# Haggerty

> District Court, M.D. Florida · December 15, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11225277

## Case

- **Full name:** Michael George Haggerty v. Rick Scott, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** December 15, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11225277

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that pro se litigants are “subject to the relevant law and rules of court, including the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION

MICHAEL GEORGE HAGGERTY,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 2:25-cv-00998-JES-NPM

RICK SCOTT, et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on review of the file.
Since initiating this action, plaintiff has filed numerous motions
seeking expedited service, to change venue, to compel records on
an emergency basis, for the appointment of a special master and
for a preliminary injunction. When such labels as “expedited”,
“time-sensitive”, or “emergency” are included in the title, “the
clerk and the court immediately pause their work on other cases
and redirect their attention to the purported emergency—even after
hours.” Hytto pte. Ltd. v. Olivares, No. 2:25-CV-576-KCD-NPM,
2025 WL 2829541, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 6, 2025). As such, the
Local Rules warn parties that “[t]he unwarranted designation of a
motion as an emergency can result in a sanction.” M.D. Fla.
3.01(f). See also (Doc. #4, pp. 8-9). “The repeated, unwarranted
designation of a motion as an emergency motion ‘unfairly disfavors
other litigants who, despite expeditious prosecution of each case
and scrupulous attention to each local and federal rule of
procedure, must wait patiently while the court disposes of a

feigned emergency.’” Onward Healthcare, Inc. v. Runnels, No. 6:12-
CV-508-ORL-37, 2012 WL 1259074, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 13, 2012)
(quoting Bravado Int'l Grp. Merch.SE Servs., Inc. v. Smith, No.
8:12–cv–613, 2012 WL 1155858, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 27, 2012)).
This will be the only warning before sanctions are considered.
The Court addresses each of these matters below. Defendants have
not been served or appeared therefore the motions are ripe.
1. Emergency Motion to Expedite Subpoena Process and Recognize
Payment of Filing Fee (Doc. #5), Consolidated Federal
Subpoena and Motion to Compel Telecommunications and
Electronic Records (Doc. #7), and Emergency Motion for
Court Order Compelling Production of Records and Subpoena
Duces Tecum for Evidence Unlawfully Withheld by Lee County
Court and Related to the July 28th Meeting, Staged
Motorcycle Accident, and December 1st Assault (Doc. #13):
Plaintiff initiated the Complaint (Doc. #1) with an
Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or
Costs (Doc. #2). Not content to wait for review, plaintiff paid
the filing fee approximately two weeks later along with the motions
to expedite the issuance of subpoenas pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
45. The first motion seeks to have the Court issue subpoenas
compelling the production of phone records, surveillance video,
and location data due to “ongoing obstruction” in a related state
proceeding. Plaintiff paid the filing fee “despite indigent
status” for the purpose of having the subpoenas issued. The second
motion seeks the issuance of subpoenas for telephone provider
information including call logs, text messages, and emails because

of “judicial interference” in ongoing state court litigation and
the necessity for “Federal oversight”. The third motion seeks
evidence that “was denied or withheld by Judge Shenko” and the Lee
County Sheriff’s Office that is vital this federal case. This
includes video footage of “judicial corridors” and keycard entries
for attorneys and state attorney staff, and internal judicial
communications.
Plaintiff seeks to compel defendants to turn over sensitive
data ex parte. In other words, before service of process or the
opportunity to respond to the allegations in the Complaint
regarding matters that may or may not be pending in state court
without a legal basis for the extraordinary relief. Subpoenas are

issued from the Court where the action is pending. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 45(a)(2). The Court finds no emergency exists that what
override the fundamental requirements for plaintiff to serve
defendants pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4. Plaintiff is cautioned
that these requests are not emergencies and the parties must submit
a discovery plan by filing a Uniform Case Management Report either:
(1) “within forty days after any defendant appears”; (2) “within
forty days after the docketing of an action removed or transferred
to this court”; or (3) “within seventy days after service on the
United States attorney in an action against the United States, its
agencies, or employees.” (Doc. #4 at 4.) As the parties have not

been served or appeared, discovery requests are premature. The
motions will be denied in their entirety.
2. Motion to Change Venue (Doc. #6) and Motion to Disqualify
Federal Judge (Doc. #37):
Plaintiff seeks to transfer this case to a venue outside of
the State of Florida because some of the defendants include a
United States Senator representing Florida, “The Governor’s
Mansion of Florida” and a judicial officer who was previously
employed in the federal courthouse prior to this appointment to
the state bench. Plaintiff initiated this case in Fort Myers,
Florida. If plaintiff wishes to pursue his case in a different
venue, such as the proposed choices of the District of Columbia
because of federal defendants or the Southern District of Georgia
because it is close, he may proceed accordingly and file the case
in the venue he desires. Of course, this would be subject to
another Court accepting jurisdiction over a case with no tenable
connection to the case or controversy.
Plaintiff also seeks to disqualify the undersigned for not
deciding his many motions more immediately. Plaintiff argues that

the undersigned has “professional ties to Lee County judicial
staff” and cannot impartially decide a case involving local
officials with “whom the judge has longstanding relationships.”
The appearance of counsel in Court as a prosecutor or counsel of
record is an insufficient basis to warrant recusal. Finding no

qualifying basis under 28 U.S.C. § 455, the Court finds that
disqualification is not required. The motions are denied.
3. Emergency Motion to Expedite Ruling (Doc. #20), Emergency
Motion for Appointment of Special Federal Master, Federal
Oversight, and Referral for Criminal Investigation of State
Officials and Judicial Actors (Doc. #25), and untitled
request for a federal protective order (Doc. #27):
In the first “emergency” motion, plaintiff seeks in bullet
form fashion the appointment of a special master, federal
protective oversight, and to prevent Judge Cohen further action in
a state court case. Plaintiff also seeks to seal exhibits from
public access without complying with the requirements of M.D. Fla.
R. 1.11. In the second motion, plaintiff seeks to “refer all
evidence of criminal conduct” by state officials to a federal
prosecutor, to exercise federal oversight, and to appoint a special
master. In the third motion, plaintiff seeks a federal protective
order prohibiting Judge Cohen from further judicial involvement in
a state court matter and for reassignment to protect plaintiff
from retaliation.
“[Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)] and its progeny
espouse a strong federal policy against federal-court interference
with pending state judicial proceedings absent extraordinary
circumstances. The policies underlying Younger abstention have
been frequently reiterated by this Court. The notion of “comity”
includes “a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of

the fact that the entire country is made up of a Union of separate
state governments, and a continuance of the belief that the
National Government will fare best if the States and their
institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in
their separate ways.” Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State
Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 431 (1982) (citation omitted). Frankly,
the Court has no authority to grant the relief sought in the
motions based on the little to no information provided. Federal
courts have limited jurisdiction and may not “exercise
jurisdiction absent a statutory basis.” Home Depot U. S. A., Inc.
v. Jackson, 587 U.S. 435, 437, 139 S. Ct. 1743, 1746, 204 L. Ed.
2d 34 (2019) (citation omitted). “The Rooker-Feldman doctrine ‘is

a jurisdictional rule that precludes the lower federal courts from
reviewing state court judgments.’” Efron v. Candelario, 110 F.4th
1229, 1235 (11th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1958 (2025)
(quoting Alvarez v. Att’y Gen. of Fla., 679 F.3d 1257, 1262 (11th
Cir. 2012)). If plaintiff’s request “requires a federal district
court to review and reject a state court decision,” the request is
barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Efron v. Candelario, 110
F.4th 1229, 1236 & n.7(11th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct.
1958, 221 L. Ed. 2d 738 (2025).
As the motions are unsupported by any authority for the Court

to determine jurisdiction interfere with the state action, with
state actors, or to appoint a special master, the motions are
denied. To the extent that plaintiff seeks a referral to the U.S.
Attorney’s Office, “[t]he decision as to which crimes and criminals
to prosecute is entrusted by the Constitution not to the judiciary,
but to the executive who is charged with seeing that laws are
enforced. [] The judiciary cannot interfere with a prosecutor's
exercise of charging discretion, except in narrow circumstances
where it is necessary to do so in order to discharge the judicial
function of interpreting and applying the Constitution.” United
States v. Smith, 231 F.3d 800, 807 (11th Cir. 2000) (citation
omitted). The motion will be denied without prejudice to plaintiff

directing his request to the appropriate party.
4. Motion to Reconsider as Indigent (In Forma Pauperis) (Doc.
#23) and Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. #32):
While the first motion is styled as a motion for
reconsideration, the Court construes it as an objection to the
Magistrate Judge’s Order. Because Plaintiff’s objections are to
the magistrate judge’s non-dispositive in forma pauperis order
(Doc. #19), the Court applies the clearly erroneous or contrary to
law standard. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a) (“When a pretrial matter not
dispositive of a party’s claim or defense is referred to a
magistrate judge to hear and decide … [t]he district judge in the
case must consider timely objections and modify or set aside any

part of the order that is clearly erroneous of contrary to law.”).
On November 19, 2025, Magistrate Judge Nicholas P. Mizell
entered an Endorsed Order denying as moot Plaintiff’s request to
proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. #19.) Since plaintiff paid the
filing fee after seeking to proceed in forma pauperis, there was
nothing clearly erroneous or contrary to law in finding the request
moot. See, e.g., Macker v. Naylor, No. 6:23-cv-1963-JSS-DCI, 2025
WL 1158698, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 21, 2025)(finding the court
lacked any basis to grant the requested relief to proceed IFP after
the plaintiff paid the filing fee); Rohrig v. Dallas Bull(301),
LLC, No. 8:21-cv-1109-MSS-JSS, 2021 WL 7542560, at *1 (M.D. Fla.
July 28, 2021)(finding the plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma

pauperis moot once the plaintiff had paid the filing fee), report
and recommendation adopted by, 2021 WL 7542559 (Oct. 13, 2021).
The objection is overruled.
Plaintiff also seeks appointment of counsel in the motion.
Plaintiff asserts in his motion that he has difficulty obtaining
justice due to: (1) repeated denial of subpoenas in state court;
(2) interference with filings; (3) unauthorized surveillance; (4)
government-connected defendants; (5) fourteen years of ongoing
state harassment; (6) denials of due process in multiple courts;
(7) the extreme complexity of the issues and the number of
defendants; and (8) his inability to effectively present evidence,

witness examinations, and ensuring the case proceeds fairly and on
the merits. (Doc. #23.) Unlike criminal defendants, a “plaintiff
in a civil case has no constitutional right to counsel.” Bass v.
Perrin, 170 F.3d 1312, 1320 (11th Cir. 1999); Poole v. Lambert,
819 F.2d 1025, 1028 (11th Cir. 1987). Section 1915(e)(1)
authorizes the Court to appoint counsel for civil litigants
proceeding in forma pauperis; however, plaintiff is not currently
proceeding in forma pauperis. This leads to the new motion to
proceed in forma pauperis.
In the next motion, plaintiff indicates that he is indigent
and “unable to pay court filing fees, service fees, or litigation-
related expenses.” To the extent that plaintiff’s previously filed

application reflects a total monthly income of $2,231, about $600
in cash, two cars worth about $32,000 total, and monthly expenses
of roughly $2,000, the Court finds that plaintiff is financially
eligible. That being said, plaintiff must still satisfy review
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 to determine if the action “(i) is
frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief
may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant
who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Until
the Court reviews the pleading, the request to appoint counsel and
to proceed in forma pauperis will remain under advisement.
5. Motion to Accept the 4th Amended Complaint (Doc. #34) and
Motion for Service of Process by U.S. Marshals Service
(Doc. #33):
Since the inception of this action, plaintiff has repeatedly
filed amended pleadings pending review of his emergency motions.
Before the Court can decide if plaintiff should be granted the
ability to proceed in forma pauperis and facilitate service of
1
process, the Court must review the proposed complaint.
The latest and purportedly “final version” includes 39
defendants with bullet points to indicate actions by each defendant
with no specific factual allegations. The entire “factual
background” is as follows:
A. Executive Order 12-64 Kidnapping & False
Arrest (2011-2012)
Fabricated threat; no probable cause; Monroe
County actors conspired to imprison Plaintiff.
B. Judicial Misconduct and Record Manipulation
(2012-2025)
Judges Cohen, Shenko, Morgan, Firtel, Miller,
Mirra, and Swett acted to obstruct filings,
alter records, deny hearings, and protect the
Governor's Mansion and prosecutors.
C. Prosecutorial Conspiracies

1
A Fourth Amended Complaint (Doc. #31) was filed before
plaintiff filed a motion seeking leave to file the document.
Ward, Madruga, Rundell, Demiglia, Fox,
Justham, Wilson maliciously prosecuted
Plaintiff without probable cause.
D. Staged Motorcycle Collision-December 1,
2024
Barrios and Jenkins, coordinated with Dowling,
caused physical injury; Gould and others
covered up evidence.
E. Courthouse Incident-July 28, 2025
Dowling and Barrios entered Judge Cohen's
chambers; concealed coordination; observed
later at bar after collusion.
F. Surveillance, Harassment, Threats
Unknown Florida Highway Trooper and Lee County
Sheriff's internal officers stationed
covertly near Plaintiff's residence.
G. False Arrests in 2003 and 2011
Fabricated affidavits; unlawful detention
without indictment.
H. Interference with Employment & Business
Sabotage of Plaintiff's product, the French
Tickler; harassment of housing management;
economic targeting.
I. Bar & JQC Failures
Florida Bar attorneys Dixon-Greer and Huston,
and JQC official Blan Teagle, knowingly
refused to act.
J. FBI, FDLE, and State Attorney Investigation
Unit Failures
Ignored credible threats, complaints, and
evidence of criminal conspiracy.
(Doc. #34-1, pp. 8-11.) “A complaint is a shotgun pleading if it
contains pervasive conclusory and immaterial facts not obviously
connected to a specific claim or asserts multiple claims without

specifying who is responsible or which persons the claim is brought
against. [] A shotgun pleading makes it virtually impossible to
know which allegations of fact are intended to support which claims
for relief.” Brown v. Columbus Police Dep’t, No. 23-11896, 2024
WL 3451862, at *6 (11th Cir. July 18, 2024). “Shotgun pleadings,
whether filed by plaintiffs or defendants, exact an intolerable
toll on the trial court's docket, lead to unnecessary and
unchannelled discovery, and impose unwarranted expense on the
litigants, the court and the court's parajudicial personnel and
resources. Moreover, justice is delayed for the litigants who are
‘standing in line,’ waiting for their cases to be heard.” Cramer
v. State of Fla., 117 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 1997).

There are four types of shotgun pleadings: (1) a complaint
with multiple counts where each count adopts all preceding counts
“causing each successive count to carry all that came before and
the last count to be a combination of the entire complaint”; (2)
“a complaint that … is guilty of the venial sin of being replete
with conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not obviously
connected to any particular cause of action”; (3) a complaint that
fails to separate into separate counts each claim for relief; and
(4) “there is the relatively rare sin of asserting multiple claims
against multiple defendants without specifying which of the
defendants are responsible for which acts or omissions, or which

of the defendants the claim is brought against.” Weiland v. Palm
Beach Cnty. Sheriff's Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1321–23 (11th Cir.
2015).
The fourth amended complaint exhibits shotgun pleading
characteristics, including conclusory, vague, and broad statements
that are not obviously connected to a particular cause of action,
and it asserts multiple claims against multiple defendants without
specifying which defendant is responsible for which act. In sum,
the complaint violates Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 10
and fails to comply with 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that
a complaint include a “short and plain statement of the claim”

with “simple, concise, and direct” allegations. Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2), (d)(1). Rule 10 of the Federal Rules further provides
that claims must be in numbered paragraphs and “[i]f doing so would
promote clarity, each claim founded on a separate transaction or
occurrence . . . must be stated in a separate count[.]” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 10(b). Pro se complaints are held to less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Nevertheless,
pro se litigants are not exempt from complying with the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, including Rule 8(a)(2)’s pleading
standard. GJR Investments, Inc. v. Cnty. of Escambia, 132 F.3d
1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998) (“Yet even in the case of pro se

litigants this leniency does not give a court license to serve as
de facto counsel for a party, [] or to rewrite an otherwise
deficient pleading in order to sustain an action[.]” (internal
citations omitted)), overruled on other grounds as recognized in
Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 706 (11th Cir. 2010); see also
Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1989) (stating that
pro se litigants are “subject to the relevant law and rules of
court, including the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure”). The
motion to amend is denied based on the proposed document but the
Court will allow plaintiff to amend the pleading to determine if
in forma pauperis status should be granted.
In amending, plaintiff should endeavor to comply with the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Under Rule 8(a),
A pleading that states a claim for relief must
contain:
(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds
for the court's jurisdiction, unless the court
already has jurisdiction and the claim needs
no new jurisdictional support;
(2) a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief; and
(3) a demand for the relief sought, which may
include relief in the alternative or different
types of relief.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Under Rule 10(b),
A party must state its claims or defenses in
numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as
practicable to a single set of circumstances.
A later pleading may refer by number to a
paragraph in an earlier pleading. If doing so
would promote clarity, each claim founded on
a separate transaction or occurrence--and each
defense other than a denial--must be stated in
a separate count or defense.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b). Plaintiff should specify the Court’s basis
for subject matter jurisdiction, and the legal basis for his claim
or claims with supporting facts. Plaintiff should include
references to the federal laws and/or sections of the United States
Constitution that have been violated for each defendant. For
additional resources and assistance, plaintiff may wish to review
the form complaints available on the Court’s website, for example
https://www.uscourts.gov/forms/pro-se-forms/complaint-violation-
civil-rights-non-prisoner.2
The motion to amend will be denied without prejudice to
plaintiff filing a Fifth Amended Complaint that follows the
parameters outlined above. Once filed, the Magistrate Judge will
consider the pleading pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 to determine
whether plaintiff should be granted in forma pauperis status. The

2
The website has tips, answers to frequently-asked questions,
and sample forms. There is also a link that may help plaintiff
generate the amended complaint.
will be denied as premature pending review of the Fifth Amended
Complaint.
Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED:
1. Plaintiff's Emergency Motion to Expedite Subpoena Process
and Recognize Payment of Filing Fee (Doc. #5) is DENIED.
2. Plaintiff’s Consolidated Federal Subpoena and Motion to
Compel Telecommunications and Electronic Records (Doc. #7)
is DENIED.
3. Plaintiff’s Emergency Motion for Court Order Compelling
Production of Records and Subpoena Duces Tecum for Evidence
Unlawfully Withheld by Lee County Court and Related to the
July 28th Meeting, Staged Motorcycle Accident, and December
1st Assault (Doc. #13) is DENIED.
4. Plaintiff’s Motion to Change Venue (Doc. #6) is DENIED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
5. Plaintiff’s Motion to Disqualify Federal Judge (Doc. #37)
is DENIED.
6. Plaintiff’s Emergency Motion to Expedite Ruling (Doc. #20)
is DENIED.
7. Emergency Motion for Appointment of Special Federal Master,
Federal Oversight, and Referral for Criminal Investigation
of State Officials and Judicial Actors (Doc. #25) is DENIED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
8. Plaintiff’s untitled request for a federal protective order

(Doc. #27) is DENIED.
9. Plaintiff’s Motion to Reconsider as Indigent (In Forma
Pauperis) (Doc. #23) is OVERRULED and the request for an
appointment of counsel remains UNDER ADVISEMENT.
10. Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc.
#32) is GRANTED as to financially eligibility but remains
pending and UNDER ADVISEMENT pending review of the Fifth
Amended Complaint.
11. Plaintiff’s Motion to Accept the 4th Amended Complaint
(Doc. #34) is DENIED and the Fourth Amended Complaint is
dismissed without prejudice to filing a Fifth Amended
Complaint within THIRTY (30) DAYS of this Opinion and

Order.
12. Plaintiff’s Motion for Service of Process by U.S.
Marshals Service (Doc. #33) is DENIED AS PREMATURE.
13. Plaintiff’s Emergency Motion to Compel Court Action on
Pending Motions, to Compel Hearings, to Require U.S.
Marshal Service of Process, to Act on Change of Venue
Motion, and Formal Notice of Oingoing Judicial Delay,
Obstruction, and Deprivation of Constitutional Rights
(Doc. #36) is DENIED AS MOOT. All motions have been
addressed herein.
DONE AND ORDERED at Fort Myers, Florida, this 15th day of
December 2025.

AA? = Pe
JGH E. STEELE
5 IOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies:
Hon. Nicholas P. Mizell
Plaintiff
Counsel of record

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11225277. Public record. Not legal advice.