# NDUAGUBU

> District Court, D. New Jersey · December 16, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11226245

## Case

- **Full name:** Benjamin Nduagubu v. Essex County et al.
- **Court:** District Court, D. New Jersey
- **Decided:** December 16, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11226245

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that the excessive force inquiry is undertaken “without regard to [an officer’s] underlying intent or motivation”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

BENJAMIN NDUAGUBU,
No. 2:23-cv-00961
(MEF)(JRA)
Plaintiff,
v. OPINION and ORDER
ESSEX COUNTY et al.,
Defendants.

Table of Contents
I. Background
A. The Allegations
B. Procedural History
II. Conspiracy
III. Force
A. Violation
B. Clearly Established
IV. Conclusion
* * *
A man was arrested by local police and claims, among other
things, (i) that an officer used excessive force while arresting
him, and (ii) that he was discriminated against.
The officer moves to dismiss these claims.
As to the first claim, the motion is denied. As to the second,
it is granted.
* * *
I. Background
A. The Allegations
The relevant allegations for now are as follows.1
A woman2 made a series of 911 calls to report on certain recent
activity of her then-husband.3 See Amended Complaint
(“Complaint”) (ECF 77) ¶¶ 15, 17, 19, 23. On the calls, the
woman suggested that her husband had, among other things,
tampered with the gas and heat in their shared apartment. See
id. ¶¶ 19, 29.
A local police officer4 responded to the apartment where the
woman and her husband lived. See id. ¶¶ 17, 24.
The officer then came back again later.5 See id. ¶ 34. To
arrest the man. See id. ¶ 35. And to serve him with a
temporary restraining order that had just been issued by a
judge. See id. ¶ 34.
The man was handcuffed. See id. ¶ 36. In cuffs, he was
escorted out of the apartment by the officer. See id.
On the way out, the officer “forced [the man’s] face and head
into [a] metal door and door frame.” Id. This caused the man
to “sustain[] significant injuries,” id. ¶ 38; he was knocked
unconscious, and taken to the emergency room of a nearby
hospital. See id.

1 Because this is a motion to dismiss, the Court must take all
of the Plaintiff’s allegations as true. See McTernan v. City of
York, 577 F.3d 521, 526 (3d Cir. 2009). Whether they are in
fact true is a question for later in the case.
2 Stella Okeke Nduagubu.
3 Benjamin Nduagubu.
4 Kyle Alleyne.
5 When exactly he came back is not specified. It is implied
that he returned later the same day, see Complaint ¶ 34, but
that is not crystal clear. It may possibly have been another
day.
B. Procedural History
In light of the above, the man (from here, “the Plaintiff”)
filed a lawsuit.
The lawsuit initially named nine6 defendants. See Complaint at
1. That has been whittled down. There are now three defendants
left. See Stipulation and Order of Dismissal Without Prejudice
as to Defendants Matthew Funk and Dana Kutzleb (ECF 121);
Stipulation and Order of Dismissal Without Prejudice Against
Defendant Sheraldine Frazer (ECF 82); Stipulation and Order of
Dismissal Without Prejudice as to Defendant County of Essex (ECF
130); December 16, 2025 Text Order (ECF 158).
This Opinion and Order focuses only7 on two of the claims in the
operative complaint, each of which is asserted against the
above-referenced police officer.8
The officer is called “the Defendant” from here.
The Defendant has moved to dismiss the two referenced claims.
The motion is now before the Court.

6 The complaint also listed out some “John Doe” defendants.
They have not been named or served, and are not accounted for
here.
7 Other claims against other defendants are taken up in an order
to be issued later today.
8 The Court takes the claims against the officer, Kyle Alleyne,
as running against him in his personal capacity. The Plaintiff
describes things that way. See Plaintiff Benjamin Nduagubu’s
Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
(“Plaintiff’s Brief”) (ECF 98) at 18-19. And that makes sense.
The complaint alleges that the officer was “acting under color
of state law” and seeks an award of damages, Complaint ¶ 98, and
“[i]f personal liability for damages under § 1983 is sought for
a state officer’s action taken under color of law, the suit
against the officer must be brought against him in his
individual or personal capacity, and not against him in his
official capacity.” Michael G. Collins, Section 1983 Litigation
in a Nutshell 152-53 (5th ed. 2016) (citing Hafer v. Melo, 502
U.S. 21 (1991)).
II. Conspiracy
The Defendant first looks to dismiss the claim for conspiracy to
violate the Plaintiff’s civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1985.
See id. ¶¶ 101-04 (Count 9).
Section 1985 opens the door to lawsuits against people who work
together to deprive someone “of the equal protection of the
laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws.” 42
U.S.C. § 1985(3).
But Section 1985 is no catch-all.
It is “not intended to provide a federal remedy for ‘all
tortious conspiratorial interferences with the rights of
others,’ or to be a ‘general federal tort law.’” Farber v. City
of Paterson, 440 F.3d 131, 135 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Griffin
v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 101-02 (1971)).
Rather, a Section 1985 claim can get off the ground only if,
among other things, there are allegations (at the motion to
dismiss stage) or evidence (at later stages) of “some racial, or
. . . otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus
behind the conspirators’ action.” Id. (emphasis omitted)
But there is nothing like that here.
The Plaintiff alleges that there was a conspiracy against him --
- an alleged effort by the Defendant and others to falsify
evidence to get him arrested. See Complaint ¶¶ 27-33, 109-11.
There is no suggestion that this was because of, say, the
Plaintiff’s race. Indeed, the Plaintiff’s race is not mentioned
in the complaint. Nor is any other part of his background.
Therefore, the Defendant’s motion to dismiss the Section 1985
claim must be granted.
III. Force
The Defendant next moves to dismiss the Plaintiff’s excessive
force claim. See Complaint ¶¶ 93-98 (Count 4).
The Defendant argues he is entitled to qualified immunity.9 See
Irvington Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Their

9 This immunity arises under federal law. The Defendant also
suggests that he is entitled to immunity on a state-law basis,
under New Jersey’s Domestic Violence Act. See Defendant’s Brief
Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
Pro. 12(B) (“Defendants’ Brief”) (ECF 93-1) at 25-26.10
* * *
To get started, the relevant law in a nutshell: a police officer
sued under Section 1983 for using too much force is entitled to
have the claim dismissed on qualified immunity grounds ---
unless the officer (1) “violated a . . . constitutional right,”
that was (2) “clearly established” at the time of the alleged
violation. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011).
Move through each prong of the test.
A. Violation
The question under the first prong: did the Plaintiff adequately
allege that the Defendant violated the Constitution by using
excessive force? See Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 735.
To assess excessive force claims that arise in the arrest
context, courts in the Third Circuit look to a range of factors
--- mainly the ones laid out by the Supreme Court in Graham v.
Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), and by the Court of Appeals in
Sharrar v. Felsing, 128 F.3d 810 (3d Cir. 1997).11 See Est. of

at 20-24; N.J.S.A. § 2C:25-22. This Act has been interpreted by
the New Jersey Supreme Court as protecting those who “in good
faith report a possible incident of domestic violence.”
Wildoner v. Borough of Ramsey, 162 N.J. 375, 389 (2000). But it
is not clear how the Defendant might be chalked up as a
“report[er]” of information here. N.J.S.A. § 2C:25-22.
Moreover, the Defendant has put forth no argument as to whether
and when a state-law immunity (like the Domestic Violence Act)
might work as a shield to a federal-law claim (like the
Plaintiffs Fourth Amendment claim). And indeed, making such an
argument stick would seem to be an uphill battle. See Doe v.
Dynamic Physical Therapy, LLC, No. 25-180, slip op. (U.S. Dec.
8, 2025) (citing Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 383 (1990);
Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 740 (2009); Williams v. Reed,
604 U.S. 168, 174 (2025)).
10 The Defendant also argues that with or without qualified
immunity, the Plaintiff’s claim does not work on the merits.
See Defendants’ Brief at 13-16. That is taken up in footnote
17.
11 The referenced Graham/Sharrar framework controls in cases
like this one --- where a police officer is accused of using
Smith v. Marasco, 430 F.3d 140, 149-50 (3d Cir. 2005) (applying
these factors); El v. City of Pittsburgh, 975 F.3d 327, 337-38
(3d Cir. 2020) (same); Couden v. Duffy, 446 F.3d 483, 496-97 (3d
Cir. 2006) (same); Saintil v. Borough of Carteret, 2024 WL
3565308, at *8 & n.16 (3d Cir. July 29, 2024) (same).
Per the Supreme Court in Graham, excessive force claims are
evaluated in light of “the facts and circumstances of each
particular case, including [1] the severity of the crime at
issue, [2] whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the
safety of the officers or others, and [3] whether he is actively
resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” 490
U.S. at 396 (brackets added).
In Sharrar, the Third Circuit zeroed in on some added
considerations: “[4] the possibility that the persons subject to
the police action are themselves violent or dangerous, [5] the
duration of the action, [6] whether the action takes place in
the context of effecting an arrest, [7] the possibility that the
suspect may be armed, and [8] the number of persons with whom
the police officers must contend at one time.” 128 F.3d at 822
(brackets added).
And in another case, the Court of Appeals noted that the
excessive force inquiry should also be anchored in [9], an
“assess[ment of] the physical injury to the plaintiff.” El, 975
F.3d at 336.
Together, these nine considerations are the Graham/Sharrar
factors.12 Tick through them now, each in turn.

excessive force in carrying out his law-enforcement duties. In
those circumstances, the applicable part of our constitutional
law is the Fourth Amendment. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 394. In
other contexts that implicate government uses of force, other
constitutional provisions may be in play. The Eighth Amendment,
for example, as to uses of force in the prison context. See
Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 318-26 (1986).
12 The Defendant briefly suggests there is a tenth factor ---
whether the officer intended to cause serious injury. See
Defendant’s Brief at 13-14. But that seems to be at odds with
what the Supreme Court has said. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 397-99
(holding that the excessive force inquiry is undertaken “without
regard to [an officer’s] underlying intent or motivation”). If,
later, the Defendant wishes to more substantially develop this
* * *
First: “the severity of the crime at issue,” Graham, 490 U.S. at
396 --- the one a plaintiff was being arrested for. See Groman
v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 634 (3d Cir. 1995).
Here, the Plaintiff alleges13 that he was “ostensibly arrested
for petty offenses.” Complaint ¶ 40.
And in applying the relevant factor, the Third Circuit has
suggested that “petty offenses” do not count as “particularly
severe.” Groman, 47 F.3d at 634.14
That points in the direction of relatively tighter limits on how
much force an arresting officer can use.
* * *
The second consideration is “whether the suspect poses an
immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others.”
Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. And on the allegations here, that runs
together with the fourth factor: “the possibility that the
persons subject to the police action are themselves violent or
dangerous.” Sharrar, 128 F.3d at 822.

argument, cf. Thomas v. City of Erie, 236 F. App’x 772, 776 (3d
Cir. 2007), he may seek to do so.
13 For now, the focus is on what is alleged by the Plaintiff in
the complaint. That is because qualified immunity is raised
here on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. And at this stage,
“qualified immunity will be upheld . . . only when the immunity
is established on the face of the complaint.” Leveto v. Lapina,
258 F.3d 156, 161 (3d Cir. 2001) (cleaned up) (emphasis added).
14 A fuller sense of what the Plaintiff allegedly did could
change the picture. But for now, nothing more is before the
Court. For example, a probable cause affidavit has been filed
on the court docket by the Defendant. See Exhibit B, Affidavit
of Probable Cause (ECF 93-2) at 11-12. But even assuming it
might be considered here, the affidavit does not shed real
light. It looks like it was originally ten pages long. See id.
But only two of those pages have been put before the Court. See
id. They indicate that three charges were brought against the
Plaintiff. But not what they were. See id. at 11.
Per the complaint, when the Plaintiff was pushed into the metal
door frame, his “hands were handcuffed behind his back” and he
was “not resist[ing] arrest.” Complaint ¶ 36.
This does not imply an “immediate threat” (under the second
factor) or “the possibility” that the Plaintiff was “violent or
dangerous” (under the fourth). See Anglemeyer v. Ammons, 92
F.4th 184, 190-91 (3d Cir. 2024) (in an excessive force case
where the evidence indicated that an officer stepped on a
plaintiff, pulled him up by his restraints, and struck him in
the face ---reversing a district court’s grant of summary
judgment on qualified immunity grounds because “the officers
could not have reasonably believed that [the plaintiff] posed
any threat, and there [was] no indication that he was resisting
the officers’ restraints”).15
* * *
The third factor is whether the arrestee was “actively resisting
arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Graham, 490
U.S. at 396.
There are no suggestions of that on the allegations here.
Indeed, the complaint affirmatively alleges the Plaintiff did
not resist arrest. See Complaint ¶ 36.
* * *
The fifth Graham/Sharrar factor is the “duration of the action,”
Sharrar, 128 F.3d at 822, measured by the officer/defendant’s
“entire involvement in the encounter.” El, 975 F.3d at 337 &
n.6.
The main idea here is for the law to do some sifting --- to
distinguish (a) “case[s] where an officer ha[s] ‘mere seconds to
assess the potential danger,’” from (b) situations that develop
more slowly, where there is a good deal of time for police to
think things through, to adjust their tactics and their approach
as circumstances might start to shift. Id. (quoting James v.
N.J. State Police, 957 F.3d 165, 172 (3d Cir. 2020); Kisela v.
Hughes, 584 U.S. 100, 105 (2018)).

15 For cases in which the “immediate threat” factor points away
from an excessive force conclusion, see, for example, Mellott v.
Heemer, 161 F.3d 117, 122-23 (3d Cir. 1998) and Moore v.
Vangelo, 222 F. App’x 167, 170-71 (3rd Cir. 2007).
The law gives a bit more leeway on one end of the spectrum
(“mere seconds”) than the other (when there is a lot of time).
Here, it is not perfectly clear how long things took to unfold.
But as alleged, it appears that the underlying events likely
took a fair amount of time. The arrest took place
“approximately ten (10) minutes after [the Defendant] entered
the apartment.” Complaint ¶ 35. And force is said to have been
applied after that, while the Plaintiff was being led out of the
apartment. See id. ¶ 36.
This was not an especially fast-moving circumstance. And given
that there were, as alleged, no warning signs of “potential
danger,” El, 975 F.3d at 337 n.6, what time there was --- it was
enough. To assess the situation, and to do so with an eye to
taking a measured tack.
* * *
The sixth factor: “whether the action takes place in the context
of effecting an arrest.” Sharrar, 128 F.3d at 822.
This matters because “Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has long
recognized that the right to make an arrest . . . necessarily
carries with it the right to use some degree of physical
coercion . . . to effect it.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.
But the force used must be necessary. To make the arrest. And
to do so in a way that is safe --- a way that protects both the
public and the police officer, and that keep the situation under
control.
Too much force is not allowed. See, e.g., Baker v. Borough of
Tinton Falls, 2020 WL 5269887, at *8 (D.N.J. Sept. 4, 2020)
(stating that “force in the context of effectuating an arrest .
. . generally weighs in favor of the officer,” but nevertheless
concluding that a reasonable jury could find the force used
unreasonable under the circumstances); Ference v. Twp. of
Hamilton, 538 F. Supp. 2d 785, 809 (D.N.J. 2008) (similar).
And the Third Circuit has indicated that where an arrestee poses
no active threat, is not armed, and is not attempting to flee or
to resist arrest --- then only a “low level of force” is
generally permissible. Couden v. Duffy, 446 F.3d 483, 497 (3d
Cir. 2006).
On the Plaintiff’s allegations, that fits this case. An arrest
was underway. See Complaint ¶¶ 35-38. But without any
suggestion, at least as alleged, of threats or weapons or
violence, or of attempts to flee or to resist. On these
allegations, only a “low level of force” was allowed. Couden,
446 F.3d at 497. But that is not consistent with what allegedly
happened --- pushing the Plaintiff’s head into a “metal door and
door frame,” Complaint ¶ 36, and injuring him to the point he
needed to be taken to the hospital. See id. ¶ 38.
* * *
The seventh factor is the “possibility that the suspect may be
armed,” Sharrar, 128 F.3d at 822, and the eighth is “the number
of persons with whom the police officers must contend with at
one time.” Id.
Here, there are no allegations that the Plaintiff was armed.
And it appears there were multiple officers on the scene, see
Complaint ¶ 98 (referring to “officers,” plural), and only one
arrestee to “contend” with. Sharrar, 128 F.3d at 822.
* * *
The ninth and final factor is “the physical injury to the
plaintiff.” El, 975 F.3d at 336.
Here, the Plaintiff has alleged “significant injuries.”
Complaint ¶ 38. Ones that were forceful enough to have “knocked
[him] unconscious” and required him to be “transported to the
emergency room” of a nearby hospital.” Id.
* * *
What this all adds up to.
On his allegations, analyzed under each of the nine
Graham/Sharrar factors, the Plaintiff has plausibly alleged a
violation of the Fourth Amendment’s excessive force prohibition.
An underlying offense that was not “particularly severe”16 (first
factor). Plus, no threat of violence (fourth factor), no
presence of weapons (seventh factor), no resisting arrest (third
factor). Force applied to a handcuffed arrestee (second, third,
and fourth factors). And enough time (fifth factor) and enough
officers (eighth factor) for things to have gone a different
way.

16 Groman, 47 F.3d at 634.
On these alleged “facts and circumstances,” Graham, 490 U.S. at
396, only a limited amount of force was allowed.
But more than that is said to have been used --- the Plaintiff
has alleged that his head was pushed into a metal door frame,
and that as a result he was knocked unconscious and transported
to an emergency room (ninth factor).
This adds up to a plausible allegation of a Fourth Amendment
excessive-force violation. And it means that the Defendant is
not entitled to qualified immunity under at least the first
prong of the analysis.17
Turn now to the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis.
B. Clearly Established
Even where a plaintiff, as here, has plausibly alleged that an
officer violated his rights --- the officer may still be
entitled to qualified immunity, if the alleged rights-violation
was not “clearly established” at the time of the incident.
Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 735.
The Defendant presses this argument. But as set out just below,
it does not work.
* * *
Per the Third Circuit, in order for a right to be “clearly
established,” existing case law must provide “fair warning.”
Stringer v. Cnty. Of Bucks, 141 F.4th 76, 86 (3d Cir. 2025)
(cleaned up).
The source of that warning can be Supreme Court or Third Circuit
caselaw, or caselaw that reflects “a consensus of persuasive

17 “There is no daylight between the first prong of the
qualified immunity inquiry and a 12(b)(6) analysis.” Stringer
v. Cnty. Of Bucks, 141 F.4th 76, 88 n.9 (3d Cir. 2025).
Therefore, because the Defendant did not prevail on the first
prong, as stated in the text, the Court will also not dismiss
the Plaintiff’s claim on Rule 12(b)(6) grounds.
authority in the Courts of Appeals” more generally, from other
circuits. Id. at 85.18
* * *
Here, there was “fair warning.” Stringer, 141 F.4th at 86
(cleaned up). The cases show that.
In Pratt v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, 563 F.
App’x 132 (3d Cir. 2014), for example, the Third Circuit
concluded that a district court erred in granting summary
judgment to officers on an excessive force claim when the
arrestee “did not resist . . . in any way, was unarmed, and had
committed, if anything, a relatively minor offense.” Id. at
135. The evidence there was that the officer-defendant
“tackled” the plaintiff “face-first, onto the ground,” and
ultimately caused him “serious and permanent spinal injuries.”
Id.
Or take Anglemeyer v. Ammons, 92 F.4th 184 (3d Cir. 2024).
There, the Third Circuit concluded that a reasonable jury could
find that an officer “engaged in objectively unreasonable
conduct when he picked up [a plaintiff] by his zip-tied arms and
dropped him on the floor, tearing both of his rotator cuffs” ---
because although the officer “saw a handgun lying on the back of
[the plaintiff’s] bed,” the officer harmed the plaintiff “after
he was fully secured, cooperative, and not a risk of flight”.
Id. at 191.
Along the way, see id., the court in Anglemeyer cited Jacobs v.
Cumberland County, 8 F.4th 187 (3d Cir. 2021).
And Jacobs explained that “striking a physically restrained and
nonthreatening” person is “nowhere near the hazy border between
excessive and acceptable force.” Id. at 197 (cleaned up).
As to this point, there is also a “consensus of persuasive
authority [among other] Courts of Appeals.” Stringer, 141 F.4th
at 85.
In Blazek v. City of Iowa City, 761 F.3d 920 (8th Cir. 2014),
for example, the Eighth Circuit concluded that if the plaintiff
could “prove at trial that he was subdued and compliant, but

18 The relevance of other sources of law to qualified immunity,
like district court opinions, see Courney v. City of Englewood,
793 F. Supp. 3d 615, 621 n.14 (2025), need not be taken up here.
that the officers grabbed him by the arms and gratuitously
‘jerked’ him from the floor onto the bed, using enough violent
force to cause significant injury, then . . . a reasonable jury
could find a violation of the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 926
(cleaned up). And the court went on to hold that the “law was
sufficiently developed to show that such a violation ---
allegedly involving unnecessary violence against a handcuffed
and compliant detainee --- would contravene clearly established
law as of 2009.” Id.
Similarly, in Butler v. City of Detroit, 936 F.3d 410 (6th Cir.
2019), the Sixth Circuit held that when an arrestee was “fully
cooperative,” officers that “slammed [him] into [a] wall . . .
ha[d] no claim to qualified immunity.” Id. at 425 (cleaned up).
The court went on to say that “[a]ssaulting an unarmed and
compliant individual has been a clearly established violation of
the Fourth Amendment for decades.” Id.
And in Ketcham v. City of Mount Vernon, 992 F.3d 144 (2d Cir.
2021), the Second Circuit cited Maxwell v. City of New York, 380
F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 2004), for the proposition that “a shove of a
restrained defendant into a police car causing the defendant’s
head to strike a hard surface inside the car could constitute
excessive force.” Ketcham, 992 F.3d at 149-50 (citing Maxwell,
380 F.3d at 109).
* * *
For now, the Plaintiff’s allegations are taken as true. See
footnote 1. At the core of those allegations is the contention
that a handcuffed arrestee was pushed hard into a metal door
frame, and as a result was knocked out and had to be taken to
the hospital. See Complaint ¶¶ 36, 38. And on the allegations
here, there is nothing on the other side of the ledger. No
weapons, violence, or resistance, for example. And no
suggestion of a situation that was especially difficult or fast-
moving.
The cases discussed above provide “fair warning” that in such a
circumstance the alleged conduct of the Defendant violated
“clearly established” law.19 Stringer, 141 F.4th at 85.

19 Changed circumstances could potentially have led to a changed
outcome. If the Plaintiff had been resisting arrest, for
example, cf. Santini v. Fuentes, 739 F. App’x 718, 721 (3d Cir.
2018), or was armed. Cf. Carswell v. Borough of Homestead, 381
* * *
In sum, on the allegations here, it is not clear from the face
of the complaint that the Defendant is entitled to qualified
immunity on the excessive force claim.
Therefore, the Defendant’s motion to dismiss that claim must be
denied.
IV. Conclusion
The Defendant’s motion to dismiss is granted in part. See Part
IIT. And it denied in part. See Part IIT.
IT IS on this 16th day of December, 2024, 0 ORDERED.
□ 0 ge
Michael E. Farbiarz, U.S.D.J.

F.3d 235, 243-44 (3d Cir. 2004). But nothing like that has been
put before the Court.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11226245. Public record. Not legal advice.