# GARCIA-ZAMORA

> District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · December 16, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11227148

## Case

- **Full name:** Amilcar Josue Garcia-Zamora v. J.L. Jamison, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** December 16, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

AMILCAR JOSUE GARCIA-ZAMORA : CIVIL ACTION
:
v. :
:
J.L. JAMISON, et al. : NO. 25-6656

MEMORANDUM
Bartle, J. December 16, 2025
On November 24, 2025, Amilcar Josue Garcia-Zamora
filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2241 and the Suspension Clause of the Constitution.
U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. He also filed a motion for a
temporary restraining order. He challenges the lawfulness of
his detention at the Philadelphia Federal Detention Center by
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). The Respondents
are: J.L. Jamison, the Warden of the Philadelphia Federal
Detention Center; Brian McShane, the acting Director of the
Philadelphia Field Office of ICE’s Enforcement and Removal
Operations; Todd Lyons, the acting Director of ICE; Kristi Noem,
the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security; Pamela
Bondi, the Attorney General of the United States; and the
Department of Homeland Security. All individuals are sued in
their official capacities.
Petitioner asks this court to issue a writ of habeas
corpus requiring that Respondents release Petitioner on his own
recognizance or on parole, bond or reasonable conditions of

supervision. In the alternative, he requests a bond hearing
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). He also asks the court to set
aside Respondents’ detention policy under the Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2), as contrary to law, arbitrary
and capricious, and contrary to constitutional rights.
Additionally, Petitioner requests a declaration that his
mandatory detention is unlawful.
In his motion for a temporary restraining order, he
seeks this court to enjoin Respondents from moving him outside
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania; enjoin Respondents from
detaining Petitioner under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2); and order
Petitioner’s immediate release from Respondents’ custody. This

court has ordered him not to be removed from this District
pending further order of this court.
I
The Constitution guarantees the availability of the
writ of habeas corpus “to every individual detained within the
United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004)
(citing U.S. Const., art I, § 9, cl. 2). “The essence of habeas
corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of
that custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is
to secure release from illegal custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). Historically, “the writ of habeas
corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of

Executive detention.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301
(2001). It is a core remedy for unlawful executive detention
that is regularly invoked on behalf of noncitizens. Munaf v.
Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008); St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 305. When
reviewing the legality of executive detention, its protections
have been the strongest. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 301.
Accordingly, a district court's habeas jurisdiction includes
challenges to immigration detention. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533
U.S. 678, 687 (2001).
II
Petitioner is a native of Venezuela. According to his
petition, he and his family were active political protesters in

Venezuela who demonstrated against the regime of Nicolas Maduro.
In retribution, the regime arrested and persecuted him on
multiple occasions.
Petitioner initially entered the country on September
12, 2022 in El Paso, Texas. Officials from Customs and Border
Patrol detained him upon entry. The Department of Homeland
Security placed him in detention briefly and subsequently
released him on parole into the United States presumably under 8
U.S.C. § 1226. Under § 1226(a), “an alien may be arrested and
detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be
removed from the United States . . . . [P]ending such a
decision, the [alien] . . . may [be] release[d] . . . on bond .

. . or . . . [on] conditional parole.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2).
Petitioner was charged with being an inadmissible alien under 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). That provision states that an alien
present in the United States without being previously admitted
or paroled is ineligible to be admitted to the United States.
Id. He was also charged under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i),
which provides that “any immigrant [who] at the time of
application for admission . . . is not in possession of a valid
unexpired immigrant visa,” or other similar documents, and “a
valid, unexpired passport, or other suitable travel document[s]”
is inadmissible. Id.
Petitioner has resided in the United States since

September 2022. Up until his recent detention, he lived in
Allentown, Pennsylvania where there is a large community of
Venezuelans. He maintains that he has worked lawfully paying
taxes in order to support his family.
During his residency, Petitioner attended check-ins as
required at the ICE office in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania in
October 2022, November 2023, and November 2024. Petitioner
filed a timely application for asylum, on or about October 17,
2024. His application is based on his fear of persecution in
his home country.
On November 19, 2025, he attended his fourth required

check-in when he was arrested by ICE officers. He was
transferred to the Federal Detention Center in Philadelphia
where he is currently detained. Once in custody, his detention
was continued without an opportunity to post bond or be released
on other conditions.
ICE took the action it did based on a new policy
position that non-citizens residing in the interior of the
United States are subject to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)
proceedings and not to § 1226(a). Section 1225(b)(2)(A)
provides: “[I]n the case of an alien who is an applicant for
admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that
an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt

entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a
[removal] proceeding.” Id. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Those detained
pursuant to § 1225(b)(2)(A) are not entitled to a bond hearing
before an immigration judge during their removal proceedings.
Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 288 (2018). Respondents
take the position they do as a result of a series of
precedential decisions by the Board of Immigration Appeals that
finally culminated in Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216
(BIA 2025).
Petitioner argues that Matter of Yajure Hurtado is
contrary to law and that the government has unlawfully
determined that he was subject to mandatory detention. He

argues that § 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to individuals like
himself who are already in the country pending the outcome of
removal proceedings.
III
In recent months, numerous district courts have
addressed the issues raised by Petitioner in this case. There
have been close to 300 decisions overall. See Patel v. McShane,
No. 25-5975, 2025 WL 3241212, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 20, 2025)
(Brody, J.). Included are decisions by at least seven judges in
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. See, e.g., id.; Ibarra v.
Warden of the Fed. Det. Ctr. Phila., No. 25-6312, 2025 WL
3294726, at *1-4 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 25, 2025) (Rufe, J.); Ndiaye v.

Jamison, No. 25-6007, 2025 WL 3229307, at *2-4 (E.D. Pa. Nov.
19, 2025) (Sanchez, J.); Demirel v. Fed. Det. Ctr. Phila., No.
25-5488, 2025 WL 3218243, at *2-4 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 18, 2025)
(Diamond, J.); Cantu-Cortes v. O'Neill, No. 25-6338, 2025 WL
3171639, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 13, 2025) (Kenney, J.); Kashranov
v. Jamison, No. 25-5555, 2025 WL 3188399, at *3-4 (E.D. Pa. Nov.
14, 2025) (Wolson, J.). In one of these cases, Anirudh v.
McShane, No. 25-6458, 2025 WL 3527528 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 9, 2025),
the undersigned granted a similar habeas petition on December 9,
2025. Id. at *6. The court incorporates its Memorandum by
reference.
The government invokes the same procedural arguments

here as it did in Anirudh. It argues that this court lacks
jurisdiction based on 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(g), 1252(b)(9), and
1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), and that the court cannot review the petition
because Petitioner did not exhaust administrative remedies.
As in Anirudh, the jurisdiction-stripping provisions
in § 1252 do not apply. Anirudh, 2025 WL 3527528, at *2-4.
8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) does not bar review of Garcia-Zamora’s claims
because he is not challenging the government's commencement of
removal proceedings but rather the legality of his detention.
Id. at *3. Similarly, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) does not oust the
court of jurisdiction because the provision does not bar the
court from reviewing collateral issues to the removal process,

such as whether a bond hearing is required. Id. Finally,
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) does not strip the court of the power to
adjudicate this matter because Petitioner is not challenging a
discretionary decision to deny him bond but rather the
government's legal position that no bond hearing is required.
Id.
Petitioner is not required to exhaust his
administrative remedies because the issue presented involves
statutory construction and exhaustion would be futile in light
of the Board of Immigration Appeals' recent decisions in Matter
of Q. Li, 29 I&N Dec. 66 (BIA 2025), and Matter of Yajure
Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). See Anirudh, 2025 WL

3527528, at *4.
Accordingly, for the reasons more fully stated in
Anirudh, the court has jurisdiction and Petitioner is not
required to exhaust his administrative remedies. Id. at *2-4.
IV
Finally, the government argues that the petition fails
on the merits. As in Anirudh, it asserts that under
§ 1225(b)(2)(A), Garcia-Zamora qualifies as an alien who is
“applicant for admission” and thus subject to mandatory
detention in advance of removal proceedings. See Anirudh, 2025
WL 3527528, at *4-5.
Section 1225(b)(2)(A) proceedings require mandatory

detention while a noncitizen's removal proceedings are pending
and the person may be released only “for urgent humanitarian
reasons or significant public benefit.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at
288 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)). To trigger
§ 1225(b)(2)(A), an examining immigration officer must determine
that the individual is: (1) an “applicant for admission”; (2)
“seeking admission”; and (3) “not clearly and beyond a doubt
entitled to be admitted.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). The court
agrees with previous decisions in this district that these are
separate requirements, all of which must be met for
Section 1225(b)(2)(A) to apply. See Anirudh, 2025 WL 3527528,
at *5.

As in Anirudh, this court rejects the government’s
interpretation of § 1225(b)(2)(A) that conflates “applicant for
admission” and “seeking admission” under Matter of Yajure
Hurtado. 29 I&N Dec. at 222-24; Anirudh, 2025 WL 3527528, at
*5. This interpretation disregards the plain meaning of
Section 1225(b)(2)(A) and violates the rule against surplusage
of statutory language. Anirudh, 2025 WL 3527528, at *5.
Instead, the court finds that § 1225(b)(2)(A) statutory
requirement of “seeking admission” limits the provision’s
application to noncitizens who are just arriving or have
recently arrived in the country. Id.
At the time of his arrest in November 2025, Petitioner

had been present in this country for over three years and was
not at that point “seeking admission,” that is seeking “lawful
entry,” into the United States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A);
Anirudh, 2025 WL 3527528, at *5.
In contrast, Section 1226 authorizes the government to
detain aliens already in the country pending the outcome of
removal proceedings. Jennings, 583 U.S. at 288-89.
Section 1226(a), as noted above and in contrast to Section 1225,
establishes a discretionary detention framework for noncitizens
arrested and detained “[o]n a warrant issued by the Attorney
General.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a); see also Anirudh, 2025 WL
3527528, at *5. It allows noncitizens subject to removal

proceedings to be released on their own recognizance, a form of
conditional parole. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2)(B); see also Gomes v.
Hyde, No. 25-11571, 2025 WL 1869299, at *2 (D. Mass. July 7,
2025). It also entitles noncitizens to a bond hearing at the
outset of any detention. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.19(a), 1236.l(d).
Petitioner entered the country in September 2022. He
was shortly thereafter charged with being an inadmissible alien,
subjected to removal proceedings, and released on conditional
parole. Since 2022, he has resided in the country. The
detention of noncitizens like Petitioner who have been long-
present in the United States is governed by the discretionary
framework of § 1226(a). Therefore, Petitioner’s detention

without the opportunity for a bond hearing violates the
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq.
Since his mandatory detention violates federal law,
the court need not address his claims that either the bond
regulations, due process, or the Administrative Procedure Act,
5 U.S.C. §§ 701 et. seq., has been violated.
V
The court will issue a writ of habeas corpus requiring
that Respondents release Petitioner because his mandatory
detention violates the Immigration and Nationality Act. The
court also declares his current detention unlawful.
Because the court has granted the writ of habeas

corpus, the court will deny Petitioner’s motion for a temporary
restraining order as moot.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11227148. Public record. Not legal advice.