# Brown

> District Court, E.D. Tennessee · December 15, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11225245

## Case

- **Full name:** Chrystal Brown v. Hamilton County, Tennessee, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Tennessee
- **Decided:** December 15, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT CHATTANOOGA

CHRYSTAL BROWN, )
) Case No. 1:23-cv-45
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) District Judge Curtis L. Collier
) Magistrate Judge Michael J. Dumitru
HAMILTON COUNTY, TENNESSEE, et )
al., )
)
Defendants. )

O R D E R
Before the Court is the parties’ joint motion for a sixty-day extension of the discovery
deadline set forth in the Court’s Scheduling Order (Doc. 45). (Doc. 60.)
Rule 16(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits “a schedule [to be] modified
only for good cause and with the judge’s consent.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). The Sixth Circuit
has recognized that “[a] court asked to modify a scheduling order for good cause ‘may do so only
if [a deadline] cannot reasonably be met despite the diligence of the party seeking the extension.”
Helena Agri-Enters., LLC v. AAA Turf, Inc., No. 22-1957/1967, 2023 WL 4842838, at *2 (6th Cir.
July 28, 2023) (quoting Marcilis v. Twp. of Redford, 693 F.3d 589, 597 (6th Cir. 2012) (alteration
in original)). Furthermore, “[t]he primary measure of Rule 16’s ‘good cause’ standard is the
moving party’s diligence in attempting to meet the case management order’s requirements.” Id.
(quoting Inge v. Rock Fin. Corp., 281 F.3d 613, 625 (6th Cir. 2002). “Another important
consideration for a district court deciding whether Rule 16’s ‘good cause’ standard is met is
whether the opposing party will suffer prejudice by virtue of the amendment.” Id. (quotation
omitted).
Here, both parties request an extension of the discovery deadline. They contend that
difficulties in scheduling depositions, trial conflicts amongst counsel, witness schedules, and the
holiday schedule have prevented them from completing discovery by the deadline, despite their
diligence. (Doc. 60 at 2.) Based on these assertions, and it appearing that granting the joint motion
will not disrupt the other deadlines set forth in the Scheduling Order, the motion (Id.) is

GRANTED. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). The discovery cutoff in this matter is hereby extended
through March 16, 2026. All other deadlines set forth in the Scheduling Order (Doc. 45) remain
unaffected by entry of this Order.
SO ORDERED.
ENTER:

/s/
CURTIS L. COLLIER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11225245. Public record. Not legal advice.
