# Quilala v. Securitas Security Services USA

> California Court of Appeal · December 16, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11225938

## Case

- **Court:** California Court of Appeal
- **Decided:** December 16, 2025
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

Filed 12/16/25
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

FRANCISCO QUILALA,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A172017
v.
SECURITAS SECURITY (San Francisco City & County
SERVICES USA, INC. et al., Super. Ct. No. CGC-24-612606)
Defendants and Appellants.

Francisco Quilala filed a complaint against Securitas Security Services
USA, Inc. (Securitas), Reynaldo De La Cruz, and Luis Castro (jointly,
defendants) alleging sexual harassment and other causes of action related to
his former employment with Securitas. Defendants’ motion to compel
arbitration was unsuccessful as the trial court determined the Ending Forced
Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 (9 U.S.C.
§§ 401–402; EFAA) barred enforcement of the parties’ predispute arbitration
agreement.
We affirm the trial court order denying the motion to compel
arbitration. As it must, the trial court exercised its independent duty to
ensure the parties’ dispute fell within the scope of the Federal Arbitration Act
(9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.; FAA). This analysis required the court to evaluate
whether the EFAA barred arbitration. We find no error in the court
undertaking this analysis without obtaining supplemental briefing. We also
find no error in its holding that Quilala stated a valid sexual harassment
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claim and, thus, the EFAA did not permit the parties’ dispute to be compelled
to arbitration since Quilala wished to pursue his claims in court. Finally, the
EFAA’s statutory language did not authorize the court to compel the non-
sexual harassment claims to arbitration.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2012, Securitas hired Quilala as a security employee. As part of
onboarding, Quilala signed an arbitration agreement providing that any
employment-related disputes would be governed by the FAA. The agreement
states it “is intended to apply to the resolution of disputes that otherwise
would be resolved in a court of law,” and therefore “requires all such disputes
to be resolved only by an arbitrator through final and binding arbitration and
not by way of court or jury trial.”
In April 2023, Securitas assigned Quilala to work security at Oracle
Park. The following month, a Securitas supervisor called Quilala and stated
there had been a complaint about him being gay, asked intrusive questions
about his sexual activity, commented that Quilala was “so embarrassing,”
and said Quilala would be removed from his work assignment and have his
hours reduced. Over the ensuing months, rumors about Quilala’s sexual
orientation allegedly spread among coworkers. Quilala was removed from his
work assignment and had his hours “substantially reduced,” and a field
supervisor repeatedly mocked Quilala by referring to him as “ ‘Mrs. Quilala’ ”
whenever they met in person.
On October 15, 2023, Quilala sent a written message to the field
supervisor demanding that the supervisor stop saying “Mrs. Quilala” and
warning that he would pursue legal action if the conduct continued. The next
day, Quilala attended a meeting with various Securitas employees, including
a district manager, two supervisors, and a human resources representative.

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During that meeting, Quilala was informed they did not appreciate his
written complaint and “badger[ed]” and “yell[ed]” at Quilala. Securitas
terminated Quilala’s employment shortly thereafter.
Quilala subsequently filed a complaint against Securitas and two of its
employees, alleging 22 causes of action including “sex, gender,” and “sexual
orientation harassment” under the California Fair Employment and Housing
Act (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.; FEHA).
Defendants moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the arbitration
agreement. Defendants argued the parties had entered into a valid
arbitration agreement as a condition of employment, all the claims fell within
the scope of the agreement, and both the FAA and California law required its
enforcement. In opposition, Quilala took the position that the court must
first determine the agreement’s validity and enforceability. He argued the
agreement was void on several bases but did not specifically raise the EFAA.
The trial court issued a tentative order declining to compel arbitration
on a ground not specifically raised by either party: the EFAA barred
enforcement of the arbitration agreement because Quilala had alleged a valid
sexual harassment cause of action. At the subsequent hearing, defendants
argued Quilala could not rely on the EFAA because he had not raised it in
opposition to their motion. They also argued the complaint failed to allege a
valid sexual harassment claim, making the EFAA inapplicable. Finally,
defendants took the position that even if the EFAA applied, the non-
harassment claims should still proceed to arbitration.
The court rejected defendants’ arguments and adopted its tentative
ruling. After noting the applicability of the FAA, the court explained the
EFAA rendered the arbitration agreement unenforceable because Quilala
pled a cognizable claim for sexual harassment. The court noted Quilala

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alleged “several specific instances of objectionable conduct that occurred after
the effective date of the EFAA,” and “[b]ased on this claim, the case is exempt
from arbitration.” Defendants timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
In deciding a motion to compel arbitration, “the trial court sits as a
trier of fact, weighing all the affidavits, declarations, and other documentary
evidence, as well as oral testimony received at the court’s discretion, to reach
a final determination.” (Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc. (1997) 15
Cal.4th 951, 972.) Insofar as the denial of a petition to arbitrate rests on a
pure question of law, we review the order de novo. (Mendez v. Mid-Wilshire
Health Care Center (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 534, 541.) We review the trial
court’s factual findings for substantial evidence if the order rests on the
court’s resolution of evidentiary disputes. (Ramirez v. Charter
Communications, Inc. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 478, 493.)
II. The FAA and the EFAA
The FAA establishes that agreements to arbitrate “shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract or as otherwise provided in [the
EFAA].” (9 U.S.C. § 2.) For decades, courts have interpreted this mandate
expansively, emphasizing that arbitration is a favored means of dispute
resolution. As the United States Supreme Court has explained, “ ‘ “[a]ny
doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of
arbitration.” ’ ” (First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan (1995) 514 U.S. 938,
945, quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. (1985)
473 U.S. 614, 626.)

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However, Congress created a narrow but significant exception to that
general rule. In 2022, Congress enacted the EFAA, amending the FAA to
render predispute arbitration agreements unenforceable in cases involving
sexual assault or sexual harassment: “Notwithstanding any other provision
of this title, at the election of the person alleging conduct constituting a
sexual harassment dispute or sexual assault dispute, . . . no predispute
arbitration agreement or predispute joint-action waiver shall be valid or
enforceable with respect to a case which is filed under Federal, Tribal, or
State law and relates to the sexual assault dispute or the sexual harassment
dispute.” (9 U.S.C. § 402(a).) The EFAA defines a “ ‘sexual harassment
dispute’ ” as “a dispute relating to conduct that is alleged to constitute sexual
harassment under applicable Federal, Tribal, or State law.” (Id., § 401(4).)
The legislative history underscores Congress’s intent to restore access
to the courts for victims of sexual harassment and assault. The House
Judiciary Committee explained that, over time, “forced arbitration clauses
have become virtually ubiquitous,” often buried in employment contracts, and
that such clauses have deprived “millions of Americans of their day in court.”
(H.R. Rep. No. 117-234, 2d Sess., p. 4 (2022).) The Committee emphasized
that arbitration’s private nature shields disputes from public scrutiny, and
“there is no guarantee that the relevant law will be applied to these disputes
or that fundamental notions of fairness and equity will be upheld in the
process.” (Ibid.) Specifically, the Committee expressed concern that forced
arbitration in such cases “protect[s] the company by keeping the records of an
arbitration secret,” which then enables employers to “retaliate against a
victim—rather than confront the harasser or the attacker—without fear of
their actions becoming public through the courts”; “allows for the growth of
office cultures that ignore harassment”; and “create[s] incentives for the

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corporate protection of rapists and other serial harassers.” (Ibid.) Through
the EFAA, Congress sought to correct this imbalance by ensuring that
survivors of sexual harassment and assault can pursue their claims in court
rather than in a system that “often favors the company over the individual.”
(Ibid.)
In sum, while the FAA continues to reflect a strong federal policy
favoring arbitration, the EFAA creates a targeted exception to that policy
where allegations of sexual harassment or sexual assault are at issue,
reflecting Congress’s determination that such claims warrant resolution
through the public court system rather than through private arbitration.
III. The Trial Court Had an Obligation To Determine the
Applicability of the FAA and EFAA
When a party seeks to compel arbitration pursuant to the FAA, the
trial court has an obligation to ensure the dispute falls within the scope of the
FAA. Such an analysis of course requires the court to evaluate whether
arbitration is barred under chapter 4—i.e., the EFAA. (9 U.S.C. § 2 [“. . . an
agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising
out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract or as otherwise provided in chapter 4.”].)
The EFAA expressly provides that its applicability “shall be determined
by a court, rather than an arbitrator.” (9 U.S.C. § 402(b); Johnson v.
Everyrealm, Inc. (S.D.N.Y. 2023) 657 F.Supp.3d 535, 550 (Johnson).) This
directive accords with the court’s established duty to decide gateway
questions of arbitrability under the FAA before compelling arbitration—
specifically, whether an agreement to arbitrate falls within the FAA’s scope.

6
In New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira (2019) 586 U.S. 105 (New Prime), the
United States Supreme Court held that before a court may stay litigation and
compel arbitration under sections 3 or 4 of the FAA, “a court must first know
whether the contract itself falls within or beyond the boundaries of §§ 1 and
2.” (New Prime, at p. 111; see also Singh v. Uber Technologies Inc. (3d Cir.
2019) 939 F.3d 210, 215 [the gateway question of arbitrability is typically
resolved in court].) New Prime rejected the notion that a party must
specifically challenge a delegation clause to consider such a threshold issue.
(New Prime, at p. 112.) Rather, it reasoned that sections 3 and 4 may be used
to enforce a delegation clause only if the court first “ ‘determine[s] that the
contract in question is within the coverage of the Arbitration Act.’ ” (Ibid.)
Applying New Prime, a court must ensure that a dispute lies within
section 2 of the FAA before compelling arbitration. Otherwise, courts cannot
determine whether an agreement to arbitrate is “valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable”; such enforceability is contingent on the agreement not being
subject to revocation under existing law or in equity “or as otherwise provided
in chapter 4 [i.e., the EFAA].” (9 U.S.C. § 2.) Because the EFAA creates an
express statutory exception to section 2’s enforcement mandate, courts
necessarily must consider its applicability. (See Olivieri v. Stifel, Nicolaus &
Company, Incorporated (2d Cir. 2024) 112 F.4th 74, 84 [“The EFAA is
codified directly into the FAA and limits the scope of [the FAA’s] broad
mandate to enforce arbitration agreements.”]; see also, e.g., Grajales-El v.
Amazon Prime (3d Cir. Aug. 29, 2024, No. 23-2984) 2024 WL 3983335, at *1
[“before the District Court invoked its power under the FAA to compel
arbitration, it was required to first determine whether that power is limited
by § 1’s ‘contracts of employment’ exclusion.”].) And, as indicated in New

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Prime, courts must address such threshold issues whether or not they have
been specifically raised by a party.
Therefore, the trial court acted according to its obligation when raising
the EFAA as a bar to arbitration in its tentative opinion. And it was not
required to request supplemental briefing before making a final
determination on the issue as a court may decide an issue on grounds not
specifically briefed by the parties, provided the parties are given notice and a
fair opportunity to be heard before a ruling is issued. (See, e.g., Bacon v.
Southern Cal. Edison Co. (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 854, 860; Noe v. Superior
Court (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 316, 335–336.)
Defendants’ assertion that they did not receive an adequate
opportunity to address the EFAA argument because the trial court was
required to request supplemental briefing is unsupported. They rely
principally on Monarch Healthcare v. Superior Court (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th
1282, 1285, which concerned a discovery dispute. There, the trial court
granted a motion to compel on a procedural basis not raised by either party.
(Ibid.) On appeal, the court acknowledged that while a trial court may rule
on unbriefed grounds, “fundamental principles of due process” required notice
sufficient to prevent an order from issuing “like a ‘bolt from the blue out of
the trial judge’s chambers.’ ” (Id. at p. 1286.) The Monarch court advised, as
a matter of sound practice, that trial courts should give advance notice of
unbriefed issues and allow the parties to address them at oral argument or
through supplemental briefing. (Ibid.)
The record here demonstrates that the trial court did exactly that. The
court issued a tentative ruling in advance of the hearing, expressly stating its
conclusion that the EFAA applied and barred arbitration. At the hearing, the
court invited the parties to address the issue. Defendants did so, devoting

8
their argument entirely to whether the EFAA had been waived and whether
it should apply. Although Monarch suggested courts may permit
supplemental briefing when new issues arise, defendants never requested
leave to file such briefing or indicated that further response was necessary.
The court’s process satisfied due process and comported with the approach
endorsed in Monarch because defendants received both notice and an
opportunity to be heard on the EFAA’s applicability.
In sum, the trial court appropriately considered whether the EFAA
barred arbitration in this action and the lack of supplemental briefing
regarding the EFAA’s applicability is not a sound basis for reversal.
IV. The EFAA Applied as Quilala Alleged a Valid Sexual Harassment
Claim
FEHA makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
harass an employee because of the sex of that person. (Gov. Code, § 12940,
subd. (j)(1).) Harassment because of sex includes sexual harassment and
gender harassment. (Id., subd. (j)(4)(C).) To prevail on a harassment claim,
an employee must show the harassment was “ ‘severe enough or sufficiently
pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create a work
environment that qualifies as hostile or abusive to employees because of their
sex.’ ” (Lyle v. Warner Brothers Television Productions (2006) 38 Cal.4th 264,
279, italics omitted.)
Whether conduct is sufficiently severe or pervasive is determined by
the totality of the circumstances. (Bailey v. San Francisco Dist. Attorney’s
Office (2024) 16 Cal.5th 611, 628 (Bailey); Gov. Code, § 12923, subd. (c).)
“ ‘ “[S]imple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless
extremely serious)” ’ are not sufficient to create an actionable claim of
harassment.” (Bailey, at p. 628.) But an isolated incident can form the basis

9
for an actionable claim if it is extremely serious. (Id. at pp. 629, 634 [single
use of an “unambiguous racial epithet” may suffice].) Section 12923,
subdivision (a), further clarifies that a hostile work environment exists when
harassing conduct “sufficiently offends, humiliates, distresses, or intrudes
upon its victim,” such that it disrupts emotional tranquility or interferes with
the victim’s sense of well-being or ability to perform his or her job.
Measured against these standards, Quilala’s allegations are clearly
sufficient to state a claim for sexual harassment. He asserts supervisors and
coworkers questioned his sexual identity, a manager asked if he “suck[ed]”
certain individuals, and that same manager mocked him by saying Quilala’s
perceived sexual orientation was “so embarrassing.” Quilala further alleged
he was removed from a work assignment and had his hours reduced because
of that perceived sexual orientation. A field supervisor’s repeated references
to him as “Mrs. Quilala” were sufficiently disruptive that Quilala formally
objected in writing and threatened legal action if the comments continued.
Viewed collectively, these allegations go well beyond “simple teasing” or
“offhand comments.” They describe repeated and humiliating conduct that
altered the conditions of employment.
Defendants’ reliance on cases decided prior to the adoption of
Government Code section 12923 or Bailey, supra, 16 Cal.5th 611 is
misplaced. Those prior authorities “fail[ ] to take into account several key
principles, including the definition of a hostile work environment [and] the
clarification that ‘[a] single incident of harassing conduct is sufficient to
create a triable issue regarding the existence of a hostile work environment if
the harassing conduct . . . created an intimidating, hostile, or offensive
working environment . . . .’ ” (Beltran v. Hard Rock Hotel Licensing, Inc.
(2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 865, 880.) Applying current standards, the trial court

10
correctly determined that Quilala’s allegations stated a plausible claim of
sexual harassment under FEHA, bringing the dispute within the scope of the
EFAA.
V. Because the EFAA Applied, Quilala Had the Right To Proceed in
Court Without an Express Invocation of the EFAA
Once the court had determined the EFAA applied because Quilala
raised a valid sexual harassment claim, it then had to determine whether
Quilala “elected” to pursue his claim in court. As we now explain, we find the
EFAA does not require an express invocation, and a plaintiff may elect to
exercise the right to proceed in court by conduct that clearly indicates he or
she wishes to do so. Holding otherwise would run counter to Congress’s
intent in enacting the EFAA.
The EFAA carves out a targeted exception to the FAA’s general
enforceability mandate “at the election of the person alleging conduct
constituting a sexual harassment dispute or sexual assault dispute.”
(9 U.S.C. § 402(a).) However, the EFAA does not define “election.” An
election is commonly understood to mean a choice (see Black’s Law Dict.
(12th ed. 2024) p. 653 [“The exercise of a choice; esp., the act of choosing from
several possible rights or remedies in a way that precludes the use of other
rights or remedies”]), and “the EFAA’s legislative history indicates the law
was intended to grant victims the choice between the arbitral forum and the
courts when seeking to redress sexual harassment in the workplace.” (Ding
v. Structure Therapeutics, Inc. (N.D.Cal. 2024) 755 F.Supp.3d 1200, 1215.)
Congress adopted the EFAA precisely to ensure victims of sexual harassment
and assault, not employers, control the choice of forum: “H.R. 4445 would
restore access to justice for millions of victims of sexual assault or
harassment who are currently locked out of the court system and are forced

11
to settle their disputes against companies in a private system of arbitration
that often favors the company over the individual.” (H.R. Rep. No. 117-234,
2d Sess., p. 4 (2022).)
Construing “election” to impose an express invocation requirement
would undermine that purpose and be in violation of our duty to interpret a
statute “ ‘ “to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s
purpose.” ’ ” (Chavez v. California Collision, LLC (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th
298, 306 [we begin with the plain and commonsense meaning of statutory
text and may consider the statute’s purpose and legislative history if the
statutory text permits more than one reasonable interpretation].) The
statute contains no requirement that a plaintiff explicitly reference or cite the
EFAA to benefit from its protection. Congress instead used a flexible term—
“elect”—that is broad enough to encompass conduct that demonstrates a
plaintiff’s choice to proceed in court. Requiring plaintiffs to meet additional
procedural formalities to invoke that choice would impose a barrier Congress
never created.
In support of their position that Quilala was required to expressly
invoke the EFAA for it to apply, defendants rely on Spriggs v. Gardenview
OPCO, LLC (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2024, No. A-1133-23) 2024 WL
5001752, an unpublished decision from the New Jersey Superior Court’s
appellate division. There, the court concluded the enforceability of the EFAA
was not properly before it because the issue had not been raised below.
(Spriggs, at p. *3.) It then briefly observed—without analysis—that the
phrase “at the election” in the EFAA required plaintiffs to “invoke their right
to ‘elect[ ]’ to void the agreement.” (Spriggs, at p. *3.)
We do not find Spriggs persuasive. Generally, “absent some
affirmative indication of Congress’ intent to preclude waiver,” statutory

12
provisions are presumptively waivable. (See United States v. Mezzanatto
(1995) 513 U.S. 196, 201.) But applying a waiver principle here would
depend on an unduly narrow reading of “election” that is inconsistent with
Congress’s intent in enacting the EFAA as discussed above.
Quilala opted to proceed in court by filing a complaint in the superior
court and opposing defendants’ motion to compel arbitration. That conduct
was sufficient to constitute an “election” under the statute. Nothing in the
text, legislative history, or purpose of the EFAA demands more, and no
conduct by Quilala evinces an intent to proceed via arbitration.
VI. The Non-harassment Claims Could Not Be Carved Out as the
EFAA Applies to the Case as a Whole
Finally, defendants contend the trial court erred by refusing to compel
arbitration of Quilala’s remaining non-sexual harassment claims. They are
mistaken.
The EFAA provides that “no predispute arbitration agreement . . . shall
be valid or enforceable with respect to a case which is filed under Federal,
Tribal, or State law and relates to the sexual assault dispute or the sexual
harassment dispute.” (9 U.S.C. § 402(a).) The statute’s plain language
makes clear that the exemption applies to the case, not individual claims,
where a plaintiff alleges conduct constituting sexual harassment or sexual
assault. And so, it is no surprise that every published California decision to
address this issue has concluded that, once properly invoked, the EFAA
renders an arbitration agreement unenforceable as to the entire case, not
merely the sexual harassment claim. (Casey v. Superior Court (2025) 108
Cal.App.5th 575, 588 (Casey), review denied May 14, 2025; Liu v. Miniso
Depot CA, Inc. (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 791, 796 (Liu), review denied Dec. 31,

13
2024; Doe v. Second Street Corp. (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 552, 577 (Second
Street).)
In Second Street, the court held the EFAA “applies to the entire case,
not merely to the sexual assault or sexual harassment claims alleged as a
part of the case,” emphasizing Congress deliberately used the term “case,” not
“claim.” (Second Street, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 577.) Both Liu and
Casey adopted and reaffirmed Second Street’s interpretation. Liu explained
that the statutory use of the term “case” forecloses an interpretation limiting
the EFAA’s reach to discrete causes of action. (Liu, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at
p. 803.) Similarly, Casey held that where even one cause of action arises from
sexual harassment, “ ‘the arbitration agreement is unenforceable as to all
claims asserted in the lawsuit.’ ” (Casey, supra, 108 Cal.App.5th at p. 588.)
We find these decisions persuasive and adopt their reasoning. And we
note that federal authorities further support our conclusion. In Johnson,
supra, 657 F.Supp.3d 535, the court found the EFAA’s text “clear,
unambiguous, and decisive,” explaining that “case” refers to a legal action “as
an undivided whole,” as compared to the narrower term “claim.” (Johnson, at
pp. 558–559.) Congress’s use of “case” in section 402(a) of the EFAA and
“claim” in the statute’s effective-date provision confirmed its intent to give
each term distinct meaning—i.e., barring arbitration of the lawsuit in its
entirety when it relates to a sexual harassment dispute. (Johnson, at
pp. 559–560.) Likewise, in Diaz-Roa v. Hermes Law, P.C. (S.D.N.Y. 2024)
757 F.Supp.3d 498 (Diaz-Roa), the court concluded that when the EFAA
applies, “the pre-arbitration agreement is invalid and unenforceable with
respect to the entire case,” noting that “Congress knows how to use the
narrower term ‘claim’ when it so intends.” (Diaz-Roa, at p. 532.) That
interpretation furthers Congress’s stated purpose: “ ‘to empower claims by

14
sexual harassment and/or assault victims that had been inhibited by
proliferating arbitration clauses in employment agreements.’ ” (Ibid.; see
also Bray v. Rhythm Management Group, LLC (D.Md. Sept. 24, 2024, Civ. A.
No. TDC-23-3142) 2024 WL 4278989, at *8 [numerous federal district courts
have likewise held that the EFAA applies to an entire case].)
Defendants’ reliance on Mera v. SA Hospitality Group, LLC (S.D.N.Y.
2023) 675 F.Supp.3d 442 (Mera) is misplaced. In Mera, the court held that
“under the EFAA, an arbitration agreement executed by an individual
alleging conduct constituting a sexual harassment dispute is unenforceable
only to the extent that the case filed by such individual ‘relates to’ the sexual
harassment dispute.” (Id. at p. 447.) This holding has been repeatedly
criticized.
Diaz-Roa observed that Mera’s interpretation of the EFAA “would
require courts to carve up every case to which the EFAA applies by reaching
judgment—with respect to each claim—on whether the claim relates to the
sexual harassment or sexual assault dispute.” (Diaz-Roa, supra, 757
F.Supp.3d at p. 532, fn. 9.) Such an approach is not only “antithetical to the
language of the EFAA and its protective intent, [citation], but it would also
have the court address early in a case and in a definitive manner ‘a question
that often is not easily answered on the pleadings.’ ” (Ibid.) Liu similarly
cautioned Mera’s approach was “unpersuasive based on the plain language of
section 402(a),” in that “the Mera court in effect added ‘to the extent’ to the
statutory language, which contravenes the rules of statutory construction.”
(Liu, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at pp. 805–806.) Moreover, we note the plaintiff
in Mera pursued wage and hour claims on behalf of all nonexempt
employees—materially different from this case, where all of Quilala’s causes

15
of action arise from his own employment and treatment by defendants. (See
Mera, supra, 675 F.Supp.3d at p. 448.)
As all of Quilala’s claims stem from the same employment relationship
and his treatment by defendants, his case “relates to” his sexual harassment
allegations within the meaning of section 402(a) of the EFAA. Consistent
with Second Street, Liu, and Casey, the EFAA renders the arbitration
agreement unenforceable as to the entirety of Quilala’s case.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Quilala may recover his costs on appeal. (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1), (2).)

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PETROU, J.

WE CONCUR:

TUCHER, P. J.

RODRÍGUEZ, J.

Quilala v. Securitas Security Services USA, Inc. / A172017

17
Trial Court: City and County of San Francisco Superior Court

Trial Judge: Hon. Richard B. Ulmer

Counsel:

Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, Lann G. McIntyre, Daniel R. Velladao;
Goldberg Segalla, Stephen C. Mazzara and Ani Garibyan for Defendants and
Appellants.

Allan Villanueva Law, Allan A. Villanueva and Parham Golestanian for
Plaintiff and Respondent.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11225938. Public record. Not legal advice.