cases in federal district courts.
The challengers have prevailed, either on a preliminary or final basis, in 350 of
those cases decided by over 160 different judges sitting in about fifty different
courts spread across the United States. Thus, the overwhelming, lopsided
majority have held that the law still means what it always has meant.

Barco Mercado v. Francis, -- F. Supp. 3d --, 2025 WL 3295903, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2025)
(footnotes omitted) (collecting cases). But the Sixth Circuit has yet to decide whether § 1225(b)
or § 1226(a) applies under these circumstances.
With that in mind, the Court’s analysis here comes in three parts.4 The Court first
considers whether it should require Petitioner to exhaust his administrative remedies before
hearing this claim. It then uses statutory interpretation to determine which section applies. And
finally, the Court addresses procedural due process.
I. Administrative Exhaustion
Petitioner has not exhausted his administrative remedies. (See ECF No. 11 at PageID
48.) To do so, he would need to request a bond hearing before an immigration judge, have an
immigration judge deny his request, and then appeal that denial to the Board of Immigration
Appeals. Respondent argues that the Court should require Petitioner to go through that process
before considering his Petition. The Court disagrees with Respondent for the reasons below.
Exhaustion is required when mandated by Congress. See McCarthy v. Madigan, 503
U.S. at 140, 144 (1992). No statute requires administrative exhaustion in this context. (See ECF
No. 7 at PageID 25.) When Congress has not explicitly mandated exhaustion, the decision
whether to require a petitioner to exhaust their administrative remedies lies within “sound
judicial discretion.” McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144 (1992). In exercising that

4 Because the Court finds that Petitioner is entitled to the discretionary bond process under §
1226 as a matter of statutory interpretation and procedural due process, it need not consider
Petitioner’s Fourth Amendment claim. (See ECF No. 1 at PageID 9; ECF No. 10 at PageID 37.)
discretion, the Supreme Court has explained that “federal courts must balance the interest of the
individual in retaining prompt access to a federal judicial forum against countervailing
institutional interests favoring exhaustion.” Id. at 146. Those institutional interests are
“protecting administrative agency authority and promoting judicial efficiency.” Id. at 145.
The Supreme Court also identified situations in which the interest of the individual

weighs heavily against the institutional interests. See id. at 146–49. Relevant here, “an
administrative remedy may be inadequate where the administrative body . . . has otherwise
predetermined the issue before it.” Id. at 148 (citing Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 575, n.
14 (1973); Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U.S. 639, 640 (1968) (in view of Attorney General's
submission that the challenged rules of the prison were “validly and correctly applied to
petitioner,” requiring administrative review through a process culminating with the Attorney
General “would be to demand a futile act”); Association of National Advertisers, Inc. v. FTC,
627 F.2d 1151, 1156–1157 (1979) (bias of Federal Trade Commission chairman), cert. denied,
447 U.S. 921 (1980); Patsy v. Florida International University, 634 F.2d 900, 912–913 (5th Cir.

1981) (en banc) (administrative procedures must “not be used to harass or otherwise discourage
those with legitimate claims”), rev’d on other grounds, sub nom. Patsy v. Board of Regents of
Florida, 457 U.S. 496 (1982)); See also Herr v. U.S. Forest Serv., 803 F.3d 822–23 (6th Cir.
2015) (“If administrative review would come to naught, if any efforts before the agency would
be pointless, the courts do not insist that litigants go through the motions of exhausting the claim
anyway.”) (internal quotations omitted).
Petitioner explains that he did not request a bond hearing because of the BIA’s decision
in Matter of Yajujure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (2025), which “renders it a certainty that the
hearing will not be conducted, let alone that a bond determination will be heard on the merits.”
(ECF No. 1 at PageID 2.) See Matter of Yajujure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. at 228 (holding that
aliens “who surreptitiously cross into the United States remain applicants for admission until and
unless they are lawfully inspected and admitted by an immigration officer” because “[r]emaining
in the United States for a lengthy period of time following entry without inspection, by itself,
does not constitute an ‘admission”’). Respondent acknowledges “Petitioner may be unlikely to

obtain the relief he seeks through the administrative process based on Matter of Yajure Hurtado,
which binds the agency and the immigration courts and rejects Petitioner’s statutory arguments
in this case.” (ECF No. 7 at PageID 26.) But Respondent nonetheless argues that the Court
should exercise its discretion and require Petitioner to exhaust his remedies. (Id.)
The Court agrees with Petitioner that Matter of Yajure Hurtado—which is binding on
immigration judges—makes exhausting administrative remedies futile here. To exhaust his
remedies, Petitioner would need to appeal to the same BIA that just decided Matter of Yajure
Hurtado. So the decision on whether to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing has been
predetermined. See Lopez-Campos, 797 F. Supp. 3d at 778 (reasoning that “administrative

review is not likely to change Respondents’ position that § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies in this
context”). What is more, the BIA has no authority to review constitutional challenges. See
Sterkaj v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 273, 279 (6th Cir. 2006). This means that Petitioner can only
bring his due process claim in federal court.
It follows that requiring exhaustion in this case would not further the ends of judicial
efficiency and protecting administrative authority because it would simply delay the resolution of
Petitioner’s legal questions. Petitioner’s individual interest in having prompt access to this
forum outweighs any institutional interests at stake. Another practical reason supports this
conclusion. “Bond appeals before the BIA, on average, take six months to complete.” Lopez-
Campos, 797 F. Supp. 3d at 779 (citing Rodriguez v. Bostock, 779 F. Supp. 3d 1239, 1245 (W.D.
Wash. 2025)).
Requiring Petitioner to wait six months—or any length of time for that matter—so that
the BIA can address an issue it has already decided creates hardship for hardship’s sake. The
Court declines to impose such a result here.5

II. Statutory Interpretation
The Parties disagree over whether § 1225(b)(2)(A) or § 1226(a) should govern
Petitioner’s detention. And the Parties take conflicting views on how to interpret these sections.
Petitioner argues that § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies only to applicants for admission “at the time of
arriving or being stopped at entry” into the United States. (ECF No. 1-3 at PageID 14.) And §
1226(a) “governs aliens present in the U.S. awaiting a final removal decision.” (Id.) Petitioner
also contends that Respondent’s § 1225(b)(2)(A) interpretation renders § 1226’s mandatory
detention provision superfluous. (Id.) See 8 U.S.C. §1226(c)(1)(E).
Respondent counters that “under § 1225’s plain terms, all unadmitted aliens in the United

States are “applicants for admission,” regardless of their proximity to the border, the length of
time they have been present here, or whether they ever had the subjective intent to properly
apply for admission.” (ECF No. 7 at PageID 27.) In other words, Respondent asserts that the
plain text of § 1225 applies to Petitioner because “he is an alien, he was not admitted, and he was

5 Respondent points to a line of cases out of the Northern District of Ohio that require
immigration habeas petitioners to exhaust their bond-related administrative remedies before
considering their habeas claims. (ECF No. 7 at PageID 25 (citing Monroy Vaillalta v. Greene, --
- F. Supp. 3d ---, No. 25-1594, 2025 WL 2472886, at *2– 3 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 5, 2025);
Hernandez Torrealba v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 25-1621, 2025 WL 2444114, at *8–
12 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 25, 2025); see also Laguna Espinoza v. Dir. of Detroit Field Off., U.S.
Immigration & Customs Enforcement, No. 25-2107, 2025 WL 2878173, at *2–3 (N.D. Ohio Oct.
9, 2025)). The Court has reviewed those cases. And it is unpersuaded for the reasons discussed
above.
present in the United States when ICE detained him.” (Id.) And Respondent points out that the
INA recognizes two classes of applicants for admission—those who are “(1) arriving aliens
determined to be inadmissible due to fraud, misrepresentation, or lack of valid documents . . .
and (2) certain other aliens designated by the Attorney General who have not been admitted or
paroled into the United States and who have been present for less than two years.” (Id. at

PageID 31 (citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) and 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii).)
When interpreting statutes, courts should construe the text “so that effect is given to all its
provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant.” Corley v.
United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009) (quoting Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004)); see
Antonin Scalia and Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 174 (2012)
(“If possible, every word and every provision is to be given effect.”). To apply this approach,
courts give each word “‘its ordinary, contemporary, common meaning,’ while keeping in mind
that ‘statutory language has meaning only in context.’” See, e.g., Kentucky v. Biden, 23 F.4th
585, 603 (6th Cir. 2022) (citation modified) (citing Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc.,

137 S. Ct. 1002, 1010, (2017). And courts “presume that [the] legislature says in a statute what
it means and means in a statute what it says there.” Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S.
249, 253–54 (1992).
For the reasons below, these principles resolve the dispute in Petitioner’s favor.
Although certain legal principles overlap, the Court first addresses the plain language before
considering the statutory framework. See Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 638 (2016).
A. Plain Language
Detention under 1225(b)(2)(A) applies “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for
admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is
not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted[.]” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). This means
the alien must be an “applicant for admission” who is “seeking admission” and “not clearly and

beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.”
Section 1225(a)’s definition of “applicants for admission” does not match Petitioner. The
statute defines an “applicant for admission” as “[a]n alien present in the United States who has
not been admitted or who arrives in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). And the statute
defines “admission” and “admitted” as “with respect to an alien, the lawful entry of the alien into
the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(13)(A) (emphasis added). So read together, “applicants for admission” means “aliens
who have unlawfully entered into the United States after inspection and authorization by an
immigration officer.” This definition applies to applicants for admission who have undergone

inspection and authorization by an immigration officer. It does not fit with Respondent’s
definition of “applicants for admission,” which would include aliens like Petitioner who have
been residing in the interior of the country for a while without inspection or authorization by an
immigration officer.
Section 1225(a)’s “seeking admission” language also does not apply to Petitioner under
these facts. “Seeking,” of course, implies “some sort of present-tense action.” Barco Mercado, -
- F. Supp. 3d. --, 2025 WL 3295903, at *5. And “seeking” suggests action. So the Court finds
that to fall under § 1225(b)(2)(A), the alien must be actively seeking admission, not simply
residing in the country after entering it unlawfully like Petitioner here.6
The plain meaning of § 1226 better captures Petitioner’s situation. For example, it
applies to the “apprehension and detention of aliens,” providing that, upon “a warrant issued by
the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested or detained pending a decision on whether the

alien is to be removed from the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Petitioner was apprehended
in the interior of the country after residing here for almost a year. Thus the Attorney General has
the discretion under this section to “continue to detain [him]” or she “may release [him] on
bond.” Id. She may not, though, deny him the bond hearing to which he is entitled. See 8
C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(8), (d)(1).
B. Statutory Framework
The titles of statutory provisions also suggest that Petitioner’s interpretation of them is
correct. See Godinez-Lopez, 2025 WL 3047889, at *4. “[T]he title of a statute in the heading of
a section are tools available for the resolution of a doubt” about a statute’s meaning. Dubin v.

United States, 599 U.S. 110, 121 (2023). Section 1225’s title is “Inspection by immigration
officers; expedited removal of inadmissible arriving aliens; referral for hearing.” 8 U.S.C.
§1225 (emphasis added). Section 1225’s title then envisions arriving aliens placed in expedited
removal. But again, Petitioner was detained over 1,000 miles from the border years after he had
crossed it. Meanwhile, § 1226’s title is “Apprehension and detention of aliens.” Id. at § 1226.

6 To be sure, the INA recognizes two classes of aliens who are not seeking admission—those that
are arriving yet found to be inadmissible because of fraud, misrepresentation, or lack of valid
documents, and those that are designated by the Attorney General who have not been admitted or
paroled and have not been present in the United States for two years. See 8 U.S.C. §§
1225(b)(1)(A)(i) and 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii). But that does not preclude the existence of other alien
classes that do not fall under § 1225. See, e.g., Padilla-Ugsha, 2025 WL 3638007.
That title fits the situation here. Petitioner was apprehended, not while arriving in the United
States, but nearly a year later in the interior of the country. And he is now detained.
Section 1225’s title therefore seems inapplicable to aliens in Petitioner’s shoes, but § 1226’s title
seems spot on.
A look at § 1225’s subject matter further undercuts Respondent’s interpretation of the

statutory framework. Section 1225 describes the process of inspecting and removing immigrants
who are actively crossing the border or entering at a port of entry. See Jennings v. Rodriguez,
583 U.S. 281, 287 (2018) (“That process of decision [described in § 1225] generally begins at
the Nation’s borders and ports of entry, where the Government must determine whether an alien
seeking to enter the country is admissible.”); 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). It explicitly applies to
“an alien who . . . has not affirmatively shown . . . that the alien has been physically present in
the United States continuously for the 2-year period immediately prior to the date of the
determination of inadmissibility . . . .” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(II). Although Petitioner
has resided in the United States for almost a year, it makes little sense, without more, to apply §

1225 to someone who is not actively crossing the border. Cf. Padilla-Ugsha v. Ladwig, 2025
WL 3638007, at *6 (“It makes little sense to apply § 1225 to Petitioner who has resided in the
United States for over a year and is not actively entering the country.”).
That is not all. The existence of § 1226(c) also cuts against Respondent’s position here
because Respondent’s interpretation of § 1225(b) makes § 1226(c)’s mandatory detention
provision superfluous. To be sure, subsections 1226(c)(1)(E)(i)–(ii) provide for mandatory
detention of certain aliens. But it applies only to those aliens who both entered the country
without inspection under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A), (C), and (7) who are also “charged with, . . .
arrested for, . . . convicted of . . .” certain crimes. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E)(i)–(ii). And so to
interpret § 1225(b)(2)(A) as Respondent argues would subject mandatory detention to every
alien who did not lawfully enter the country. This reading would strip 1226(c) of meaning.
What is more, Congress only recently added subsection 1226(c)(1)(E) when it passed the Laken
Riley Act. Pub. L. No. 119-1, 139 Stat. 3 (2025). Respondent’s interpretation asks this Court to
presume Congress pointlessly amended the statute with a redundant provision when it most

recently considered it. The Court declines to do so. See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 607–08
(2019) (“This would violate the cannon against interpreting any statutory provision in a manner
that would render another provision superfluous.”).
The Court addresses one final point. Respondent acknowledges that another court in the
Western District of Tennessee considered these same statutory provisions and held that § 1226(a)
applied to the petitioner there. (Id. at PageID 29 (citing Godinez-Lopez, 2025 WL 3047889).)
And Respondent seeks to distinguish that case from the facts here. In short, he argues that the
petitioner in Godinez-Lopez had been in the United States for over three years and had been
granted status as a Special-Immigrant Juvenile through 2027. (Id. at PageID 30.) But here,

Petitioner has only been present in the United States for 11 months and is subject to removal.
(Id.) But Respondent overlooks that this Court has considered facts like these and still concluded
that § 1226(a) governed.
In Padilla-Ugsha v. Ladwig, this Court concluded that § 1226(a) applied to a detained
alien who resided in the United States for over a year. 2025 WL 3638007, at *6. That is because
the plain text and statutory framework indicate that §§ 1225 and 1226 are different statutory
provisions that apply in different contexts. As the Supreme Court explained in Jennings, the
government may “detain certain aliens seeking admission into the country” under § 1225(b)
while § 1226 “authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens already in the country pending
the outcome of removal proceedings.” 583 U.S. at 289 (emphasis added). So even though
Petitioner here has resided in the United States for less than a year, § 1226 governs because he is
not seeking admission but is already in this country. Petitioner is therefore subject to the
discretionary bond process under § 1226.
III. Due Process

Because the Court has found that § 1226(a) applies to Petitioner’s detention, he is owed
the process given to him under the statute. See, e.g. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam,
591 U.S. 103, 140 (2020) (“[A]n alien in [Petitioner’s] position has only the rights . . . that
Congress has provided by statute.”). Petitioner alleges that Respondent violates his due process
rights by continuing to detain him without a bond hearing. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 6.)
Respondent counters that because Petitioner complains that he is detained under the wrong
statute, even if his detention is unlawful, it is not unconstitutional. Respondent notes that
Petitioner “has been given notice of the charges against him, has access to counsel, may attend
hearings with an immigration judge, can request bond at that time, and has the right to appeal the

denial of any request for bond.” (ECF No. 7 at PageID 39 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1362).) Put simply,
Respondent asserts that § 1225(b)(2)(A) has already afforded Petitioner the due process that
Congress chose to provide him. (Id.)
The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution protects every person from being
“deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. The
Sixth Circuit generally “applies the balancing test from Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319
(1976), to evaluate the level of process owed to a noncitizen.” Godinez-Lopez, 2025 WL
3047889, at *6 (citing United States v. Silvestre-Gregorio, 983 F.3d 848, 852 (6th Cir. 2020)).
And under Matthews, the Court must consider (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the
official action.” (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest,” and (3) “the
Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens
that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” 424 U.S. at 335.
All three factors weigh in Petitioner’s favor. He has a strong liberty interest in being free
from physical detention. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004); Zadvydas v. Davis,

533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). The risk of erroneous deprivation is high here considering that
Respondent and the BIA’s current position is to afford him no bond hearing whatsoever. And
bond hearings are a significant procedural safeguard to balance the Government’s interest in
immigration enforcement against individual liberties. So the Court finds that the Government’s
interest in detaining Petitioner without that procedural safeguard does not outweigh Petitioner’s
liberty interest or the risk of erroneous deprivation. This is all the more true because Petitioner
has no meaningful opportunity for an immigration judge to consider whether he is a danger to
society or a flight risk. This all makes clear that Petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing before an
immigration judge. And not only that, but his continued detention without that bond hearing

violates his due process rights. The Court therefore GRANTS the Petition.
IV. Attorney’s Fees and Costs
Petitioner seeks attorney’s fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28
U.S.C. § 2412. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 9.) Section 2412(b) allows a court to award “reasonable
fees and expenses of attorneys, in addition to the costs which may be awarded pursuant to
subsection (a), to the prevailing party in any civil action brought by or against the United States.”
28 U.S.C. § 2412(b). The Federal Rules require that claims for attorney’s fees and related
expenses be made by motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2)(A). So Petitioner must timely file a
motion that complies with Local Rule 54.1(b) to seek attorney’s fees and costs. See L.R. 54.1(b).
CONCLUSION
Immigration policies have long been subject to the changing tides of government. But
those changing tides cannot usurp statutory authorization. For the reasons above, the Court
GRANTS IN PART the Petition and ORDERS Respondent to provide Petitioner with a bond
hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(8), (d)(1) within 14 days of the entry

of this Order.7 And the Court further ENJOINS Respondent from pursuing Petitioner’s
detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).
SO ORDERED, this 19th day of December, 2025.
s/Thomas L. Parker
THOMAS L. PARKER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

7Given the facts here, the Court declines to Order that Respondent release Petitioner pending the
bond hearing.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11228810. Public record. Not legal advice.