# Bolds

> District Court, S.D. Florida · December 15, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11226231

## Case

- **Full name:** Shonta Bolds v. Future Investment Holdings LLC d/b/a The VIP Gentlemen’s Club, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Florida
- **Decided:** December 15, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11226231

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that the lodestar is “properly calculated by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation times a reasonable hourly rate” (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 888 (1984))

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Case No. 25-CV-10026-MOORE/Elfenbein
SHONTA BOLDS,

Plaintiff,

v.

FUTURE INVESTMENT HOLDINGS LLC
d/b/a The VIP Gentlemen’s Club, et al.,

Defendants.
/

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on the Parties’ Joint Motion for In Camera Review and
Approval of FLSA Settlement Agreement and for Dismissal with Prejudice (the “Joint Motion”),
ECF No. [46]. The Honorable K. Michael Moore has referred the Motion to me “to take all
necessary and proper action required by law” “except with regard to dismissal with prejudice,”
which Judge Moore will rule upon after the undersigned “has adjudicated the Parties’ request for
approval of their settlement.” See ECF No. [47].
I. BACKGROUND
On March 17, 2025, Plaintiff Shonta Bolds filed her Complaint against Defendants Future
Investment Holdings LLC d/b/a The VIP Gentlemen’s Club, Yuliya Andrews, and Jerry Wayne
Andrews (collectively “Defendants”). See ECF No. [1] at 1. Plaintiff’s Complaint asserted one
count under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–19, alleging that
Defendants failed to pay her overtime compensation, minimum wage, and tips and seeking an
equal sum in liquidated damages. See generally ECF No. [1].
On September 22, 2025, the Parties filed a Notice of Settlement, ECF No. [42], and on
November 6, 2025, they filed the Joint Motion, seeking approval of the settlement, ECF No. [46].
Following Judge Moore’s referral of the Joint Motion, the undersigned scheduled a Fairness
Hearing via Zoom, which took place on November 25, 2025. See ECF No. [48]. During the
Fairness Hearing, the Court orally published all material terms of the Settlement Agreement on the
record and discussed the disputed issues in the case between the Parties as well as their respective
evaluations of the case prior to settlement. See ECF No. [49]. The Court also discussed the amount
of attorney’s fees and costs that Plaintiff’s counsel would recover as part of the settlement and
ultimately ordered Plaintiff to provide supplemental briefing regarding the reasonableness of
Plaintiff’s counsel’s attorney’s fees, including any law supporting the proposed fees, counsel’s time
sheets, and affidavits necessary to support the lodestar analysis. See ECF No. [49]. Plaintiff has
since provided the Court with the necessary supplemental briefing, affidavits, and timesheets. See

ECF No. [50]. The Motion is now ripe for review.
For the reasons explained below, the undersigned respectfully RECOMMENDS that the
Joint Motion, ECF No. [46], be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part and the Settlement
Agreement between Plaintiff and Defendants, including the allocation of funds towards Plaintiff’s
attorney’s fees and costs, be APPROVED, except for Paragraphs 11(C) and 11(D).
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
“There are only two ways in which back wage claims arising under the FLSA can be settled
or compromised by employees.” Lynn’s Food Stores, Inc. v. U.S. By & Through U.S. Dep’t of
Lab., Emp. Standards Admin., Wage & Hour Div., 679 F.2d 1350, 1352 (11th Cir. 1982). The one
relevant here arises “in the context of suits brought directly by employees against their employer

to recover back wages for FLSA violations.” Nall v. Mal-Motels, Inc., 723 F.3d 1304, 1306 (11th
Cir. 2013) (alteration adopted and quotation marks omitted). “In those lawsuits, the parties may
present to the district court a proposed settlement and the district court may enter a stipulated
judgment after scrutinizing the settlement for fairness.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). To pass
scrutiny, the agreement must be “a fair and reasonable resolution of a bona fide dispute over FLSA
provisions.” Lynn’s Food, 679 F.2d at 1355; see also Nall, 723 F.3d at 1308 n.3.
“If a settlement in an employee FLSA suit does reflect a reasonable compromise over
issues, such as FLSA coverage or computation of back wages, that are actually in dispute,” a court
can “approve the settlement in order to promote the policy of encouraging settlement of litigation.”
Lynn’s Food, 679 F.2d at 1354. When deciding whether the settlement reflects a reasonable
compromise, courts in this district typically evaluate “various factors, including: (1) the possible
existence of collusion behind the settlement; (2) the complexity, expense, and likely duration of
the litigation; (3) the stage of the proceedings and the amount of discovery completed; (4) the

probability of the plaintiff’s success on the merits; (5) the range of possible recovery; and (6) the
opinions of counsel.” Nagy v. Aventura Worldwide Transp. Serv., Inc., 631 F. Supp. 3d 1226, 1229
(S.D. Fla. 2022); Silva v. Miller, 547 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1303-04 (S.D. Fla. 2008).
“Additionally, the FLSA requires judicial review of the reasonableness of counsel’s legal
fees to assure both that counsel is compensated adequately and that no conflict of interest taints
the amount the wronged employee recovers under a settlement agreement.” DeGraff v. SMA
Behav. Health Servs., Inc., 945 F. Supp. 2d 1324, 1328 (M.D. Fla. 2013) (quotation marks omitted).
When evaluating counsel’s fee award, courts should consider factors like the “reasonableness of
the hours expended” and “the relationship between the amount of the fee awarded and the results
obtained” for the client. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437, 438 n.13 (1983).
III. ANALYSIS
a. Reasonableness of the Settlement
To decide whether the settlement here reflects a reasonable compromise, the Court has
considered Plaintiff’s claims as outlined in her Statement of Claim compared to the strengths and
weaknesses of the Parties’ respective cases, which they addressed in their Joint Motion and at the
Fairness Hearing. In her Statement of Claim, Plaintiff sought $127,588.57 in unpaid tips, unpaid
minimum wages, and unpaid overtime with an equal amount in liquidated damages for a total sum
of $255,177.14. By comparison, the Parties have negotiated a settlement in which she will receive
$227,500 of which $62,500 represents Plaintiff’s alleged unpaid tips, unpaid minimum wages, and
unpaid overtime wages, another $62,500 represents liquidated damages, and the remaining
$102,500 represents the amount of recoverable attorney’s fees and costs.
To support the reasonableness of the settlement, the Parties explain in their Motion that this

case involved “several hotly disputed issues [as to liability and damages] and both sides have
significant risk of defeat at trial.” See ECF No. [46] at 5. Specifically, the Parties disputed issues,
such as “(a) the number of hours Plaintiff allegedly worked each week;” (b) whether Plaintiff was
exempt from receiving overtime wages “under the FLSA during any weeks where she claims to
have worked more than forty hours;” (c) whether Plaintiff qualified as an “employee” as that term
is defined; (d) “whether the individual Defendants represent Plaintiff’s ‘employer’ as that term is
defined and interpreted under the FLSA;” (e) “whether Defendants’ alleged unlawful actions were
willful;” and (f) “whether Defendants acted in good faith in” determining how to compensate
Plaintiff. See ECF No. [46] at 5. At the Fairness Hearing, the Parties further explained that there
was a significant dispute as to whether Plaintiff would qualify as an independent contractor versus

an employee under a seven-factor fact-driven analysis and that the issue of willfulness, which
impacts the recoverability of liquidated damages, was contested as the Defendants received and
followed advice from a lawyer regarding the independent contractor classification. In addition, at
the Fairness Hearing, Plaintiff’s counsel explained that the amount of unpaid tips, unpaid wages,
and unpaid overtime in the Statement of Claim was a rough estimate based on their preliminary
review of 43,000 text messages but was not based on specific time sheets. Comparing the amount
of wages sought in the Statement of Claim ($127,588.57) to the amount Plaintiff will receive in
the settlement ($62,500), the Court finds that the latter amount is reasonable as it reflects a
compromise over disputes as to FLSA liability and the amount of wages due.
Regarding liquidated damages, the Parties explained that the recoverability of such
damages was uncertain given Defendants’ good-faith reliance on legal advice regarding Plaintiff’s
employment classification and the existence of a bona fide dispute. See Davila v. Menendez, 717
F.3d 1179, 1186 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting Dybach v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 942 F.2d 1562, 1566 (11th

Cir. 1991)) (“To satisfy the subjective ‘good faith’ component, the employer has the burden of
proving that it had an honest intention to ascertain what the Act requires and to act in accordance
with it.”). The Parties have demonstrated that Defendant genuinely disputed that Plaintiff was
entitled to any overtime wages under the FLSA and that they did not act willfully in failing to pay
any allegedly unpaid overtime wages. See, e.g., Patterson v. Acad. Fire Prot., Inc., No. 23-CV-
87-34JBT, 2014 WL 169812, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 8, 2014) (finding FLSA settlement agreement
was fair and reasonable when the plaintiff did not receive liquidated damages because of a genuine
dispute as to whether the plaintiff was entitled to such damages). The Court, therefore, finds this
compromise of liquidated damages in the amount of $62,500, which represents a sum equal to
what Plaintiff is receiving for allegedly unpaid tips, unpaid wages, and unpaid overtime, to be

reasonable under the circumstances.
The Court notes, however, that the Settlement Agreement contains confidentiality
provisions in paragraph 11. As district courts in this Circuit have explained, confidentiality
provisions in FLSA settlements are generally “unenforceable” because they operate “in
contravention of the FLSA” by “precluding other employees’ and the public’s access to, and
knowledge of,” the agreement. Dees v. Hydradry, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1243, 1245 (M.D.
Fla. 2010). And precluding public access to a settlement “thwarts Congress’s intent both to
advance employees’ awareness of their FLSA rights and to ensure pervasive implementation of the
FLSA in the workplace.” Id. at 1245. Here, though, the terms of the settlement were orally
published in open court at the Fairness Hearing and the monetary terms of the settlement are
discussed in this Report and Recommendation. See id. at 1244–45; Brown v. Advantage Eng’g,
Inc., 960 F.2d 1013, 1016 (11th Cir. 1992) (“Once a matter is brought before a court for resolution,
it is no longer solely the parties’ case, but also the public’s case.”). The Court finds that the step

of publicly announcing the terms of the Settlement Agreement and discussing the monetary terms
in this Report and Recommendation counteracts the policy problems with the confidentiality
provisions.
With that said, the provisions within paragraphs 11(B) and 11(C) that seek to penalize
Plaintiff for violating the confidentiality agreement contravene the FLSA’s policy of allowing other
employees or the public from obtaining information about the agreement. See Dees, 706 F. Supp.
2d at 1243, 1245. These provisions should, therefore, be stricken from the Settlement Agreement.
In particular, paragraphs 11(B) and (C) provide as follows:
(B) Bolds acknowledges that a violation of paragraph 11 or any of its subparts
would cause immeasurable and irreparable damage to the Future Investment
Defendants in an amount incapable of precise determination. Accordingly, Bolds
agrees that the Future Investment Defendants shall be entitled to injunctive relief
in any court of competent jurisdiction for any actual violation of paragraph 11 and
all of its subparts, in addition to any other available remedies.
(C) Any disclosure or dissemination, other than as described above in paragraph 11
or 11(A) [referencing to limited disclosures to Bolds’s attorney, accountant, tax
advisor, the Internal Revenue Service, other government agencies, as otherwise
required by law, and pursuant to a subpoena] will be regarded as a breach of the
AGREEMENT and a cause of action shall immediately accrue for injunctive relief.

The Court, therefore, respectfully RECOMMENDS APPROVING the Settlement Agreement,
EXCEPT for Paragraphs 11(B) and 11(C) as these paragraphs would automatically entitle
Defendants to injunctive relief against Bolds for violating the confidentiality provisions therein.
b. Reasonableness of Attorney’s Fees
As to the reasonableness of counsel’s legal costs and fees, the Settlement Agreement
awards Plaintiff’s counsel an amount of $102,500 in attorney’s fees and costs. Pursuant to the
Court’s Order, Plaintiff’s counsel provided a Supplemental Memorandum along with an affidavit
supporting the hourly rates for counsel and a copy of their timesheets on this case. See ECF No.
[50], [50-1], and [50-2].
To calculate attorney’s fee awards, courts generally use the “lodestar” method. See
Norman v. Hous. Auth. of City of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1299 (11th Cir. 1988). “The most
useful starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee” using the lodestar method “is
the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.
This calculation provides an objective basis on which to make an initial estimate of the value of a
lawyer’s services.” See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433; ACLU of Ga. v. Barnes, 168 F.3d 423, 427 (11th
Cir. 1999) (noting that the lodestar is “properly calculated by multiplying the number of hours
reasonably expended on the litigation times a reasonable hourly rate” (quoting Blum v. Stenson,
465 U.S. 886, 888 (1984))). “[T]here is a ‘strong presumption’ that the lodestar is the reasonable
sum the attorneys deserve.” See Bivins v. Wrap It Up, Inc., 548 F.3d 1348, 1350 (11th Cir. 2008)
(quoting Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 565–66
(1986)).
“The first step in the computation of the lodestar is determining the reasonable hourly rate.”
Loranger v. Stierheim, 10 F.3d 776, 781 (11th Cir. 1994). “A reasonable hourly rate is the
prevailing market rate in the relevant legal community for similar services by lawyers of
reasonably comparable skills, experience, and reputation.” Id. (quoting Norman, 836 F.2d at
1299). “The general rule is that the relevant market for purposes of determining the reasonable
hourly rate for an attorney’s services is the place where the case is filed.” Barnes, 168 F.3d at 437.
“The party seeking attorney’s fees bears the burden of producing satisfactory evidence that the
requested rate is in line with prevailing market rates,” which requires “more than the affidavit of
the attorney performing the work.” Loranger, 10 F.3d at 781 (citation and quotation marks
omitted). Of course, the court “is itself an expert on the question and may consider its own
knowledge and experience concerning reasonable and proper fees and may form an independent
judgment either with or without the aid of witnesses as to value.”1 Id. (quotation marks omitted).

“The next step in the computation of the lodestar is the ascertainment of reasonable hours.”
Norman, 836 F.2d at 1301. “Counsel for the prevailing party should make a good faith effort to
exclude from a fee request hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary, just as a
lawyer in private practice ethically is obligated to exclude such hours from his fee submission.”
Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. “In other words, the Supreme Court requires fee applicants to exercise
‘billing judgment.’” Norman, 836 F.2d at 1301 (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437). As noted

1 Indeed, where “there is a lack of documentation or testimonial support the court may make the award on
its own experience. Where documentation is inadequate, the district court is not relieved of its obligation
to award a reasonable fee, but the district court traditionally has had the power to make such an award
without the need of further pleadings or an evidentiary hearing. Likewise, no additional evidentiary hearing
or pleadings are required where fee counsel fails to provide evidence on some factor which it contends the
court ought to take into account. It is perfectly proper to award attorney’s fees based solely on affidavits in
the record.” Norman, 836 F.2d at 1303 (footnote and citations omitted).
above, the “product” of the reasonable hourly rate and the number of hours reasonably expended
on the litigation “is the lodestar.” See Bivins, 548 F.3d at 1350.
As noted above, Plaintiff’s counsel provided a Supplemental Memorandum, an affidavit,
and their timesheets to support the amount of attorney’s fees and costs. Looking first at the billable
rates, Elliot Kozolchyk, the partner on the case, billed his time at $450 per hour whereas Dillon
Cuthbertson, the associate on the case, billed his time at $375 per hour. In total, Mr. Kozolchyk
billed 202.3 hours at $450 per hour for a total of $91,035.00 while Mr. Cuthbertson billed 86.9
hours at $375 per hour for a total of $32,587.50. See ECF No. [50] at 10. Collectively, their total
attorney’s fees were $123,622.50 and their costs were $515.00. See ECF No. [50] at 10.
According to Plaintiff’s Supplemental Memorandum and time sheets, Plaintiff’s counsel
devoted a significant number of hours to the following tasks in their prosecution of Plaintiff’s
claims: (1) “[e]xtensive pre-suit investigation into Defendants’ prior civil and criminal litigation

history, assets, and public representations;” (2) “[r]eview and preservation of Defendants’ social
media and online representations about the club’s operations and ‘menu’ of services;” (3)
“[p]reparation and filing of the Complaint and related case-initiating documents,” (4) “[d]etailed
review and analysis of approximately 303 separate work-related text-message threads (comprising
2,887 pages) and additional text-message productions, together amounting to tens of thousands of
messages [that were] central to: (a) Plaintiff’s hours worked; (b) amounts paid; and (c) the level of
control Defendants exercised over Plaintiff;” (5) “[t]ravel to and from Key West to inspect and
photograph Defendants’ premises, signage, and business operations;” (6) “[r]eview and analysis
of deposition transcripts from related state-court litigation involving the same parties and
overlapping factual issues;” (7) “[d]rafting and litigating responses to Defendants’ Motion to

Withdraw, Motion to Compel Arbitration, and Rule 11 threats;” (8) “[d]eveloping and litigating
discovery strategy, including multiple sets of written discovery, subpoenas, and conferral letters;”
(9) “[r]eviewing Defendants’ production of 2,570 pages of handwritten checks and daily log
records and cross-referencing those documents with text messages and Plaintiff’s testimony;” (10)
“[p]reparing for and participating in the Court-ordered settlement conference, including review,
synthesis, and presentation of key evidence;” and (11) “[o]ngoing communications with Plaintiff
and related counsel to coordinate evidence, strategy, and settlement posture.” See ECF No. [50]
at 10-11. Further, Plaintiff explains that the 42,976 text messages that required extensive analysis
“were the heart of the case” because “[t]hey documented, in real time, Plaintiff’s schedule, hours,
pay arrangements, discipline, and Defendants’ pervasive control over her work” and
“contradict[ed] Defendants’ statements in their Rule 11 letter.” See ECF No. [50] at 11.
Starting with the reasonable hourly rate, the Court must determine what the prevailing
market rate in South Florida is for similar services by lawyers of skills, experience, and reputation

reasonably comparable to those of Plaintiff’s counsel. See Loranger, 10 F.3d at 781; Barnes, 168
F.3d at 437. Having considered the information contained in the Supplemental Memorandum and
affidavit and in view of the Court’s own knowledge and experience presiding over FLSA matters
and as a practitioner in this District for nearly twenty years, see Norman, 836 F.2d at 1303, the
Court finds that the requested hourly rates for Mr. Kozolchyk ($450) and Mr. Cuthbertson ($375)
are reasonable and comparable to those awarded to similarly situated attorneys within this District.
Moving to the second step in the lodestar analysis, the Court must determine the number
of hours reasonably expended on the litigation. See Barnes, 168 F.3d at 427. In doing so, the
Court has a duty to ensure that counsel for the prevailing party has exercised “billing judgment,”
meaning counsel has made a good faith effort to exclude from the fee request any hours that are

excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary, just as a lawyer in private practice ethically is
obligated to exclude such hours from his fee submission to his client. See Norman, 836 F.2d at
1301–02; Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434, 437. After a review of the time entries included in the
timesheets, see ECF No. [50-1], the Court finds that the number of hours billed is reasonable.
Although the lodestar here would be $123,622.50 in total attorney’s fees and $515.00 in costs, the
negotiated amount of attorney’s fees and costs in the Settlement Agreement is $102,500, which is
$21,637 less than the lodestar. In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that the attorney’s fees
payable as part of the settlement are reasonable as Plaintiff’s counsel have cut their fee to obtain a
settlement for their client.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, I respectfully RECOMMEND that the Parties’ Joint Motion for In
Camera Review and Approval of FLSA Settlement Agreement and for Dismissal with Prejudice,
ECF No. [46], be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part and the Court APPROVE the

Settlement Agreement, except for Paragraphs 11(B) and 11(C), which should be STRICKEN
from the Settlement Agreement.
Pursuant to Local Magistrate Rule 4(b), the parties have fourteen (14) days from the date
of being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation within which to file written
objections, if any, with the Honorable K. Michael Moore. Failure to timely file objections shall
bar the parties from a de novo determination by the District Judge of an issue covered in the Report
and shall bar the parties from attacking on appeal unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions
contained in this Report, except on grounds of plain error if necessary in the interest of justice.
See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985); Henley v. Johnson, 885 F.2d
790, 794 (11th Cir. 1989); 11th Cir. R. 3-1.
CASE NO. 25-CV-10026-MOORE/Elfenbein

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED in Chambers in Miami, Florida on December 15, 2025.

MARTY FULGUEIRA ELFENBEIN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
cc: All counsel of record

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11226231. Public record. Not legal advice.