# Piccolo

> District Court, S.D. New York · October 31, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11224642

## Case

- **Full name:** Arthur Piccolo v. New York City Board of Elections
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. New York
- **Decided:** October 31, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11224642

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding standing to challenge practice of allegedly administering prison legal assistance program differently based on the gender of the prisoner
- holding that a signature requirement made it more likely that plaintiffs would have “a more narrow choice of delegates pledged to the various presidential candidates” “if [plaintiffs’] statistical arguments are credited”

## Opinion text

USDC SDNY
DOCUMENT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT □□□ BILED
DATE FILED: 10/31/2025
ARTHUR PICCOLO,
Plaintiff, 1:25-cv-2617-GHW
-y- ORDER
NEW YORK CITY BOARD OF ELECTIONS,
Defendant. 2

GREGORY H. WOODS, United States District Judge:
I. INTRODUCTION
Arthur Piccolo thinks that he should be the Mayor of New York City. Rather than
collecting signatures in support of a petition to appear on the ballot—or doing any other work that
has been revealed to the Court—Mr. Piccolo filed this lawsuit demanding that the Court order that
he be placed on the primary ballot as a Democratic nominee for Mayor. Mr. Piccolo asserts that the
petition process administered by the New York City Board of Elections (the “Board”’) ts
constitutionally defective. He seeks structural injunctive relief, on the theory that this relief will give
him a fair shot at running in future elections. The Board moved to dismiss his claims for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a clam. Because Mr. Piccolo has not shown that
he has standing to pursue his claims and because the provisions of New York’s election law that he
challenges do not violate the United States Constitution, the Court GRANTS the Board’s motion to
dismiss.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The New York City Board of Elections
The New York City Board of Elections is a commission of ten members, appointed by the
New York City Council and entrusted with administering New York City elections. N.Y. Elec. Law

§3-200. “Each of the major political parties shall be eligible to recommend appointment of an equal
number of commissioners.” Id. § 3-200(2). The “major political parties” are the “two parties which
polled for their respective candidates for the office of governor the highest and next highest number
of votes at the last preceding election for such office.” Id. § 1-104(24).
New York election law outlines the process by which the Board must conduct primary
elections. See N.Y. Election Law §§ 6-100, et seq. As is relevant to this case, the “designation of a

candidate for party nomination at a primary election . . . shall be by designating petition.” Id. § 6-
118. A designating petition for a New York City mayoral primary must be filed “in the office of the
Board of Elections” of New York City, id. § 6-144, “not earlier than the thirteenth Monday before,
and not later than the twelfth Thursday preceding the primary election,” id. § 6-158(1). The
petitioning period is approximately five weeks long. See id. § 6-134(4). Only enrolled voters of a
party may sign a designating petition for a candidate seeking to appear on the ballot as a member of
that party. Id. § 6-132. The signatures must be ink signatures. Id. An individual may also seek
office by filing an “independent nomination,” which only requires that the signatories be registered
voters who have not signed another petition nominating “the same or a different person for the
same office.” Id. § 6-138. State law does not prescribe a minimum number of signatures needed for
a designating petition for the New York City mayoral primary, but states that “[f]or any office to be
filled by all voters of the city of New York,” the “number of signatures need not exceed . . . seven
thousand five hundred signatures.” See id. § 6-136(2)(a). The New York City Charter requires a

candidate for mayor to obtain 3,750 signatures for either a designating petition or an independent
nominating petition. See N.Y.C. Charter § 1057-b(a)(1). New York law deems a petition
“presumptively valid if it is in proper form and appears to bear the requisite number of signatures,
authenticated in a manner prescribed by [Chapter 17 of New York law].” N.Y. Election Law § 6-
154(1). After a petition has been certified, any eligible voter may file written objections within three
days. Id. § 6-154(2).
B. Facts1
0F
Mr. Piccolo alleges that he was a “serious,” “legally qualified” candidate for Mayor of New
York City. Compl. at 3–5. He alleges that he sought the Democratic party’s nomination for the
position. Id. at 3. He alleges that he had a “robust campaign platform” and “demonstrable public
support based on his well known and highly respected community activities.” Id. at 9. Mr. Piccolo
alleges that he is responsible for various accomplishments related to Bowling Green Park and that
he had a “24-point campaign platform.” PI Ex. Among other accomplishments, Mr. Piccolo alleges
that he is responsible for the “world famous Charging Bull” at Bowling Green and the “First St.
Pat[r]ick’s Day Parade.” Id. at 3. He alleges that despite these accomplishments, he was not well-
funded, and that he did not have the institutional support of the Democratic party. Compl. at 9.
Mr. Piccolo alleges that prior to filing the complaint, he did not try to collect signatures for a
designating petition. Opp. at 4. He alleges that the people who had qualified for the June 2025
Democratic primary were all “aligned with the Democratic Party structure in New York City.”
Compl. at 14–15. He also alleges that at least some candidates on the ballot “did not meet the
signature requirement.” Opp. at 4.
In addition to his allegations concerning the June 2025 Democratic primary campaign, Mr.
Piccolo alleges that there are several flaws with the petition process to secure a place on the primary
ballot. He alleges that the process has three “interlocking issues.” Compl. at 5. First, he alleges that

the partisan makeup of the Board favors “entrenched party interests” and “disadvantag[es]
1 The facts relevant to this motion are drawn primarily from Plaintiff’s complaint. Dkt. No. 1, (“Compl.”), and are
accepted as true for the purposes of this motion. See, e.g., Town of Babylon v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 699 F.3d 221, 227 (2d
Cir. 2012). However, “[t]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is
inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In light of Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court
considers supplemental allegations made by Plaintiff in opposition to the Board’s motion, Dkt. No. 54-2 (“Opp.”), Dkt.
No. 54-3, and supplemental allegations made by Plaintiff in connection with his motion for a preliminary injunction,
Dkt. No. 16 (“PI Ex.”). See Johnson v. Wright, 234 F. Supp. 2d 352, 356 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (deeming factual allegations
contained in pro se plaintiff’s brief to “supplement” his pleading).
candidates that are independent of” the two major parties that make up the Board. Id. Second, he
alleges that the petition process is one of the “most burdensome in the nation,” because candidates
must physically collect ink signatures that “exceed legal minimums by as much as threefold” “in
order to safeguard against challenges.” Id. at 7. He alleges that this process is burdensome because
it requires physical signature collection “within a narrow time window, often in freezing weather.”
Dkt. No. 54-3 at 1. Finally, he alleges that the verification and challenge process is “vulnerable to

errors and fraud.” Compl. at 7–8. He alleges that this is the result of the “delegation of signature
verification to unregulated private actors.” Opp. at 4. Moreover, Mr. Piccolo, citing reports in the
media, alleges that the Board has “long been mired in inefficiency and mismanagement.” Compl. at
10–14. He also alleges that other jurisdictions have “successfully adopted fully secure electronic
petitioning systems for ballot access.” Id. at 10.
C. Prior Proceedings
Mr. Piccolo, acting pro se, filed a complaint against the Board on March 26, 2025. See Compl.
As a result of his limited financial resources, Chief Judge Laura T. Swain—to whom this case was
assigned—granted him leave to proceed in forma pauperis, without paying the required filing fee. Dkt.
No. 5. In his complaint, he alleges that the Board’s petition process violated his constitutional
rights. Compl. at 14–16. He alleges violations of his equal protection rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment because the Board’s process favors “well-funded candidates or those backed by
established party machines.” Id. at 15. He also alleges violations of his First Amendment rights,

both because the Board’s procedures “silence” him as an “individual candidate” “by making it nearly
impossible to qualify” for a party’s nomination, and because he is “deprived of a genuine choice” as
a voter. Id. at 16. His complaint sought two forms of injunctive relief: first, for the Court to order
the Board to grant him access to the primary ballot for the June 2025 Democratic primary; and
second, for the Court to order the Board to implement “a secure, digital petitioning system with
real-time verification . . . and to undertake comprehensive structural and administrative reforms to
eliminate partisan bias.” Id. at 24.
On April 7, 2025, Mr. Piccolo filed a motion for a preliminary injunction ordering the Board
to place him on the June 24, 2025 primary ballot. Dkt. No. 10. He argued that he faced “immediate
and irreparable harm” because the petition process made it “virtually impossible” for him to
otherwise access the ballot. Id. at 1. He also argued that he was likely to succeed on the merits

because “[t]he U.S. Supreme Court has struck down similarly burdensome ballot-access
frameworks.” Id. at 2 (citing Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983), Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S.
23 (1968), and Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279 (1992)). Finally, he argued that his participation on “fair
constitutional grounds” was in the public interest. Id.
The Board filed a brief in opposition on May 8, 2025. Dkt. No. 30. The Board first argued
that Plaintiff failed to file and serve a notice of constitutional question as required by Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 5.1(a). Id. at 5. The Board argued that because the state had not had an opportunity
to intervene to defend its statutes, Plaintiff should be denied interim relief. Id. Next, the Board
argued that because Plaintiff had failed to promptly move for injunctive relief, his motion should be
denied under the Supreme Court’s decision in Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1 (2006). Dkt. No. 30 at
5–8. The Board noted that the application for preliminary injunctive relief was filed four days after
the last day to file a petition for the June 2025 primary. Id. at 7. Turning to Plaintiff’s argument that
he would suffer irreparable harm, the Board argued that Mr. Piccolo did not have a presumptive

right to be a candidate, and even if he did, he could not tie the alleged constitutional violations to
any personal harm because he himself had failed to even attempt to gather signatures. Id. at 8–10.
Finally, the Board argued that Plaintiff did not have any likelihood of succeeding on the merits on
his Equal Protection claim both because the claim arose out of Plaintiff’s failure to build a campaign
and because the state law requirements were rationally related to the State’s interest in regulating
elections. Id. at 10–12.
In a hearing on May 8, 2025, the Court denied Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction.
Dkt. No. 39 (“Tr.”). The Court construed Plaintiff’s claims to be a “facial challenge to the
constitutionality of N.Y. Election Law § 6-130, et seq.” Id. at 23:1–2. The Court held that, evaluating
the state laws restricting ballot access under the Anderson-Burdick framework, Plaintiff’s claims did

not “have a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, nor [did they] raise a sufficiently serious
question going to the merits.” Id. at 23:15–18. The Court found that the petition requirement was
“far from excessive,” even given the Plaintiff’s status as an “independent and nonparty backed
candidate.” Id. at 23:18–26:5.
D. The Board’s Motion to Dismiss
On July 1, 2025, the Board filed its motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Dkt. No. 52 (“Moving Br.”). The Board raised two principal arguments:
first, that Mr. Piccolo lacked standing to bring his equal protection challenge and second, that he had
failed to state a Section 1983 claim based on either the composition of the Board or the petitioning
process. On the first argument, the Board argued that Mr. Piccolo did not suffer injury-in-fact from
the Board’s partisan position because he was a Democratic candidate. Id. at 12. The Board also
argued that because Plaintiff had failed to file a petition, any controversy concerning a petition was
moot because the election had passed. Id. at 13. On the second argument, the Board first argued

that courts had rejected similar constitutional challenges to the Board’s composition, and that the
logic of those decisions applied to Mr. Piccolo’s challenge. Id. at 13–15. The Board finally argued
that the petitioning process was not unduly burdensome, and that the complaint failed to allege how
the petition process is “not rationally related to the State’s interest in regulating elections or its
legitimate concerns about fraud, verification of signatures, and the efficiency of the signature
gathering process.” Id. at 15–16.
On July 28, 2025, Plaintiff emailed his opposition to the Board. See generally Opp.
Responding to the Board’s standing argument, he argued that his exclusion from the ballot was
based on the “failure of the [Board]” to verify signatures, allowing individuals who he alleges did not
meet the signature target required to place him on the ballot. Id. at 3–4. He argued that he had

stated a claim because the Board’s composition and its signature verification process “undermines
equal protection and due process rights.” Id. at 5. He then argued that the cases cited by the Board
were distinguishable. Id. at 5–6. Mr. Piccolo concluded his opposition requesting that the Court
order expedited discovery and “consider scheduling an evidentiary hearing.” Id. at 7–9.
The Board filed a reply on August 18, 2025. Dkt. No. 54. The Board largely repeated the
arguments made in its moving brief relating to standing. Id. at 2–3. Responding to Plaintiff’s
argument that the Board allowed individuals who had not met the signature requirement onto the
ballot, the Board argued that Mr. Piccolo had not alleged that he had challenged any particular
petition. Id. at 4. The Board further characterized Mr. Piccolo’s claim that the Board should
implement electronic signature gathering as an argument for policy change rather than a
constitutional claim. Id. at 5–6.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss

A district court must dismiss a claim under Rule 12(b)(1) if a plaintiff fails to allege facts
sufficient to establish standing under Article III of the Constitution. See Cortlandt Street Recovery Corp.
v. Hellas Telecomm., 790 F.3d 411, 416–17 (2d Cir. 2015). The plaintiff bears the burden of “alleging
facts that affirmatively and plausibly suggest that [he] has standing to sue.” Id. at 417 (quotation and
alteration omitted). Each element of standing “must be supported in the same way as any other
matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence
required at the successive stages of the litigation.” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992).
Where, as here, “standing is challenged on the basis of the pleadings, we accept as true all material
allegations of the complaint, and must construe the complaint in favor of the complaining party.”
W.R. Huff Asset Mgmt. Co., LLC v. Deloitte & Touche LLP, 549 F.3d 100, 106 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting
United States v. Vazquez, 145 F.3d 74, 81 (2d Cir. 1998)) (cleaned up).

Constitutional standing has three “irreducible” elements:
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact—an invasion of a legally
protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent,
not conjectural or hypothetical. Second, there must be a causal connection between
the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury has to be fairly traceable to the
challenged action of the defendant, and not the result of the independent action of
some third party not before the court. Third, it must be likely, as opposed to merely
speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61 (internal citations and quotations omitted). Plaintiffs seeking injunctive
relief must also demonstrate that the identified injury-in-fact presents a “real and immediate threat
of future injury.” Shain v. Ellison, 356 F.3d 211, 215 (2d Cir. 2004). “A plaintiff pursuing injunctive
relief may not rely solely on past injury, but also must establish that ‘she is likely to be harmed again
in the future in a similar way.’” Calcano v. Swarovski N. Am. Ltd., 36 F.4th 68, 74 (2d Cir. 2022)
(quoting Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d 220, 239 (2d Cir. 2016)). “Such ‘threatened injury must
be certainly impending to constitute injury in fact, and . . . allegations of possible future injury are not
sufficient.’” Id. at 74 (quoting Am. Civ. Liberties Union v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 800 (2d Cir. 2015))
(emphasis in original). The “constitutional minima [of standing] are assessed as of the time the
lawsuit is brought.” Comer v. Cisneros, 37 F.3d 775, 787 (2d Cir. 1994) (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 569
n.4).
B. Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss
To survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), “a
complaint must allege sufficient facts, taken as true, to state a plausible claim for relief.” Johnson v.
Priceline.com, Inc., 711 F.3d 271, 275 (2d Cir. 2013) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–
56 (2007)). To determine plausibility, courts follow a “two-pronged approach.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 679 (2009). “First, although a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a
complaint, that tenet is inapplicable to legal conclusions, and threadbare recitals of the elements of a
cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d

66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009) (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). Second, a court determines
“whether the ‘well-pleaded factual allegations,’ assumed to be true, ‘plausibly give rise to an
entitlement to relief.’” Hayden v. Paterson, 594 F.3d 150, 161 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
679). Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim is a “context-specific task that
requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 679.
Because he is proceeding pro se, the Court must liberally construe Plaintiff’s submissions and
interpret them “to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons,
470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Pabon v. Wright, 459 F.3d 241, 248 (2d Cir. 2006)); see also,
e.g., Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (“A document filed pro se is ‘to be liberally
construed’ . . . .” (citation omitted)). This mandate “applies with particular force when a plaintiff’s
civil rights are at issue.” Bell v. Jendell, 980 F. Supp. 2d 555, 558 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (quoting Maisonet v.
Metro. Hosp. & Health Hosp. Corp., 640 F. Supp. 2d 345, 348 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)). However, “the liberal

treatment afforded to pro se litigants does not exempt a pro se party from compliance with relevant
rules of procedural and substantive law.” Id. at 559 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted);
see also Rahman v. Schriro, 22 F. Supp. 3d 305, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“[D]ismissal of a pro se complaint
is nevertheless appropriate where a plaintiff has clearly failed to meet minimum pleading
requirements.” (citing Rodriguez v. Weprin, 116 F.3d 62, 65 (2d Cir. 1997))).
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Standing
Mr. Piccolo has not alleged sufficient facts to establish his standing to bring this lawsuit
either as a candidate or as a voter. As a threshold matter, the Court only analyzes Mr. Piccolo’s
standing to seek prospective structural relief. “‘A plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each claim
and form of relief sought.’” Carver v. City of New York, 621 F.3d 221, 225 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting

Baur v. Veneman, 352 F.3d 625, 642 n.15 (2d Cir. 2003)). Mr. Piccolo’s request to be included on the
June 2025 ballot is moot because the primary has passed. See Indep. Party of Richmond Cnty. v. Graham,
413 F.3d 252, 256 (2d Cir. 2005). Therefore, the Court analyzes only whether he has standing to
pursue the structural injunctive relief he seeks. He does not.
i. Candidate Standing
Mr. Piccolo has not established that he has standing as a candidate to pursue his claims
under the either the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or the First
Amendment because he has not established that he suffered an injury in fact. Where a plaintiff
alleges violations of his equal protection rights, “‘the injury in fact is the denial of equal treatment
resulting from the imposition of the barrier, not the ultimate inability to obtain the benefit.’” Able v.
United States, 88 F.3d 1280, 1291 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting Northeastern Florida Chapter of Associated Gen.
Contractors v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 666 (1993) (internal quotations and alterations
omitted)). Standing to pursue an equal protection claim is established where: “(1) there exists a

reasonable likelihood that the plaintiff is in [a] disadvantaged group, (2) there exists a government-
erected barrier, and (3) the barrier causes members of one group to be treated differently from
members of [another] group.” Id. (quoting Comer, 37 F.3d at 793).
Even assuming that Mr. Piccolo meets the disadvantaged group requirement, his complaint
does not establish his standing to bring an equal protection claim because it does not allege that any
differential treatment is caused by a government-imposed barrier.2 The government-imposed
1F
barriers Mr. Piccolo alleges reduce his opportunity to compete for a spot on the primary ballot are
the absence of adequate signature verification, the partisan composition of the Board, and the
requirement that candidates gather ink signatures in-person. Compl. at 5–6. The first two are not
barriers at all. On the facts alleged in the complaint, they work to the advantage of candidates like
Mr. Piccolo. First, Mr. Piccolo alleges that he sought to appear on the Democratic primary ballot,
and the Democratic party is one of the two major political parties that comprise the Board’s
membership. See Sloan v. Michel, No. 15-cv-6963, 2016 WL 1312769, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2016)
(dismissing equal protection challenge to composition of New York City Board of Elections because
the plaintiff was a member of the Republican party). Second, the alleged absence of adequate
signature verification makes it more likely that Mr. Piccolo and candidates like him could appear on
the primary ballot. As his opposition suggests, he could have submitted a petition with fewer than
the required number of signatures and still appeared on the ballot. See Opp. at 4.
Mr. Piccolo has not pleaded sufficient facts to establish that the physical signature
requirement results in denial of equal treatment. On its face, the physical signature requirement

2 The Court does not believe that Mr. Piccolo has adequately pleaded that he is a member of a disadvantaged group as
required by Comer to establish standing to pursue a claim under the Equal Protection Clause. Courts applying the
disadvantaged group requirement in Comer to equal protection challenges to the administration of facially neutral laws
have found standing in cases where the allegedly disadvantaged group was defined by a characteristic traditionally subject
to protection under the Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., Thomas v. City of New York, 143 F.3d 31, 34, 36 n.9 (2d Cir.
1998) (finding standing to challenge a law discriminating against “livery car base station operators, who are alleged to be
predominantly African Americans and Hispanics”); Harnage v. Dzurenda, 176 F. Supp. 3d 40, 47 (D. Conn. 2016) (finding
standing to challenge practice of allegedly administering prison legal assistance program differently based on the gender
of the prisoner). Before issuing its decision in Comer, the Second Circuit has also held that members of a major political
party had standing to pursue a challenge to New York election law based on the geographic distribution of members of
that party. See Rockefeller v. Powers, 74 F.3d 1367, 1382 (2d Cir. 1995) (“The plaintiffs point to a disparity between districts
with many Republicans and districts with few Republicans.”). Here, however, Mr. Piccolo does not identify any such
category as the source of his alleged disadvantage. As the Board argues, Mr. Piccolo is a member of the Democratic
party, the nomination of which he seeks. Rather, Mr. Piccolo alleges that he is disadvantaged because he lacks funding
and institutional support. And those deficits may, indeed, disadvantage his candidacy. However, the Court is unaware
of any legal support for the position that candidates with limited support are the kind of “disadvantaged group” that is
protected by the Equal Protection Clause. After all, the election system is designed to weed out candidates who do not
have support.
applies to all candidates equally. See N.Y.C. Charter § 1057-b(a)(1). Thus, to meet this requirement,
Mr. Piccolo must plead facts to establish that it is the administration of the provision that results in
different treatment to him as a member of a disadvantaged group. See Comer, 37 F.3d at 793 (holding
that plaintiff had standing to challenge a facially race neutral local housing preference policy that
caused African American residents to be treated differently because “the erection and application of
the local preference acts as a proxy for race . . . .”); see also Rockefeller v. Powers, 74 F.3d 1367, 1376 (2d

Cir. 1995) (holding that a signature requirement made it more likely that plaintiffs would have “a
more narrow choice of delegates pledged to the various presidential candidates” “if [plaintiffs’]
statistical arguments are credited”).
Mr. Piccolo has not met this burden. Despite alleging that inadequate signature verification
allows candidates who have acquired fewer than 3,750 signatures onto the ballot, Opp. at 4, Mr.
Piccolo pleads that it is difficult for some candidates to meet the ink signature requirement, Compl.
at 5–6. Even accepting these allegations as true, Mr. Piccolo does not have standing to assert this
claim because he did not attempt to meet the signature requirement. Opp. at 4. Nor does he allege
that he intended to do so. See generally Compl. To the contrary, he argues that he intentionally chose
not to. Tr. at 13:24–25. As a result, there is no basis on which the Court can conclude that the
signature requirement as administered results in differential treatment. See MGM Resorts Int’l Glob.
Gaming Dev., LLC v. Malloy, 861 F.3d 40, 47–48 (2d Cir. 2017) (holding that casino developer that
had “not alleged any concrete plans to enter into a development agreement with a Connecticut

municipality[] or demonstrated any serious attempts at negotiation” lacked standing to challenge
state law creating special registration pathway for federally recognized Native American tribes).
Accordingly, Mr. Piccolo has not established standing to maintain an equal protection challenge to
any of the alleged barriers he identifies.
Mr. Piccolo also has not established standing to pursue his claims as a candidate under the
First Amendment. The injury he asserts is that the petition process imposed a “de facto barrier” to
his ability to get on the primary ballot, which “nullif[ied] his campaign.” Compl. at 16, 24. Since
Plaintiff seeks to challenge the statutes governing the petition process as far as they “regulat[e] [his]
ability to engage in interactive political speech and associational activity, [his] standing to challenge
the statute on its face is governed by the overbreadth doctrine.”3 Lerman v. Bd. of Elections in City of
2F
New York, 232 F.3d 135, 144 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing Secretary of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467
U.S. at 947, 955–56 (1984)). “Under the overbreadth doctrine, [plaintiff] need only ‘demonstrate a
substantial risk that application of the provision[s] will lead to the suppression of speech.’” Id.
(quoting National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 580 (1998)). Mr. Piccolo has not
alleged sufficient facts to demonstrate a substantial risk that the laws governing the petition process
will suppress speech. He alleges that “the system effectively silences independent and grassroots
candidates by making it nearly impossible for them to qualify.” Compl. at 16. He does not allege
any facts that demonstrate this impossibility. He does not even allege facts demonstrating it was
impossible for him to qualify, because he does not allege that he tried to meet the requirements and
found the barriers insurmountable. Without more, Mr. Piccolo’s allegations that it is impossible for
certain candidates—himself included—to qualify for the primary ballot is another “conclusory
statement[],” and is insufficient to establish the constitutional minimum of standing. Harris, 572
F.3d at 72.
ii. Voter Standing

Mr. Piccolo’s standing to bring this lawsuit fares no better if the Court construes his injuries
as those of a voter because any injury is no more than a generalized grievance. To confer standing,
an injury must be particularized; in other words, it “must affect the plaintiff in a personal and

3 Though in his opposition he frames his injury as “exclusion from the 2025 Democratic primary ballot,” Opp. at 3–4,
he does not allege that he submitted a petition that his Board actually denied a petition he submitted. To the contrary,
he alleges that he “submitted no signatures.” Id. at 4.
individual way.” Soule v. Connecticut Ass’n of Sch., Inc., 90 F.4th 34, 45–46 (2d Cir. 2023) (quoting
Spokeo v. Robins, 572 U.S. 330, 339 (2016)); see also Collins v. Merrill, No. 16-cv-9375, 2016 WL
7176651, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2016) (Sullivan, J.) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 n.1).
“Accordingly, an injury that plaintiff ‘suffers in some indefinite way in common with people
generally’ will not suffice.” See Collins, 2016 WL 7176651, at *1 (quoting DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno,
547 U.S. 332, 344 (2006)). “‘[A] voter fails to present an injury-in-fact when the alleged harm is

abstract and widely shared or is only derivative of a harm experienced by a candidate.’” Id. at *2
(quoting Crist v. Comm’n on Presidential Debates, 262 F.3d 193, 195 (2d Cir. 2001)). Here, Mr. Piccolo
alleges that the voters of New York are injured because the “electorate is deprived of a genuine
choice”—meaning any choice that excludes him. Compl. at 16. This is a quintessential generalized
grievance, insufficient to confer standing. See Collins, 2016 WL 7176651, at *2. (dismissing a
complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction where the plaintiff’s complaint is “premised entirely
on alleged injuries that [the] [p]laintiff shares with the general voting population . . . .”).
Accordingly, Mr. Piccolo’s complaint must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
B. Merits
Even if Mr. Piccolo’s complaint can be read to establish his standing to bring this lawsuit, his
constitutional challenge to the petitioning process fails on the merits. “[C]ourts evaluate challenges
to state action restricting ballot access under the Anderson-Burdick framework, and vary the level of
scrutiny applied depending on the burden that the state law imposes on First and Fourteenth

Amendment Rights.” Libertarian Party of New York v. New York Bd. Of Elections, 539 F. Supp. 3d 310,
320 (S.D.N.Y. 2021) (citing Libertarian Party of Connecticut v. Lamont, 977 F.3d 173, 176 (2d Cir.
2020)). “[W]hen a state election law provision imposes only ‘reasonable, nondiscriminatory
restrictions’ upon the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of voters, ‘the State’s important
regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify’ the restrictions.” Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S.
428, 434 (1992) (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983)).4
3F
The burden imposed by the ink signature requirement and the verification process is both
reasonable and nondiscriminatory. When assessing the burden of a ballot access measure requiring
signatures, “[w]hat is ultimately important is not the absolute or relative number of signatures
required but whether a reasonably diligent candidate could be expected to be able to meet the
requirements and gain a place on the ballot.” Libertarian Party of Connecticut v. Lamont, 977 F.3d 173,
178–79 (2d Cir. 2020) (internal quotations and citation omitted). “[A] requirement that ballot
access petitions be signed by at least 5% of the relevant voter pool is generally valid, despite any
burden on voter choice that results when such a petition is unable to meet the requirement.” Prestia
v. O’Connor, 178 F.3d 86, 88 (2d Cir. 1999).
New York City’s requirement is 3,750 signatures, which is far less than 5% of Democratic
voters in New York City. See Tr. at 24:12–16. This is not an excessive burden, nor is it a
discriminatory one. See SAM Party of New York v. Kosinski, 987 F.3d 267, 276 (2d Cir. 2021)
(upholding a signature requirement of 1,500 signatures or 5 percent of the off-year electorate for
county and state assembly offices, whichever is less). While the possibility of legal challenges to
petitions might increase the burden for a particular candidate, the presumptive validity of a
designating petition offsets that burden. Cf. Schulz v. Williams, 44 F.3d 48, 57 (2d Cir. 1994) (“Past
history indicates that the advantages of presumptive validity have made the ballot largely accessible
to third-party contenders in New York.”).

The minimal burden of the signature requirement is rationally related to New York’s interest

4 The Supreme Court has suggested that there does not exist a “constitutional right to have a ‘fair shot’ at winning [a]
party’s nomination.” New York State Bd. of Elec. v. Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. 196, 205 (2008). However, the Second Circuit
has applied the Anderson-Burdick framework in the context of candidates challenging the actions of the New York State
Board of Elections during a party’s primary. See Yang v. Kosinski, 960 F.3d 119 (2d Cir. 2020). As discussed below, even
assuming the Mr. Piccolo has experienced constitutional injury as a candidate sufficient to establish standing, his claims
do not have merit.
in regulating elections. “Just as States may require persons to demonstrate ‘a significant modicum
of support’ before allowing them access to the general-election ballot . . . , they may similarly
demand a minimum degree of support for candidate access to a primary ballot.” New York State Bd.
of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. 196, 204 (2008) (quoting Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 442
(1971) (internal quotations omitted)).
Mr. Piccolo’s argument that the partisan composition of the Board results in further ballot

access restriction is unavailing. In his opposition, he argues that the Board’s partisan membership
is a “structural delegation of ballot gatekeeping to private political actors,” and is therefore a
constitutionally deficient ballot access restriction. Opp. at 6. However, the Board is not a private
actor. It is a creature of state law. See N.Y. Election Law § 3-200. Though the major political
parties may recommend Board members, they are ultimately appointed by the New York City
Council—another public body. Id. §§ 3-200(2)–(3). It is true that the Board is composed of
members of the two major political parties and has broad responsibilities in administering elections.
But New York law provides for a process by which any voter can challenge a designating petition.
N.Y. Election Law § 6-154(2).5 And even though New York law “give[s] the major political
4F
parties . . . broad authority in supervising the administration of elections,” this practice “does not
by itself unconstitutionally burden fundamental voting or associational rights.” Green Party of State of
New York v. Weiner, 216 F. Supp. 2d 176, 193 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (Lynch, J.). Accordingly, Mr. Piccolo
has not stated a claim under Section 1983 for violations of his rights as guaranteed by the First or
the Fourteenth Amendment.
C. Possible State Law Claims
Having dismissed his federal claims, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over any state law claims that his complaint may be read to suggest. The liberal construction

5 The Court notes that Mr. Piccolo has not alleged that he challenged any designating petition.
afforded to submissions by pro se litigants requires consideration of potential state law claims, even
if the plaintiff does not specifically assert state law claims. See McLeod v. Jewish Guild for the Blind, 864
F.3d 154, 156–57 (2d Cir. 2017). To the extent that Mr. Piccolo asserts claims under state law, the
Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any such claims. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§1367(a), “in any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts
shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action

within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III
of the United States Constitution.” However, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), the exercise of
supplemental jurisdiction over a plaintiff’s state law claims is within the Court’s discretion if it has
“dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” The Second Circuit counsels against
exercising supplemental jurisdiction in such a situation: “[I]f the federal claims are dismissed before
trial, even though not insubstantial in a jurisdictional sense, the state claims should be dismissed as
well.” First Capital Asset Mgmt., Inc. v. Satinwood, Inc., 385 F.3d 159, 183 (2d Cir. 2004) (internal
quotations omitted) (quoting Castellano v. Bd. of Trs., 937 F.2d 752, 758 (2d Cir. 1991)). Having
dismissed all of Mr. Piccolo’s federal claims, and there being no other basis for federal jurisdiction,
the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any potential state law claims. See 28
U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Accordingly, the Court dismisses any state law claims without prejudice.
D. Leave to Amend
The Court will not grant Mr. Piccolo leave to amend his complaint. District courts generally

should grant a self-represented plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to cure its defect,
unless amendment would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123–24 (2d Cir. 2011);
Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). Indeed, the Second Circuit has cautioned that
district courts “should not dismiss [a pro se complaint] without granting leave to amend at least once
when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.”
Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Gomex v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d
794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999)). However, amendment ts futile where there is a substantive problem with a
cause of action that cannot be cured by pleading additional facts. See cd (affirming district court’s
dismissal with prejudice because “the problem with [the pro se plaintiff's] causes of action is
substantive” and “better pleading will not cure it”). Mr. Piccolo’s complaint is legally deficient
because the features of New York’s election law that he challenges are not invalid under the United
States Constitution. Repleading will not cure this deficiency. Accordingly, the Court dismisses his
federal claims with prejudice.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Board’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED. Plaintiffs federal
claims are dismissed with prejudice and his state claims are dismissed without prejudice. The Court
certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that any appeal from this order would not be taken in
good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United
States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).
‘The Court requests that counsel for Defendant provide Plaintiff with copies of unpublished
cases cited in this decision pursuant to Local Rule of the United States District Courts for the
Southern and Eastern Districts of New York 7.2. ‘The Clerk of Court ts directed to enter judgment
for Defendant, to terminate the motion pending at Dkt. No. 50, to mail a copy of this order to
Plaintiff by certified mail, and to close this case.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: October 31, 2025
New York, New York
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11224642. Public record. Not legal advice.