# Ladwig

> District Court, W.D. Tennessee · December 18, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11227953

## Case

- **Full name:** Rudis Humberto Rios Pena v. Scott Ladwig
- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Tennessee
- **Decided:** December 18, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION

RUDIS HUMBERTO RIOS PENA, )
)
Petitioner, )
) No. 2:25-cv-03082-TLP-cgc
v. )
)
SCOTT LADWIG, )
)
Respondent. )

ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner Rudis Humberto Rios Pena, an alien detained in the West Tennessee Detention
Facility in Mason, Tennessee, petitions for a Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
(ECF No. 1.) On December 1, 2025, the Court entered an Order directing Respondent to show
cause why the Writ should not be granted. (ECF No. 8.) Respondent responded. (ECF No. 10.)
And Petitioner replied.1 (ECF No. 11.) For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS the
Petition.
BACKGROUND
Around August 2021, Petitioner, a Honduran citizen, entered the United States as an
Unaccompanied Alien Child near McAllen, Texas. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 6.) He is now twenty
years old. (Id. at PageID 7.) He has no criminal history in the United States. (Id.) And he
recently became engaged. (Id.) Petitioner has a pending asylum application with the United

1 The Parties consented to the Court ruling without a hearing. See emails from Margot P.
Kniffin, Petitioner’s Counsel, and Monica M. Simmons-Jones, Respondent’s Counsel, to the
Court. (Dec. 9, 2025) (on file with the Court); ECF No. 10 at PageID 25.)
States Citizenship and Immigration Services and has applied for a valid employment
authorization document. (Id.; ECF No. 10 at PageID 25.) But he has no lawful status. (See ECF
No. 1-2.) Although Petitioner once resided in Virginia, he temporarily relocated to Tennessee
for seasonal employment. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 7.)
On November 6, 2025, Petitioner went to assist his cousin who had been in a car accident

in Millington, Tennessee. (Id.; ECF No. 10 at PageID 25.) The responding officers asked for
Petitioner’s identification and then requested assistance from agents associated with the
“Memphis Safe Operation.” (ECF No. 1 at PageID 7; ECF No. 10 at PageID 25.) The United
States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) took custody of Petitioner the next day.
(ECF No. 10 at PageID 25.) The United States Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) then
provided Petitioner with a Notice to Appear. (ECF No. 1-2 at PageID 14.) They allege that he
entered the country without a valid entry document and that he is an immigrant without “a valid
unexpired passport, or other suitable travel document, or document of identity and nationality” in
violation of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) and 1182 (a)(7)(A)(i)(I).2 (Id.) Petitioner remains in
ICE custody at the West Tennessee Detention Facility in Macon, Tennessee.3 (ECF No. 10 at

PageID 25.)
Yet DHS and the Executive Office of Immigration Review (“EOIR”) have not held a
bond hearing for Petitioner. (See ECF No. 1 at PageID 7.) They determined that he is subject to
mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), a change from a decades-long practice of
affording aliens in Petitioner’s position with bond hearings. (Id. at PageID 4–5.) The change
came in July 2025, when DHS, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”), and ICE issued a new

2 The United States Code here codifies the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) §§
212(a)(6)(A)(i) and 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I). Petitioner’s Notice to Appear cites the INA sections.
3 Respondent does not dispute the above facts. (ECF No. 10 at PageID 25.)
policy.4 See, e.g., Monge-Nunez v. Ladwig, No. 25-3043, 2025 WL 3565348, at *1 (W.D. Tenn.
Dec. 12, 2025). This new policy subjects aliens who have resided in the United States for over
two years and who are apprehended in the interior of the country to mandatory detention. Id.
Before, those same persons were detained and afforded bond hearings under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).
Id.; Godinez-Lopez v. Ladwig v., No. 25-2962, 2025 WL 3047889, at *1 (W.D. Tenn. Oct. 31,

2025). (ECF No. 1 at PageID 4–5.) The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) later upheld
this new policy in the case of In re Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025).
So now, immigration judges are bound by precedent which denies aliens like Petitioner bond
hearings under § 1225(b)(2)(A).
And for Petitioner, who has resided in the United States for over four years with no
criminal history, this means that he now faces detention “without a bond hearing to determine
whether he is a flight risk or danger to others.” (ECF No. 1 at PageID 9.) Petitioner alleges that
Respondent’s failure to provide him a bond hearing violates 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), the
Administrative Procedure Act, and his Fifth Amendment right to procedural due process. (Id. at

PageID 7–9.) He asks for the Court to grant his Petition and require “that Respondent[] release
Petitioner or provide him a bond hearing . . . within 7 days.” (Id. at PageID 9.) Petitioner also
seeks attorney’s fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act. (Id.)
LEGAL STANDARD
A petition for habeas corpus enables a person to challenge the legality of their custody.
See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 745 (2008) (quoting Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475,

4 American Immigration Lawyers Association, ICE Memo: Interim Guidance Regarding
Detention Authority for Applications for Admission, AILA (July 8, 2025),
https://www.aila.org/ice-memo-interim-guidance-regarding-detention-authority-for-applications-
for-admission (“For custody purposes, these aliens are now treated in the same manner that
‘arriving aliens’ have historically been treated.”) (last visited Dec. 15, 2025).
484 (1973)). And “the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.”
Preiser, 411 U.S. at 484; see 28 U.S.C. 2241(c)(3) (“The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend
to a prisoner unless . . . [h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States[.]”). Petitioner here asserts that his custody under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) is
unlawful.

Detention of noncitizens during removal proceedings, is typically governed by
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) §§ 1225 and 1226. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225, 1226.
Section 1225(b)(2)(A) governs the mandatory detention of “applicant[s] for admission” after an
immigration officer has determined that an applicant is not entitled to admission in the United
States.
(b) Inspection of applicants for admission
. . .
(2) Inspection of other aliens
(A) In general
Subject to subparagraphs (B) and (C), in the case of an
alien who is an applicant for admission, if the examining
immigration officer determines that an alien seeking
admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be
admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding under
section 1229a of this title.
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). An “applicant for admission” is an alien “present in the United States
who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1).
“[A]dmission” and “admitted” are defined as “the lawful entry of the alien into the United States
after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A). And
again, detention is mandatory under this section. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).
Section 1226(a) provides for discretionary detention:
(a) Arrest, detention, and release
On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and
detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the
United States. Except as provided in subsection (c) and pending such
decision, the Attorney General—
(1) may continue to detain the arrested alien; and
(2) may release the alien on—
(A) bond of at least $1,500 with security approved by, and
containing conditions prescribed by, the Attorney General .
. . .
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Known as the Laken Riley Act, subsection (c) of § 1226 provides for the
mandatory detention of aliens found inadmissible or deportable under specific provisions and
who have been “charged with,” “arrested for,” “convicted of,” or admit to “having committed”
certain listed crimes. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). Aliens arrested and detained under this section “have
a right to request a custody redetermination (i.e., bond hearing) before an Immigration Judge.”
Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, -- F. Supp. 3d --, No. 2:25-cv-12486, 2025 WL 2496379, at *4
(citing 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(8), (d)(1)). That immigration judge “evaluates whether there is a
risk of nonappearance or danger to the community.” Id. (citing Matter of Guerra, 24 I. & N.
Dec. 37, 40 (BIA 2006)). With that in mind, the Court now turns to the Parties’ arguments.
ANALYSIS
The Court must determine whether § 1225(b)(2)(A) or § 1226(a) applies to Petitioner’s
detention. This is not an issue of first impression before this Court. And Respondent detaining
Petitioner under § 1225(b) instead of § 1226(a) is not an isolated event. Indeed, the Court
recently considered this same question and held that Ҥ 1226 governs the arrest and detention of
an alien without a criminal history who has been residing in the United States.” See, e.g.,
Monge-Nunez, 2025 WL 3565348, at *6; Padilla-Ugsha v. Ladwig, No. 25-3045, 2025 WL
3638007 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 15, 2025). Because of the increasing frequency of these habeas
petitions, other district courts in this circuit have also been asked to consider which statutory
provision governs. They too have determined that § 1226(a) fits in this scenario. See, e.g.,
Godinez-Lopez, 2025 WL 3047889; Lopez-Campos, -- F. Supp. 3d --, 2025 WL 2496379. Other
district courts across the country have concluded the same. As one court just observed:
By a recent count, the central issue in this case – the administration's new position
that all noncitizens who came into the United States illegally, but since have been
living in the United States, must be detained until their removal proceedings are
completed – has been challenged in at least 362 cases in federal district courts.
The challengers have prevailed, either on a preliminary or final basis, in 350 of
those cases decided by over 160 different judges sitting in about fifty different
courts spread across the United States. Thus, the overwhelming, lopsided
majority have held that the law still means what it always has meant.

Barco Mercado v. Francis, -- F. Supp. 3d --, 2025 WL 3295903, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2025)
(footnotes omitted) (collecting cases). But the Sixth Circuit has yet to decide whether §§
1225(b) or 1226(a) applies under these circumstances.
With that in mind, the Courts analysis here comes in three parts.5 The Court first
considers whether it should require Petitioner to exhaust his administrative remedies before
hearing this claim. It then uses statutory interpretation to determine which section applies. And
finally, the Court addresses procedural due process.
I. Administrative Exhaustion
Petitioner has not exhausted his administrative remedies. (See ECF No. 11 at PageID
48.) To do so, he would need to request a bond hearing before an immigration judge, have an
immigration judge deny his request, and then appeal that denial to the Board of Immigration
Appeals. Respondent argues that the Court should require Petitioner to go through that process
before considering his Petition. The Court disagrees with Respondent for the reasons below.

5 Because the Court finds that Petitioner is entitled to the discretionary bond process under §
1226 as a matter of statutory interpretation and procedural due process, it need not consider
Petitioner’s Administrative Procedure Act claim. (See ECF No. 1 at PageID 9; ECF No. 10 at
PageID 37.)
Exhaustion is required when mandated by Congress. See McCarthy v. Madigan, 503
U.S. at 140, 144 (1992). The Parties agree that no statute requires administrative exhaustion in
this context. (ECF No. 10 at PageID 26; ECF No. 11 at PageID 48.) And the Court finds the
same. But the Parties disagree on whether the Court should apply the prudential exhaustion
doctrine. (No. 10 at PageID 28; ECF No. 11 at PageID 48.)

When Congress has not explicitly mandated exhaustion, the decision to require a
petitioner to exhaust their administrative remedies lies within “sound judicial discretion.”
McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144 (1992). In exercising that discretion, the Supreme
Court has explained that “federal courts must balance the interest of the individual in retaining
prompt access to a federal judicial forum against countervailing institutional interests favoring
exhaustion.” Id. at 146. Those institutional interests are “protecting administrative agency
authority and promoting judicial efficiency.” Id. at 145.
The Supreme Court also identified several situations in which the interest of the
individual weighs heavily against the institutional interests. See id. at 146–49. Relevant here,

“an administrative remedy may be inadequate where the administrative body . . . has otherwise
predetermined the issue before it.” Id. at 148 (citing Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 575, n.
14 (1973); Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U.S. 639, 640 (1968) (in view of Attorney General's
submission that the challenged rules of the prison were “validly and correctly applied to
petitioner,” requiring administrative review through a process culminating with the Attorney
General “would be to demand a futile act”); Association of National Advertisers, Inc. v. FTC,
627 F.2d 1151, 1156–1157 (1979) (bias of Federal Trade Commission chairman), cert. denied,
447 U.S. 921 (1980); Patsy v. Florida International University, 634 F.2d 900, 912–913 (5th Cir.
1981) (en banc) (administrative procedures must “not be used to harass or otherwise discourage
those with legitimate claims”), rev’d on other grounds, sub nom. Patsy v. Board of Regents of
Florida, 457 U.S. 496 (1982)); See also Herr v. U.S. Forest Serv., 803 F.3d 822–23 (6th Cir.
2015) (“If administrative review would come to naught, if any efforts before the agency would
be pointless, the courts do not insist that litigants go through the motions of exhausting the claim
anyway.”) (internal quotations omitted).

Petitioner argues that the BIA’s decision in Matter of Yajujure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec.
216 (2025) makes requesting a bond hearing from the immigration court “futile.” (ECF No. 1 at
PageID 2.) That is because that ruling upholds the very policy Petitioner is challenging here.
(Id.) See Matter of Yajujure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. at 228 (holding that aliens “who
surreptitiously cross into the United States remain applicants for admission until and unless they
are lawfully inspected and admitted by an immigration officer” because “[r]emaining in the
United States for a lengthy period of time following entry without inspection, by itself, does not
constitute an ‘admission”’). Respondent acknowledges “Petitioner may be unlikely to obtain the
relief he seeks through the administrative process based on Matter of Yajure Hurtado, which

binds the agency and the immigration courts and rejects Petitioner’s statutory arguments in this
case.” (ECF No. 10 at PageID 28.) But it nonetheless argues that the Court should exercise its
discretion and require Petitioner to exhaust his remedies. (Id.)
The Court agrees with Petitioner that Matter of Yajure Hurtado—which is binding on
immigration judges—makes exhausting administrative remedies futile here. For Petitioner to
exhaust his remedies, he would need to appeal to the same BIA that just decided Matter of
Yajure Hurtado. So the decision on whether to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing has been
predetermined. See Lopez-Campos, -- F. Supp. 3d. --, 2025 WL 2496379, at *4 (reasoning that
“administrative review is not likely to change Respondents’ position that § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies
in this context”). What is more, the BIA has no authority to review constitutional challenges.
See Sterkaj v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 273, 279 (6th Cir. 2006). This means that Petitioner can only
bring his due process claim in federal court.
It follows that requiring exhaustion in this case would not further the ends of judicial
efficiency and protecting administrative authority because it would simply delay the resolution of

Petitioner’s legal questions. Petitioner’s individual interest in having prompt access to this
forum outweighs any institutional interests at stake. Another practical reason supports this
conclusion. “Bond appeals before the BIA, on average, take six months to complete.” Lopez-
Campos, -- F. Supp. Ed. --, 2025 WL 2496379, at *4 (citing Rodriguez v. Bostock, 779 F. Supp.
3d 1239, 1245 (W.D. Wash. 2025)).
Requiring Petitioner to wait six months—or any length of time for that matter—so that
the BIA can address an issue it has already decided creates hardship for hardship’s sake. The
Court declines to impose such a result here.6
II. Statutory Interpretation

The Parties disagree over whether § 1225(b)(2)(A) or § 1226(a) should govern
Petitioner’s detention. And the Parties take conflicting views on how to interpret these sections.
Petitioner argues that “[t]he plain text of the provisions demonstrates that § 1226(a), not §
1225(b), applies to people like Petitioner.” (ECF No. 1 at PageID 5.) That is because § 1226(a)

6 Respondent points the Court to a line of cases out of the Northern District of Ohio that require
immigration habeas petitioners to exhaust their bond-related administrative remedies before
considering their habeas claims. (ECF No. 10 at PageID 27 (citing Monroy Vaillalta v. Greene, -
-- F. Supp. 3d ---, No. 25-1594, 2025 WL 2472886, at *2– 3 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 5, 2025);
Hernandez Torrealba v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 25-1621, 2025 WL 2444114, at *8–
12 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 25, 2025); see also Laguna Espinoza v. Dir. of Detroit Field Off., U.S.
Immigration & Customs Enforcement, No. 25-2107, 2025 WL 2878173, at *2–3 (N.D. Ohio Oct.
9, 2025)). The Court has reviewed those cases. And finds the reasoning unpersuasive for the
reasons discussed above.
applies to those persons who are “charged as being admissible, including those who entered
without inspection.” (Id.) Meanwhile, § 1225(b) applies only “to people arriving at U.S. ports
of entry or who recently entered the United States.” (Id. at PageID 6.) Respondent counters that
“under § 1225’s plain terms, all unadmitted aliens in the United States are “applicants for
admission,” regardless of their proximity to the border, the length of time they have been present

here, or whether they ever had the subjective intent to properly apply for admission.” (ECF No.
10 at PageID 29.) In response, Petitioner contends that Respondent’s § 1225(b)(2)(A)
interpretation here renders § 1226(c)’s mandatory detention provision superfluous. (ECF No. 11
at PageID 52.) See 8 U.S.C. §1226(c)(1)(E).
When interpreting statutes, courts should construe the text “so that effect is given to all its
provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant.” Corley v.
United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009) (quoting Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004)); see
Antonin Scalia and Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 174 (2012)
(“If possible, every word and every provision is to be given effect.”). To apply this approach,

courts give each word within the statute “‘its ordinary, contemporary, common meaning,’ while
keeping in mind that ‘statutory language has meaning only in context.’” Kentucky v. Biden, 23
F.4th 585, 603 (6th Cir. 2022) (citation modified) (citing Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands,
Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1010, (2017); Graham Cnty. Soil & Water Conserv. Dist. v. United States
ex rel. Wilson, 545 U.S. 409, 415 (2005); Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338,
356 (2013)). And courts “presume that [the] legislature says in a statute what it means and
means in a statute what it says there.” Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54
(1992).
For the reasons below, these principles resolve the dispute in Petitioner’s favor.
Although certain legal principles overlap, the Court first addresses the plain language before
considering the statutory framework. See Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 638 (2016).
A. Plain Language
Detention under 1225(b)(2)(A) applies “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for

admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is
not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted[.]” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). This means
the alien must be an “applicant for admission” who is “seeking admission” and “not clearly and
beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.”
Section 1225(a)’s definition of “applicants for admission” does not match Petitioner. The
statute defines an “applicant for admission” as “[a]n alien present in the United States who has
not been admitted or who arrives in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). And the statute
defines “admission” and “admitted” as “with respect to an alien, the lawful entry of the alien into
the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1101(a)(13)(A) (emphasis added). So read together, “applicants for admission” means “aliens
who have unlawfully entered into the United States after inspection and authorization by an
immigration officer.” This definition applies to applicants for admission to have undergone
inspection and authorization by an immigration officer. It does not fit with Respondent’s
definition of “applicants for admission,” which would include aliens like Petitioner who have
been residing in the interior of the country for a long time without inspection or authorization by
an immigration officer.
Section 1225(a)’s “seeking admission” language also does not apply to Petitioner under
these facts. “Seeking,” of course, implies “some sort of present-tense action.” Barco Mercado, -
- F. Supp. 3d. --, 2025 WL 3295903, at *5. And “seeking” suggests action. So the Court finds
that to fall under § 1225(b)(2)(A), the alien must be actively seeking admission, not simply
residing in the country after entering it unlawfully. Respondent claims that Petitioner is “seeking
admission” because he entered the United States without admission. (ECF No. 10 at PageID 31.)
But as Petitioner notes, he was not “seeking admission” into the United States when he was

detained. (ECF No. 11 at PageID 52.) His unlawful entry occurred years ago. It cannot be said
that he was actively seeking admission into the United States at the point of his detention.7
The plain meaning of § 1226 better captures Petitioner’s situation. For example, it
applies to the “apprehension and detention of aliens,” providing that, upon “a warrant issued by
the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested or detained pending a decision on whether the
alien is to be removed from the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Petitioner was apprehended
at a car accident in the interior of the country after residing here for several years. The Attorney
General therefore has the discretion under this section to “continue to detain [him]” or she “may
release [him] on bond.” (Id.) She may not, though, deny him the bond hearing to which he is

entitled. See 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(8), (d)(1).
B. Statutory Framework
The titles of the statutory provisions also suggest that Petitioner’s interpretation of them
is correct. See Godinez-Lopez, 2025 WL 3047889, at *4. “[T]he title of a statute in the heading
of a section are tools available for the resolution of a doubt” about a statute’s meaning. Dubin v.

7 To be sure, the INA recognizes two classes of aliens who are not seeking admission—those
who are arriving yet found to be inadmissible because of fraud, misrepresentation, or lack of
valid documents, and those that are designated by the Attorney General who have not been
admitted or paroled and have not been present in the United States for two years. See 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) and 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii). But that does not preclude the existence of other
alien classes that do not fall under § 1225. See, e.g., Padilla-Ugsha, 2025 WL 3638007.
United States, 599 U.S. 110, 121 (2023). Section 1225’s title is “Inspection by immigration
officers; expedited removal of inadmissible arriving aliens; referral for hearing.” 8 U.S.C.
§1225 (emphasis added). Section 1225’s title then envisions arriving aliens placed in expedited
removal. But again, Petitioner was detained over 1,000 miles from the border years after he had
crossed it. And he was not eligible for expedited removal proceedings. See Jennings v.

Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 287 (2018). Meanwhile, § 1226’s title is “Apprehension and detention
of aliens.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226. That title fits here. Petitioner was apprehended, not while arriving
in the United States, but years later while stopping to help his cousin. And he is now detained.
Section 1225’s therefore seems inapplicable to aliens in Petitioner’s shoes, but § 1226’s title
seems spot on.
A look at § 1225’s subject matter further undercuts Respondent’s interpretation of the
statutory framework. Section 1225 describes the process of inspecting and removing immigrants
who are actively crossing the border or entering at a port of entry. See Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287
(“That process of decision [described in § 1225] generally begins at the Nation’s borders and

ports of entry, where the Government must determine whether an alien seeking to enter the
country is admissible.”); 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). It explicitly applies to “an alien who . . . has
not affirmatively shown . . . that the alien has been physically present in the United States
continuously for the 2-year period immediately prior to the date of the determination of
inadmissibility . . . .” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(II). It makes little sense to apply § 1225 to
Petitioner who has resided in the United States for over four years and is not actively entering the
country.
That is not all. The existence of § 1226(c) also cuts against Respondent’s position here
because Respondent’s interpretation of § 1225(b) makes § 1226(c)’s mandatory detention
provision superfluous. To be sure, subsections 1226(c)(1)(E)(i)–(ii) provide for mandatory
detention of certain aliens. But it applies only to those aliens who both entered the country
without inspection under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A), (C), and (7) and who are also “charged with,
. . . arrested for, . . . convicted of . . .” certain crimes. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E)(i)–(ii). And so,
to interpret § 1225(b)(2)(A) as Respondent argues would subject to mandatory detention every

alien who did not lawfully enter the country. This reading would strip 1226(c) of meaning.
What is more, Congress only recently added subsection 1226(c)(1)(E) when it passed the Laken
Riley Act. Pub. L. No. 119-1, 139 Stat. 3 (2025). Respondent’s interpretation asks this Court to
presume Congress pointlessly amended the statute with a redundant provision when it most
recently considered it. The Court declines to do so. See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 607–08
(2019) (“This would violate the cannon against interpreting any statutory provision in a manner
that would render another provision superfluous.”).
At bottom, §§ 1225 and 1226 are different statutory provisions that apply to different
contexts. And the Supreme Court has already distinguished the two. In Jennings, the Court

determined that the government may “detain certain aliens seeking admission into the country”
and that the § 1225 process “generally begins at the Nation’s borders and ports of entry, where
the Government must determine whether an alien seeking to enter the country is admissible.”
583 U.S. at 287, 289. Whereas § 1226 “authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens
already in the country pending the outcome of removal proceedings.” 583 U.S. 281, 289 (2018)
(emphasis added). Respondent has articulated no compelling reason to stray from this
commonsense understanding.
So the Court finds § 1226 governs the detention of an alien like Petitioner, who has no
criminal history and who has been residing in the United States for several years. Petitioner is
therefore subject to the discretionary bond process under § 1226.
III. Due Process
Because the Court has found that § 1226(a) applies to Petitioner’s detention, he is owed

the process given to him under the statute. See, e.g. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam,
591 U.S. 103, 140 (2020) (“[A]n alien in [Petitioner’s] position has only the rights . . . that
Congress has provided by statute.”). Petitioner alleges that Respondent violates his due process
rights by continuing to detain him without a bond hearing. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 9; ECF No. 11
at PageID 56.) Respondent counters that because Petitioner complains that he is detained under
the wrong statute, even if his detention is unlawful, it is not unconstitutional. Respondent notes
that Petitioner “has been given notice of the charges against him, has access to counsel, may
attend hearings with an immigration judge, can request bond at that time, and has the right to
appeal the denial of any request for bond.” (ECF No. 10 at PageID 40–41 (citing 8 U.S.C. §

1362).) Put simply, Respondent asserts that § 1225(b)(2)(A) has already afforded Petitioner the
due process that Congress chose to provide him. (Id.)
The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution protects every person from being
“deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. The
Sixth Circuit generally “applies the balancing test from Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319
(1976), to evaluate the level of process owed to a noncitizen.” Godinez-Lopez, 2025 WL
3047889, at *6 (citing United States v. Silvestre-Gregorio, 983 F.3d 848, 852 (6th Cir. 2020)).
And under Matthews, the Court must consider (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the
official action.” (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest,” and (3) “the
Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens
that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” 424 U.S. at 335.
All three factors weigh in Petitioner’s favor. He has a strong liberty interest in being free
from physical detention. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004); Zadvydas v. Davis,
533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). The risk of erroneous deprivation is high here considering that

Respondent and the BIA’s current position is to afford him no bond hearing whatsoever. And
bond hearings are a significant procedural safeguard to balance the Government’s interest in
immigration enforcement against individual liberties. So the Court finds that the Government’s
interest in detaining Petitioner without that procedural safeguard does not outweigh Petitioner’s
liberty interest or the risk of erroneous deprivation. This is all the more true because Petitioner
has no meaningful opportunity for an immigration judge to consider whether he is a danger to
society or a flight risk. And the fact that Petitioner has been living and working in the United
States for the past several years with no criminal history further tips the scales in his favor.
This all makes clear that Petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing before an immigration

judge. And not only that, but his continued detention without that bond hearing violates his due
process rights. The Court therefore GRANTS the Petition.
IV. Attorney’s Fees and Costs
Petitioner seeks attorney’s fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28
U.S.C. § 2412. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 9.) Section 2412(b) allows a court to award “reasonable
fees and expenses of attorneys, in addition to the costs which may be awarded pursuant to
subsection (a), to the prevailing party in any civil action brought by or against the United States.”
28 U.S.C. § 2412(b). The Federal Rules require that claims for attorney’s fees and related
expenses be made by motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2)(A). So Petitioner must timely file a
motion that complies with Local Rule 54.1(b) to seek attorney’s fees and costs. See L.R. 54.1(b).
CONCLUSION
Immigration policies have long been subject to the changing tides of government. But
those changing tides cannot usurp statutory authorization. For the reasons above, the Court

GRANTS the Petition and ORDERS Respondent to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing
under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(8), (d)(1) within 7 days of the entry of this
Order. The Court further ORDERS Respondent to release Petitioner pending that bond hearing.
And the Court further ENJOINS Respondent from pursuing Petitioner’s detention under 8
U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).
SO ORDERED, this 18th day of December, 2025.

s/Thomas L. Parker
THOMAS L. PARKER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11227953. Public record. Not legal advice.