# S.R.

> District Court, S.D. Texas · December 12, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11225370

## Case

- **Full name:** Laura Romo, et al. v. Spring Branch Independent School District, ez. ai.
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Texas
- **Decided:** December 12, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11225370

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- applying the Supreme Court’s test outlined in Davis to Section 504 claims

## Opinion text

Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
December 15, 2025
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
LAURA ROMO, et. al., §
§
Plaintiffs, §
§
v. § Civil Action No. H-25-0508
§
SPRING BRANCH INDEPENDENT §
SCHOOL DISTRICT, ez. ai., §
§
Defendants. §
ORDER
Pending before the Court are Defendant Spring Branch Independent School
District’s Motion to Strike Exhibits to Plaintiffs’ Response to SBISD’s Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint (Document No. 50); Defendant Spring
Branch Independent School District’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended
Complaint Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (Document No. 30);
and Defendants Soliant Health, LLC d/b/a Soliant Health’s and Jamila Tressie
Spencer’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint (Document No.
32). Having considered the motions, submissions, and applicable law, the Court
finds that Defendant Spring Branch Independent School District’s motion to strike
should be granted, the Defendant Spring Branch Independent School District’s
motion to dismiss should be granted in part and denied in part, and that Defendants

Soliant Health, LLC d/b/a Soliant Health’s and Jamila Tressie Spencer’s motion
should be denied.
I. BACKGROUND
This is a matter involving the alleged wrongful death of a child. Plaintiffs .

Laura Romo and Omar Romo (collectively “Plaintiffs”) are the parents of the
deceased “S.R.” The deceased was a child with severe autism and Williams-Beuren
Deletion Syndrome and a student at Stratford High School within Defendant Spring
Branch Independent School District (“SBISD”). On February 6, 2023, S.R., who had

a propensity to chew on objects around him, ingested a rubber glove ultimately
leading to his death on February 8, 2023. At the time of the incident, SBISD had a
contract with Defendant Soliant Health (“Soliant”) whereby Defendant Jamila
Tressie Spencer (“Spencer”), an employee of Soliant, would provide services to S.R.
and other students at Stratford High School.
On the day of the incident, S.R. and his classmates were in the gymnasium
with Spencer who was tasked with supervising the students. S.R. became visibly
distressed but Spencer, who was allegedly on her cellphone at the time, did not
notice. Eventually, S.R. tripped and fell, and only then did Spencer notice that S.R.

was not breathing and had turned blue. EMS was called and dispatched to the scene,
discovering that a rubber glove was lodged in S.R.’s airway. S.R. was then
transported to Texas Children’s Hospital West Campus where he died two days later.

Based on the foregoing, on February 6, 2025, Plaintiffs filed suit in this Court
against SBISD asserting claims under: (1) Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973; (2) the Americans with Disabilities Act; (3) the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution; (4) the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution; and (5) the doctrine of
Respondeat Superior.‘ Plaintiffs also assert claims against Soliant and Spencer for:
(1) negligence; (2) gross negligence; and (3) wrongful death.* On June 17, 2025,
SBISD filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. On June 23, 2025, Soliant and Spencer filed a motion to dismiss for failure

to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. On July 25, 2025, Plaintiffs
responded to SBISD’s motion to dismiss. On July 31, Plaintiffs responded to Soliant
and Spencer’s motion to Dismiss. On August 7, 2025, SBISD replied to Plaintiffs’

response. On August 18, Soliant and Spencer replied to Plaintiffs’ response.
Ul. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule 12(b)(6) allows dismissal if a plaintiff fails “to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Under Rule 8(a)(2), a pleading must
contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled

to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although “the pleading standard Rule 8 announces

! See Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint, Document No. 29 at 20-23.
* See Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint, Document No. 29 at 23-26.

does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ . . . it demands more than . . . ‘labels
and conclusions.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Ail.

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “[A] formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, “[t]he
‘court accepts all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable

to the plaintiff.” In re Katrina Canal Breeches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5™ Cir.
2007) (quoting Martin K. Eby Constr. Co. v. Dall. Area Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d 464,
467 (5" Cir. 2004)). To survive the motion, a plaintiff must plead “enough facts to

state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
“Conversely, ‘when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a
claim of entitlement to relief, this basic deficiency should . . . be exposed at the point
of minimum expenditure of time and money by the parties and the court.’” Cuvillier

v. Taylor, 503 F.3d 397, 401 (5" Cir. 2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558).
Il. LAW & ANALYSIS
The Court will consider, in turn: (A) Defendant SBISD’s Motion to Strike;
(B) Defendant SBISD’s Motion to Dismiss; and (C) Spencer and Soliant Health’s
Motion to Dismiss.

A. Defendant SBISD’s Motion to Strike (Document No. 50)
SBISD moves to strike the exhibits Plaintiffs’ attached to their response to

SBISD’s motion to dismiss, contending that the exhibits “are plainly improper under
Rule 12(b)(6).”? In response, Plaintiffs’ contend that the Court should take judicial
notice of the exhibits and that the exhibits in question were already noted in their
Amended Complaint.
Federal Rule of Civil Rule 12(f) states, in relevant part, that “[t]he court may
strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial,
impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). In reviewing a motion to
dismiss, the Court is generally limited to the Complaint and the motion itself. See
Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 244 F.3d 496, 498 (Sth Cir. 2000).
A review of the record in this matter reveals that the exhibits in question were
attached, for the first time, to the Plaintiffs’ response to SBISD’s motion to dismiss.°
Based on the foregoing, the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f), and
the clear guidance of the Fifth Circuit that the Court should limit its review of a

3 Defendant Spring Branch Independent School District’s Motion to Strike Exhibits
to Plaintiffs’ Response to SBISD’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint,
Document No. 50 at 4.
4 Plaintiffs Response to Spring Branch Independent School District’s Motion to
Strike Exhibits, Document No. 6] at 4—5.
> See Plaintiffs’ Response to the School District’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First
Amended Complaint, Document No. 42, Exhibit A, Exhibit B, Exhibit C.

motion to dismiss to the Complaint and motion, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’
exhibits should be struck. As such, the Court finds that SBISD’s motion to strike
should be granted. The Court will now consider Defendants’ motions to dismiss and
will disregard the exhibits included in Plaintiffs’ response to SBISD’s motion to
dismiss. .
B. Defendant SBISD’s Motion to Dismiss (Document No. 30)
SBISD moves to dismiss all of Plaintiffs’ claims, contending Plaintiffs failed

to sufficiently plead said claims. Plaintiffs contend that the pleading of each claim
is sufficient to satisfy the requirements under Rule 8(a)(2). The Court will consider,
in turn, each claim that SBISD contends should be dismissed.
1. Fourth Amendment Claim
Plaintiffs allege that SBISD violated S.R.’s Fourth Amendment right to “be
free from unreasonable and unnecessary seclusion[.]”®© SBISD contends that
Plaintiffs failed to provide any facts suggesting that S.R.’s seclusion was
unreasonable. In response, Plaintiffs contend that SBISD did not address certain
aspects of the Fourth Amendment Claim and has consequentially waived it.
Furthermore, Plaintiffs contend that, given the facts alleged in their Amended

6 Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint, Document 29 at 13.

Complaint, their Fourth Amendment claim is plausible and thus should not be
dismissed.
The Fourth Amendment protects the “right of the people to be secure in their

persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8 (1868). It is long established that the Fourth Amendment
applies in schools, at least to the extent that the rights it protects are appropriate for
the students. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655 (1995). In
evaluating claims brought under the Fourth Amendment, the central question for a
court’s consideration is whether a government seizure is reasonable under the
circumstances. See Milligan v. City of Slidell, 226 F.3d 652, 654 (5" Cir. 2000). In
determining reasonableness, “courts balance the governmental interest against the
invasion which the search or seizure entails.” Milligan, 226 F.3d at 654 (citing Terry,
392 U.S. at 19). When determining if a school’s seizure is reasonable, “custodial and
tutelary reasonability for children” must be considered. Vernonia Sch. Dist., 515
U.S. at 656. Lastly, the scope of search or seizure must be proportional to the
justification for restraint. See Littell v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 894 F.3d 616, 620
(2018) (relating to reasonableness for a search under the Fourth Amendment).
Here, the Court has reviewed Plaintiffs’ complaint in detail. In doing so, the
Court considered the language of Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim, which states
that “S.R. had a right, while alive to be free from unreasonable and unnecessary

seclusion, which violated his rights pursuant to the 4th Amendment to the United
States Constitution.”’” SBISD contends that Plaintiffs have not offered facts to
suggest that the placement of S.R. in a self-contained classroom was unreasonable.
SBISD further contends that the confinement of S.R. in a portion of his classroom

was an attempt to keep him safe and was not a departure from accepted professional
standards. Lastly, SBISD contends that S.R. being is a self-contained classroom was
in accordance with S.R.’s individualized education program (“IEP”), which the
Plaintiffs agreed to.’ In response, Plaintiffs concede that S.R’s placement in a self-
contained classroom was reasonable, but contend that the methods of seclusion used
by SBISD were unreasonable.’ Plaintiffs allege that S.R. was kept in a small area of
the room, was surrounded by bookshelves, and was separated from the rest of his
class.
A review of the record in this matter reveals that S.R.’s IEP specifically
allowed S.R.’s placement in a self-contained classroom and that Plaintiffs agreed to
S.R.’s IEP. Thus, given the Fifth Circuit’s guidance on determining reasonableness,

1 Plaintiffs’ Amended Petition, Document 29 at 21.
8 See Defendant Spring Branch Independent School District’s Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),
Document No. 30 at 14.
Plaintiffs’ Response to the School District’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First
Amended Complaint, Document No. 42 at 29.

the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to plead facts showing that the methods of
seclusion were unreasonable given the school’s interest in keeping S.R. safe and
complying with his IEP. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ Fourth
Amendment claim should be dismissed. The Court will now address Plaintiffs’
claims under the Fourteenth Amendment.
2. Fourteenth Amendment Claims
Plaintiffs allege three claims against HISD under the Fourteenth Amendment
related to policy and practices, due process, and equal protection. The Fourteenth
Amendment states, in relevant part, that “[n]o State shall... deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. Given the
intertwined facts and law relevant to Plaintiffs’ policy and practices and due process
claim, the court will consider them together.

i. “Policy and Practices” and “Due Process’!®
Plaintiffs allege that the SBISD School Board “had an actual policy, practice,
and custom of conscious and deliberate indifference to federal and state law” and
that the indifference was a “moving force in the injuries.”"! Plaintiffs further allege
that SBISD failed to supervise and train staff, leading to the violation of S.R.’s rights.
In response, SBISD contends that Plaintiffs’ fourteenth amendment policy and
practices claim must be dismissed because Plaintiffs “fail to and cannot plead the
elements of municipal liability under Section 1983.”!” In response, Plaintiffs contend
that their claims under the Fourteenth Amendment are plausible.'°
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a municipality may be liable if execution of the
government’s policy results in constitutional violations. See Monell v. Dept. of Soc.

10 Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint, Document No. 29 at 21. The Court notes that
Plaintiffs bring separate claims for “Policy and Practice” and “Due Process Claims.” A
review of Plaintiffs’ claims reveal that they are essentially Monell liability claims. As such,
the Court will construe Plaintiffs’ “Policy and Practice” and “Due Process Claims” as a
Monell liability claim and consider Plaintiffs’ policy and lack of training allegations
separately. Furthermore, to the extent that Plaintiffs intend to bring claims against SBISD
under the theory of respondeat superior, they too will be construed as Monell liability
claims by this Court.
'! Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint, Document No. 29 at 21.
2 Defendant Spring Branch Independent School District’s Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) □□□□
Document No. 30 at 14.
13 Plaintiffs’ Response to the School District’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First
Amended Complaint, Document No. 42 at 32.
10

Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To succeed on a claim
for municipal liability, a plaintiff must prove “a policymaker; an official policy; and

a violation of constitutional rights whose ‘moving force’ is the policy of custom.”
Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (Sth Cir. 2001). To show an
“official policy” a plaintiff must show “[a] policy . . . officially adopted ... by an
official” or “a persistent, widespread practice . . . [that is] so common and well settled

as to constitute a custom.” Eugene v. Alief Indep. Sch. Dist., 65 F.3d 1299, 1304 (Sth
Cir. 1995). To show a custom, a pattern must be “so common and well-settled as to
constitute a custom that fairly represents municipal policy.” Peterson v. City of Fort
Worth, Tex., 237 F.3d 567, 579 (5th Cir. 2009). A failure to train can be thought of

as a policy only “where [the failure] reflects a ‘deliberate’ or ‘conscious’ choice by
the municipality[.]” Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 379 (1989). Most pertinent
here, “[if] the need for more or different training is so obvious, and the inadequacy
so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, [then] the policymakers . .

. can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need.” Jd. at 390.
Here, Plaintiffs allege that SBISD “failed to have a policy on how to keep and

secure cleaning materials like safety gloves.”' Plaintiffs further allege that SBISD

\4 Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint, Document No. 29 at 2.
11

“failed to enact a Policy & Procedure to address medical emergencies[.]”!> Plaintiffs
further allege that SBISD “failed to sufficiently supervise staff regarding addressing
the needs of children . . . especially a student with a disability like $.R.”! Plaintiffs
rely on the Supreme Court’s holding in Canton, and argue that SBISD’s deliberate
indifference is shown by the fact that the risk of constitutional violations was
obvious.!” Lastly, Plaintiffs contend that SBISD does not address the “failure to have

a choking policy & procedure in place [claim]” in their motion to dismiss, and thus
it is waived.!®
In response, SBISD contends that Plaintiffs’ policy and practices claim fails
because Plaintiffs fail to allege a custom of improper treatment of choking victims

or of improper storage of gloves.!? SBISD further contends that Plaintiffs “make

'5 Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint, Document No. 29 at 2.
'6 Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint, Document No. 29 at 21. □
'7 See Plaintiffs’ Response to the School District’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’
First Amended Complaint, Document No. 42 at 35 (citing Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378,
379 (1989)).
'8 Plaintiffs’ Response to the School District’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First
Amended Complaint, Document No. 42 at 34. A review of the record in this matter reveals
that SBISD does address Plaintiffs allegation “that SBISD’s Board failed to develop
policies or procedures on: (1) how to address choking victims[.]” Regardless, the contend
of SBISD’s motion to dismiss does not excuse Plaintiffs from the pleading requirements
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 8(a)(2).
19 See Defendant Spring Branch Independent School District’s Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),
Document No. 30 at 18.
12

conclusory allegations [and] . . . do not plead the existence of any similar
incidents[.]”*? SBISD further contends that Plaintiffs have failed to show that
SBISD was deliberately indifferent in any failure to train that may have existed.”!
A review of the record reveals that Plaintiffs fail to plead sufficient facts to
suggest either a custom of improper treatment of choking victims or of any deliberate
indifference on behalf of SBISD. Plaintiffs’ pleadings allege only that a previous
individualized examination of S.R. conducted by SBISD included notes of S.R.
being a choking hazard, a previous incident where S.R. swallowed a paper clip, and
“multiple incidents involving the ingestion of foreign objects.”*? However, the
Plaintiffs plead no similar instances, including the aforementioned incidents, where
S.R., or any other student, was improperly treated for choking. Furthermore, a
review of the record in this matter reveals that Plaintiffs do not plead similar events
where SBISD failed to secure cleaning materials.
Given the Fifth Circuit and Supreme Court’s clear guidance that establishing
a custom or deliberate indifference requires pleading facts that suggest either a

20 Defendant Spring Branch Independent School District’s Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),
Document No. 30 at 18.
1 Defendant Spring Branch Independent School District’s Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),
Document No. 30 at 20.
2 See Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint, Document No. 29 at 13-14.
13

pattern of behavior or an obvious need for change of training, the Court finds that
Plaintiffs have failed to show that SBISD was deliberately indifferent to any choice
with respect to training or that any well-settled custom existed. Based on the
foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment claim, with respect
to policy, practice, training, and supervision, should be dismissed. The Court will

now consider Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment claim under equal protection.
ii. Equal Protection
Plaintiffs allege that SBISD’s actions violated “Equal Protection of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States[.]”*? SBISD
contends that Plaintiffs’ equal protection claim should be dismissed because it fails

as a matter of law.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that
persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.’” Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S.
202, 216 (1982) (quoting F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415
(1920)). A plaintiff can bring an equal protection claim as a class of one by alleging
that they have “been intentionally treated differently from other similarly situated
and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.” Village of
Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (citing Sioux City Bridge Co. v.

3 Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint, Document No. 29 at 22.
14

Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441 (1923)). Furthermore, a plaintiff must allege that the
unequal treatment “stemmed from a discriminatory intent.” Taylor v. Johnson, 257
F.3d 470, 473 (Sth Cir. 2001).
Here, Plaintiffs allege that “[t]he failures by SB ISD School Board were a
moving force in violating the rights of S.R., as a class of one[.]** SBISD contends
that Plaintiffs claim as a “class of one” must fail because they fail to allege “any
facts that show S.R. was treated differently from similarly situated individuals or
that unequal treatment of S.R. stemmed from discriminatory intent.””° SBISD further
contends that “Plaintiffs have not plead any facts to support a cause of action under
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment apart from referencing the
clause itself.”*° In response, Plaintiffs allege that S.R. was “confined” and that “there
is no rational basis for such mistreatment.”?”

4 Amended Complaint, Document No. 29 at 29.
25 Defendant Spring Branch Independent School District’s Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),
Document No. 30 at 15.
26 Defendant Spring Branch Independent School District’s Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),
Document No. 30 at 15 n. 2.
27 Plaintiffs’ Response to the School District’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First
Amended Complaint, Document No. 42 at 31.
15

A review of the record in this matter reveals that Plaintiffs fail to plead
sufficient facts suggesting that S.R. was treated differently from similarly situated
individuals without any rational basis or with discriminatory intent. On the contrary,
“S.R. was educated in what is termed a Self-contained Classroom with other students
who also had significant disabling conditions.””® Based on the foregoing, and the
Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit’s clear guidance that an equal protection claim
requires the Plaintiff plead discriminatory intend and no rational basis for difference
in treatment, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently plead their claim
under the Equal Protection Clause. As such, this claim should be dismissed. The
Court will now consider Plaintiffs’ claims under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973 (“Section 504”) and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”).””
3. Section 504 and ADA Claims
Plaintiffs allege that SBISD violated Section 504 and brings claims for: (i)
professional bad faith or gross misjudgment; (ii) failure to keep safe; (iii) disparate

8 Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint, Document No. 29 at 12.
29 Given the similarities between Section 504 and the ADA,,.the Court will consider
Plaintiffs’ claims under both acts simultaneously. See Smith v. Harris County, Tex., 956
F.3d 311, 317 (Sth Cir. 2020) ([t]he close relationship between Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act and Title II of the ADA means that precedents interpreting either law
generally apply to both”); see also Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d 795, 799 (Sth Cir. 2000)
(“[jjurisprudence interpreting either section [Section 504 and the ADA] is applicable to
both”).
16

treatment; and (iv) failure to accommodate.*? In addition, Plaintiffs allege that S.R.

was “a victim of discrimination based upon his disability . . . [and thus,] has a
plausible claim pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §
12131[.]’3! SBISD contends that these claims must be dismissed because Plaintiffs
“fail to plead facts supporting any of the elements[.]’%”
“(T]he basic purpose of § 504. . . is to ensure that handicapped individuals

are not denied jobs or other benefits because of the prejudiced attitudes or the
ignorance of others.” School Bd. Of Nassau County, Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273,
284 (1987). Comparably, the ADA states, in relevant part, that “[n]o qualified
individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from
participation in or be denied benefits of the services, programs, or actives of a public
entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12132. The
Court will consider, in turn, each of Plaintiffs’ claims under Section 504 and the
ADA.

30 Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint, Document No. 29 at 23.
31 Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint, Document No. 29 at 22-23.
32 Defendant Spring Branch Independent School District's Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),
Document No. 30 at 6.
17

i. Professional Bad Faith or Gross Misjudgment
Plaintiffs allege that “the School District demonstrated professional bad faith

or gross misjudgment and/or mismanagement of S.R.’s educational plan[.]”?? SBISD
contends that “Plaintiffs reference to ‘bad faith or gross mismanagement’ is
outdated, irrelevant, and does not constitute the assertion of any viable claim.”*4 In

response to SBISD’s motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs concede that their “use of the
phrase ‘Professional Bad Faith Or Gross Misjudgment” is outdated and incorrect.”
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ claim for Professional Bad
Faith or Gross Misconduct should be dismissed because a claim described as such

33 Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint, Document No. 29 at 22.
34 Defendant Spring Branch Independent School District’s Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),
Document No. 30 at 8.
35 Plaintiffs’ Response to the School District’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First
Amended Complaint, Document No. 42 at 39.
18

does not exist under neither Section 504 nor the ADA.*° The Court will now consider
Plaintiffs’ Section 504 and ADA claim for failure to keep safe.
ii. Failure to Keep Safe
Plaintiffs allege that “the School District [SBISD] failed to provide S.R. a safe
and non-hostile educational environment, and as such he is a victim of
discrimination based upon disability.°” SBISD contends that Plaintiffs claim for
“failure to keep safe” is not sufficiently pled and must be dismissed.*®
The Fifth Circuit has recognized a five-part test that must be met to impose
liability for disability-based harassment. See Estate of Lance v. Lewisville
Independent School Dist., 743 F.3d 982, 997 (Sth Cir. 2014) (applying the Supreme
Court’s test outlined in Davis to Section 504 claims); Davis v. Monroe County Board
of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999). The aforementioned test requires a plaintiff show

36 In response to SBISD’s motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs allege that, despite the fact
that their claim for “Professional Bad Faith or Gross Misjudgment” is incorrect, their
Failure to Provide a Free Appropriate Public Education (“FAPE”) claim survives. See
Plaintiffs’ Response to the School District’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended
Complaint, Document No. 42 at 39. The Court has reviewed Plaintiffs’ Amended
Complaint in detail and, even construing Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint liberally, the
Court is unable to construe Plaintiffs’ general reference to FAPE and the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”) as a claim against SBISD. As such, to the extent
Plaintiffs intend to bring a claim under IDEA or FAPE, the Court finds it should be
dismissed.
37 Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint, Document No. 29 at 22.
38 Defendant Spring Branch Independent School District’s Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) □□□□
Document No. 30 at 12.
19

that: (1) they are an individual with a disability; (2) they were harassed based on
their disability; (3) “the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive;” (4) the
defendant “knew about the harassment;” and (5) that the defendant “was deliberately
indifferent to the harassment.” Estate of Lance, 743 F.3d at 997.
Here, SBISD contends that Plaintiffs’ “failure to keeps safe” claim must be
dismissed because “[flailure to property store, use, or dispose of rubber gloves does

not constitute discrimination under the ADA or Section 504 because Plaintiffs have

not pled that the failure was due to intentional discrimination.or that the District was
deliberately indifferent.’ In response, Plaintiffs’ contend that their “failure to keep
safe claim” requires a showing that “the environment was unsafe” and that “[i]t is
uncontroverted that the environment for S.R. was unsafe.’””° Plaintiffs rely on their □

understanding of the elements required “to sustain an unsafe educational
environment claim” which requires, in relevant part, a showing of an unsafe
environment.*! Plaintiffs appear to rely on the holdings of Doe and Lance to

construct their understanding of what is required in pleading their claim. However,

39 Defendant Spring Branch Independent School District’s Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),
Document No. 30 at 11.
© Plaintiffs’ Response to the School District’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First
Amended Complaint, Document No. 42 at 41.
‘l Plaintiffs’ Response to the School District’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First
Amended Complaint, Document No. 42 at 41.
20

a review of the cases upon which Plaintiffs construct their understanding reveals that

a claim for “failure to keep safe” requires a showing of “harassment based on
disability[,]” rather than a simple showing of an unsafe environment.”
Based on the foregoing, and the Fifth Circuit’s clear guidance that a “failure
to keep safe” claim requires a showing of harassment, the Court finds that Plaintiff
has failed to plead any facts that suggest S.R. was harassed because of his disability,
and that, as such, Plaintiffs’ claim for “failure to keep safe” should be dismissed for
failure to state a claim.*? The Court will now consider Plaintiffs’ Section 504 and
ADA claims for disparate treatment.
iii. Disparate Treatment
Plaintiffs allege that the facts “support a plausible ‘Disparate Treatment
Claim’ also pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act.”“* SBISD contends that Plaintiffs’

” See Plaintiffs’ Response to the School District’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’
First Amended Complaint, Document No. 42 at 41(citing Doe v. Texas A&M Univ., 634
F.Supp.3d 365, 383 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 6, 2022)) (finding that “the Fifth Circuit states that to
plead a claim for hostile educational environment a plaintiff must allege that . . . [she] was
harassed based on [her] disability) (citing Estate of Lance v. Lewisville Independent School
Dist., 743 F.3d 982, 997 (Sth Cir. 2014)).
3 See Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint, Document No. 29. Plaintiffs fail to mention
any events of harassment outside of S.R.’s seclusion in his classroom. Given the fact that
seclusion was an attempt to keep him safe, the Court declines to construe this seclusion as
harassment.
“4 Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint, Document No. 29 at 23.
21

disparate treatment claim must be dismissed because it fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.
Disparate treatment occurs when “[t]he employer treats some people less
favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or [other protected
characteristics].” Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335, n. 15 (1977).
“Liability in a disparate-treatment case ‘depends on whether the protected trait .. .
actually motivated the employer’s decision’” Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S.
44, 52 (2003) (citation omitted).
Here, SBISD contends that “[b]ecause Plaintiffs fail to plead a ‘disparate
treatment’ claim for intentional discrimination, their Section 504 and ADA disparate
treatment claims against SBISD must be dismissed.”4° SBISD reasons that
“treatment of a disabled student may be different from a non-disabled student but
that doesn’t make it discriminatory.’”*° In response, Plaintiffs contend that their claim
is sufficiently pled because they provide that S.R. was “excluded from being
educated in the classroom as were his peers, and rather was segregated in a corner

4S Defendant Spring Branch Independent School District’s Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),
Document No. 30 at 12.
46 Defendant Spring Branch Independent School District’s Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),
Document No. 30 at 12. See also J.W. v. Paley, 81 F.4th 440, 451 (Sth Cir. 2023) (“if
different were always discriminatory, then even disability accommodations would be
discriminatory”).
22

of the room because of his disabilities.’“7 A review of the record reveals that
Plaintiffs’ own pleadings concede that S.R.’s seclusion was “one way the District
tried to keep [S.R.] safe[.]”"®
Based on the foregoing, and the Supreme Court’s clear guidance that the
protected trait must be the motivation behind the discrimination, the Court finds that
Plaintiffs’ claim for disparate treatment should be dismissed for failure to state a
claim as the record clearly reveals, per Plaintiffs’ own statement, that S.R.’s safety
was the motivation behind his seclusion, not his disability. The Court will now
consider Plaintiffs’ Section 504 and ADA claims for failure to accommodate.
iv. Failure to Accommodate
Plaintiffs allege that the facts “support a plausible ‘failure to accommodate’
claim pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act[.]’“? SBISD contends that Plaintiffs’ failure

to accommodate claim must be dismissed because Plaintiffs fail to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.
“To succeed on a failure-to-accommodate claim, a plaintiff must prove: (1) he
is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) the disability and its consequential

47 See Plaintiffs’ Response to the School District’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’
First Amended Complaint, Document No. 42 at 42.

48 See Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint, Document No. 29 at 16.
9 Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint, Document No. 29 at 23.
23

limitations were known by the covered entity; and (3) the entity failed to make
reasonable accommodations.” Smith v. Harris Cnty., 956 F.3d 311, 317 (Sth Cir.
2020) (quotation omitted). Generally, “[iJt is the plaintiff's burden to request
reasonable accommodations.” Jenkins v. Cleco Power, LLC, 487 F.3d 309, 315 (Sth
Cir. 2007). However, a plaintiff can succeed on a failure to accommodate claim even
when they did not request an accommodation if it is shown that the necessary
accommodations were “open, obvious, and apparent.” Smith v. Harris County, Tex.,
956 F.3d 311, 318 (Sth Cir. 2020).
Here, SBISD contends that Plaintiffs’ failure to accommodate claim must be
dismissed because they “do not and cannot identify any accommodations they
requested from the District or that the District refused any such accommodations.”*°
In response, Plaintiffs contend that “there was no need for the family to ask for any
specific accommodations.”*! A review of the record in this matter, including the
allegations in Plaintiffs’ Complaint, reveals that Plaintiffs pled sufficient facts to

suggest that S.R.’s need for specific accommodations were open and obvious.”

50 Defendant Spring Branch Independent School District’s Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),
Document No. 30 at 9.
>! Plaintiffs’ Response to the School District’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First
Amended Complaint, Document No. 42 at 49.
2 See Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint, Document No. 29 at 13.
24

Based on the foregoing, and given the Fifth Circuit’s clear guidance that a plaintiff
need not request the accommodations when the need is open and obvious, the Court
finds that SBISD’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ failure to accommodate claim
should be denied.*? The Court will now consider Defendants Jamila Tressie Spencer
and Soliant Health, LLC d/b/a Soliant Health’s Motion to Dismiss.
C. Spencer and Soliant Health’s Motion to Dismiss (Document No. 32)
Spencer and Soliant Health move to dismiss all of Plaintiffs’ claims
contending that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. Plaintiffs contend that their claims are sufficiently pled and, as such, that
Spencer and Soliant Health’s motion should be denied. The Court will consider
Spencer and Soliant Health’s Motion to Dismiss, in turn, Plaintiffs’ claims against
Spencer and Soliant Health.
1. Plaintiffs’ Claims Against Spencer
Plaintiffs allege that Spencer’s negligence and gross negligence caused S.R.’s
death. As such, Plaintiffs seek damages under Chapter 71 of the Texas Civil Practice
and Remedies Code pursuant to a wrongful death and survival action. Spencer
contends that Plaintiffs’ claims should be dismissed because Spencer: (1) has

25

statutory immunity; (2) owed no “duty to render life-saving medical aid;” and (3)
because her “alleged inaction was not the proximate cause of S.R.’s death.”*4
When exercising jurisdiction over a question based upon state law, federal
courts should apply the substantive law of that state. Crisalli v. ARX Holding Corp.,
177 F. App’x 417, 419 (Sth Cir. 2006) (citing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S.
64, 72 (1938)). Tort law is a matter of state law. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64, 87 (1938). To allege a negligence action under Texas law, a Plaintiff must
allege sufficient facts to show “a legal duty owed by one person to another, a breach
of that duty, and damages proximately caused by the breach.” Nabors Drilling, USA,
Inc. v. Escoto, 288 S.W.3d 401, 404 (Tex. 2009); Lane v. Halliburton, 529 F.3d 548,
565 (5th Cir. 2008) (applying Texas State law). To succeed on a gross negligence
claim, a plaintiff must show that “1) when viewed objectively . . . the act or omission
involved an extreme degree of risk . . . and 2) the defendant had actual, subjective
awareness of the risk involved[.]” U-Haul Int’l, Inc. v. Waldrip, 380 S.W.3d 118,
137 (Tex. 2012).
Most pertinent here, the Texas Education Code provides, in relevant part, that
“Ta] professional employee of a school district is not personally liable for any act
that is incident to or within the scope of the duties of the employee’s position of

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint, Document
No. 32 at 12-16.
26

employment and that involves the exercise of judgment or discretion[.]” TEX. EDUC.
CODE § 22.051(a). Generally, a discretionary act is an act that requires personal
deliberation and an act where the law does not specify the action. See Finlan v.
Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 90 S.W.3d 395, 409 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2002, pet. denied).
Here, Spencer contends that Plaintiffs’ negligence and gross negligence
claims must be dismissed because she is entitled to immunity, owed no duty to save
S.R.’s life, and was not the proximate cause of S.R.’s death. In response, Plaintiffs
contend that Spencer is not entitled to immunity, that she did owe S.R. a duty, and
that she was a proximate cause of S.R.’s death. With respect to Spencer’s immunity,
Plaintiffs contend that Spencer was not a professional employee and that the act, or
omission of acts, was not discretionary as required by the Texas Education Code §
22.051. Plaintiffs further contend that “[t]hese duties [to supervise S.R.] were not
complex, clinical, instructional, or discretionary in nature, they were routine, basic
supervisory tasks.”°° Lastly, Plaintiffs contend that “[Spencer] was obligated to
follow the IEP, which specified the need for constant supervision due to S.R.’s risk

3 Plaintiffs’ Response to Soliant Health, LLC D/B/A Soliant Health and Jamila
Tressie Spencer’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint, Document No.
46 at 6.
6 Plaintiffs’ Response to Soliant Health, LLC D/B/A Soliant Health and Jamila
Tressie Spencer’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint, Document No.
46 at 15.
27

of choking ... remov[ing] discretion from the equation.”*’ A review of the record in
this matter clearly reveals that S.R. had an IEP requiring supervision. Based on the
foregoing, and the Texas Education Code’s clear requirement ‘that an act for which
immunity applies must be discretionary, the Court finds that it was not within
Spencer’s discretion to supervise S.R. and that, as such, immunity does not apply.
Plaintiffs contend that even if Spencer’s acts involved the exercise of
discretion, she is not entitled to immunity because she is not a professional employee
as defined by the Texas Education Code.°® Spencer conclusively states that she is a
professional employee as defined by the Texas Education Code.*? The Texas
Education Code defines “professional employee of a school district” as: “(1) a
superintendent, principal, teacher, including a substitute teacher, supervisor, social
worker, school counsel, nurse, and teacher’s aide employed by a school district; (2)

a teach employed by a company that contract with a school district to provide the
teacher’s services to the district; .. . and (6) any other person employed by a school

°7 Plaintiffs’ Response to Soliant Health, LLC D/B/A Soliant Health and Jamila
Tressie Spencer’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint, Document No.
46 at 15.
8 Plaintiffs’ Response to Soliant Health, LLC D/B/A Soliant Health and Jamila
Tressie Spencer’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint, Document No.
46 at 8.
59 Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint, Document
No. 32 at 13.
28

district whose employment requires certification and the exercise of discretion.”
TEX. EDUC. CODE § 22.051(a).
Here, Spencer conclusively contends that she is entitled to immunity under
22.051(a)(2) and 22.051(a)(6).°° Plaintiffs contend that Spencer does not fall under
either 22.051(a)(2) or 22.051(a)(6).°! Plaintiffs argue that Spencer is not a “teacher”
and that, as such, 22.051(a)(2) is inapplicable. In support of their argument,
Plaintiffs contrast 22.051(a)(2), which includes only the term teacher, with the
language of 22.051(a)(1) which includes the terms teachers, aids, nurses, and
others.® Plaintiffs contend that this difference clearly shows that “assistant speech
pathologists who [do not] hold a teaching certificate” are not intended to be included
under 22.051(a)(2). Furthermore, Plaintiffs contend that Spencer cannot be

6° Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint, Document
No. 32 at 13.
6! Plaintiffs’ Response to Soliant Health, LLC D/B/A Soliant Health and Jamila
Tressie Spencer’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint, Document No.
46 at 8.
6 Plaintiffs’ Response to Soliant Health, LLC D/B/A Soliant Health and Jamila .
Tressie Spencer’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint, Document No.
46 at 8-9.
63 Plaintiffs’ Response to Soliant Health, LLC D/B/A Soliant Health and Jamila
Tressie Spencer’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint, Document No.
46 at 9. See TEX. EDUC. CODE § 22.05 1(a).
64 Plaintiffs’ Response to Soliant Health, LLC D/B/A Soliant Health and Jamila
Tressie Spencer’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint, Document No.
46 at 8-9.
29

included under 22.051(a)(1) or 22.051(a)(6) because she is ‘not “employed by a
school district[,]” but rather “by Soliant[.]”©
Considering the clear text of the Texas Education Code, the Court finds
Plaintiffs’ interpretation of § 22.051 more persuasive than Spencer’s conclusory
contention. Based on the foregoing, and the Court’s independent interpretation of
the relevant sections, the Court finds that Spencer is not a professional employee of

a school district as defined by the Texas Education Code. As such, even if Spencer’s
actions involved the exercise of discretion, the Court finds that Spencer is still not
entitled to immunity under § 22.051 because she has failed to show that she is
entitled to such immunity as an assistant speech pathologist.
Turning to the contested elements of negligence, Spencer contends that
Plaintiffs’ negligence claim must be dismissed because she owed no duty to save
S.R.’s life and was not a proximate cause of S.R.’s death. In response, Plaintiffs’
contend that they “do not hinge their negligence theory solely on a failure to perform
medical aid. Rather . . . Spencer breached [her] duty by failing to monitor S.R.”% A

65 Plaintiffs’ Response to Soliant Health, LLC D/B/A Soliant Health and Jamila
Tressie Spencer’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint, Document No.
46 at 11 (pointing out the stark different between 22.051(a)(2), which expressly covers
employees contracting with a school district, and 22.051(a)(1) and (a)(6) which includes
school district employees).
66 Plaintiffs’ Response to Soliant Health, LLC D/B/A Soliant Health and Jamila
Tressie Spencer’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint, Document No.
46 at 17.
30

review of the record in this matter reveals that Plaintiffs’ plead not only that Spencer
was negligent in failing to render aid, but also that Spencer was negligent in “failing
to monitor, supervise, [and] protect [S.R.].” Based on the foregoing, the Court finds
that Plaintiffs have successfully pled their negligence claim with respect to duty.
Lastly, in response to Spencer’s proximate cause argument, Plaintiffs’
contend that “[u]nder Texas law, proximate causation is typically a question of fact,
not appropriate for resolution on summary judgment-let alone dismissal with
prejudice on the pleadings.”®” Given the clear guidance of Texas appellate courts,
the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ negligence claim is sufficiently pled with respect to
causation. Consequently, the Court finds that Spencer’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’
negligence claim should be denied. The Court will now briefly consider Spencer’s
motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ gross negligence claim.
Spencer contends that “Plaintiffs’ gross negligence claim fails for the same

reason as the negligence claim.’”®* In response, Plaintiffs’ contend that this argument
“depend[s] entirely on dismissal of the underlying negligence claim against

6? Plaintiffs’ Response to Soliant Health, LLC D/B/A Soliant Health and Jamila
Tressie Spencer’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint, Document No.
46 at 23 (citing First Assembly of God, Inc. v. Texas Utilities Elec. Co., 52 S.W.3d 482,
493 (Tex. App. 2001)).
68 Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint, Document
No. 32 at 6.
31 □

Spencer.”® Given the Court’s prior finding that Spencer’s motion to dismiss should
be denied with respect to Plaintiffs’ negligence claim, and given no alternative

argument by Spencer, the Court further finds that Spencer’s motion to dismiss
Plaintiffs’ gross negligence claim should be denied. The Court will now consider
Plaintiffs’ claims against Soliant Health.
2. Plaintiffs’ Claims Against Soliant Health
Soliant Health pomrends that “Plaintiffs do not allege any independent tortious
conduct as to Soliant.””? Solaint Health further contends that “[b]Jecause the
Complaint fails to state negligence and gross negligence claims against Spencer, it
necessarily fails to state a claim based [on] the viacarious liability of Soliant.””’
Absent any alternative argument by Soliant Health, and given the Court’s finding
that Plaintiffs’ claims against Spencer are sufficiently pled, the Court finds that
Spencer and Soliant Health’s motion to dismiss should be denied.

® Plaintiffs’ Response to Soliant Health, LLC D/B/A Soliant Health and Jamila
Tressie Spencer’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint, Document No.
46 at 25.
10 Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint, Document
No. 32 at 21.
41 Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint, Document
No. 32 at 21-22.
32

IV. CONCLUSION .
Based on the foregoing, the Court hereby
ORDERS that Defendant Spring Branch Independent School District’s
Motion to Strike Exhibits to Plaintiffs’ Response to SBISD’s Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint (Document No. 50) is GRANTED. The Court
further
ORDERS that Defendant Spring Branch Independent School District’s
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint Pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (Document No. 30) is DENIED IN PART with respect to
Plaintiffs’ Failure to Accommodate claims and GRANTED IN PART with respect
to all other claims Plaintiffs’ bring against Defendant Spring Branch Independent
School District. The Court further
ORDERS that Defendants Soliant Health, LLC d/b/a Soliant Health’s and
Jamila Tressie Spencer’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint
(Document No. 32) is DENIED. The Court further □

ORDERS that Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim, Policy and Practice
claim, Due Process claim, Equal Protection claim, Professional Bad Faith or Gross
Misjudgment claims, Failure to Keep Safe claims, Disparate Treatment claims, and
Respondeat Superior claim against Spring Branch Independent School District are
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The Court further

33

ORDERS that all other claims brought against Spring Branch Independent
School District, with the exception of Plaintiffs’ Failure to Accommodate claims,
are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
SIGNED at Houston, Texas, on this (A day of December, 2025.

DAVID HITTNER
United States District Judge ~

34

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11225370. Public record. Not legal advice.