# Zanzarella v. United States

> United States Court of Federal Claims · December 15, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11224906

## Case

- **Court:** United States Court of Federal Claims
- **Decided:** December 15, 2025
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Judges:** David A. Tapp
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11224906

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that an owner “is entitled to receive the value of what he has been deprived of,” and that awarding more “would be unjust to the public”

## Opinion text

In the United States Court of Federal Claims
No. 24-239
Filed: December 15, 2025

MICHAEL ZANZARELLA, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

THE UNITED STATES,

Defendant.

Steven M. Wald, with Michael J. Smith, Thomas S. Stewart, and Reed W. Ripley, Stewart, Wald
& Smith, LLC, St. Louis, MO, for Plaintiffs.

Emily A. Davis, Environment and Natural Resources Division, Natural Resources Section, with
Adam R.F. Gustafson, Acting Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice,
Washington, D.C., for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

TAPP, Judge.

Plaintiffs seek compensation for the United States’ uncompensated taking related to their
New York properties. They now move for partial summary judgment as to liability. (Pls.’ Mot.,
ECF No. 38). Plaintiffs ask the Court to find that: (1) all source conveyances granted easements
to the Railroad; (2) recreational trail use exceeds the scope of those easements; (3) Plaintiffs
regained fee simple ownership of the land underlying the Railroad corridor based on their
adjacency to the rail line; and (4) the issuance of the Notice of Interim Trail Use (“NITU”)
effected a taking. (Id.). The United States objects in part and cross-moves for partial summary
judgment. (Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 43). The United States variously argues the Plaintiffs cannot
show: (1) that they have an ownership interest in the rail corridor; (2) causation or a right to just
compensation due to the existence of an existing recreational trail; and (3) that the Railroad
would have abandoned the rail line absent the NITU. (Id.).

The Court finds that Plaintiffs’ source documents conveyed a combination of both
easements and fees simple. The Court also finds that while the pre-existing recreational trail does
not affect causation, it may nevertheless impact just compensation—an issue overlooked by the
Plaintiffs. To that end, the United States has taken a portion of Plaintiffs’ property for public use,
but several claims remain unresolved. Therefore, summary judgment is GRANTED-IN-PART
and DENIED-IN-PART for both Parties.
I. Background

This rails-to-trails case concerns a 41.1-mile section of rail line running from the
Connecticut/New York State Line (Milepost 71.2) to Beacon, New York (Milepost 0.0)
traversing Dutchess and Putnam Counties (the “Line”). (Compl. at ¶ 3, ECF No. 1; Pls.’ Mot. at
1).

(Pls.’ Mot., Ex. 6 at 7, ECF No. 38-6). The Line was previously owned by the Maybrook
Railroad Company (“MRC”), which in 1992 acquired 157 miles of railroad that included this
segment. (See Pls.’ Mot., Ex. 13 (“Danbury Terminal R.R. Co. and Maybrook Properties, Inc.-
Acquisition and Operation Exemption- Consolidated Rail Corp., ICC Docket No. FD 32180
(Sub-No. 1) (served Dec. 29, 1992), available at 1992 WL 383337”), ECF No. 13). In 1995,
ownership of the Line transferred to the Metro-North Commuter Railroad Company (“MNR”).
(Pls.’ Mot. at 5 (citing Pls.’ Ex. 15, ECF No. 38-15)).

Under the Trails Act, a railroad may initiate abandonment proceedings of a rail line
before the Surface Transportation Board (“STB”). 49 U.S.C. § 10903; see 16 U.S.C. § 10502. It
is not uncommon for a railroad to abandon all or some portion of its line. The Trails Act permits
intervention by qualified private organizations or public agencies to railbank the corridor before
abandonment is consummated by agreeing to serve as a trail operator in the interim. 16 U.S.C. §
1247(d). The railbanking intervention process enables a railroad to negotiate with the intervening

2
entity, which then assumes financial and managerial responsibility for the corridor by operating
it as a recreational trail. 28 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 6 (citing Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1, 6–7,
(1990) (“Preseault I”)). To allow for this process, the STB may issue a NITU. 49 C.F.R. §
1152.29. If the railroad and trail sponsor agree, then the parties notify the STB, the corridor is
railbanked, the STB retains jurisdiction, and “interim trail use is thereby authorized.” Preseault I,
494 U.S. at 7 n.5 (1990); see also 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d); 49 C.F.R. § 1152.29(h). If an agreement
is not reached, the railroad may exercise its STB-granted authority to abandon the line. 49 C.F.R.
§ 1152.29(d)(1), (e)(2); see Citizens Against Rails-to-Trails v. STB, 267 F.3d 1144, 1150–53
(D.C. Cir. 2001).

In December 2023, MNR filed a Verified Notice of Exemption of Abandonment
(“Abandonment Application”) with the STB. (Pls.’ Mot., Ex. 26, ECF No. 38-26). MNR also
requested a NITU with MNR as the trail sponsor, (id., Ex. 6, ECF No. 38-6), which the STB
issued on February 8, 2024, (id., Ex. 7, ECF No. 38-7). Per the NITU, MNR was required to
notify the STB of a trail use agreement prior to its expiration on February 8, 2025. (Id., Ex. 7 at
3). MNR filed for and was granted an Extension of the Interim Trail Use Negotiation period,
which is now set to expire on February 8, 2026. (Id., Ex. 158, ECF No. 38-158).

II. Analysis

A. Standard of Review

The Parties each move for summary judgment. The Court may “grant summary judgment
if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” RCFC 56(a). The moving party bears the burden of
demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Facts are material if they “might affect the outcome of the suit.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A genuine factual dispute exists
when “the evidence is such that a reasonable [factfinder] could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party.” Id.

While “inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts . . . must be viewed in the light
most favorable to the party opposing the motion[,]” United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654,
655 (1962), summary judgment may still be granted when the party opposing the motion submits
evidence that “is merely colorable . . . or is not significantly probative.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at
249–50 (internal citations omitted). However, the moving party “need not produce evidence
showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact but rather may discharge its burden by
showing . . . that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.”
Dairyland Power Co-op. v. United States, 16 F.3d 1197, 1202 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (citing Celotex
Corp., 477 U.S. at 325). Courts may only grant summary judgment when “the record taken as a
whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party[.]” Matsushita, Elec.
Indus. Co., Ltd. v. United States, 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (quoting First Nat. Bank of Ariz. v.
Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289 (1968)). A trial court is permitted, in its discretion, to deny
even a well-supported motion for summary judgment if the case would benefit from a full
hearing. Lowery v. United States, 167 Fed. Cl. 28, 37 (2023) (citing United States v. Certain Real
& Personal Prop. Belonging to Hayes, 943 F.2d 1292 (11th Cir. 1991)).

3
B. Discussion

In Trails Act cases, a taking occurs when “government action destroys state-defined
property rights[,]” either “by converting a railway easement to a recreational trail, if trail use is
outside the scope of the original railway easement[,]” or by compelling the continuation of a
railroad-purposes easement to accommodate negotiations for a trail-use agreement, even if the
negotiations are ultimately unsuccessful. Ladd v. United States, 630 F.3d 1015, 1019, 1025 (Fed.
Cir. 2010); see also Caquelin v. United States, 959 F.3d 1360, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2020). The
determinative issues for takings liability are: (1) whether the railroad acquired full ownership of
the land (fee simple) or merely easements; (2) if only easements were acquired, whether those
easements were limited to railroad use or also permitted future use as public recreational trails;
and (3) whether any such easement permitting recreational trail use expired before the alleged
taking, leaving the landowners with full, unencumbered ownership at that time. Galt Auto.
Warehouse, Inc. v. United States, ___ Fed. Cl. ___, 2025 WL 3012202, *2 (Fed. Cl. October 28,
2025) (“Galt Auto.”) (citing Preseault v. ICC, 100 F.3d 1525, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1996)); see also
Ellamae Phillips Co. v. United States, 564 F.3d 1367, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (outlining the
determinative issues for takings liability). Importantly, property rights are determined by the
operation of state law. Castillo v. Diaz, 952 F.3d 1311, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2020).

This analysis becomes more complicated when a trail use agreement has not been
reached. The Federal Circuit has held that in cases where no trail-use agreement is reached, but
the NITU compels the railroad to delay its abandonment, the issuance of a NITU may effect a
temporary physical taking. Ladd, 630 F.3d at 1023–24. To show causation when no trail use
agreement exists, it must be clear that the railroad “had every intent to abandon the railroad lines
during the period of time that the NITU was in effect and was prevented from doing so by the
existence of the NITU.” Memmer v. United States, 50 F.4th 136, 145 (Fed. Cir. 2022). To
evaluate the railroad’s intent, the Court may look to a variety of circumstances, including: the
railroad’s initiation of abandonment proceedings, its refusal to extend the NITU, the timing of its
abandonment relative to the NITU’s expiration, the scope of authority granted under the NITU,
and whether the railroad undertook physical acts consistent with abandonment, such as removing
track infrastructure, etc. See Galt Auto., 2025 WL 3012202, at *3 (citing Sauer West LLC v.
United States, 151 F.4th 1339, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2025)). These factors are illustrative, not
exhaustive. See Sauer West, 151 F.4th at 1346.

Plaintiffs categorize their claims into five distinct groups, each defined by the type of
recording instrument used to convey the subject properties. (Pls.’ Mot. at 11). The recording
instruments fall within the following groups: (1) condemnations (“Group 1“); (2) deeds that
reference railroad purposes in the granting clause (“Group 2”); (3) deeds that reference railroad
purposes in the granting clause but also contain broader language regarding use of the easement
(“Group 3”); (4) deeds that reference railroad purposes outside of the granting clause (“Group
4”); and (5) deeds that expressly incorporate the General Railroad Act (“GRA”) (“Group 5”). 1

1
The GRA, passed by the New York legislature, was formally titled “An Act to authorize the
formation of railroad corporations, and to regulate the same[,]” passed on April 2, 1850. See

4
133089-6055-15- Rogers 0-1/497
21 Coyote Two, LLC
668289-0000 PLF000143-000193
133089-6155-11- Rogers 0-1/497
1 Michael Zanzarella
615684-0000 PLF000143-000193
133089-6155-03- Scofield 0-1/448
77 Louis Sebesta
125211-0000 PLF000197-000204
132200-6758-04- Tabor SC/142
12 Dana Brown
829254-0000 USZANZ0000130-142
Anthony Chianese, Sr.
132200-6758-04- Tabor SC/142
16 & Anthony Chianese,
860314-0000 USZANZ0000130-142
Jr.
James & Jean 132200-6758-04- Tabor SC/142
23
DeBonis 880372-0000 USZANZ0000130-142
Homer & Jo Ann 132200-6758-04- Tabor SC/142
45
Griffin 831232-0000 USZANZ0000130-142
132200-6758-04- Tabor SC/142
76 Jessica Schleicher
870342-0000 USZANZ0000130-142
132200-6758-04- Tabor SC/142
87 Brian Van Vlack
875357-0000 USZANZ0000130-142
John & Alexandra 134089-6856-00- W. Worden SC/151
18
Colbert 602005-0000 PLF000212-000215
Joette Forsblom Fero
133089-6356-01- White 0-1/435
49 Kane 2018
315608-0000 PLF001358-001375
Irrevocable Trust
133089-6356-01- White 0-1/435
85b Judith Valentino
272582-0000 PLF001358-001375

(See Pls.’ Mot., Ex. 1). These Plaintiffs argue that New York law limits a railroad’s interest in
condemned property to an easement. (Pls.’ Mot. at 12–15). The United States acknowledges that
these properties were acquired via condemnation. (Def.’s Mot. at 18 (“[T]he United States
concedes that, in some cases, [the] Railroad acquired their interest in the corridor via
condemnation proceedings, as described in Plaintiffs’ discussion of their ‘Group 1’ deeds.”)).

The Court agrees with Group 1 Plaintiffs. Under New York State law, condemnations
convey easements limited to railroad purposes. (See The New York Railroad Act of 1850 (“the
GRA”), §§ 14–21, 25–26, 28 (Pls.’ Mot., Ex. 8, ECF No. 38-8)). New York courts have
consistently held that the GRA statute does not permit railroads to acquire property in fee
pursuant to condemnation. Crouch v. State, 218 A.D. 356, 358 (N.Y. App. Div. 1926) (“[T]he
general rule is that unless express authority to take a fee is given, the railroad company acquires
title only in the nature of an easement.”) (citing Hudson & Manhattan R. R. Co. v. Wendel, 193
N. Y. 166, 177, 179 (1908)); Erie Lackawanna Ry. Co. v. State, 38 A.D.2d 463, 464 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1972); People v. Helinski, 222 A.D.2d 788, 790 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (finding the subject
property was acquired through condemnation and thus the railroad could only acquire a
permanent easement, not title in fee) (citing O&W Lines, Inc. v. St. John, 228 N.E.2d 370, 371
(N.Y. 1967)). The law in New York is clear—a railroad’s interests in land acquired via

6
condemnations can only amount to an easement and not a fee title. Therefore, the Group 1
Plaintiffs succeed on this claim.

ii. Group 2 – Deeds Referencing Railroad Purposes In Granting
Clause.

Plaintiffs argue that for twenty-two 2 of their claims, there is limiting language in the
instruments through which the constructing railroad acquired its rights that limits the grant to
railroad purposes. (Pls.’ Mot. at 15–18). Plaintiffs assert that such language conveyed easements
to the railroad. (Id. at 18). The United States does not dispute Plaintiffs’ assertions. (Def.’s Mot.
at 24–25 (“[A]s described in Plaintiffs’ discussion of their Group 2 deeds. . . this is a clear
limited grant of land for railroad purposes only, and the plain language reflects the grantor’s
intent.) (citing Pls.’ Mot. at 15–18) (emphasis added)). Because the Parties agree that the Group
2 deeds conveyed easements to the original railroad, the Court finds that Plaintiffs are successful
as to this portion of their Group 2 claims.

iii. Group 3 – Deeds Referencing Railroad Purposes In Granting
Clause and Containing Broader Language.

Turning to Group 3, Plaintiffs note that Group 3 is treated separately from Group 2 only
because the Group 3 deeds include broader language about “the type of use allowed.” 3 (Pls.’
Mot. at 18–19). As an example of the “broader language,” Plaintiffs reference the Glenham Co.
Deed, which states in pertinent part:

The said party of the first part . . . have sold and by these Presents do grant
and convey to the said Dutchess and Columbia Rail Road Company their
successors and assigns for the purposes of constructing along and operating
thereon a Freight and Passenger Railroad as aforesaid and for such other
uses and purposes as the Company may choose to apply said land that
portion of the lands of said party of the first part upon which said so laid said
Railroad line is so located . . . .

(Id. (citing Pls.’ Mot., Ex. 124, ECF No. 38-124); Def.’s Mot., Ex. 2 (emphasis added)).

According to Group 3 Plaintiffs, the cited language affects the breadth of the easement,
not the character of the interest conveyed—i.e., fee versus easement. (Pls.’ Mot. at 18). For this
reason, Plaintiffs assert the deeds could only convey an easement to the railroad. (Id.). Once
again, the United States does not dispute Plaintiffs’ arguments. (Def.’s Mot. at 22 (“[T]he United
States does not dispute that the Group B deeds conveyed an easement to the original

2
The twenty-two Group 2 claims and the associated Plaintiffs are listed in Exhibit 2 of Plaintiffs’
Motion. (Pls.’ Mot. Ex. 2, ECF No. 38-2).
3
The Group 3 Plaintiffs and their associated documents are listed in Exhibit 3 of Plaintiffs’
Motion. (Pls.’ Mot., Ex. 3, ECF No. 38-3).

7
railroad.”)). 4 Because this issue is undisputed, the Court finds that the railroad only obtained an
easement at the time of the original conveyance.

However, the United States cross-moves for summary judgment as to the Group 3 deeds.
(Def.’s Mot. at 22–29). In doing so, the United States asserts that, though the deeds conveyed
easements, they are “broad, general easements” such that they permit alternative uses, including
implementation of a trail. (Id. at 22). Because of this, the United States argues that use of the rail
corridor as a trail does not exceed the scope of the easement and therefore cannot constitute a
taking. (Id.).

The Court finds Romanoff Equities, Inc. v. United States to be instructive. 119 Fed. Cl.
76, 79 (2014), aff’d, 815 F.3d 809 (Fed. Cir. 2016). In that case, plaintiffs challenged whether,
under New York law, the scope of the easement permitted the government to convert the right-
of-way into an elevated park. 5 Romanoff Equities, 119 Fed. Cl. at 78. The applicable deed
contained the following:

[Grantor] does hereby grant and convey unto the Railroad Company, its
successors and assigns forever, the permanent and perpetual rights and
easements to construct, maintain and operate, without interference or right of
interference, its railroad and appurtenances within those portions of the
parcels of land herein described included between an upper plane and a lower
plane drawn at the respective elevations herein provided for as to each such
parcel, together with the exclusive use of the portion of the parcels of land
herein described included between said plane for railroad purposes and for
such other purposes as the Railroad Company, its successors and assigns,
may from time to time or at any time or times desire to make use of the
same, subject only to the permanent rights and easement herein specifically
reserved to the [Grantor], its successors and assigns, in the portions of said
parcels of land included between the said respective planes.

Id. at 79 (emphasis added).

The trial court determined the deed “clearly and unambiguously” contemplated that the
easement may be used for purposes beyond the railroad. Id. at 81 (highlighting that the deed’s

4
While the United States declines to accept Plaintiffs’ “Group 3” naming convention, it
encompasses the same Plaintiffs and associated properties as those identified by Plaintiffs as
“Group B.” (Def.’s Mot. at 22 n.8 (“The Group B deeds in the United States’ Motion correlate
with the “Group 3” deeds in the Plaintiffs’ Motion. However, as described above, the United
States declines to adopt the Plaintiffs’ naming convention.”)).
5
For context, this case concerned a railroad built in the airspace rather than on the ground—
hence the term “elevated.” See Romanoff Equities, Inc. v. United States, 119 Fed. Cl. 76, 79
(2014), aff’d, 815 F.3d 809 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (also referring to the recreational trail as the
“Highline.”)

8
language permitted use of the easement “for railroad purposes and for such other purposes as the
Railroad Company, its successors and assigns, may from time to time or at any time desire to
make use of the same.” (emphasis added)). The Federal Circuit affirmed the decision, finding
that under New York law, the intent of the parties must be determined based on the language
found within the grant. Romanoff Equities, 815 F.3d at 812 (citing Dowd v. Ahr, 583 N.E.2d 911,
913 (N.Y. 1991)). Further still, when a deed’s language grants such a broad easement, it will be
construed as including “any reasonable use . . . provided the use is lawful and one contemplated
by the grant.” Id. (quoting Phillips v. Jacobsen, 499 N.Y.S.2d 428, 429 (1986)). For these
reasons, the trial court determined, and the Circuit agreed, that utilizing the corridor for a public
trail and park fell within the plain terms of the relevant easement. Romanoff Equities, 119 Fed.
Cl. at 81, aff’d, 815 F.3d at 812–13.

There is no reason to depart from the Circuit’s clear rationale regarding this issue. Under
New York law, the Court looks to the language in the grant, and when the language is not limited
to railroad purposes, but “expressly includes other purposes for which the grantee or its
successors may desire[,]” the Court will not impose additional restrictions. Romanoff Equities,
815 F.3d at 812–13 (“The phrase ‘for such other purposes as the Railroad Company . . . may . . .
desire’ means ‘for any purposes’ or ‘for whatever purposes’ the Railroad Company may
desire[.]”). Plaintiffs cite the Glenham Co. Deed as “exemplary of the Group 3 deeds.” (Pls.’
Mot. at 18). In pertinent part, the granting clause of the Glenham Co. Deed expressly states that
the conveyance would be “for the purpose of constructing . . . [a] Railroad . . . and for such other
uses and purposes as the Company may choose to apply to said land.” (Pls.’ Mot., Ex. 124). This
language is no different than the language evaluated by the Circuit in Romanoff Equities.
Therefore, this Court finds that to the extent that the Group 3 deeds contain identical or
analogous clauses, conversion of the rail corridor into a recreational trail does not exceed the
scope of the easement.

Plaintiffs attempt to distinguish the present case from Romanoff Equities by raising two
points: (1) that Plaintiffs can demonstrate that imposition of a trail damaged their existing parcel;
and (2) the broad use language of the Group 3 deeds applies only to the railroad company and
not its “successor and assigns.” (Pls. Mot. at 26–29). The Court will take each point raised in
turn.

Plaintiffs argue that under New York law, a “dominant estate” is not afforded the right to
“significantly burden the servient estate nor its abutting land.” (Pls.’ Mot. at 26). Plaintiffs base
this argument on the Court’s discussion in Romanoff Equities which, after finding the relevant
deed broad enough to encompass use of the rail corridor as a public park or trail, states:

[U]se of the corridor for a public park would by the plain terms of the
easement appear to be clearly within the scope of the easement, absent
evidence that the new easement is not lawful or imposes some significant
new burden on the servient estate. There is no question here that the
Highline is a lawful project. Plaintiff has not made any allegation to
support a finding that use of the corridor for the Highline will impose
significant new burdens on the servient estate.

9
Romanoff Equities, 119 Fed. Cl. at 81–82 (citing Gates v. AT&T, 956 N.Y.S.2d 589, 591 (2012))
(emphasis added). Plaintiffs assert that the recreational trail has “significantly burdened” their
properties, unlike in Romanoff Equities. 6 (Pls.’ Mot. at 27). Specifically, Plaintiffs argue their
remainder parcels are damaged “largely from [a] loss of privacy and security.” (Id.).

To support this claim, Plaintiffs state that their expert appraiser, Luke Nordine (“Mr.
Nordine”), analyzed New York real estate data and determined that, when applied to the Group 3
Plaintiffs, the recreational trail resulted in $693,900 in damages and a reduction in market value.
(Pls.’ Mot. at 27). Plaintiffs provide the Court with several pieces of evidence compiled by Mr.
Nordine including: (1) a spreadsheet purporting to show damages to the remainder of each
Plaintiffs’ existing parcels due to imposition of the trail; (2) a 24-page “damage” study; and (3)
excerpts from Mr. Nordine’s report regarding each Group 3 Plaintiffs’ remainder parcel and the
associated damages. (Id. (citing Pls.’ Mot., Ex. 159)). Nothing in Plaintiffs’ arguments or
evidence sufficiently demonstrates that the construction of a trail is a “significant new burden[.]”

In Lopez v. Adams, plaintiffs sued for damages resulting from the defendants’ repairs to
an easement over plaintiffs’ property. 69 A.D.3d 1162, 1162–63 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010). The
easement granted the defendants the right to use a private roadway across plaintiffs’ land to
access their own property. Id. at 1163. The court held that the easement permitted the defendants
not only to access the road but also “to carry out work as necessary to reasonably permit the
passage of vehicles and, in so doing, to ‘not only remove impediments but supply deficiencies in
order to construct [or repair] a suitable road[.]’” Id. at 1163–64 (alteration in original). In
reaching this conclusion, the court emphasized that easement holders may take actions
“necessary to effectuate the express purpose of its easement[.]” Id. at 1164 (citing Albrechta v.
Broome County Indus. Dev. Agency, 274 A.D.2d 651, 652 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000)). Regardless of
this right, the court noted that the defendants were not permitted to materially increase the
burden on the servient estate or impose new and additional burdens on the same. Id.

The defendants did conduct repairs on the private road; however, the court found that
several of their actions during those repairs significantly burdened the plaintiffs’ property. Lopez,
69 A.D.3d at 1164. Specifically, the defendants (1) destroyed land features that had previously
prevented rocks, gravel, and earth from washing into a stream on plaintiffs’ land; (2) altered the
terrain of plaintiffs’ property; and (3) caused flooding on plaintiffs’ property. (Id. at 1164–65).
Although the defendants had the right to repair the road under the easement, these actions
“exceeded the [easement’s] scope.” Id. at 1165.

The Lopez decision illustrates what it means to “significantly burden” a servient estate. In
essence, a significant burden arises when an easement holder undertakes actions that
substantially interfere with the servient owner’s use and enjoyment of the property in a manner
not contemplated by the terms of the easement. Additionally, New York courts have explained,
“[t]he rights of an easement holder are measured by the purpose and character of the easement.”

6
For this argument the Plaintiffs do not assert that the trail itself was illegal, instead they choose
to rely on the argument that this trail has created a new and significant burden on the Plaintiffs’
remainder properties. (See Pls.’ Mot. at 27).

10
Whalen v. Town of Dover, 226 A.D.3d 847, 850 (N.Y. App. Div. 2024) (quoting Solow v.
Liebman, 175 A.D.2d 120, 121 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991). As previously determined, conversion of
the rail line to a recreational trail is a use fully contemplated by the easement’s terms and
therefore does not, by itself, burden the servient estate. Although Plaintiffs contend that a trail
will diminish their privacy or security, such concerns should have been contemplated at the time
the easement was granted. Romanoff Equities, 119 Fed. Cl. at 81 (“Under New York law, the
court’s inquiry into a general easement must focus on what uses were contemplated when the
easement was granted.”) (internal citations omitted). For this reason, Plaintiffs’ allegations of
lost privacy or security provide no evidence of a burden uncontemplated by the original grant
such that it could be construed as significantly burdening the servient estate or imposing a new
and additional burden upon it.

Next, Plaintiffs argue that the language of the Group 3 deeds differs from that in
Romanoff Equities, and is therefore distinguishable. (Pls.’ Mot. at 29–30). Specifically, Plaintiffs
argue that the grant in Romanoff Equities stated that the grant was for “railroad purposes and for
such other purposes as the Railroad Company, its successors and assigns, may from time to
time or at any time or times desire to make use of the same.” (Pls.’ Mot. at 29 (quoting Romanoff
Equities, 119 Fed. Cl. at 812–15) (emphasis added)). The Plaintiffs compare this language to the
Group 3 granting language, which generally state that the grants are “for the purposes of
constructing along and operating thereon a Freight and Passenger Railroad as aforesaid and for
such other uses and purposes as the Company may choose to apply said land.” (Id. (citing Pls.’
Mot., Exs., 121–130) (emphasis added)). Based on this, Plaintiffs argue that since the Group 3
deeds do not explicitly include the term “successors and assigns,” MNR, as the successor to the
original acquiring railroad, “has no right to use the easement for any purpose and is instead
restricted to use as if the broad language did not exist[.]” (Id.).

The United States rebuts Plaintiffs’ argument by first highlighting that the Circuit in
Romanoff Equities did not analyze the scope of the easement based on the “successors and
assigns” language. (Def.’s Mot. at 28). Second, the United States claims that New York law does
not require “words of inheritance for an easement on the servient estate to be binding.” (Id.
(citing In re Acquisition of Real Prop. by Warrensburg Hydro Power Ltd. Pshp., 263 A.D.2d
822, 824 (App. Div. 3rd Dept. 1999) and Wilcox v. Reals, 178 A.D.2d 885, 886 (App. Div. 3rd
Dept. 1991))). Lastly, the United States points out that many of the Group 3 deeds do in fact
include the “successors and assigns” language, effectively nullifying Plaintiffs’ argument.

On appeal in Romanoff Equities, part of the plaintiff’s principal argument was that the
original easement “did not authorize the successors of the New York Central [Railroad
Company] to use the property for other purposes, such as a park.” Romanoff Equities, 815 F.3d at
812. The plaintiff raised several arguments to this end, first asserting that the scope of the
easement was limited to railroad purposes, but the Circuit found this to be incorrect as the grant
expressly included other purposes. Id. Even still, the Circuit noted that the cases on which the
plaintiff relied to make its argument all concerned easements that were “limited to a specific
purpose[,]” and therefore were distinguishable from the subject deed. Id. In making its analysis,
the Circuit stated that the subject deed did not “limit the purpose[s] for which the easement [was]
granted, but explicitly state[d] that the purposes extend to any purpose for which the grantee and
its successors wish to use the property[.]” Id. Romanoff Equities, however, attempted to drill
down even further by arguing that the ten-page easement document contained “only a single

11
sentence” regarding the “other uses” for which the rail corridor could be used. Romanoff
Equities, 815 F.3d at 813. The plaintiff argued it was impossible to conclude, from this singular
reference, that the original parties to the agreement intended the easement to grant New York
City—the successor—the right to use the property for any purpose it “desired.” Id. The Circuit
disagreed, finding “the document plainly authorizes such a successor to use the property for
such other purposes [as it may] desire to make use of the same.” Id. (emphasis added). From this,
the Circuit concluded that the granting document’s text was “exactly contrary to [plaintiffs]
argument that such a reading is ‘impossible.’” Id.

The Court acknowledges that the Circuit in Romanoff Equities found the text of the
granting clause expressly authorized successors to utilize the rail corridor for “other purposes.”
See Romanoff Equities, 815 F.3d at 812. However, Plaintiffs in this case are essentially asking
this Court to find that if the grant document fails to expressly authorize successors to use the
easement for “other purposes,” then that flexibility extinguishes the moment the property is
conveyed to a successor. The Court does not believe the Circuit in Romanoff Equities intended
such a result. If the Court were to accept Plaintiffs’ argument, it would be establishing a new
rule—that failure to include the “successors and assigns” language is affirmative proof of the
original parties’ intent to limit the easement’s broad language to the railroad. However, this
would require the Court to infer an interpretation of the Circuit’s decision that it did not
expressly state. The Court declines to do so.

Additionally, Plaintiffs do not provide any caselaw to support such an inference but
instead point to cases that simply state broad principles of deed interpretation. 7 (See Pls.’ Reply
at 11, ECF No. 46). In fact, as the United States points out, many New York cases have found
that “words of inheritance” are unnecessary. See Cronk v. Tait, 305 A.D.2d 947, 949 n.1 (App.
Div. 3rd dept. 2003) (“It merits observation that words of inheritance are not necessary to create
an easement[.]”) (quoting Wilcox v. Reals, 178 A.D.2d 885, 886 (App. Div. 3rd Dept. 1991));

7
Plaintiffs cite to various cases arguing that in New York:

“[I]t is a fundamental principle of deed construction that ‘[w]hen words have
a definite and precise meaning, it is not permissible to go elsewhere in search
of conjecture in order to restrict or extend the meaning.’” BPGS Land
Holdings, LLC v. Flower, 198 A.D.3d 1344, 1346 (N.Y. App. Div. 2021)
(quoting Uihlein v. Matthews, 64 N.E. 792, 794 (N.Y. 1902)). “An instrument
creating an estate or interest in real property must be construed according to
the intent of the parties, insofar as their intent can be determined by the
language of the grant.” Hudson Valley Cablevision Corp. v. 202 Devs., Inc.,
185 A.D.2d 917, 920 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (emphasis added). By the plain
text of the deeds, the parties’ intent was that the broad easement would not
apply to anyone but the Dutchess and Columbia Rail Road. See Edge Mgmt.
Consulting, Inc. v. Blank, 25 A.D.3d 364, 369 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006).

(Pls.’ Reply at 11). None of these cases hold that a failure to include “successor or assigns”
language indicates the original parties’ intent to limit a broad conveyance.

12
that Plaintiffs have successfully demonstrated that the Group 4 deeds conveyed easements for
railroad purposes.

v. Group 5 – Deeds Expressing the General Railroad Act of 1850.

For Group 5, Plaintiffs allege that because the railroad acquired its rights in the Line
through recorded instruments “that expressly incorporate the provisions of the GRA[,]” 8 this
demonstrates a “clear intent to limit the conveyance to only . . . an easement.” (Pls.’ Mot. at 21–
22). Stated differently, Plaintiffs claim that regardless of the method through which the railroad
obtains its property interest, if the granting clause incorporates the GRA, then it is limited to an
easement. The United States disagrees and cross-moves for summary judgment, arguing that the
Group 5 deeds “conveyed a fee simple interest” to the railroad under New York law. (Def.’s
Mot. at 15–21). The United States’ argument is primarily based on: (1) the plain language of the
grant; (2) absence of express language limiting the estate granted; and (3) in some instances,
valuable consideration paid. (Id. at 15). Additionally, the United States rejects the notion that
simply referencing the GRA demonstrates an intent to limit the conveyance to an easement. (Id.
at 19–21).

Group 5 consists of nine different deeds for eighteen claims. (See Pls.’ Mot., Ex. 5, ECF
No. 38-5). Plaintiffs point to the “Rogers Deed (149/59)” as an example of a deed that “expressly
incorporates” the GRA. (Pls.’ Mot. at 22 (citing Pls.’ Ex. 138, ECF No. 38-138)). Specifically,
the Plaintiffs highlight language that states: “estate title and interest therein of said part of the
first part subject nevertheless to all the duties and liabilities imposed on said party of the second
part of the provisions and conditions of the [GRA] of the State of New York and the Amendment
thereto.” (Pls.’ Ex. 138 (emphasis added)). Citing to O&W Lines, Plaintiffs argue that, by
incorporating the “duties and liabilities” of the GRA, the grant limited the conveyance to an
easement. (Pls.’ Mot. at 22 (citing O&W Lines, Inc., 228 N.E.2d at 371)). The Court cannot
agree with such a broad assertion.

First, while the Court in O&W Lines did find the grant document “[e]xpressly
incorporated by reference . . . the Railroad Act of 1850,” Plaintiffs’ reliance on this fact alone is
misplaced. In reviewing the granting clause, the court in O&W Lines stated that:

Expressly incorporated by reference into this indenture is the Railroad Act of
1850, which provides that, following an appraisal and judgment of
condemnation, ‘the (railroad) company shall be entitled to enter upon, take
possession of, and use the said land for the purposes of its incorporation,
during the continuance of its corporate existence, by virtue of this or any other
act . . .

8
The GRA, also referred to in many cases as the “General Railroad Law,” was the New York
law in effect authorizing the “formation of railroad corporations and regulating the same[.]”
Crouch v. State, 218 A.D. 356, 357 (App. Div. 4th Dept. 1926); see also N.Y. Law ch. 140
(1850); Plaintiffs attach a copy of the Act to their Motion. (See Pls.’ Mot., Ex. 8, ECF No. 38-8).

14
O&W Lines, Inc., 228 N.E.2d at 371. However, the court did not hold that a mere reference to
the GRA automatically limits a grant to an easement. Instead, the court emphasized that the deed
also incorporated any amendments to the GRA, including one provision stating that “[a]ll lands
acquired by any railroad company by appraisal, for passenger and freight depots, shall be held
by such company in fee.” O&W Lines, Inc., 228 N.E.2d at 371. These distinctions make clear
that whether land was acquired by “appraisal and judgment of condemnation” produces a
materially different outcome than if the land was acquired by “appraisal [specifically] for
passenger and freight depots.” Id. The question of whether the railroad acquired a fee simple
interest or an easement is therefore not governed solely by a reference to the GRA, or lack
thereof; rather, the grant must be considered in its entirety to discern the original parties’ intent.

Notably, in Corning, the plaintiffs argued that the railroad company only acquired an
easement “because of the provisions of the [GRA] under which the [Railroad Company] had
been incorporated.” Corning v. Lehigh Val. R. Co., 14 A.D.2d 156, 160 (App. Div. 4th Dept.
1961) (“[Plaintiffs] contend that . . . a voluntary grant to a railroad company incorporated under
the 1850 act can convey to the railroad only a railroad easement, regardless of the terms of the
grant.”). The language of the relevant deed stated:

[T]he said Daniel Valentine, in consideration of the sum of one dollar to him
. . . hereby promises and agrees to and with the said Railroad Company to
grant and convey to said Company, free of encumbrance and by a good and
sufficient deed, all the land that said Company may require for the
construction and convenient use of their Railroad, upon and across the lands
of said Daniel Valentine, along the Lake Shore, situated in the town of Genoa,
County of Cayuga, in the State of New York, and being a part of Lot No. 22
whenever said Company shall have finally built their Railroad . . . and a deed
conveying the same.’

Id. at 159 (emphasis added). The court found that this language was sufficient to convey fee
simple to the railroad, specifically highlighting use of the terms “to grant and convey . . . by a
good and sufficient deed, all the land[.]” Id. (“These are the appropriate terms for the conveyance
of a fee. There is no reference in the agreement to a railroad easement.”). Additionally, the court
found that the provisions of the GRA on which the plaintiff relied did not restrict the railroad’s
interest to an easement, but instead, made the railroad’s interest “depend[ent] upon what the
grant says.” Id. at 161 (citing In re City of Buffalo, 206 N.Y. 319, 330 (1912) (“We can find
nothing in the Railroad Law which contravenes or changes this rule [the rule that a railroad
company may take a fee]”); Holland v. McClusky, 174 A.D.3d 1344, 1345 (App. Div. 4th Dept.
2019) (finding the railroad had only obtained a right of way easement based on the language in
the deed)).

Accordingly, under the GRA, the “duties and liabilities” of condemnation proceedings
arise only after a judgment of condemnation has been issued. O&W Lines, Inc., 228 N.E.2d at
371 (“This particular section, authorizing railroad companies to acquire land by condemnation
for any and all recognized purposes, has been authoritatively construed as giving the railroad not

15
part . . . subject nevertheless to the General Railroad Act of the
State of New York . . . ” PLF000123 – 124 (emphasis added).

Rankin
149/104 Summary
PLF000132- No objection raised; No translation available Judgment
000134 *See Denied
also Table A
“The said parties of the first part . . . do grant and convey to the
said Boston Hartford and Erie RR their successors and assigns
Fee simple
All that piece parcel of land situate in the town of East Fishkill,
conveyed; no
Rogers County of Dutchess, State of New York . . . containing 41/100
limiting
149/59 acres of land be the same more or less . . . with the appurtenances
language /
PLF000195- and all the estate, title and interest therein of said party of the
Summary
000196 first part subject nevertheless to all the duties and liabilities
Judgment
imposed on said party of the second part by the provisions and
Granted.
conditions of the General Railroad Act of the State of New York.”
PLF000195 (emphasis added).
“The said parties of the first part in consideration of the sum of
$1300 to them duly paid by the said railroad company have sold
Fee simple
and by these presents do grant and convey to the said Boston &
Rogers conveyed; no
Hartford Railroad Company their successors and assigns All
47/138 limiting
that piece or parcel of land situate in the town of Patterson,
PLF000193- language /
County of Putnam, State of New York . . . containing two one
000194 *See Summary
hundredths of an acre more or less with the appurtenances and all
also Table A Judgment
the estate title and interest therein of said parties of the first
Granted.
part . . . subject neverless to the General Railroad Act of the State
of New York.” PLF000193 - 194 (emphasis added).
“The said parties of the first part in consideration of the sum of
$1300 to them duly paid by the said railroad company have sold
Fee simple
and by these presents do grant and convey to the said Boston &
St. John conveyed; no
Hartford Railroad Company their successors and assigns All
47/141 limiting
that piece or parcel of land situate in the Town of Patterson,
PLF000205- language /
County of Putnam, State of New York . . . containing 3 55/100
000206 *See Summary
acres more or less with the appurtenances and all the estate title
also Table A Judgment
and interest therein of said parties of the first part . . . subject
Granted.
neverless to the General Railroad Act of the State of New York.”
PLF000205-206 (emphasis added).
“The said parties of the first part . . . have sold and by these presents Fee simple
Storm
do grant and convey to the said Boston & Hartford Railroad conveyed; no
149/68
Company their successors and assigns All that piece or parcel limiting

17
PLF000207- of land situate in the town of East Fishkill, County of Dutchess, language /
000209 and State of New York . . . containing two + seventy six one Summary
hundred acres of land more or less. with the appurtenances and all Judgment
the estate title and interest therein of said parties of the first Granted.
part . . . this conveyance is made subject to the terms, provisions,
and conditions of the General Railroad Act of the State of New
York . . . .” PLF000207 – 208 (emphasis added).
“The said parties of the first part in consideration of the sum of
$2400 to them duly paid by the said railroad company have sold
and by these presents do grant and convey to the said Boston & Fee simple
Tabor Hartford Railroad Company their successors and assigns all conveyed; no
149/75 that piece or parcel of land situate in the Town of Beekman and limiting
PLF000210- County of Dutchess and State of New York . . . containing 11.13- language /
000211 *See 100 acres with the appurtenances and all the Estate, Title and Summary
also Table A Interest therein of said party of the first part subject nevertheless to Judgment
all the duties and liabilities imposed on the parties of the second Granted.
part by the General Railroad Act of the State of New York . . . .”
PLF000210 (emphasis added).

2. Centerline Presumption

The Court next turns to the Parties’ dispute regarding the applicability of the “centerline
presumption. The “centerline presumption” generally assumes that property owners whose land
borders a railroad or road also own the land up to the centerline of that right-of-way, unless state
law or the original deed shows otherwise. Castillo, 952 F.3d at 1311, 1314, 1320 (citing Banks v.
Ogden, 69 U.S. 57, 68 (1864)). The presumption is just that—a presumption. It can be rebutted.
New York law provides that where there is sufficient evidence—such as from the deed or
surrounding circumstances—that the original grantor intended to transfer land only up to the
edge of the road, the presumption is inapplicable. Marks v. Gaeckle, 156 N.Y.S.3d 402, 404
(N.Y. App. Div. 2021); Bashaw v. Clark, 699 N.Y.S.2d 533, 537 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999). Courts
consider various factors, including the deed’s language, land layout, and actions of past owners,
to determine intent. DiMarino v. United States, __ Fed. Cl. __, 2025 WL 2985441, at *3 (Fed.
Cl. Mar. 24, 2025) (citing Marks, 156 N.Y.S. at 404). When there is doubt as to intent, it can also
be garnered from the practical construction of the grantor and grantee and their successors in
title. Id. (citing Lehrman v. Lake Katonah Club, Inc., 794 N.Y.S.2d 670 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005)
(internal citations omitted)).

Plaintiffs now seek to establish their ownership of the land adjoining and underlying
those segments of the corridor where the railroad acquired only an easement for railroad
purposes. (Pls.’ Mot. at 30–31). If they can prove adjacency, Plaintiffs then aim to assert a
property interest in the rail corridor under New York’s centerline presumption. (Id.). In its
response, the United States does not raise arguments contesting whether any of the properties are
adjacent to the Line. (See Def.’s Mot.). However, the United States challenges the application of
the centerline presumption with respect to nearly every property and moves for summary
judgment, asserting that Plaintiffs’ “deed instruments do not convey an ownership interest in the
underlying corridor.” (Id. at 29–33). The United States further contends that Plaintiffs’ broad
reliance on the exhibits attached to their motion, as evidence of such an interest, fails to

18
substantively engage with the contents of those exhibits. (Id.). Specifically, the United States
argues that, based on the “metes and bounds descriptions” and “attached maps[,]” the documents
demonstrate an intent of the original grantor “to limit the conveyances to the exterior of the
Beacon Line corridor.” (Id. at 30).

In response, Plaintiffs assert that the United States places to much reliance on the fact that
some of the deeds either describe various properties as running “along” the rail line or identify
particular “lot[s.]” (Pls.’ Reply at 16–19 (“If the government was correct, then any delineation of
a public way of any type or style for any deed would rebut the presumption before it could ever
arise.”)). Plaintiffs also argue that a deed’s reference to directions, boundaries, or mapped lines
does not overcome the centerline presumption under New York law. (Id.). Finally, Plaintiffs
suggest that unless the United States can provide evidence, “in the form of chain of title or
otherwise,” which demonstrates the Plaintiffs’ sought to retain only a reversionary interest in the
rail corridor, then the centerline presumption cannot be rebutted. (Id. at 19).

Plaintiffs’ counter arguments appear to suggest that the boundaries their predecessors
intended to convey cannot be determined from the deeds themselves. This assertion is incorrect.
To clarify, numerous New York cases demonstrate that courts routinely interpret such
boundaries directly from the deeds. Marks, 156 N.Y.S.3d at 404 (stating that the subject deed
defined the properties’ boundary as the “‘[e]asterly line’—i.e., the outer edge—of the 30-foot
private road, supporting the defendant’s contention that the deed expressly excluded the disputed
strip[.]”); see also City of Albany v. State, 270 N.E.2d 705, 707 (N.Y. 1971) (“[W]hen the deed
describes the grant as starting at a corner of an intersection, and then running along parallel to or
bounding on a street or streets to the beginning point , the grant is limited to the exterior line of
the street[.]”). To overcome the centerline presumption, the deed must include language that
affirmatively limits the scope of the conveyance. Town of Clifton Park v. Boni Builders, Inc., 156
A.D.3d 1035, 1037 (N.Y. App. Div. 3rd Dept. 2017) (citing Lamm v. Mauser, 132 A.D.3d. 1120,
1123 (N.Y. App. Div. 3rd Dept. 2015)) (finding that utilization of terms such as “along a curve”
and “the point or place of beginning” are “descriptive reference points” but do not indicate an
intent to limit the conveyance to the edge of the boundary.); Town of Lake George v. Landry, 96.
A.D.3d 1220, 1223 (N.Y. App. Div. 3rd Dept. 2012) (finding that a deed expressly limiting the
conveyance to the “westerly bounds of a right of way” precluded a determination that the
defendant’s property extended to the eastern boundary of the adjoining parcel). Therefore, mere
reference to metes and bounds, even where those bounds coincide with mapped lines, is
insufficient to establish an intent to exclude the adjacent road’s exterior.

Accordingly, where the deed lacks clear limiting language, the centerline presumption
remains intact; conversely, where such limiting language is present, the presumption is rebutted.
Therefore, the Court GRANTS-IN-PART and DENIES-IN-PART both the Plaintiffs’ and
Defendant’s motions for partial summary judgment as to the centerline presumption in
accordance with the chart below:

19
along the lands now or formerly the Penn-
Central Railroad Company S 61 ° 43’ 06”
W, 680.53 feet to a point, thence along the
lands, now or formerly of A. D. Tompkins, N
25° 33’ 15” W, 24.92 feet to the point or place
of beginning, containing 0.34 acres more or
less.

(Pls.’ Ex. 107a).
“[B]eginning is North 12° 26’ 15” West 365.15
feet from the Northwesterly corner of lands of
Thomas T. Daniels, formerly Davis; thence
running along the Easterly side of Cushman
Road North 3° degrees 21’ 50” West 508.23
feet to the Northwesterly corner of premises
being described; Thence leaving Cushman
road running along the division line between
premises being described and lands of Martha
Bryan Cushman South 86° 52’ 50” East 454.22
feed and North 54° 36’ 10” East 337.55 feet to
the division line between premises being
described and lands of New York, New
Haven & Hartford Railroad; Thence along
said division line on a curve to the left
Arlene G. having a radius of 2059.53 feet a distance of Rebutted,
Durk: 13.-2- 31/(1 & 5) 55.50 feet; thence south 34° 43’ 00” East does not
63 354.07 feet; thence north 55° 17’ 00” East apply
100.00 feet; thence South 34° 43’ 00” East
294.99 feet; thence on a curve to the left having
a radius of 1383.19 feed a distance of 222.56
feet to the division line between premises being
described and lands of Martha Bryan
Cushman; thence along said division line
North 88° 58’ 20” West 744.30 feet; thence
North 85° 25’ 37” west 293.96 feet and North
87 degrees 20’ 00” West 211.91 feet (the said
last two courses and distances being lone the
center line of a stone wall) to the easterly side
of Cushman Rod the point or place of
beginning.”

(Pls.’ Ex. 53a)
“[T]hence running along lands now or
Coyote Two,
formerly Hull (Liber 1635 pg 646); South 37-
LLC: 21/(1 & 3) Applies
33-10 East 238.41 feet to a point; thence along
133089-
lands now or formerly Texaco South 36-55-21

21
6055-15- West 120.65 feet to a point; thence along
668289-0000 lands now or formerly Consolidated Rail
Corp., on a curve to the left having a radius
of 1004.87 feet for a distance of 93.10 feet to
a point; thence along lands now or formerly
Hancock the following: North 18-00-56 West
103.27 feet, North 16-32-59 West 26.05 feet,
North 01-00-35 West 34.62 feet, and North 27-
02-33 West 69.79 feet to a point; thence along
the southerly line of Old Glenham Road North
67-57-26 East 93.70 feet to the point or place
of BEGINNING.”

(Pls.’ Ex. 47a).
“BEGINNING at a point in the southerly line
of Kipp Avenue, said point being
distant southwesterly 710 feet from the
intersection of the said southerly line of
Kipp Avenue with the westerly line of Blodgett
Road; and running thence with the said
southerly line of Kipp Avenue, the following
courses and distances: South 70 degrees 11’
40” West 6.57 feet; thence South 75 degrees
Michael
54’ West 103 feet; thence South 81 degrees 36’
Zanzarella: Rebutted,
30” West 12.3 feet to line of lands of Ribera;
133089- 1/(1 & 3) does not
thence with said line of lands of Ribera, South
6155-11- apply
12 degrees 16’ East 144.99 feet to the
615684-0000
northerly line of lands of the New York, New
Haven and Hartford Rail Road Company;
thence with said northerly line of lands of
said railroad company, North 64 degrees 21’
30” East 150.1 feet; thence North 24 degrees
20’ 10” West 116.16 feet to the place of
BEGINNING.”

(Pls.’ Ex. 29a).
Louis
Sebesta: No limiting language identified.
133089- 77/(1 & 3) Applies
6155-03- (Pls.’ Ex. 96a).
125211-0000
Dana Brown:
No limiting language identified.
132200-
12(/1 & 5) Applies
6758-04-
(Pls.’ Ex. 40a).
829254-0000

22
“RUNNING THENCE along said division line
between Lots 31 and 32 South 66 degrees 45’
00” East 312.69 feet to a point on the line of
lands now or formerly New York, New
Haven and Hartford R.R. Co.;

RUNNING THENCE along same, South 31
Anthony
degrees 36’ 30” West 151.61 feet to a
Chianese, Sr.
point on the division line between Lots 32 and
& Anthony
33 as shown on the aforesaid filed
Chianese, Jr.: 16/(1 & 5) Applies
map;
132200-
6758-04-
RUNNING THENCE along same North 66
860314-0000
degrees 45’ 00” West 290.65 feet to a
point on the easterly line of Gold Road;
RUNNING THENCE along same North 23
degrees 15’ 00” East 150.00 feet to the
point or place of BEGINNING.”

(Pls.’ Ex. 43a).
“RUNNING THENCE along the easterly side
of said road, North 23 degrees 15 minutes 00
seconds East 150.00 feet; THENCE leaving
said road and running along a parcel designated
as Number 27, South 72 degrees 32 minutes 40
seconds East 289.88 feet to the westerly
James &
exterior line of the NYNH and H Railroad
Jean
Co.; THENCE along said line, South 58 Rebutted,
DeBonis:
23/(1 & 5) degrees 23 minutes 30 seconds East 66.00 feet does not
132200-
and South 31 degrees 36 minutes 30 seconds apply
6758-04-
West 181.00 feet; THENCE leaving said line
880372-0000
and running along a parcel designated as
Number 29, North 65 degrees 06 minutes 20
seconds West 327.51 feet to the point or place
of BEGINNING.”

(Pls.’ Ex. 48a).
Homer & Jo
Ann Griffin: No limiting language identified.
132200- 45/(1 & 5) Applies
6758-04- (Pls.’ Ex. 64a).
831232-0000
“RUNNING thence along the southeasterly
Jessica Rebutted,
line of said Gold Road, North 23 degrees
Schleicher: 76/(1 & 5) does not
15’00” East 150.00 feet; THENCE leaving
132200- apply
said road and running along other lands of

23
6758-04- now or formerly Chauncey Gold and Monroe
870342-0000 Gold, South 66 degrees 45’00” East 341.04
feet to the westerly exterior line of the New
York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad
Co.; THENCE along said line, South 17
degrees 42’25” West 64.77 feet and South
31 degrees 36’30” West 66.45 feet;
THENCE leaving said line and running along
other lands of said Chauncey Gold and
Monroe Gold, North 66 degrees 45’00” West
334.73 feet to the point or place of
BEGINNING.”

(Pls.’ Ex. 95a).
“Being known and designated as lot 29 on a
certain map entitled “Indian Hills” filed in the
Dutchess county clerk’s office on June 21,
1963 as map no. 3140 and further described as
follows: beginning at a point on the easterly
side of gold road at the northwesterly corner
of lot no. 30 on said map, running thence
along the easterly side of gold road, north 23-
Brian Van 15 east 150 feet to the southerly side of lot no.
Vlack: 28, running thence along the same, south 65-
132200- 87/(1 & 5) 06-20 east 327.51 feet to the westerly side of
6758-04- lands formerly of the New York New
875357-0000 Haven and Hartford Railroad, now of
Conrail, running thence along the same
south 17-42-25 west 141.26 feet to the
northerly side of said lot no. 30, running
thence along the same, north 66-45 west
341.04 feet to the point and place of
beginning.”

(Pls.’ Ex. 104a).
“BEGINNING at a point the westerly side of
the right of way of the New York, New Haven
and Hartford Railroad Company which point
John &
of beginning is identified as being south 3° 58’
Alexandra
E 502.74 feet measured southerly along said
Colbert:
18/(1 & 5) right of way from the northeasterly corner of Applies
134089-
the lands of Hahn, the southeasterly corner of
6856-00-
lands now reputedly of Cole, formerly James
602005-0000
Holmes; thence running along the lands of
the said railroad North 82° 11’ W 105.13 feet
and continuing on the same bearing 85 feet to

24
the center of a large boulder; thence still
continuing on this same bearing 50 feet to a
point the southwesterly corner of the premises
herein described being 8 feet easterly of a row
of trees; thence running northerly and at right
angles to the last course and at all times 8 feet
from said row of trees 77 feet to a point located
5 feet east from a large maple tree; thence
running westerly through the lands of Hahn
430 feet more or less to a point on the westerly
line of the lands of Hahn and easterly line of
the lands now or formerly of Baker; thence
running along said Baker lands and lands
reputedly of Cole north 41° 24’ E 19, 85 feet
north 27° 28’ E 383.81 feet and south 84° 01’
E 419. 96 feet to a corner in the westerly side
of the right of way of the New York, New
Haven & Hartford Railroad Company;
thence along the said Railroad Company’s
land south 3° 58’ E 502.74 feet to the point
or place of beginning.”

(Pls.’ Ex. 44a)
“BEGINNING at a stake on the west bank of
Sprout Creek at the northwest corner of Boss
(814 deeds page 490) and running thence along
a wire fence S 55° 41’ W 19.6 feet; Thence S
Joette
44° 54’ W 143.2 feet to a point; thence along a
Forsblom
stone wall and the northerly line of Boss and
Fero Kane
Hupe N 84° 36’ W 389.5 feel to the end of the
2018 Rebutted,
stone wall; thence N 13° 06’ W 5.24 feet to
Irrevocable 49/(1) does not
the southerly line of the New Haven
Trust: apply
Railroad; thence along the southerly line of
133089-
the New Haven Railroad to the west bank of
6356-01-
Sprout Creek aforementioned; thence
315608-0000
southerly along the west bank of Sprout Creek
to the point of beginning;”

(Pls.’ Ex. 68a).
Judith “BEGINNING at a point in the southerly line
Valentino: of Kipp Avenue, said point being
133089- 85b/(1 & 2) distant southwesterly 330 feet from the Rebutted,
6356-01- intersection of the said southerly line of does not
272582-0000 Kipp Avenue with the westerly line of Blodgett apply
Judith Road, and running thence with the said
85a/(3)
Valentino: southerly line of Kipp Avenue South 62

25
133089- degrees 43’ west 120 feet; thence with other
6155-11- lands of Earl T. Ketcham South 30 degrees 7’
644708-0000 10” East 102.19 feet to the northerly line
lands of the New York, New Haven and
Hartford Railroad Company; thence with
the said northerly line of lands of said
Railroad Company North 64 degrees 21’
30” East 115 feet to line of lands of
Prendergast North 27 degrees 17’ West 105.36
feet to the place of beginning.”

(Pls.’ Ex. 103a).
Haslett/JLD “Commencing at a point on the westerly Right-
Fishkill: Of Way (R.O.W.) line of New York State
133089- 47a/(2 & 3) Route #52, said point also being the
6256-04- southeasterly corner of Parcel I as described
700259-0000 herein, thence; running northeasterly
through said R.O.W. the following course;
N 87°52’37” E a distance of 84.38 feet to a
point on the easterly line of said R.O.W.,
said point also being the TRUE POINT OF
BEGINNING: thence; running northwesterly
along said easterly R.O.W. line the following
three courses; N 32°52’17” W a distance of
Applies
Haslett/JLD 43.16 feet to a point, thence; N 37°45’28’’ W
Fishkill: a distance of 84.60 feet to a point, thence; N
133089- 47b/(2) 41°41’02” W a distance of 109.62 feet to a
6256-04- point, thence; transitioning from said R.O.W.
711305-0000 line to the southerly R.O.W. line of New York
State Route 82 and running northeasterly along
said line the following two courses; N
24°10’31” E a distance of 108.20 feet to a
point, thence; N 67°04’31” E a distance of
47.41 feet to a point, thence . . . .” ;

(Pls.’ Ex. 66a).
“[R]unning; thence along the Southerly line of
said Highway N 70-38 E 25.00 feet;
The Richard thence along the Westerly line of now or
E. Monroe formerly Chiavelli S 19-23 E 405.00 feet,
Rebutted,
Trust: thence along the Southerly line of lands now or
58/(2 & 3) does not
133089- formerly said Chiavelli and now or formerly or
apply
6256-04- Ruppert N 70-38 E 188.24 feet; thence along
960446-0000 the Westerly line of Michaels, the party of the
second part hereto, S 19-23 E 405.59 feet to
the Northerly exterior line of the Dutchess

26
and Columbia Railroad; thence along the
Northerly exterior line and distant 49.50 feet
at right angles and parallel to the
monumented center line of said railroad S
67-38 W 213.54 feet; thence leaving said line
and along the Easterly line of now or formerly
said K. Oscar Carlson N 19-23 W 821.75 feet
to the point of beginning.”

(Pls.’ Ex. 77a).
“BEGINNING at a point in the southerly line
of Mirras Boulevard, said point being distant
along said street line South 85° 20’ 10” East
224.59 feet from a pipe marking the
intersection of said southerly line of Mirras
Boulevard with the southerly line of Ward
Place and running thence along the first
mentioned street line South 85° 20’ 10” East
Firas Abbasi
105 feet to a point; thence with other land of Rebutted,
133089-
4/(2) Theiss South 3° 25’ 7” East 235.96 feet to a does not
6356-01-
point in the northerly right of way line of apply
189582-0000
New York, New Haven and Hartford
Railroad; thence along the same South 82°
10’ West 105 feet to a point; thence along
other lands of Theiss North 3° 15’ 22” West
258.81 feet of the point or place of
BEGINNING.”

(Pls.’ Ex. 32a).
Lisa Badia:
No limiting language identified.
133089-
7/(2) Applies
6356-01-
(Pls.’ Ex. 35a).
077512-0000
“BEGINNING at the northeasterly corner
of a 3.3 acre parcel by Michael Mirras and
other to Baird and running thence along the
right of way fence of the New York, New
Haven and Hartford Railroad North 80
BR Trust:
degrees 07 minutes East 203.33 feet and
133089-
9/(2) North 82 degrees 05 minutes East about 624 Applies
6356-01-
feet to the westerly side of a proposed road
191540-0000
or street; thence along the westerly line of said
street southerly about 35 feet to an angle; South
36 degrees 05 minutes West about 195 feet;
and South 25 degrees 08 minutes West 183.82
feet; thence leaving said street and running

27
along the lands conveyed by Michael Mirras
and others to Klinga South 43 degrees no
minutes West about 50 feet to the bank of the
cove of the Fishkill Creek; thence along said
bank in the westerly direction about 540 feet to
the southeasterly corner of the above
mentioned Baird parcel; thence along the
easterly line of the same North 07 degrees no
minutes West about 320 feet to the point or
place of BEGINNING . . . .”

(Pls.’ Ex. 37a).
Christopher
& Donna
No limiting language identified.
Consaga:
19/(2) Applies
133089-
(Pls.’ Ex. 45a).
6356-03-
058467-0000
Nicola
Coppola: No limiting language identified.
133089- 20/(2) Applies
6356-03- (Pls.’ Ex. 46a).
012486-0000
“BEGINNING at an iron pin on the southerly
side of the New York, New Haven and hartford
Railroad right of way, said pin being distant
969.13 feet southwesterly along said RR right
of way from the intersection of the westerly
line of McGrath Terrace and southerly side of
Robert &
the RR right of way; THENCE running north
Elisa
66° 09’ 49” East 248.19 feet to a point on the Rebutted,
DeWitt:
25/(2) southerly side of said right of way; THENCE does not
133089-
South 35° 07’ 40” East 246.57 feet to a point; apply
6356-03-
THENCE South 63° 05’ 20” West 300 feet
039448-0000
more or less to the bank of Fishkill Creek;
THENCE northwesterly westerly and
northeasterly along the creek bank to the point
of beginning.”

(Pls.’ Ex. 50a).
“[S]outh 03 degrees 01 minutes 10 seconds
Vincent A.
east 301.27 feet to a point on the line of lands
Fernandez &
N/F Midtown Trackage Adventures
Meghan 33/(2) Applies
(ID836251) thence along said Midtown
Bliss:
Trackage Adventures the following two
133089-
courses and distances; 1) South 82 degrees 10

28
6356-01- minutes 00 seconds west 44.00 feet to a point
162573-0000 of curve, 2) On a curve to the left having a
radius of 2914.51 feet an arc distance of 56.00
feet having a curve bearing of south 81 degrees
36 minutes 58 seconds west and a chord length
of 56.00 feet to a point on the line of lands N/F
Guthrie thence along the lands of Guthrie north
02 degrees 44 minutes 50 seconds west passing
through an iron pipe on line at 38.23 feet for a
total distance of 299.41 feet to a point on the
southerly line of said Ward Place thence along
the southerly line of said Ward Place the
following two courses and distances; 1) North
74 degrees 53 minutes 00 seconds east 70.41
feet to an iron pipe found, 2) South 85 degrees
20 minutes 10 seconds east 29.59 feet to the
place and paint of beginning.”

(Pls.’ Ex. 55a).
“[R]unning thence along the southerly line
of the consolidated Rail Corporation and
the remains of an old wire fence, N 75-57 - E
52.31 feet, N 76-33-00 E 69.34 feet to a point
in the westerly line of lands now or formerly of
Souers (L. 1424 cp 172); thence along the
Scott & westerly line of lands now or formerly of
Diane Ferris: Souers. S 07-00 E. 320.00 feet to a point on the Rebutted,
133089- 34/(2) northerly bank of the Fishkill Creek: thence does not
6356-01- along the Fishkill Creek N 77-40-05 W. 86.31 apply
154526-0000 feet to a point in the easterly line of lands now
or formerly of Kovach; thence along the
easterly line of lands now or formerly of
Kovach; N 15-05-00 W. 280.00 feet to the
point or place of beginning.”

(Pls.’ Ex. 56a).
John &
Myrna
No limiting language identified.
Georges:
39/(2) Applies
133089-
(Pls.’ Ex. 60a).
6356-03-
078483-0000
David Kuran “BEGINNING at a point in the Southerly
Rebutted,
133089- line of New York, New Haven and Hartford
51(2) does not
6356-03- Railroad on the westerly side of McGrath
apply
108498-0000 Terrace 50.96 feet Northerly from the end of

29
McGrath Terrace; and CONTINUING
FROM THENCE along the Westerly line of
McGrath Terrace and the Westerly line of
the lands of Baird South 33 degrees 30
minutes East 280 feet more or less to the
bank of the Fishkill Creek; THENCE
Southwesterly along the Northerly bank of said
creek 135 feet more or less to the
Southwesterly comer of the herein described
parcel; THENCE North 37 degrees 45 minutes
00 seconds West 375 foot more or less to the
Southerly line of the New York, New Haven
and Hartford Railroad; THENCE North 67
degrees 38 minutes East 150 feet to the point
of BEGINNING.”

(Pls.’ Ex. 70a).
“THENCE along the lands now or formerly
Cowen (Liber 1204 cp 583), South 15 degrees
05’00” East 446.57 feet to a point; THENCE
along the bank of the Fishkill Creek, South 75
degrees 55’52” West 259.85 feet to a point;
THENCE along the lands now or formerly
Pinto (Liber 1795 cp 845), North 20 degrees
Jason A. &
50’00” West 432.72 feet to a point; THENCE
Stacey L.
along the lands now or formerly
Meister:
55/(2) Consolidated Rail Corporation the Applies
133089-
following five (5) courses and distances: 1)
6356-01-
North 68 degrees 51 ‘00” East 9.00 feet; 2)
136518-0000
North 71 degrees 04’00” East 106.88 feet; 3)
North 72 degrees 43 ‘00” East 84.69 feet; 4)
North 74 degrees 28’00” East 64.95 feet and;
5) North 75 degrees 37’00” East 38.00 feet to
the point or place of BEGINNING.”

(Pls.’ Ex. 74a).
“BEGINNING at the corner formed by the
intersection of the easterly line of East Court
with the southerly line of McGrath Terrace;
Caroline
Running thence along the southerly line o[f]
Meyer:
McGrath Terrace south 65 degrees 19’ East
133089- 56/(2) Applies
168.57 feet to the westerly line of Lot 20 on
6356-03-
said map; Running thence along same South 24
041494-0000
degrees 41’ west 176.58 feet and South 67
degrees 38’ 56.96 feet to the easterly line of
East Court’ Running thence along same

30
North 2 degrees 22° West 53.35 feet and north
1 degrees 49’ 00” West 203. 28 feet to the point
or place of beginning.”

(Pls.’ Ex. 75a).
“BEGINNING at a point in the southernly line
of Mirras Boulevard, said point being distant
along said street line South 85 degrees 20’ 10”
East 124 59 feet from a pipe marking the
intersection of said southerly line of Mirras
Boulevard with the southerly line of Ward
Place and running thence along the first
Catherine F. mentioned street line south 85 degrees 20’ 10”
Oken East 100 feet to a point, thence along lands of Rebutted,
133089- 63/(2) Strohecker South 3 degrees 15’ 22” East 258 does not
6356-01- 81 feet to a point in the northerly right-of- apply
180579-0000 way line of the New York, New Haven and
Hartford Railroad, thence along the same
South 82 degrees 10’ West 100 feet to a
point, thence along lands of Emil Theis North
3 degrees 7’ 34” West 280 57 feet to the point
of beginning . . . .”

(Pls.’ Ex. 82a).
“[R]unning thence along said street line North
seventy four degrees fifty three minutes East
one hundred feet; thence leaving said street line
and running along lands of Emil Theiss, South
nine degrees no minutes twenty seconds East
two hundred seventy seven and eighteen
hundredths feet to a point in the northerly
Anthony M.
line of the New York, New Haven and
Ott, III &
Hartford Railroad on a curve; thence along
Tracy Ott
said railroad line, on a curve to the left Rebutted,
(f/k/a
64/(2) radius 2914.511 feet, a distance of one does not
Tracy Smith)
hundred feet (the chord bearing being South apply
133089-
seventy four degrees twenty two minutes
6356-01-
twenty seconds West) to the southeasterly
125554-0000
corner of the abovementioned Partridge and
Knapp lands; thence along said lands North
nine degrees one minute thirty seconds West
two hundred seventy eight and six hundredths
feet to the point of beginning.”

(Pls.’ Ex. 83a).

31
“RUNNING THENCE along the southerly and
westerly side of Mirraas Boulevard the
following distances and courses: North 82
degrees 20 minutes East 93.68 feet; South 53
degrees 35 minutes East 37.53 feet and South
17 degrees 19 minutes East 195.53 feet to the
northerly right of way line of the New York,
Jason Payne:
New Haven and Hartford Railroad Rebutted,
133089-
65/(2) Company; THENCE along the North line of does not
6356-01-
said right of way line of said railroad, South apply
212588-0000
82 degrees 10 minutes West 169.20 feet to the
southeasterly corner of lands of Wendover;
THENCE along land of Wendover, North 3
degrees 33 minutes 3 seconds West 219.93 feet
to the place of BEGINNING.”

(Pls.’ Ex. 84a).
Jeffrey
Roosa &
Stacey Roosa
f/k/a No limiting language identified.
Stacey Van 70/(2) Applies
Den Thoorn: (Pls.’ Ex. 89a).
133089-
6356-03-
056496-0000
“BEGINNING at a point in the southerly line
or Ward Place at the most northerly
corner of the herein described parcel said point
is bearing South 58 degrees 30’00” West
120.00 feet from the northwest corner of lands
formerly of Charles Theiss and now or
formerly of Carl J. Frey (Liber 1150 cp 327);
THENCE running with said road line, South 58
Richard
degrees 30’00” West 110.00 feet to a square
Tivnan: Rebutted,
iron bar found at the most northerly corner of
133089- 84/(2) does not
lands now or formerly of John J. Reynolds
6356-01- apply
(Liber 1064 cp 33) THENCE running with the
108542-0000
easterly line of said lands, South 15 degrees
22’50” East 224.00 feet to a point in line with
0.09 feet short of another square iron bar
found; THENCE running with the northerly
line of the lands of the Consolidated Rail
Corp., formerly of the New York, New
Haven and Hartford Railroad Co., along a
curve to the right having a radius of 2914.43

32
feet for a distance of 100.18 feet to the
southwest corner of lands now or formerly
Hugh H. McDowell (Liber 1006 pg. 429);
THENCE running with the west line of said
McDowell (Liber 1006 pg. 429) North 14
degrees 03’20” West 247.71 feet to the
aforementioned road line and the point or place
of BEGINNING . . . .”

(Pls.’ Ex. 102a).
“BEGINNING at a point, said point being the
intersection of the southerly line of Main Street
with the easterly line of Churchill Street, and
running thence along said southerly line of
Main Street the following: North 54 degrees
52’ 00” East 157.00 feet; and North 53 degrees
27’ 10” East 74.90 feet;
Verdi Boy
Realty Group THENCE along the northerly line of lands,
Rebutted,
LLC: now or formerly Con Rail Corp., the
89/(3) does not
130200- following: along a curve to the right, having
apply
6054-37- a radius of 902.19 feet and being distant
113729-0000 westerly 213.47 feet; and North 55 degrees
12’ 00” West 15.27 feet;

THENCE along said easterly line of Churchill
Street, North 47 degrees 55’ 30” West 22.53
feet to the point of BEGINNING.”

(Pls.’ Ex. 106a).
“Beginning in the southerly line of the road
from Fishkill to Wiccopee (Route 52) at a point
582 feet more or less westerly from the line of
lands formerly of Christie, which point is the
northwesterly corner of lands of Knapp, and
running thence along the road South 84 degrees
ANK Realty 22’ West 298 feet more or less, and South 77
Rebutted,
Inc.: 133089- degrees 23’ West 51 feet more or less to lands
5/(3) does not
6256-04- of Lanci; thence along side lands of Lanci
apply
516255-0000 South 5 degrees 48’ East 276.6 feet more or
less to the northerly line of the New Haven
Railroad Company; thence along the
railroad line easterly 343 feet more or less to
the line of lands of Knapp; thence along said
Knapp line North 13 degrees 39’ West 280 feet
more or less to the place of beginning. BEING

33
more particularly described by a recent survey
made by J. William Komisar, NYS LLC, dated
06/26/2014 and bounded and described as
follows:

All that tract or parcel of land situate in the
Town of Fishkill, County of Dutchess, and the
State of New York, bounded and described as
follows:

Beginning at a point in the Southerly line of N.
Y. S. Route 52, said point being the
Northwesterly comer of lands now or formerly
Nenni Construction Company, Inc. (Liber
1568, cp 611 ); thence along the Westerly line
of the said lands now or formerly Nenni
Construction Company, Inc. (Liber 1568, cp
611), South 13-39-00 East 250.60 feet to a
point; thence along the Northerly line of
lands now or formerly Midtown Trackage
Ventures LLC (Deed Document Number
22007/986) on a curve to the left having a
radius of 3869.33 feet a length of 388.18 feet
to a point; thence along the Easterly line of
lands now or formerly Gulla (Liber 1650, cp
366) North 5-48-00 West 273.92 feet to a point
in the said Southerly line of N.Y.S. Route 52,
said point being 4.6 feet, more or less,
Southerly from a concrete monument found;
thence along the said Southerly line of N.Y.S.
Route 52 the following two courses: North 70-
01-00 East 52.25 feet to a point and North 77-
00-00 East 298.00 feet to the point or place of
beginning.”

(Pls.’ Ex. 33a).
Ballistic
Bodyworks,
No limiting language identified.
LLC:
8/(3) Applies
133089-
(Pls.’ Ex. 36a).
6256-04-
634245-0000
Stephanie No limiting language identified.
Devine: 24/(3) Applies
133089- (Pls.’ Ex. 49a).

34
6155-17-
012230-0000
“BEGINNING at the southerly line of Petticoat
Lane 225 feet East of the easterly line of
Winterberry Road, as extended and running
Dean &
thence along Petticoat Lane S 46-14-00 E
Deborah A.
273.6 feet to the northerly line of the Penn Rebutted,
DiRubbio:
26/(3) Central Railroad, thence westerly along the does not
133089-
same on a curve to the right (1512.88 feet) a apply
6155-03-
distance of 331+ feet to a point, thence N 40
043256-0000
E 233 feet to the place of BEGINNING.”

(Pls.’ Ex. 51a)
“[T]hence running along the northerly side of
Park Lane in a westerly direction South 83° 50’
00” West 80 feet to Lot 11 on the aforesaid
map; thence running along the dividing line
between Lot 11 and Lot 10 in Block 1 on the
aforesaid map in a northerly direction North
13° 00’ 40” West 205.74 feet to the lands now
Robert & or formerly of New York - New Haven and
Beverly Hartford Railroad; thence running along
Dross: the lands now or formerly of New York –
30/(a) Applies
133089- New Haven and Hartford Railroad on a
6155-17- curve to the left with a radius of 1612.[]8 feet
003230-0000 and a length of 120.00 feet to Lot 9’ in Block
1 on the aforesaid map; thence running
southerly along the division line of Lot 9 and
Lot 10 in Block 1 on the aforesaid map, South
2° 17’ 11” East 175.46 feet to the northerly side
of Park Lane and the point of beginning.

(Pls.’ Ex. 52a).
Michael J. &
Rosemary
No limiting language identified
Engel:
32/(3) Applies
133089-
(Pls.’ Ex. 54a).
6155-17-
060233-0000
“Thence along the northerly line of Park
Richard &
Avenue, South 83° 50’ 00” West 80.00 feet to
Marie A.
a point; thence along Lot No. 9, Block 1, on
Fonteneou:
35/(3) said Filed Map No. 2461, North 02° 24’ 48” Applies
133089-
West 160.78 feet to a point; thence along
6155-17-
lands now or formerly Conrail Corp., On a
020229-0000
curve to the left having a radius of 1612.88

35
feet for a distance of 80.00 feet to a point;
thence along Lot No. 7, Block 1, on said Filed
Map No. 2461, South 02° 25’ 20” East 150.01
feet to the point or place of BEGINNING.”

(Pls.’ Ex. 57a).
“[T]hence N 26° 25’ W 480.37 feet to a point
in a wire fence marking the southerly
boundary of the lands of the New York, New
Vincent Haven and Hartford railroad; thence along
Gaglioti & the last mentioned boundary line N 59° 42’
Mary E 236.76 feet to a stake set in the junction of
Rodriquez wire fences; thence along a wire fence
Rebutted,
n/k/a marking the west line of lands formerly of
36/(3) does not
Mary Mulford, now of Nelson and others S 16° 07’
apply
Gaglioti: E 524.38 feet to a point in the north line of the
132800- New York State Highway Route #82; thence
6457-01- along the north line of the New York State
120505-0000 Highway Route #82 S 71° 24’ W 143.71 feet
to the point or place of beginning . . . .”

(Pls.’ Ex. 58a).
“[T]hence along the northerly line of
Washington Avenue (a/k/a Glenham Avenue)
S 88-26-17 W 80.00 feet to a point; thence
along the lands now or formerly Powell, N
03-49-23 W 204.10 feet to a point; thence
Daniel
along the lands now or formerly
Goodman:
Consolidated Rail Corp., on a curve to the
133089- 42/(3) Applies
right having a radius of 1096.31 feet a distance
6055-16-
of 81.92 feet to a point; thence along the lands
828257-0000
now or formerly Nichols, S 03-02-35 E 200.40
feet to the point or place of BEGINNING . . .
.”

(Pls.’ Ex. 61a).
“THENCE along the said northerly bounds of
N.Y.S. Route No. 82, south 71 degrees 24
Jaime
minutes west, 126.50 feet to an iron rod found;
Gordon &
THENCE turning and running along lands now
Richard
or formerly of Hayden, north 26 degrees 25
Nappi 43/(3) Applies
minutes west, 434.39 feet to an iron rod found;
132800-
THENCE turning and running along lands
6457-03-
now or formerly of Metro North Commuter
099490-0000
Railroad Co., north 59 degrees 42 minutes
east, 98.31 feet to a point; THENCE turning

36
and running along lands now or formerly of
Scott, south 26 degrees 25 minutes 06 seconds
east, 275.0 feet to an iron rod found; THENCE
turning and running along the same, south 75
degrees 54 minutes 49 seconds east, 35.81 feet
to a point; THENCE turning and running still
along the same, south 26 degrees 25 minutes
06 seconds east, 160.00 feet to the point or
place of BEGINNING.”

(Pls.’ Ex. 62a).
“[B]eginning at the Northwestern corner of
said parcel, N. 64 degrees 30’ E. for a distance
of 610.20 feet to a pole, then running North 69
degrees 8’ E. for a distance of 219.35 feet then
running to a pole; then running N. 70 degrees
50’ E. for a distance of 300.95 feet to a pole;
then running N. 77 degrees 23’E. for a distance
Alfredo &
of 243.42 feet to the Eastern corner boundary
Marie Gulla: Rebutted,
pole; a distance of 276.00 feet; then running
133089- 46/(3) does not
along the Northerly exterior line of the N.Y.
6256-03- apply
N.H. &H.R.R. Co. to the Westerly boundary
440213-0000
pole along an oblique line for 1,462.46 feet;
then running along the tree and fence line of
Rowe to Pulombo Bros., in a Northerly
direction N. 7 degrees 8’E, for a distance of
332.50 feet.”

(Pls.’ Ex. 65a).
“RUNNING THENCE from said point of
beginning along said division line between
Lots Nos. 59 and 58 on the aforementioned
map, South 25° 59’ 30” East 115.00 feet to
lands now or formerly New York, New
Haven & Hartford Railroad; RUNNING
Robert A. THENCE along said last mentioned lands,
Malvarosa: South 64° 00’ 30” West 80.00 feet to the
133089- 53/(3) division line between Lots Nos. 58 and 57 on Applies
6155-10- the aforementioned map; RUNNING
392507-0000 THENCE along said division line, North 25°
59’30” West 115.00 to a point on the southerly
side of Van Steuben Road; RUNNING
THENCE along the southerly side of Van
Steuben Road, North 64° 00’ 30” East 80.00
feet to the point and place of BEGINNING.”

37
(Pls.’ Ex. 72a).
“Thence Westerly along the Northerly line of
Park Lane South 83-50-00 West 100.00 feet to
a point; thence northerly along lands reputedly
of the Town of Fishkill North 11-30-10 West
Mark A. &
233.56 feet to a point; thence easterly along
Christine
lands reputedly of The Consolidated Rail
Matthews:
54/(3) Corporation South 79-57-00 East 101.23 feet Applies
133089-
to a point; thence southerly along Lot 10 South
6055-20-
13-00-40 East 205.74 feet to a point on the
992230-0000
northerly line of Park Lane and the point or
place of beginning.”

(Pls.’ Ex. 73a).
Robert
“[T]hence from said point of beginning,
Musiello:
running along the southerly side of the
133089- 60a/(3)
aforementioned New York, New Haven &
6155-00-
Hartford Railroad North 64 ° 40’ 40’’
715730-0000
East 645.83 feet to lands now or formerly of
Robert
Fishkill Properties, Inc.; thence along other
Musiello: Rebutted,
lands of Fishkill Properties South 25° 19’
133089- 60b/(3) does not
20”·East 123.23 feet, South 48° 42’ 20” West
6155-00- apply
394.68 feet, South 25° 19’ 20” East 66.04 feet,
738755-0000
South 64 ° 40’ 40” West 230.74 feet and North
Robert
32° 08’ 50” West 300.00 feet to the point and
Musiello:
place of BEGINNING . . . .”
133089- 60c/(3)
6155-00-
(Pls.’ Ex. 79a).
764735-0000
“South fifty-one degrees forty-eight minutes
thirty seconds West thirty-seven and forty-five
hundredths feet; thence South sixty-one
degrees twenty-one minutes thirty seconds
West ninety-eight and forty-six hundredths
feet, thence South sixty-two degrees forty-
Linda Nevels
three minutes West fourteen and nine
f/k/a Linda
hundredths feet; thence with other lands of Rebutted,
Slinskey:
61/(3) party of the first part (Ketcham) South twenty- does not
133001-
seven degrees seventeen minutes East one apply
6155-11-
hundred five and thirty-six hundredths feet to
656717-0000
the Northerly line of lands of the New York
New Haven and Hartford Railroad
Company; thence with the said Northerly
line of lands of said Railroad Company
North sixty-four degrees twenty-one
minutes thirty seconds East one hundred

38
sixty-one and thirty-four hundredths feet to
line of lands of Ainsworth; thence with said
line of lands of Ainsworth North thirty-three
degrees one minute West one hundred twenty
and one tenth feet to the place of beginning.”

(Pls.’ Ex. 80a).
“[R]unning thence along the westerly line of
said Robinson, South 33-01-00 East 142.01
feet to a point in the northerly line of lands
of New York, New Haven & Hartford
Railroad Co., South 64-21-30 West 100.42
feet to a point marking the most southerly
Barbara corner of the herein described parcel and
Reale: that most easterly corner of lands now or Rebutted,
133001- 67/(3) formerly of Prendergast (Liber 740 cp 559); does not
6155-11- running thence along the easterly line of said apply
665726-0000 Prendergast, North 33-01-00 West 120.10 feet
to a point in the southerly line of the
aforementioned Kipp Avenue; running thence
along the same, N 51-48-30 E 100.00 feet to
the point or place of BEGINNING.”

(Pls.’ Ex. 86a).
“South 25 deg. 59’ 30” East from a monument
and point of curvature in the southerly side of
Lot No. 16, as shown on said map, which
monument is South 64 deg. 00’ 30” West 40
feet from the southeasterly comer of said lot
16; thence on a curve to the right having a
Barbara M. radius of 110 feet a distance of 73.89 feet;
Renza 2020 thence South 16 deg. 38’ 28” West 188.88 feet
Irrevocable to a point which is the intersection of the line
Trust: 68/(3) of lands now or formerly of Hammond and Applies
133089- lands now or formerly of New York, New
6155-14- Haven, and Hartford Railroad; thence
378494-0000 North 64 deg. 00’ 30” East along lands now
or formerly of New York, New Haven and
Hartford Railroad, 196.33 feet; thence North
25 deg. 59’ 30” West 115 feet to the point or
place of beginning . . . .”

(Pls.’ Ex. 87a).
Rombout “[T]hence running along said west line of said Rebutted,
Fire District: 69/(3) Lot Number 7, South 03-33-00 East 50 feet to does not
133089- a point on the north line of the right of way apply

39
6256-04- of the Central New England Railway
574274-0000 Company; thence along north line of said
Railroad right of way South 83-53-00 West
75 feet to a point in the east line of lands now
or formerly of Henry Morgenthau1 Jr.; thence
North 03-33-00 West 50 feet along said lands
of said Morgenthau to a point; thence still
along said lands of said Morgenthau North 83-
53-00 East 75 feet to the place of
BEGINNING.”

(Pls.’ Ex. 88a).
Sean
Michael
No limiting language identified.
Rowan:
71/(3) Applies
133089-
(Pls.’ Ex. 90a).
6155-10-
405517-0000
Richard
Runion No limiting language identified.
133089- 72/(3) Applies
6155-17- (Pls.’ Ex. 91a).
044231-0000
“RUNNING THENCE north 26 degrees 25
minutes 06 seconds West, 160.00 feet;
THENCE North 75 degrees 54 minutes 49
seconds West, 35.81 feet; THENCE North 26
degrees 25 minutes 06 seconds West, 275.00
Anthony & feet; THENCE North 59 degrees 42 minutes
Jessica 00 seconds East, 126.29 feet; THENCE South
Russo: 26 degrees 25 minutes 07 seconds East, 480.37
73/(3) Applies
132800- feet to a point on the northerly side of New
6457-03- York State Route 82; THENCE along the
107499-0000 northerly side of New York State Route 82,
South 71 degrees 24 minutes 00 seconds West,
99.70 feet to the point or place of
BEGINNING.”

(Pls.’ Ex. 92a).
Mary Ann “[R]unning thence along the southwesterly line
Schetter of Petticoat Lane S 47 degrees 22’ 20” E 37.50
Irrevocable feet to a point; thence leaving said line and Rebutted,
Trust 74/(3) running through lands of parties of the first part does not
Agreement (Goldsmith) S 38 degrees 51’ 40” W 277.10 apply
dated feet to a point on the northerly line of lands
8/27/2019: of the New York, New Haven and Hartford

40
133089- Railroad, on a curve convex to the south,
6155-03- having a radius of 1512.88 feet and a length
018271-0000 westerly of 42.03 feet to a point; thence
leaving said line and running along the
southerly line of lands of Noel and Patricia
Schetter and along the southerly line of lands
of the party of the second part N 38 degrees 51’
40” E 296.03 feet to the point of beginning . . .
.”

(Pls.’ Ex. 93a).
“BEGINNING at an iron pipe set at the
southernly corner of lands of Gordon Schetter
and running thence with the line of lands of
Archibald S 40 deg. W 161.03 feet to a pipe set
in the northerly line of the New York, New
Haven & Hartford Railroad Company; thence
with lands of said Railroad Company the
following courses and distances on a curve
to the right (radius 1512.88 feet) in a general
westerly direction 140.21 feet; thence N 67
deg. 2’ W 167.49 feet to the easterly bank of
Adolph J. the Fishkill creek; thence down along the
Schetter: easterly bank of the Fishkill Creek the
133089- 75/(3) following course and distances: N 42’ 26” E Applies
6055-16- 125.58 feet; thence N 2 deg. 41’ 39” W 59.99
994262-0000 feet; thence N 44 deg. 56’ 50” W 61.14 feet;
thence N 16 deg. 5’ 10” E 7.79 feet; thence
with line of lands of Archibald S 85 deg. 47’
30” E 238 feed to an iron pin set at the westerly
corner of lands of Fitzgerald; thence with lands
of Fitzgerald and line of lands of Noel and
Patricia Schetter S 41 deg. 2’ 40” E 196.62
feet; thence with line of lands of Gordon
Schetter S 45 deg 43’ E 90 feet to the place of
beginning.”

(Pls.’ Ex. 94a).
Diane
Sherwood: No limiting language identified.
133089- 78/(3) Applies
6155-03- (Pls.’ Ex. 97a).
075268-0000
Cynthia [R]unning with that land South 27° East 117 Rebutted,
Simmons: 79/(3) feet to the exterior line of the New York, does not
130200- New Haven and Hartford Railroad apply

41
6055-04- company; thence with said exterior line in a
625271-0000 parallel line with the center line of said
railroad and 49 1/2 feet distant northwesterly
therefrom westerly about 290 feet to the
southeasterly side of Fishkill Avenue; thence
along the same North 57° East 275 feet to the
place of BEGINNING.”

(Pls. Ex. 98a).
“BEGINNING at a point, said point being the
intersection of the westerly line of Bridge
Street with the northerly line of Washington
Avenue, and RUNNING THENCE along said
northerly line of Washington Avenue S 88-26-
Zachary
17 W 150.00 feet; THENCE along the easterly
Solomon &
line of Moseman N 03-20-35 W 200.40 feet;
Amanda Rebutted,
THENCE along the southerly line of lands
Berman: 81/(3) does not
now or formerly Consolidated Rail Corp.,
133089- apply
along a curve to the right having a radius of
6055-16-
1096.28 feet and being distant easterly
839257-0000
150.00 feet; THENCE along the said westerly
line of Bridge Street S 04-09-05 E 178.00 feet
to the point of BEGINNING.”

(Pls.’ Ex. 100a).
“BEGINNING at a point in the southerly line
of Kipp Avenue said point being distant
southwesterly 535.00 feet from the intersection
of the said southerly line of Kipp Avenue with
the westerly line of Blodgett Road and running
thence with the said southerly line of Kipp
Avenue the following courses and distances:
South 65° 20’ West 26.4 feet; thence South 68°
Anthony R. 44’ 40’’ West 58.6 feet; thence with lands of
Thomaselli: party of the first part (Ketcham) South 24° 27’ Rebutted,
133089- 83/(3) 40” East 107.47 feet to the northerly line of does not
6155-11- lands of the New York New Haven and apply
631696-0000 Hartford Railroad Company; THENCE
with the said northerly line of land of said
Railroad Company North 64° 21’ 30” East
85.00 feet: THENCE with other lands of party
of the first part (Ketcham) North 24° 30’ 20”
West 102.54 feet to the place of
BEGINNING.”

(Pls.’ Ex. 101a).

42
“BEGINNING at an iron pipe set in the
southerly line of the State Road leading from
Fishkill Village to Brinckerhoff at the
Northwesterly corner of lands of Horton and
running thence with line of lands of Horton the
following courses and distances, South nine (9)
degrees ten (10) minutes East three hundred
(300) feet; thence North seventy two (72)
degrees fifty eight (58) minutes thirty (30)
seconds East two hundred (200) feet to line of
David Van lands of Palumbo; thence with line of lands of
Voorhis, Palumbo South nine (9) degrees ten (10)
Donald Van minutes East one hundred sixty seven (167)
Voorhis, feet to the Northerly line of lands of the New Rebutted,
and Susan 88/(3) York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad does not
Murray: Co., thence with the Northerly line of the apply
133089- New York, New Haven and Hartford
6256-03- Railroad Co. in a general Westerly direction
232018-0000 two thousand one hundred eighty five (2185)
feet more or Less to the Easterly line of lands
of Ursulla Hotel Corporation; thence with the
Easterly line of the Ursulla Hotel Corporation
North thirteen (13) degrees twelve (12)
minutes West one thousand two hundred
seventy (1270) feet more or less to the inter
section of the Easterly line of lands of the
Ursulla Hotel Corporation . . . .”

(Pls. Ex. 105a).
334 Fishkill
Ave., LLC: No limiting language identified.
130200- 2/(4) Applies
6054-23- (Pls.’ Ex. 30a).
284922-0000
“[T]hence running N87° 14’ 46” E 23.00’ to a
point thence running N81° 45’ 46”E 96.82’ to
a point. Thence running S06° 47’16”E 120.85’
along lands now or formerly 334 Fishkill Ave
KAP Realty
LLC to a point. Thence running S67°
NY, LLC:
40’50”W 88.09’ along lands now or
130200- 50/(4) Applies
formerly Metro-North to point. Thence
6054-23-
running N22 ° 19’10”W 24.50’ to a point.
280919-0000
Thence still running along lands now or
formerly Niche Modern LLC S67°31’50”W
32.00’ to a point. Thence running
N06°07’00”W 128.58’ along lands now or

43
formerly 326 Fishkill Avenue LLC to the point
of BEGINNING.”

(Pls.’ Ex. 69a).
“BEGINNING in the northerly line of Liberty
Street at the easterly comer of Lot #11, and
running thence along Lot #11 , North 27
degrees 34’ West 225 feet to the back of the
creek; THENCE up and along the creek
easterly 100 feet to the extension of the
Anne Provet: easterly line of Lot #15; THENCE South 27
130200- degrees 34’ East 104 feet to land reserved by
66/(4) Applies
6054-23- Navarro (818 Deeds, page 387); THENCE
374946-0000 along the same South 62 degrees 26’ West 84
feet; and South 27 degrees 34’ East 84 feet to
the northerly line of Liberty Street; THENCE
along the same, South 62 degrees 26’ West 16
feet to the place of BEGINNING.”

(Pls.’ Ex. 85a).
“THENCE of an iron pin, South 43° 04’ 15”
West 70.21 feet, THENCE on a curve to the
left having a radius of 50’ 46.52 feet to an iron
pin and then the southeasterly comer of
premises being described, THENCE North 47°
59’ 45” West 91.91 feet to an iron pin,
THENCE North 87° 26’ 45” West 34.50 feet
to a point on the easterly side of Pump House
Road, THENCE along the easterly side of
Geraldine Pump House Road, North 2° 33’ 15” East
Cheverko: 15/(4) 98.19 feet to an iron pin, THENCE along Applies
56.8-1-11 lands now or formerly of Penn Central
Railroad, New Haven Division, THENCE on
a curve to the left having a radius of 3174.88’,
85.21 feet to an iron pin, THENCE along the
southerly line of Lot No. 4, South 39° 43 ‘, 30”
East 183.21 feet to an iron pin at the westerly
side of Fairview Road to the point and place of
BEGINNING.”

(Pls.’ Ex. 42a).
Robin No limiting language identified.
Greene: 44/(4) Applies
56.27-1-5 (Pls.’ Ex. 63a).

44
Wilson No limiting language identified.
Morales: 59/(4) Applies
56.27-1-6 (Pls.’ Ex. 78a).
“THENCE along said lands of Peck the
following courses and distances: North 87° 33’
26” West 32.21 feet; North 68° 34’ 29” West
60.17 feet; North 62° 13’ 22” West 10.45 feet
and North 75° 08’ 44” West 82.04 feet to a
point in the easterly side of the right of way
of the New York-New Haven and Hartford
Railroad Company; THENCE along said
lands of said railroad company and along a
post and wire fence the following courses
and distances: North 9° 10’ 35” West 241.86
Robert C.
feet; North 8° 11’ 28” West 32.85 feet; North
Kalbfell
9° 05’ 22” West 262.30 feet to a point in the
Revocable
southerly boundary line of lands now or
Trust and
formerly of Rogers; THENCE along said lands
Nanci Pinto 48/(5) Applies
of Rogers on a course North 86° 09’ 29” East
Kalbfell
206.30 feet passing through two iron pins set
Revocable
in the ground to a third iron pin set in the
Trust:
westerly side of said public highway;
13.-2-12
THENCE along the westerly side of said public
highway, the following courses and distances:
South 2° 04’ 28” East 52.74 feet; South 7° 57’
21” East 147.86 feet; South 3° 21’ 29” West
122.61 feet; South 4 ° 08’ 59” East 14 7 .86
feet; South 3°· 21’ 29” West 122.61 feet; South
4 ° 08’ 59” East 141.55 feet and South 12° 59’
53” East 134.08 feet to the point or place of
BEGINNING.”

(Pls. Ex. 67a).
“RUNNING THENCE along said land now or
formerly of Rogers, north 88 degrees 21
minutes 59 seconds west, 91.20 feet, south 88
degrees 10 minutes 01 second west, 168.21
Anthony feet to land now or formerly of the New
Luca & York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad
Filomena 52/(5) Company; THENCE along said land, north Applies
Didomenico: 14 degrees 18 minutes 29 seconds west, 34.23
13.-2-14 feet, north 17 degrees 52 minutes 29 seconds
west, 134.49 feet to a fence post and lands
now or formerly of Cushman; THENCE along
said land now or formerly of Cushman, north
00 degrees 30 minutes 49 seconds west, 132

45
feet to a drilled hole and lands now or formerly
of O’Hara; THENCE along said lands now or
formerly of O’Hara, north 88 degrees 14
minutes 00 seconds east, a distance of 311.01
feet to an iron pin at the westerly side of Route
Nos. 216 and 311; THENCE along said
westerly side of Route Nos. 216 and 311, south
05 degrees 15 minutes 11 seconds west, 7.15
feet and south 00 degrees 00 minutes 01I
second west, 292.85 feet to the point or place
of BEGINNING.”

(Pls. Ex. 71a).
Matthew &
No limiting language identified.
Catherine
14/(5) Applies
Castellano:
(Pls.’ Ex. 41a).
13.-2-19
“Thence along the northerly line of N.Y.S.
Route 52, North 88-07-00 West 51.91 feet to a
point; Thence along lands now or formerly
Silveri (Doc. #2005-10707) and generally
along the remains of a wire fence, North 17-28-
55 East 347.29 feet to a point; Thence
continuing along lands now or formerly Silveri
(Doc. #2005-10707), North 81-41-00 West
250.41 feet to a point; Thence along lands now
or formerly Nicolari (Doc. #2000-1987), along
lands now or formerly Beal (Doc. #1999-
10589), along lands now or formerly Large
Gavin &
LLC (Doc. #2004- 2338) and along a stone
Louise
walk North 13-45-00 East 7.68 feet, North 17-
Skinner:
80/(5) 46-00 East 61.23 feet, North 15-03-00 East Applies
132800-
83.00 feet and North 15-59-00 East 303.95 feet
6557-03-
to a point; Thence along lands now or
435119-0000
formerly Metro North Commuter Railroad
Company (Liber 1956 page 339), South 80-
29-00 East 412.44 feet to a point; Thence
along lands now or formerly Tucker & Gosen
(Liber 1994 page 116) and along a stone wall,
South 70-40-00 East 117.29 feet to a point;
Thence along lands now or formerly White
(Liber 1661 page 217) and along a stone wall,
South 15-23-00 West 77.50 feet, South 11-10-
00 West 21.50 feet, South 17-14-00 West
43.60 feet, South 11-18-00 West 52.00 feet,
South 17-12-00 West 60.00 feet and South 14-

46
19-00 West 168.17 feet to a point; Thence
along Parcel I as shown on said Filed Map No.
3928, North 81-41-00 West 232.62 feet to a
bent iron pin found, South 38-45-50 West
35.93 feet to an iron pin found and South 17-
28-55 West 310.00 feet to the point or place of
beginning.”

(Pls.’ Ex. 99a).
“RUNNING THENCE along the line of said
lands now or formerly of Amanda C. Hoffman
along a stone wall, North 80 degrees l 7
minutes 40 seconds West, 163.18 feet and
North 81 degrees 35 minutes 40 seconds West,
405.14 feet to the easterly side of Cushman
Road; THENCE along the easterly side of
Cushman Road, North 02 degrees 51 minutes
00 seconds East, 210.20 feet, North 01 degree
Brache- 18 minutes 00 seconds East, 201.40 feet and
Lanza North 04 degrees 24 minutes 03 seconds East, Rebutted,
Family 10/(5) 117.69 feet to lands now or formerly of Keith does not
Trust: 13.-2- and Juliet Irvine; THENCE leaving said road apply
61.1 and running along said lands now or formerly
of Keith and Juliet Irvine, North 86 degrees 52
minutes 30 seconds East. 601 .96 feet to the
westerly exterior line of said lands now or
formerly of Con-Rail Corp; THENCE along
the line of said lands, South 06 degrees 13
minutes 10 seconds West, 585.99 feet to the
point of BEGINNING.”

(Pls.’ Ex. 38a).
“South 05 degrees 24’ 33” West 184.80 feet;
thence North 81 degrees 50’ 27” West 59.40
feet; thence South 05 degrees 24’ 33” West
178.20 feet to a point; running thence along
lands now or formerly of Metro North
William
Commuter Railroad Company South 77
Antalek:
degrees 58’ 49” West 219.74 feet to a point;
132800- 6/(5) Applies
. . . North 01 degrees 00’ 00” East 445.50 feet
6657-03-
to a point running thence in the midst of
145245-0000
Seaman Road a/k/a Back Road) South 83
degrees 00’ 00” East 243.99 feet; thence South
05 degrees 24’ 33” West 8.59 feet; thence
along the southerly line of Seaman road (a/k/a
Back Road) South 81 degrees 50’ 27” East

47
59.40 feet to the point or place of
BEGINNING.”

(Pls.’ Ex. 34a).
Paul T.
Brady
Revocable
Trust
& Donna R. No limiting language identified.
Brady 11/(5) Applies
Revocable (Pls.’ Ex. 39a).
Trust:
132800-
6657-03-
226236-0000
“[T]hence, South 79 degrees 22’ 30” East
along the southerly side of said highway,
196.90 feet; thence continuing along the
southerly side of said highway, South 77
degrees 41’ 30” East 129.55 feet; thence
continuing along the southerly side of said
Michael
highway, South 77 degrees 02’ 00” East 492.95
Gallo, Jr.:
feet to a point; thence, South 79 degrees 20’
132800- 37/(5) Applies
00” West 930.05 feet to a point; thence along
6657-03-
a fence, North 8 degrees 50’ 10” West 178.20
195259-0000
feet; thence, South 78 degrees 24’ 50” East
59.40 feet; thence, North 8 degrees 50’ 10”
East 184.80 feet to the point or place of
BEGINNING.”

(Pls.’ Ex. 59a).
The Mikiel
Family
No limiting language identified.
Trust:
57/(5) Applies
132800-
(Pls.’ Ex. 76a).
6657-03-
208229-0000

48
3. The Maybrook Trail

The United States also moves for
summary judgment on the basis that
several Plaintiffs are unable to establish
both causation and just compensation
due to the existence of the “Maybrook
Trail.” 10 (Def.’s Mot. at 34–38). The
Maybrook Trail, which runs along
several of the subject properties to this
litigation, was opened in 2020
(predating the NITU), and is currently
being utilized as a pedestrian walking
and biking trail. (Id. at 34; Pls.’ Reply at
20 (“It is not disputed that there is a trail
on part of the corridor that is subject to
the NITU.”)). First, the United States
posits that the Group D Plaintiffs cannot
establish causation, because the
Maybrook Trail makes it impossible for
Plaintiffs to prove “that the STB’s NITU
has taken something from the Group D
landowners . . . [as the] pre-existing use Image of the Maybrook Trail (Def.’s Mot., Ex. 4 at 8,
of the railroad corridor for walking and ECF No. 43-4)
biking” would continue even in the
NITU’s absence. (Def’s Mot. at 35–36). Second, the United States argues that Plaintiffs are
unable to meet their burden of proof on the element of just compensation. (Id. at 36–38).

i. Causation

For its causation argument, the United States first points to Caquelin. (Def.’s Mot. at 35).
The Caquelin court held that “a NITU does not effect a taking if, even in the absence of a NITU,
the railroad would not have abandoned its line (a necessary prerequisite for termination of the
easement under state law) during the period of the NITU.” Caquelin, 959 F.3d. at 1363. This is
because, in such circumstances “the NITU takes nothing from the landowner that the landowner
would have had in the absence of the NITU.” Id. Relying on this principle, the United States
argues that “there can be no taking if the Plaintiffs would never have their land back
unencumbered by a trail but for the NITU[.]” (Def.’s Mot. at 35). However, the land’s current
encumbrance by the Maybrook Trail does not constitute evidence that the Railroad would not, in

10
The United States asserts this argument for twenty-three (23) of the claims in this matter
(“Group D”). (See Def.’s Ex. 4, ECF No. 43-4). This grouping does not correlate with any of
Plaintiffs’ groupings.

49
fact, have abandoned its line absent the NITU. Instead, the Court must consider a variety of
factors to properly discern the Railroad’s intent. See Sauer West, 151 F.4th at 1346.

Pursuant to the Trails Act, the “railbanking” process typically begins when the rail carrier
files either an abandonment application or a request for an exemption with the STB. Caldwell v.
United States, 391 F.3d 1226, 1229 (Fed. Cir. 2004 (citing 49 U.S.C. §§ 10903, 10502)). Upon
the STB’s approval and publication of the notice of exemption, any potential trail operator can
file a railbanking petition which must include “(1) a map of the right-of-way, (2) a statement
indicating that the trail operator will assume financial and legal liability for the right-of-way, and
(3) an acknowledgement that the right-of-way may be reactivated for railroad use in the future.”
Id. (citing 49 C.F.R. § 1152.29(a)). Assuming the petition meets the proper criteria, and the
railroad agrees to negotiate with the petitioner, the STB will issue a NITU which permits the
railroad “discontinue service, cancel tariffs, and salvage track and other equipment . . . without
consummating abandonment[.]” Id. A taking is accomplished when the NITU blocks state law
reversionary property interest that would otherwise take effect pursuant to normal abandonment
proceedings. Caquelin, 959 F.3d at 1363 (citing Caldwell, 391 F.3d at 1236)). When no trail-use
agreement has been reached, but the NITU compels the railroad to delay its abandonment, the
issuance of a NITU may effect a temporary physical taking. Ladd, 630 F.3d at 1023–24. In the
absence of a trail use agreement, it must be clearly shown that the railroad intended to abandon
its lines during the NITU period but was prevented from doing so by the existence of the NITU.
Memmer, 50 F.4th at 145.

In order reach the question of whether the Plaintiffs here have established causation, the
Court must first determine the proper analytical framework as set forth by the Federal Circuit. A
NITU alone is not sufficient to establish that the government has caused a taking; the Court
should take a totality of the circumstances approach to discern “whether [the railroad] would
have consummated abandonment in the absence of the NITU.” Sauer West, 151 F.4th at 1346. In
Sauer West, the Circuit discussed many different factors that the Court could consider when
seeking to discern the railroad’s intent; these factors included things such as (1) the railroad’s
request to abandon the line; (2) refusing to consent to an extension of the NITU; (3)
abandonment of the line within months of the NITU’s expiration; (4) whether the NITU
authorized track removal during the NITU period; and (5) whether the railroad did in fact
remove tracks. Id. (citing Caquelin, 959 F.3d at 1373; Memmer, 50 F.4th at 145 (comparing
different factors considered in Caquelin and Memmer)). The Circuit, however, pointed out how
in Sauer West the Claims Court considered additional factors beyond those listed in Caquelin,
including: (1) six one-year extensions to negotiate the trails agreement; (2) improvements to the
Line; (3) no removal of tracks; (4) railcar storage on the line; (5) negotiations with other parties
to reopen the Line, and (6) the eventual decision not to abandon. Id. (citing Sauer West v. United
States, 168 Fed. Cl. 49, 68 (2023) (finding plaintiffs had not demonstrated that the railroad
would have abandoned the line and therefore failed to establish causation)).

Notably, none of these cases state that a plaintiff is unable to recover damages due to
their land being encumbered by a trail that pre-existed the NITU. The Circuit’s focus has always
been on the NITU’s issuance and, in the absence of a trail use agreement, the railroad’s intent, or
lack thereof, to abandon the rail line. For these reasons, the Court does not find the United
States’ arguments persuasive, as they appear to suggest that real-world conditions—namely, the
Maybrook Trail—eliminate the need to apply the totality-of-the-circumstances approach

50
articulated by the Circuit. The United States’ reliance on Loveridge only heightens the Court’s
concerns with its position.

The United States contends that the “real-world conditions” of this case are comparable
to the circumstances in Loveridge v. United States. (Def.’s Mot. at 34 (citing Loveridge v. United
States, 174 Fed. Cl. 379, 389–90 (2024), appeal docketed, No. 25-1244 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 4, 2024)).
Specifically, the United States argues that “[t]he construction of and continued maintenance of
the Maybrook Trail is inconsistent with an intent to abandon MNR’s property rights in this
corridor.” (Id. at 36). To start, the United States’ suggestion that MNR’s “construction and
continued maintenance” of the Maybrook Trail is somehow indicative of MNR’s intent not to
abandon the rail line is simply illogical. (Id.). The purpose of the Trails Act is to “preserve the
right-of-way for future use, and, in the interim, convert the corridor into a recreational trail[;]” a
railroad acting in accordance with the Act’s stated purpose does not preclude the Court from
finding a taking occurred. Dimarino, 2025 WL 2985487, at *2 (Fed. Cl. May 13, 2025) (quoting
Chicago Coating Co. LLC v. United States, 892 F.3d 1164, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (internal
citation omitted)). 11 It is hardly surprising that MNR—having volunteered to assume financial
and legal responsibility for the proposed trail—would take steps to ensure that its pre-existing
trail remained serviceable. Moreover, had a trail-use agreement already been executed and a trail
constructed pursuant to that agreement, MNR’s actions would be entirely consistent with, if not
expected of, a trail sponsor. In any event, maintenance of the Maybrook Trail is fundamentally
distinct from the continued maintenance of the rail line itself, and the former provides no basis
for concluding that the Railroad would not have abandoned the line.

The Court also finds United States’ comparison of the present case to Loveridge lacking.
In Loveridge, the Port of Tillamook Bay Railroad (“POTB”) entered a third-party contract to
operate a scenic train known as the “Oregon Coast Scenic Railroad” (“OCSR”) prior to the
issuance of the NITU. Loveridge, 174 Fed. Cl. at 388. OCSR did not conduct freight services but
instead was established to educate the public about railroad’s logging history. Id. Because the
language of POTB’s easements were broad, the decision to enter a third-party contract with
OCSR would most likely not have exceeded the scope of their easement. See id. at 390 (citing
Loveridge v. United States, 150 Fed. Cl. 143, 150 (2020)). 12 However, this issue was never
properly before the Court.

11
The United States also argues that there can be no causation because “MNR has not elected to
consummate abandonment of [the rail] line.” (Def.’s Mot. at 40). But this argument fails for the
same reasons, namely MNR has not consummated abandonment because it continues to pursue a
trail-use agreement, but this is an expected part of the railbanking process and does not resolve
the question of whether a taking occurred. See Galt Auto., 2025 WL 3012202, at *4.
12
Interestingly, during the liability phase of the litigation, neither party disclosed OCSR’s
existence which resulted in a finding by Judge Firestone that a taking had occurred. Loveridge, at
389. During a subsequent site visit to the rail line, the Court was surprised to find the scenic train
operating on the subject rail line. Loveridge, 174 Fed. Cl. at 389. The existence of the scenic

51
To be clear, Loveridge was concerned with the possibility that the railroad’s third-party
agreement with OCSR was a use contemplated by the broad scope of the subject easement.
Loveridge, 174 Fed. Cl. at 390 (“[T]he scenic rail was in operation on the same rail corridor prior
to and after the issuance of the NITU . . . I certainly think it impacts the decision of whether
there was a taking to begin with.”). This is not the same scenario, and the United States’
arguments fail to comport with the Court’s analysis in Loveridge. Here, the United States is not
arguing that the Maybrook Trail is a use contemplated by the underlying easement, rather it
asserts that the mere existence of the trail prevents the Plaintiffs’ from establishing causation
because their land would remain encumbered. (Def.’s Mot. at 35). Again, the government’s
position elevates the effects of “real-world conditions” over the express terms of the railroad’s
deed. Under this reasoning, a railroad could hypothetically construct a trail despite deed
language limiting its interest to railroad purposes, and later, when seeking to abandon the line,
argue that the plaintiffs cannot establish causation because their property would remain
encumbered even in the absence of the NITU. The Loveridge decision made no such finding, and
the United States has not cited any case supporting this approach. Adopting it would create a
loophole that would allow the United States to avoid paying just compensation after depriving
property owners of the reversionary interests to which they are entitled. Having clarified the
proper analysis set forth by the Circuit, the Court proceeds to determine whether the Plaintiffs
have established causation.

First, MNR filed an abandonment application with the STB, reflecting its intent to
abandon the rail corridor. (Pls.’ Mot., Ex. 6, ECF No. 38-6). It is clear from the filings that MNR
is filling the shoes of the trail operator. MNR states that it acknowledges that use of the line “is
subject to MNR, as owner and sponsor of the proposed trail,” and that it is assuming
responsibility for any financial and legal liability that may arise. (Pls.’ Mot., Ex. 6 at 4). MNR
also acknowledged that the right-of-way will be subject to potential reactivation of the rail line.
(Id. at 5). MNR’s application was accepted, which led to the STB’s issuance of a NITU. (Pls.’
Mot., Ex. 7, ECF No. 38-7). Upon approving MNR’s Abandonment Application, the STB
specifically notes that “MNR is both the owner of the Line and the trail sponsor, [therefore] the
negotiations that normally take place to reach a trail use agreement as contemplated under 49
C.F.R. § 1152.29 may not be needed.” (Id. at 2).

Second, MNR has on several occasions stated its intent to abandon the line to pursue
recreational trail use to the STB. (See Pls.’ Ex. 26 at 4 (“This Verified Notice concerns MNR’s
planned abandonment of the [rail line]”), 5 (“MNR intends to consummate the proposed
abandonment[.]”), and 6 (“MNR is seeking abandonment of the Line”)). 13 In the absence of
convincing evidence to the contrary, these statements strongly indicate MNR’s intent to abandon
the rail line. See Galt Auto., 2025 WL 3012202, at *4 (“MNR’s self-expression of its intent to

train, previously unknown during the liability stage, raised questions about whether a taking had,
in fact, occurred. Id. at 390. The Court expressed significant concern that this information had
not been expressly presented during the liability phase and noted that the scenic train “may have
altered the liability outcome.” Id. at 390.
13
Citations to page numbers are those assigned by CM/ECF.

52
abandon, and the United States failure to rebut the presumption of abandonment, left no doubt
that a taking had in fact occurred.”) (citing DiMarino, 2025 WL 2985441, at *3).

To rebut this presumption, the United States submits a Declaration from Susan Sarch,
former Vice President and General Counsel for MNR, in which she states:

MNR uses the existing rail yard near Hopewell Junction and portions of the
Beacon Line property for storage of equipment and materials used in MNR’s
provision of commuter rail service on its active rail lines; however, MNR
does not use the Beacon Line for any other purposes except for fiber optic
communication (there is a fiber optic cable spanning the entire Beacon Line).

(Decl. of Susan Sarch, at ¶ 19, ECF No. 43-6). There also does not seem to be any evidence that
MNR has removed any tracks, even from along the areas alongside the Maybrook Trail. (Def.’s
Mot. at 41). Even so, while MNR has sought and obtained a one-year extension of the NITU, the
United States acknowledges that service on the rail line has been discontinued for some time
now. (Def.’s Mot. at 40 (“[T[here is no dispute that service on the Beacon Line has only been
discontinued[.]”)).

The Court finds that the United States has not presented evidence “affirmatively
indicating the railroad would have delayed abandonment . . . had there been no NITU[.]” Sauer
West, 151 F.4th at 1346. MNR’s fiber optic cable and use of one rail yard are insufficient to find
in favor of the United States. Plaintiffs, however, have demonstrated that MNR would have
abandoned the rail line absent the NITU. Again, MNR’s statements and reaffirmance support this
finding. (See Pls.’ Ex. 26). Therefore, the Court DENIES the United States’ Motion as to
causation. Additionally, while the United States moved for summary judgment as to causation
specifically as to Group D Plaintiffs, the Court’s finding is also applicable to any Plaintiffs
outside of this Group who have successfully demonstrated an interest in the rail corridor.
Therefore, the Court GRANTS partial summary judgment, as to causation, for any Plaintiff who
has demonstrated a property interest as discussed earlier in this decision. 14

ii. Just Compensation

Next, the United States argues that the Plaintiffs cannot meet their burden of proof as to
just compensation because their expert reports failed to account for the Maybrook Trail. (Def.’s
Mot. at 36–38). According to the United States, Plaintiffs’ expert (“Mr. Nordine”) was expressly
instructed by legal counsel “not to consider [the Maybrook Trail] in the ‘Before’ scenario of his
appraisal reports.” (Id. at 37 (emphasis in original)). Therefore, the United States claims that Mr.
Nordine’s reports fail to provide an opinion of market value that incorporates the Maybrook Trail
but instead are based on a “counter-factual Hypothetical Condition” that the land within the
corridor is unencumbered. (Id.).

14
For Plaintiffs whose property interests have not yet been determined, this finding would be
instructive if those interests are established.

53
Where a taking has been established, property owners bear “the burden of proving an
actual loss has occurred” to determine just compensation. Otay Mesa Prop., L.P. v. United
States, 779 F.3d 1315, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Landowners bear the burden of establishing a
railroad corridor’s value, which is a factual inquiry. Memmer v. United States, 150 Fed. Cl. 706,
753–54 (2024). Landowners bear the burden of establishing the value of the railway corridor.
Hyatt v. United States, 170 Fed. Cl. 417, 432 (2024) (internal citations omitted). Property owners
meet this burden if they show actual damages “with reasonable certainty.” Ind. Mich. Power Co.
v. United States, 422 F.3d 1369, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2005). This “requires more than a guess, but less
than absolute exactness.” Precision Pine & Timber, Inc. v. United States, 596 F.3d 817, 833
(Fed. Cir. 2010).

The Federal Circuit has recognized that traditional compensation methods are not
exclusive, and that alternative valuation approaches may be appropriate in cases involving the
taking of an easement. See Vaizburd v. United States, 384 F.3d 1278, 1285–87 (Fed. Cir. 2004);
see also Yaist v. United States, 17 Cl. Ct. 246, 257 (1989) (“[t]he court may use its judgment in
selecting the method to determine fair market value.”). In ruling on disputes over valuation
standards in takings cases, the Court is cognizant of the guiding principle that “just compensation
should be carefully tailored to the circumstances of each particular case.” Otay Mesa Prop., L.P.
v. United States, 670 F.3d 1358, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2012). The Court seeks “the full

[Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.]

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11224906. Public record. Not legal advice.