# Merritt-Wilson

> District Court, S.D. Illinois · December 16, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11226260

## Case

- **Full name:** Bianca Lace Merritt-Wilson v. New American Funding, LLC, Broker Solutions, Inc., d/b/a New American Funding, MDK Legal, Edward Ralph Peterka, Zachariah Lee Manchester, Scott D. Smith, Lindsey Everhart Reese, Intercounty Judicial Sales Corporation, Hon. Stacey L. Campbell, in her official capacity, and Does 1-50
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** December 16, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

BIANCA LACE MERRITT-WILSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

NEW AMERICAN FUNDING, LLC,
BROKER SOLUTIONS, INC., d/b/a NEW
AMERICAN FUNDING, Case No. 25-cv-02177-JPG
MDK LEGAL,
EDWARD RALPH PETERKA,
ZACHARIAH LEE MANCHESTER,
SCOTT D. SMITH,
LINDSEY EVERHART REESE,
INTERCOUNTY JUDICIAL SALES
CORPORATION,
HON. STACEY L. CAMPBELL, in her official
capacity, and
DOES 1-50,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This case is before the Court on Plaintiff Bianca Lace Merritt-Wilson’s Emergency
Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) (Doc. 4). She asks this Court to enjoin
Defendants from: (1) conducting the foreclosure sale on property located at 1321 Lebanon
Avenue, Belleville, Illinois 62221; (2) issuing or recording any Sherriff’s Deed; (3) confirming
any sale; (4) seeking possession or eviction; (5) treating Plaintiff as an ‘unlawful occupant’ under
SB 1563, and (6) altering the status quo pending further order of this Court. Defendant New
American Funding, LLC began a foreclosure proceeding in the Circuit Court for the Twentieth
Judicial Circuit, St. Clair County, Illinois, in March 2025, in New American Funding, LLC vs.
Bianca Merritt, No. 2025FC000150. By September 2025, the court had entered a judgment of
foreclosure. The foreclosure sale is scheduled for December 17, 2025. Plaintiff seeks to stop the
foreclosure sale. She has indicated that she provided advance notice of this filing to Defendants’
counsel by email transmission. However, none of the Defendants have been served or have
appeared in this case.

The Court now turns to the motion for a TRO. Ordinarily, this Court will not issue a TRO
ex parte. Such a policy “reflect[s] the fact that our entire jurisprudence runs counter to the notion
of court action taken before reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard has been granted
[to] both sides of a dispute.” Am. Can Co. v. Mansukhani, 742 F.2d 314, 321 (7th Cir. 1984)
(citing Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Bhd. of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers Loc. No. 70 of
Alameda Cnty., 415 U.S. 423, 438–39 (1974)). However, the Court may issue an ex parte TRO
of a brief duration and limited scope to preserve the status quo pending a hearing. Id. (citing
Granny Goose, 415 U.S. at 438–39). Ex parte TROs, if issued, should last only as long as is
necessary to hold a hearing and no longer. Granny Goose, 415 U.S. at 438–39; Am. Can, 742
F.2d at 322.

When deciding whether to issue a TRO, the Court applies the same standard as it does to
a motion for a preliminary injunction. Crue v. Aiken, 137 F. Supp. 2d 1076, 1083 (C.D. Ill.
2001). A party seeking a preliminary injunction “must make a threshold showing that: (1) absent
preliminary injunctive relief, he will suffer irreparable harm in the interim prior to a final
resolution; (2) there is no adequate remedy at law; and (3) he has a reasonable likelihood of
success on the merits.” Turnell v. CentiMark Corp., 796 F.3d 656, 662 (7th Cir. 2015). If the
moving party is able to establish these three factors, the Court must then balance the harms to
both parties using a “sliding scale” analysis, also taking into consideration the effect that

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granting or denying the injunction will have on the public interest. Id. “[T]he more likely he is to
win, the less the balance of harms must weigh in his favor; the less likely he is to win, the more it
must weigh in his favor.” Id.
The Court declines to issue an ex parte TRO in this case because Plaintiff does not have a

reasonable likelihood of success on the merits. As a preliminary matter, it appears the Court
lacks jurisdiction over this case. Plaintiff asserts federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1331. Her complaint attempts to set forth two constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: (1)
deprivation of procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment; and (2) denial of access
to the courts under the First Amendment. But neither of these claims plausibly suggest a right to
relief above a speculative level. In order to state a § 1983 claim against an individual, a plaintiff
must allege that the defendant deprived the plaintiff of rights secured by the Constitution or laws
of the United States and that the defendant was acting under color of state law. Gomez v. Toledo,
446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980); McKinney v. Duplain, 463 F.3d 679, 683 (7th Cir. 2006); Brokaw v.
Mercer Cnty., 235 F.3d 1000, 1009 (7th Cir. 2000).

All the defendants, besides the Honorable Stacey L. Campbell (“Judge Campbell”), are
private actors. “A private party may be found to act under the color of law if he has a ‘meeting of
the minds and thus reached an understanding with a state actor to deny plaintiffs a constitutional
right.’” Brown v. Hasemyer, No. 22-CV-01384-SPM, 2023 WL 5431779, at *7 (S.D. Ill. Aug.
23, 2023) (quoting Wilson v. Warren Cnty., 830 F.3d 464, 468 (7th Cir. 2016)). In other words,
“[t]he private party and the state actor ‘must share a common unconstitutional goal.’” Id.
(quoting Wilson, 830 F.3d at 468). Plaintiff alleges that the private party Defendants may be
liable under § 1983 because they “invoked state authority to obtain summonses, schedule

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hearings, issue notices, and conduct sale proceedings,” benefitted from the Clerk’s office
enforcement of filing refusals, and “relied upon . . . state-enabled actions to advance foreclosure
without resolving jurisdictional defects.” However, that is not sufficient to show that the private
party Defendants acted under color of state law. “[T]he mere fact that an attorney made an

argument and a judge accepted it does not give rise to a plausible inference that the attorney and
judge conspired with one another.” Falls v. Meyerson, No. 21 C 2490, 2022 WL 313742, at *2
(N.D. Ill. Feb. 2, 2022) (citing Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27–28 (1980) (“Of course, merely
. . . being on the winning side of a lawsuit does not make a party a co-conspirator or a joint actor
with the judge.”); Fries v. Helsper, 146 F.3d 452, 457–58 (7th Cir. 1998) (same)). Accordingly,
the private party Defendants cannot be liable under § 1983.
In addition, Plaintiff fails to state a claim under § 1983 against Judge Campbell because
she is entitled to judicial immunity. The doctrine of judicial immunity “confers complete
immunity from suit, not just a mere defense to liability.” Dawson v. Newman, 419 F.3d 656, 660
(7th Cir. 2005). Judicial immunity has always been “applicable in suits under section 1983

because the ‘legislative record [gave] no clear indication that Congress meant to abolish
wholesale all common-law immunities.” Id. at 661 (citing Dellenbach v. Letsinger, 889 F.2d
755, 758 (7th Cir. 1989)). The statute was amended in 1996 to specifically bar injunctive relief
against a judicial officer for acts taken in their official capacity. See Smith v. City of Hammond,
388 F.3d 304, 307 (7th Cir. 2004). “Judicial immunity extends to acts performed by the judge ‘in
the judge’s judicial capacity.’” Dawson, 419 F.3d at 661 (citing Dallenbach, 889 F.2d at 759
(emphasis in original)). It “applies ‘to judicial acts, but not to ministerial or administrative acts.’”
Id. (citing Lowe v. Letsinger, 772 F.2d 308, 312 (7th Cir. 1985)). “A judge will not be deprived

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of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of
his authority . . . .” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356–57 (1978).
Here, Plaintiff attempts to hold Defendant Judge Campbell liable for acts she took in her
judicial capacity. Plaintiff alleges that Judge Campbell erred by entering orders without personal

jurisdiction and failing to address the jurisdictional defects in the case. She also alleges that
Judge Campbell committed numerous procedural errors throughout the case. But if Plaintiff
believes Judge Campbell erred in the foreclosure proceedings, “through inadvertence or
otherwise, [her] remedy is through appellate process,” not through a separate proceeding in this
Court. See Dawson, 419 F.3d at 661. Plaintiff’s allegation that the St. Clair County Circuit Court
had no personal jurisdiction over her does not change the outcome. All that is required is that
Judge Campbell had “jurisdiction over the subject matter before [her].” And Illinois Circuit
Courts have “inherent power to hear and determine foreclosure cases.” Nationstar Mortg., LLC
v. Canale, 10 N.E.3d 229, 234 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014). Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under §
1983, and without a federal cause of action, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.

Even more importantly, even if Plaintiff had stated a claim, the Court would likely
abstain from hearing this case on the basis of Younger abstention. See Younger v. Harris, 401
U.S. 37, 53–54 (1971). That abstention doctrine “is rooted in traditional principles of equity,
comity, and federalism, [and] requires federal courts to refrain from exercising their jurisdiction
when relief may interfere with certain state proceedings.” Ewell v. Toney, 853 F.3d 911, 916 (7th
Cir. 2017). Exercising Younger abstention is appropriate where “there is an ongoing state
proceeding that is judicial in nature, involves important state interests, provides the plaintiff an
adequate opportunity to raise the federal claims, and no exceptional circumstances exist.” Id. It is

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proper where federal civil proceedings implicate a state’s interest in enforcing orders and
judgments of its courts. J.B. v. Woodard, 997 F.3d 714, 722 (7th Cir. 2021). Further, it is proper
“only when state court proceedings are initiated ‘before any proceedings of substance on the
merits have taken place in the federal court.” Ewell, 853 F.3d at 916. (internal citations omitted).

The relief sought in this case, specifically, a TRO prohibiting the sale of the property
pursuant to a state court judgment would certainly “interfere with . . . state proceedings.” Id. The
state proceeding involves important state issues regarding real estate within its borders and the
enforcement of loan contracts made by banks within the state with citizens of the state. Plaintiff
had the opportunity to raise her federal claims as a defense to the foreclosure proceeding. In fact,
Plaintiff did raise these claims, both in the foreclosure case and in a separate chancery case that
she filed in the St. Clair County Circuit Court. See Bianca L. Merritt-Wilson v. New American
Funding, LLC, No. 2025CH000022. Further, she has pointed to no exceptional circumstances
that would justify the Court calling a halt to the state foreclosure proceeding as it nears its
conclusion.

Consistent with Younger abstention, the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, states, “A
court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except
as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to
protect or effectuate its judgments.” This applies to requests like Plaintiff’s to enjoin state
foreclosure proceedings. Mitchell v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n for Wells Fargo Asset Sec. Corp.
Mortg. Pass-Through Certificates Series 2006-AR4, 293 F. Supp. 3d 209, 213 (D.D.C. 2018).
Plaintiff alleges that, to the extent the Anti-Injunction Act is implicated, she seeks relief
expressly authorized by 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff is correct that the Anti-Injunction Act does

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not apply to suits under § 1983. See Lawson v. Hill, 368 F.3d 955, 960 (7th Cir. 2004). However,
as the Court explained above, Plaintiff has not stated a plausible claim under § 1983. Therefore,
the exception does not apply, and this Court cannot grant a TRO.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff Bianca Lace Merritt-Wilson’s

Emergency Motion for TRO (Doc. 4). The Court ORDERS Plaintiff to SHOW CAUSE on or
before January 15, 2026, why the Court should not (1) dismiss this case for lack of federal
subject matter jurisdiction and/or (2) abstain from hearing this case under the Younger abstention
doctrine. In response to this order to show cause, Plaintiff may file an amended complaint with
sufficient facts to state a claim under a federal statute which does not interfere with the state
foreclosure proceeding. If Plaintiff fails to timely respond to this order to show cause, the Court
will dismiss this case for lack of jurisdiction or abstain from exercising jurisdiction. The Court
RESERVES RULING on Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis (Doc. 3),
Motion for Order Appointing Limited-Scope ADA Counsel (Doc. 4), Motion for ADA
Accommodation (Doc. 4), and Motion for Leave to Participate in Electronic Filing (Doc. 4). As a

one-time courtesy to Plaintiff, and in light of the urgency of this matter, the Court DIRECTS the
Clerk of Court to send a copy of this order to her by email to bianca.l.merritt88@gmail.com in
addition to mailing a hard copy.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: December 16, 2025

s/ J. Phil Gilbert
J. PHIL GILBERT
United States District Judge
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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11226260. Public record. Not legal advice.