# LESKO

> District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania · December 18, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11227925

## Case

- **Full name:** Robert Michael Lesko v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration
- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** December 18, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11227925

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
PITTSBURGH DIVISION

ROBERT MICHAEL LESKO, )
) Civil Action No.:

) 2:24-CV-01660-CBB
Plaintiff,
)

)
vs.
) Christopher B. Brown

) United States Magistrate Judge
COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL
)
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
)
)
Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION1
ON CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ECF Nos. 4 and 6

Christopher B. Brown, United States Magistrate Judge

I. Introduction
Plaintiff Michael Robert Lesko (“Lesko”) filed his claim for disability
insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act (the “Act”), 42 U.S.C. §§
401–434, on March 16, 2023. ECF No. 2-2 at 25. Lesko claimed he became disabled
beginning December 25, 2022 due to stage 1 blood cancer, chronic pain, gout,
fatigue/immune system deficiencies. ECF No. 2-3 at 3.
After Lesko’s claims were initially denied, he sought reconsideration and a
hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) on July 18, 2024. ECF No. 5 at

1 All parties have consented to jurisdiction before a United States Magistrate Judge; therefore
the Court has the authority to decide dispositive motions, and to eventually enter final judgment.
See 28 U.S.C. § 636, et seq.
1. On August 16, 2024, the ALJ denied Lesko’s requests for benefits and found that
Lesko was not disabled under the Act. Id. The Appeals Council declined to review
the ALJ’s decision and Lesko filed a timely appeal with this Court. ECF No. 7 at 3.

Presently pending before the Court are cross motions for summary judgment
by the parties. ECF Nos. 4 and 6. The motions are fully briefed and ripe for
consideration. ECF Nos. 5, 7, 9. For the reasons that follow, Lesko’s motion for
summary judgment is granted, the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment
is denied, the Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits is vacated and the matter is

remanded pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further review
consistent with this decision.2
II. Factual Background
The following summary is limited to information relevant to the current
appeal. Lesko was born on October 1, 1960 and was 62 years old at the onset of his

alleged disability on December 25, 2022. ECF No. 2-2 at 26; ECF No. 2-3 at 2. He
previously worked as a business manager, but testified he stopped working on
December 25, 2022 after he became ill and was diagnosed with myleofibrosis, a rare
type of incurable blood cancer in January 2023. ECF No. 2-10 at 26. For palliative
care, Lesko was prescribed Pacritinib (Vonjo), a medication used for treating
individuals with intermediate or high-risk myelofibrosis and azacytidine, a
chemotherapy medication to reduce the growth of cancer cells. Id. at 14; ECF No. 2-

2 Frank Bisignano is substituted as the Defendant in this matter, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
25(d) and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Clerk is directed to amend the docket to reflect this change.
12 at 16, 20-21; ECF No. 5 at 9 n. 10; n. 11. Side effects of Pacritinib include, inter
alia, shortness of breath, numbness in a leg or arm and extreme fatigue. ECF No. 2-
12 at 2-5.. Side effects of azacitidine include, inter alia, unusual weakness or

tiredness. Id. at 21..
Lesko was treated by Dr. Salman Fazal, an oncologist, and his primary care
physician Dr. Brian Lamb. ECF No. 5 at 8-9. Throughout his treatment, Lesko
reported symptoms of, inter alia, brain fog, fatigue, and neuropathy in his feet to his
treating physicians. See ECF No. 5 at 9. In treatment notes for an April 2024

appointment, Dr. Fazal noted Lesko’s fatigue symptoms and characterized Lesko’s
inability to perform activities as remaining “quite significant.” ECF No. 2-25 at 12.
Among other medical testimony, there are several key medical opinions and
evaluations in the present record:

Dr. Fazal: Treating Oncologist
Dr. Fazal, Lesko’s treating oncologist, authored two medical opinions, one in
June 2023 and one in February 2024. ECF No. 2-17 at 32-33; 89-90. In his June
2023 opinion, Dr. Fazal opined Lesko could lift up to 5 lbs occasionally during the
workday; could use his hands for simple grasping repetitively, but not for pushing,
pulling or find manipulation; and he could not use his feet for repetitive movements.

Id. at 32; 89. Dr. Fazal expected Lesko’s disability to last twelve continuous months
and opined based on his clinical assessment of Lesko that he could not be employed.
Id. at 33. In his February 2024 opinion, Dr. Fazal again opined that Lesko could
stand/walk less than one hour and lift up to 5 lbs occasionally during the workday;
could use his hands for repetitive simple grasping; and could not push or pull. ECF
No. 2-24 at 65-66. Based on his clinical assessment, Dr. Fazal again opined that
Lesko could not be employed. Id. at 66.

Dr. Lamb: Treating Primary Care Physician
Dr. Lamb, Lesko’s primary care physician, issued an opinion in the form of a
physical capacity evaluation in February 2024 in which he opined in an eight-hour
workday, Lesko could stand or walk less than one-hour and lift up to 5 lbs
occasionally; could use hands repetitively for simple grasping and no pushing,
pulling or fine manipulation; and could not use his feet for repetitive movements.

Id. at 68-69. Dr. Lamb stated Lesko was “still not able to work. He has MDS which
is preventing him from meaningful employment.” Id. at 69.
Independent Functional Capacity Evaluation
Lesko underwent a functional capacity evaluation (“FCE”) by David W.
Truschel, MS, OTR/L, CEAS, CMT. ECF No. 2-17 at 99-105. Truschel’s August 8,
2023 report noted a validity profile score of 100%, which means Lesko demonstrated

consistent effort throughout the evaluation. Id. at 99; 104-105. Truschel noted
Lesko could work part-time (five 4-hour days) at the sedentary level. Id. at 99-100;
105. Truschel noted “right hand prehensile strength was diminished. Weakness
was noted in the bilateral gluteus maximus and medius. Hamstring length was
diminished bilaterally. Crepitus was noted in the right knee and diminished
sensation in the bilateral fingertips bilaterally. Right shoulder external/internal
rotation was moderately limited.” Id. at 105. Truschel also noted that fatigue was
caused by several activities including hand carry, repetitive postural maneuvers,
overhead reaching, forward reaching, kneeling, stair climbing, and
standing/walking. Id. at 102-03.

Kathleen Lederman, PsyD.
In December 2023, Lesko underwent a mental status evaluation in
September 2023 with Kathleen Ledermann, PsyD. Id. at 106. Among other
diagnoses and assessments, Dr. Lederman diagnosed Lesko with fatigue,
exhaustion, and brain fog and assessed “mild limitations” to Lesko’s ability to
“understand and remember complex instructions,” “carry out complex instructions,”

and “make judgments on complex work-related decisions.” Id. at 109; 111.
State Agency Consultations
In April 2023, John Bertolino, M.D., a state agency medical consultant,
reviewed Lesko’s medical records and opined that Lesko could, in part, lift up to 20
pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently, stand and/or walk for about 6 hours
in a workday, and sit for about 6 hours in a workday. ECF No. 2-3 at 6.

In October 2023, state psychiatric consultant Karen Plowman, PsyD reviewed
Lesko’s medical records and cited a non-severe depressive, bipolar and related
disorder and anxiety and obsessive-compulsive disorder and assessed “mild”
limitations to Lesko’s ability to understand, remember or apply information,
interact with others, concentrate, persist or maintain pace, and adapt or manage

oneself. Id. at 14.
In December 2023, Michael Lombard, M.D., another state agency medical
consultant, reviewed Lesko’s medical records at the reconsideration level and
agreed with Dr. Bertolino’s assessment that Plaintiff could lift up to 20 pounds

occasionally and 10 pounds frequently and sit for about 6 hours in a workday but
was limited to only 4 hours of standing or walking. Id. at 16. Dr. Lombard indicated
these exertional limits considered Lesko’s myeloid malignancies and “effects of
therapy on function.” Id. at 6.
III. The ALJ Decision
The following summary is limited to information relevant to the current

appeal.
At step one of the sequential analysis – whether the claimant is engaging in
substantial gainful activity – the ALJ found Lesko met the insured status
requirements of the Social Security Act through June 30, 2027 and had not engaged
in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset of his symptoms on December

25, 2022. ECF No. 2-2 at 28.
At step two of the sequential analysis – whether the claimant has medically
determinable impairments that are severe – the ALJ found Lesko had two severe
impairments: myelofibrosis and obesity. Id. at 29-30 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c)).

The ALJ found that while documented in medical evidence, Lesko’s hypertension,
obstructive sleep apnea, gout, diarrhea, depressive disorder, adjustment disorder
and anxiety disorder were “non-severe” impairments and did not more than
minimally limit his ability to perform basic work activities. Id. at 30. (citing SSR 85-
28). As for Lesko’s mental impairments related to fatigue, “brain fog” and
concentration symptoms, the ALJ found testimony and records supporting a finding
that these symptoms were “no more than mild mental limitations[]” in Lesko’s

ability to do basic work activities and found these impairments were nonsevere. Id.
at 30-33 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(d)(1)). The ALJ stated the mild mental
limitations were “not a residual functional capacity assessment but are used to rate
the severity of mental impairments at steps 2 and 3 of the sequential evaluation
process. The mental residual functional capacity assessment used at steps 4 and 5
of the sequential evaluation process requires a more detailed assessment. The
following residual functional capacity assessment reflects the degree of limitation

the undersigned has found in the ‘paragraph B’ mental function analysis.” Id. at 32.
At step three of the sequential analysis – whether the claimant’s
impairments are so severe to meet or medically equal the criteria set forth in the
regulations – the ALJ found “the medical evidence does not document listing-level

severity” for Lesko’s myelofibrosis and obesity, and “no acceptable medical source as
mentioned findings equivalent in severity to the criteria of any listed impairment,
individually or in combination.” Id. at 33.
Prior to commencing step four, the ALJ determined Lesko’s residual
functional capacity (“RFC”). The ALJ found Dr. Fazal and Dr. Lamb’s opinions not

persuasive, found Truschel’s opinion only partially persuasive, and found Drs.
Bertolino and Lombard’s opinions generally persuasive and adopted Dr. Lombard’s
opinion on Lesko’s RFC in full. Id. at 33-39. The ALJ did not explicitly discuss Dr.
Lederman or Dr. Plowman’s opinions on his mild mental limitations in formulating
the RFC. The ALJ found Lesko was capable of lifting and carrying 20 pounds
occasionally and 10 pounds frequently; sitting for six hours and standing and/or

walking for a total of four hours over the course of an eight-hour workday; push and
pull and much as he can lift and carry; frequently climb ramps and stairs;
frequently maintain balance over narrow, slippery, or erratically moving surfaces;
frequently stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl; occasionally climb ladders, ropes or
scaffolds; occasionally work at unprotected heights or in close proximity to
dangerous moving mechanical parts; and never work in conditions in which he is
exposed to the weather. Id. at 34.

At step four – whether the claimant's impairments prevent him from
performing his past relevant work – the ALJ found Lesko had the RFC to perform
less than the full range of light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. 404.1567(b). Id.
Relying on the RFC, the ALJ found Lesko could perform his past relevant work

because the work did not require the performance of work-related activities
precluded by Lesko’s RFC. Id. at 40 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1565). Considering the
Vocational Expert’s (“VE”) testimony, the ALJ found Lesko could perform his past
work as a business manager, which the VE explained is a light exertional, skilled
job. Id. (citing Dictionary of Titles (“DOT”) 187.167-082). The ALJ then found Lesko
was not disabled. Id. at 40-41.

IV. Standard of Review
Judicial review of a social security case is based upon the pleadings and the
transcript of the record, and the scope of that review is limited to determining
whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal standards and whether the

record, as a whole, contains substantial evidence to support the Commissioner's
findings of fact. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). If the Court finds substantial evidence
supports the final decision, it must uphold it. See Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d
546, 552 (3d Cir. 2005). The Court may not set aside a decision that is supported by
substantial evidence “even if [it] would have decided the factual inquiry differently.”
Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing § 405(g)).
“Substantial evidence” is defined as “more than a mere scintilla.” Plummer v.

Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 427 (3d Cir. 1999). It means “such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id.; Biestek v.
Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97 (2019). Substantial evidence “does not mean a large or
considerable amount of evidence, but rather such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487
U.S. 552, 565 (1988). An ALJ's findings must “be accompanied by a clear and

satisfactory explication of the basis on which [they] rest[ ].” Cotter v. Harris, 642
F.2d 700, 704 (3d Cir. 1981). Decisions that are conclusory in their findings or
indicate the ALJ's failure to consider all the evidence are not supported by
substantial evidence. See id. at 705–06. Moreover, the Court must ensure the ALJ
did not “reject evidence for no reason or for the wrong reason.” Id. at 706 (citing
King v. Califano, 615 F.2d 1018 (4th Cir. 1980)).
A district court, after reviewing the entire record may affirm, modify, or
reverse the decision with or without remand to the Commissioner for rehearing.
Podedworny v. Harris, 745 F.2d 210, 221 (3d Cir. 1984). Remand is appropriate if

the record is incomplete or if the ALJ’s findings are incomplete and failed to
“explicitly weigh all relevant, probative and available evidence” of record. Adorno v.
Shalala, 40 F.3d 43, 48 (3d Cir. 1994) (cleaned up).
To be eligible for Social Security benefits under the Act, a claimant must
demonstrate that they cannot engage in “substantial gainful activity” because of a
medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to
result in death, or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous

period of at least twelve months. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); Brewster v. Heckler, 786
F.2d 581, 583 (3d Cir. 1986).
When reviewing a claim, the ALJ must utilize a five-step sequential analysis
to evaluate whether a claimant has met the requirements for disability. 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520, 416.920. The ALJ must determine:
(1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity;

(2) if not, whether the claimant has a severe impairment or a combination of
impairments that is severe;

(3) whether the medical evidence of the claimant's impairment or
combination of impairments meets or equals the criteria listed in 20 C.F.R.,
Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1;

(4) whether the claimant's impairments prevent them from performing their
past relevant work; and
(5) if the claimant is incapable of performing their past relevant work,
whether they can perform any other work which exists in the national
economy.

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4); see Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 24–
25 (2003). The claimant carries the initial burden of demonstrating by medical
evidence that he is unable to return to his previous employment under steps 1
through 4. Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606 F.2d 403, 406 (3d Cir. 1979). If the
claimant meets his burden and shows he is unable to resume previous employment,
the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step 5 to prove that, given claimant’s
mental or physical limitations, age, education, and work experience, he can perform
alternative substantial gainful activity. Doak v. Heckler, 790 F.2d 26, 28 (3d Cir.
1986).
V. Discussion
Lesko argues the ALJ erred in assessing his residual functional capacity
because he failed to account for the “total limiting effects” of his impairments –
specifically, his chronic fatigue, “brain fog” and neuropathy. ECF No. 5 at 3. Within
that overarching argument, Lesko makes the specific arguments that the ALJ erred
in formulating the RFC when (1) he failed to consider the medical opinions from his
treating oncologist and PCP with respect to his aforementioned impairments; (2)

used highly selective references to the record to support his decision and ignored
other objective medical records supporting Lesko’s impairments; (3) engaged in lay
interpretation of medical evidence; (4) failed to provide the VE with any
hypothetical incorporating the limitations ascribed by Lesko’s treating physicians;
and (5) failed to consider Lesko’s self-described chronic fatigue, brain fog and
neuropathy symptoms. ECF No. 5 at 13-18.

The Commissioner responds that the ALJ’s decision is supported by
substantial evidence. ECF No. 7 at 8-13.
In his reply brief, Lesko reemphasizes his argument that the RFC was not
supported by substantial evidence because while the ALJ found Lesko had mild

mental limitations, the ALJ provided “no analysis of how [these symptoms]
impact[ed] his RFC – except for the conclusory statement . . . that ‘the persistence
and intensity of symptoms [] including fatigue, are reflected in the limitations found
in this RFC.’” ECF No. 9 at 3 (quoting ECF No. 2-3 at 19). Because Lesko is correct
that the RFC was not supported by substantial evidence related to his mild mental
limitations, only that argument is addressed.

a. The RFC was not Supported by Substantial Evidence Related
to Lesko’s Mental Limitations
Lesko argues the RFC was not supported by substantial evidence because the
ALJ adopted the state agency administrative findings which acknowledged Lesko’s
brain fog and fatigue as consistently demonstrated symptoms but provided no
analysis about how these mild mental limitations impacted the RFC, and relatedly
that the ALJ failed to include these limitations in the hypothetical question to the
vocational experts whom the ALJ relied in determining that he could return to his
past prior work. ECF No. 5 at 4; 15-16; ECF No. 9 at 3. The Commissioner does not
explicitly respond to this argument but responds the ALJ considered Lesko’s
symptoms and resulting limitations when he considered the medical record as a
whole and found Lesko’s subjective complaints were not consistent with his
treatment record, reasonably determined he was less limited than he alleged and

was not precluded from performing a range of light work. ECF No. 7 at 13.
At step 2, when the claimant alleges mental impairments, the ALJ must
determine whether the mental impairment is “severe.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520a,
416.920a. If the ALJ determines the medical record supports a medically
determinable mental impairment, but finds those mental impairments are not

“severe” and instead rates the degree of the claimant’s limitations as “mild,” 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1520a; 416.920a; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520a(d)(1); 416.920a(d)(1), an ALJ
is still required to consider all impairments – both severe and non-severe – when
formulating the RFC. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(2), 416.945(a)(2).

In determining the RFC, the ALJ must determine “the most [a claimant] can
still do despite [his] limitations based on all the relevant evidence in [the] case
record.” Hess v. Comm'r Soc. Sec., 931 F.3d 198, 209 (3d Cir. 2019) (cleaned up).
The RFC determination “requires a more detailed assessment [of the areas of
functional limitation] by itemizing various functions contained in the broad
[functional limitation] categories” and “must be expressed in terms of work-related
functions” like “describing the claimant’s abilities to: understand, carry out, and

remember instructions; use judgment in making work-related decisions; respond
appropriately to supervision, co-workers and work situations; and deal with
changes in a routine work setting.” Id. (cleaned up). While no special “incantations
are required at step four and five simply because a particular finding has been
made at steps two and three[,]” the ALJ’s statement of limitation must

reflect the claimant’s particular impairments, including those
embodied in the functional limitation findings. “In assessing RFC, the
adjudicator must consider limitations and restrictions imposed by all of
an individual’s impairments, even those that are not ‘severe.’ ” [SSR
96-8P] at *5; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(c), 416.945(c) (explaining
that a mental RFC assessment must begin with an examination of “the
nature and extent of [the claimant’s] mental limitations and
restrictions”). And, again, although steps two and three differ from
steps four and five, the functional limitation findings are plainly
relevant to an ALJ’s statement of the claimant’s limitation at the later
steps because they involve the claimant’s actual impairments. Cf. SSR
96-8P, at *4 (“The mental RFC assessment used at steps 4 and 5 of the
sequential evaluation process requires a more detailed assessment [of
the areas of functional limitation] by itemizing various functions
contained in the broad [functional limitation] categories[.]”).
Hess, 931 F.3d at 209. The ALJ is not required to recite the functional limitation
findings verbatim in the statement of limitation but must “adequately convey[]”
those findings because they are “relevant to that statement of limitation, which
must be sufficient to reflect all of a claimant’s impairments.” Hess, 931 F.3d at 210.
Here, at step 2, the ALJ found that Lesko had medically determinable mental
impairments related to, inter alia, fatigue, memory and concentration, and brain
fog, that caused no more than “mild” limitation in any of the functional areas. ECF
No. 2-2 at 30-32. The ALJ stated “[t]he mental residual functional capacity
assessment used at steps 4 and 5 of the sequential evaluation process requires a
more detailed assessment. The following residual capacity assessment reflects the
degree of limitation the undersigned has found in the “paragraph B” mental
function analysis.” Id. at 32. In formulating the RFC, the ALJ recounted the record
evidence including treatment notes indicating that Lesko had fatigue,
memory/concentration and brain fog symptoms but provided no analysis how these
mild limitations impacted the RFC. The ALJ concluded the limitations in the RFC

related to reduced standing and walking and postural limitations “accounted for”
Lesko’s “variable symptoms (fatigue, shortness of breath, etc.)[.]” Tr. at 38. But,
there was no further discussion or analysis of Lesko’s mental limitations except to
note that state agency medical consultant’s proposed limitations that were adopted
by the ALJ “accounted for” these limitations. Id. at 39. These boilerplate
statements and incorporation by reference of Lesko’s mental limitations into the
RFC are not “valid explanations” or “detailed assessments” of how Lesko’s mental

limitations were considered in deciding his RFC as required by the applicable
regulations and jurisprudence. See Hess, 931 F.3d at 213–14; Ramirez v. Barnhart,
372 F.3d 546, 555 (3d Cir. 2004); SSR96-8P.
Courts in this circuit have “consistently held that even mild limitations in the

relevant domains of mental functioning must be included in an RFC assessment
and hypothetical question posed to the VE that the ALJ relies upon.” Meersand v.
Kijakazi, No. CV 20-1084, 2021 WL 5003331, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 28, 2021) (citing
Benedetto v. Saul, No. CV 19-4021, 2020 WL 5763551, at *6–7 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 28,
2020); Hefferan v. Berryhill, No. 17-2720 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 5, 2018); Kennedy v.
Berryhill, Civil No. 16-5478 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 23, 2018); Metelli v. Berryhill, No. CV 16-
6094, 2017 WL 2570913, at *1 (E.D. Pa. May 26, 2017), report and recommendation

adopted, No. CV 16-6094, 2017 WL 2547288 (E.D. Pa. June 13, 2017); Savage v.
Berryhill, No. 17-2548 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 17, 2018); Green v. Colvin, 179 F. Supp. 3d
481, 486 (E.D. Pa. 2016); Curran v. Astrue, No. CIV.A. 11-5894, 2012 WL 5494616,
at *5 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 13, 2012); Harmon v. Astrue, No. CIV.A. 10-6781, 2012 WL

94617, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 11, 2012); Washington v. Astrue, No. CIV.A. 08-2938,
2009 WL 855893, at *1–2 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2009)). See also: Gunn v. Kijakazi, 705
F. Supp. 3d 315, 332 (E.D. Pa. 2023) (remand appropriate when ALJ did not explain
why claimant’s mild mental impairments were not considered in determining
claimant’s RFC); Kich v. Colvin, 218 F. Supp. 3d 342, 357 (M.D. Pa. 2016) (remand
appropriate where ALJ did not explain why mental health related limitations were
omitted in the RFC); Siry v. Bisignano, No. CV 24-1910, 2025 WL 2447786, at *5

(E.D. Pa. Aug. 25, 2025) (remand appropriate when ALJ did not explain why
claimant’s mild mental impairments were not considered in determining claimant’s
RFC and ALJ used boilerplate language at step 4 to analyze the impact of
claimant’s minimal mental limitation); Maria A. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No.
CV 23-2484 (MAS), 2024 WL 943466, at *6 (D.N.J. Mar. 5, 2024) (remand
appropriate when ALJ included only a “passing reference” to mild mental

limitations which was insufficient to determine a claimant’s RFC); Balla v. Comm'r
of Soc. Sec., No. CV 18-00386 (RBK), 2019 WL 2482661, at *3 (D.N.J. June 14,
2019) (remand appropriate because “the ALJ's reference to [the] [p]laintiff's mild
mental limitations fails to clearly explain the ‘impact of [the] [p]laintiff's mental
impairments on her ability to’ complete the relevant work”); Curry v. Comm'r of
Soc. Sec., No. 1:15-CV-07515-NLH, 2017 WL 825196, at *5–6 (D.N.J. Mar. 2, 2017)
(same).

Simply put, while a finding that a claimant has a mild mental limitation does
not automatically result in “a corresponding mental limitation in the RFC[,]” an
ALJ must consider these findings in formulating the RFC. Gunn, 705 F. Supp. 3d at
333. In Gunn, the court was asked to assess similar language to that used by the
ALJ here to assess a claimant’s mild mental limitations. Id. After considering the
universe of authority, the court found

a boilerplate statement at step two that the ensuing RFC assessment
“reflects” the limitations determined at step two, with no further
discussion of those limitations (except to the extent they match the
limitations noted in the required discussion of the State agency
psychological consultants’ administrative findings) is not the “valid
explanation” required by Third Circuit case law or the “detailed
assessment” required by SSR 96-8p. See Hess, 931 F.3d at 213-14;
Ramirez, 372 F.3d at 555; SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *5. It is
inconsistent with regulations requiring the ALJ when formulating the
RFC to “consider” all impairments, even non-severe ones, and at odds
with the only circuit-level decision addressing the viability of such a
statement. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(2), 416.945(a)(2); Wells [v.
Colvin], 727 F.3d [1061] at 1068-71.
Id. See also Siry, 2025 WL 2447786, at *5 (rejecting similar “boilerplate language”
that “neglected to articulate how [claimant’s] minimal mental limitation impacted
her RFC.”).
“[I]t is insufficient for the ALJ to state that he considered all symptoms and
make passing reference to the medical evidence regarding mental health if the ALJ
did not specifically consider or address the impact of a plaintiff’s mental
impairments on her ability to work[.]” Maria A., 2024 WL 943466, at *6 (cleaned
up). Having a mild mental limitation does not automatically signify that a claimant
can perform his “past relevant work at the calculated RFC.” Balla, 2019 WL
2482661, at *3.

The ALJ here did not account for any impact of Lesko’s mental limitations in
formulating his RFC and used boilerplate language at step 4 that has been rejected
by other courts explained supra. The ALJ found Lesko had mild mental limitations
at step 2 and did not explain the impact those limitations had, if any, on Lesko’s
RFC. The ALJ’s assessment simply stated: “The following residual functional

capacity assessment reflects the degree of limitation the undersigned has found in
the “paragraph B” mental function analysis.” ECF No. 2-2 at 32. At step 4, the ALJ
adopted the state medical consultant’s opinion because it included physical
limitations for standing and sitting that “better accounted for the claimant’s
variable symptoms (fatigue, shortness of breath, etc.)” but neglected to articulate
the impact of his mental limitations on the RFC. Accordingly, the case will be

remanded for the ALJ to consider Lesko’s mild mental limitations in formulating
the RFC.
b. Lesko’s Additional Arguments
Because the court cannot independently weigh the evidence or substitute its
conclusions for those of the ALJ, the Court cannot determine whether the ALJ’s

decision was otherwise supported by substantial evidence. Curry, 2017 WL 825196,
at *6 (“The Court cannot weigh the evidence or substitute its conclusions for those
of the ALJ, or independently determine the impact of Plaintiff's mental
impairments in combination with her physical impairments on her RFC. Without
the ALJ performing that analysis, the Court also cannot determine whether the
ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence.”). Because it is possible on

remand that the ALJ may reach different conclusions after considering Lesko’s
mental limitations in formulating the RFC, which may render any further
arguments levied by Lesko moot, the Court declines to address Lesko’s additional
arguments, without prejudice for him to reassert if appropriate. See William R. v.
Bisignano, No. 24-CV-4765, 2025 WL 1738663, at *9 (E.D. Pa. June 23, 2025);
Steininger v. Barnhart, No. CIV.A. 04-5383, 2005 WL 2077375, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Aug.
24, 2005).

VI. Conclusion
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, summary judgment is granted in favor
of Lesko, the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment is denied, the
Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits is vacated and this matter is remanded
pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further consideration of Lesko’s
mental impairments in the formulation of the RFC. An appropriate Order follows.

DATED this 18th day of December, 2025.

BY THE COURT:

s/Christopher B. Brown
United States Magistrate Judge

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11227925. Public record. Not legal advice.