# Perez

> District Court, S.D. New York · September 25, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11222035

## Case

- **Full name:** Eric Andrew Perez v. Dr. Neil C. Evans, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. New York
- **Decided:** September 25, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11222035

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that appellant demonstrates good faith when seeking review of a non-frivolous issue
- noting “the lack of a RICO damages remedy for even direct personal injuries”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
--------------------------------------------------------- X
:
ERIC ANDREW PEREZ, :
:
Plaintiff, :
: 24-CV-356 (VSB) (SN)
- against - :
: OPINION & ORDER
DR. NEIL C. EVANS, et al., :
:
Defendants. :
:
--------------------------------------------------------- X

Appearances:

Eric Andrew Perez
San Antonio, FL
Pro se Plaintiff

Rebecca Lynn Salk
United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York
New York, NY
Counsel for Defendants Dr. Neil C. Evans, Carol Johnson, George Reed Grimes, Damian
Williams, and Melanie Jay

Jodyann Galvin
Cheyenne Nicole Freely
Hodgson Russ LLP
Buffalo, NY
Counsel for Defendant Dr. Mark J. Mulligan

Alexander Cousins
Arthur Edward Brown
Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP
New York, NY
Counsel for Defendants AstraZeneca AB, AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals LP, and AstraZeneca
UK Ltd.
VERNON S. BRODERICK, United States District Judge:
Before me are pro se Plaintiff Eric Andrew Perez’s objections to Magistrate Judge Sarah
Netburn’s Report and Recommendation, which recommends that I dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint with prejudice. For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff’s objections are OVERRULED,
Judge Netburn’s Report and Recommendation is ADOPTED in its entirety, and Plaintiff’s

Amended Complaint is DISMISSED with prejudice.
Factual Background
Plaintiff Eric Andrew Perez (“Plaintiff” or “Perez”), a veteran of the United States
Marine Corps, participated in a clinical trial of AstraZeneca’s COVID-19 vaccine at the
Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”). (Doc. 37 (“Am. Compl.”) ¶¶ 6, 21.) Perez claims that
he received the vaccine in two doses, on December 22, 2020, and January 19, 2021. (Id. ¶ 37;
see also Doc. 132 (“Report”) at 2.) Immediately after receiving the first dose of the vaccine,
Plaintiff states that he began suffering from a host of medical issues, including migraines, non-
alcoholic fatty liver disease, and persistent peroneal vein thrombosis in his right calf, all of which

Plaintiff attributes to the vaccine. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 31, 33.)
In February 2021, the director of the vaccine study informed Plaintiff that he had not
received the vaccine and instead received a placebo. (Id. ¶ 29.) Plaintiff alleges that the portion
of his medical record indicating he received a placebo is fraudulent and was created as part of a
broader conspiracy. (Id. ¶¶ 22, 29.)
Plaintiff then filed a claim through the Health Resources & Services Administration’s
Countermeasures Injury Compensation Program (“CICP”), (id. ¶¶ 27, 35), which is a federal
program that compensates serious injuries or deaths that occur because of the administration of
certain countermeasures during public health emergencies, (see Report at 3 (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 247d-6e; 42 C.F.R. § 110)). The COVID-19 vaccine was declared a “covered countermeasure”
on March 17, 2020, pursuant to the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act (“PREP
Act”). Id. (citing 85 Fed. Reg. 15,198, at 15202 (Mar. 17, 2020).) CICP requested additional
information and records from Plaintiff about his claim, and Plaintiff in turn filed a HIPPA
request with the VA Medical Records Office requesting documentation of his participation in the

AstraZeneca study. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 43–45.) On September 13, 2023, the VA Medical Records
Office denied Plaintiff’s request due to his failure to properly complete the necessary paperwork.
(See Doc. 1-1 at 6.)
Based on these events, Plaintiff asserts that his CICP claim is being “deliberately
obstructed” by members of the federal government. (Am. Compl. ¶ 21.) Plaintiff alleges the
existence of a widespread racketeering conspiracy between all Defendants to cover up
experimentation on veterans through the COVID-19 vaccination program. (Id. at 9; see also id.
¶¶ 29, 35.) He claims his medical records have been deliberately altered as part of a cover-up of
the conspiracy, and that certain Defendants have illegally cloned his electronic devices and

iCloud, allowing them to delete and alter his records. (Id. ¶¶ 27, 29, 35, 38.)
Procedural History
On January 16, 2024, pro se Plaintiff filed his complaint. (Doc. 1.) That same day,
Plaintiff filed a consent to receive electronic service through the ECF system. (Doc. 4.) On
April 3, 2024, I referred this case to Magistrate Judge Robyn F. Tarnofsky for general pretrial
management. (Doc. 25.) On April 9, 2024, the referral was reassigned to Magistrate Judge
Sarah Netburn. On April 25, 2024, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint against various
Defendants, including Dr. Neil C. Evans, Carol Johnson, Dr. Mark J. Mulligan, George Reed
Grimes, Damian Williams, AstraZeneca LP, AstraZeneca AB, AstraZeneca UK Lmdt, Melanie
Jay, AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals LP, and AstraZeneca UK Ltd. (Am. Compl.)
On September 6, 2024, Defendant Mark J. Mulligan moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint. (Doc. 99.) The same day, Defendants AstraZeneca AB, AstraZeneca
Pharmaceuticals LP, and AstraZeneca UK Ltd. (collectively, the “AstraZeneca Defendants”) also
moved to dismiss, (Doc. 101), as did Defendants Neil C. Evans, George Reed Grimes, Melanie

Jay, Carol Johnson, and Damian Williams (collectively, the “Federal Defendants”), (Doc. 103).
On December 11, 2024, I referred the motions to dismiss to Magistrate Judge Netburn for a
Report and Recommendation. (Doc. 125.)
On May 15, 2025, Magistrate Judge Netburn issued a thorough 27-page Report and
Recommendation (the “Report”), recommending that I grant the motions to dismiss and dismiss
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint with prejudice. (See Report at 26.) The Report notes that
because Plaintiff cannot allege new facts to cure the deficiencies in the Amended Complaint,
amendment would be futile with respect to all of his claims. (Id. at 24.)
On May 22, 2025, I granted Plaintiff’s request to extend his time to object to the Report

to July 14, 2025. (Doc. 135.) On July 14, 2025, Plaintiff filed objections to the Report. (Doc.
136 (“Obj.”).) On July 28, 2025, Defendant Mark Mulligan filed a response to Plaintiff’s
objections, (Doc. 138), as did the AstraZeneca Defendants, (Doc. 139). On July 29, 2025, the
Federal Defendants filed a response to Plaintiff’s objections. (Doc. 140.)
On July 28, 2025, Plaintiff moved for a temporary restraining order. (Doc. 141.) On
August 1, 2025, I issued an order informing Defendants that they need not respond to the motion
for a temporary restraining order until after I issue my opinion regarding the pending Report.
(Doc. 142.)
On September 19, 2025, Plaintiff filed a motion “requesting that the Court enter an
emergency order directing the immediate preservation of all evidence and information
potentially relevant to the above-captioned matter,” (Doc. 144 at 1), in addition to another
motion for preservation of evidence, (Doc. 145), and a proposed order granting Plaintiff’s
motions, (Doc. 146).
Legal Standard

After a magistrate judge issues a report and recommendation, a district court may
“accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the
magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). “To accept the report and recommendation of a
magistrate [judge], to which no timely objection has been made, a district court need only satisfy
itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record.” Trs. of Drywall Tapers & Pointers
Loc. Union No. 1974 Benefit Funds v. Cite C Corp., No. 17-CV-9304, 2019 WL 1745743, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). Where specific objections are
made, the court is obligated to review the contested issues de novo. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3).
However, when “the objecting party makes only conclusory or general objections, or simply

reiterates the original arguments,” the court will review the report only for clear error. Jones v.
Smith, No. 09-CV-6497, 2012 WL 1592190, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 2012) (collecting cases).
“Moreover, parties may not raise new arguments for the first time in objections to a report and
recommendation.” Erickson v. Jernigan Cap., Inc., 692 F. Supp. 3d 114, 120 (S.D.N.Y. 2023).
In other words, “a party is not to be afforded a second bite at the apple when filing objections to
a Report and Recommendation, as the goal of the federal statute providing for the assignment of
cases to magistrate[] [judges] is to increase the overall efficiency of the federal judiciary.”
Michaud v. Nippon Cargo Airlines, Co., No. 09-CV-3375, 2011 WL 5402642, at *1 (E.D.N.Y.
Nov. 7, 2011) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). Even where exercising de novo
review, a “district court need not . . . specifically articulate its reasons for rejecting a party’s
objections or for adopting a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation in its entirety.”
Morris v. Loc. 804, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 167 F. App’x 230, 232 (2d Cir. 2006) (summary
order).
Pro se complaints are afforded “special solicitude” and must be interpreted to “raise the

strongest arguments that they suggest.” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 477
(2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, a pro se litigant is still “obligated to
comply with the relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.” Doe v. Torres, No. 05-CV-
3388, 2006 WL 290480, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2006). Accordingly, “where a pro se party’s
objections to a report and recommendation are ‘conclusory or general,’ or where a plaintiff
‘simply reiterates his original arguments,’ the report should be reviewed only for clear error.”
DeGrate v. Broad. Music, Inc., No. 12-CV-1700, 2013 WL 639146, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20,
2013) (quoting Walker v. Vaughan, 216 F. Supp. 2d 290, 292 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)).
Discussion

Plaintiff filed 81 pages of objections, in addition to 184 pages of exhibits. Without
counting the pages of exhibits, Plaintiff’s objections alone are three times the length of the
Report itself, which is far longer than the permissible length of memoranda under the Local
Rules in this District, see S.D.N.Y. Civ. Rule 7.1, as well as my Individual Rules, see Rule 4.B,
Individual Rules & Practices in Civil Cases for Judge Vernon S. Broderick, and contrary to the
purpose of referrals under the Federal Magistrates Act, which is to create efficiency. See United
States v. Gardin, 451 F. Supp. 2d 504, 507 (W.D.N.Y. 2006).
Plaintiff acknowledges that he “used Chat GPT to draft his first draft of this
submission.”1 (Obj. 2 n.1.) Plaintiff includes seventeen footnote citations to ChatGPT
throughout his objections, including, for instance, a citation to a copy of a conversation in which
an anonymous user, presumably Perez, prompted ChatGPT to “prepare legal memorandum
countering government sovereignty claims.” (See, e.g., Obj. 46 n.28.) ChatGPT generated a

non-case-specific legal memorandum in response, much of which is included in Plaintiff’s
Objections verbatim. (See Obj. 46–47.)
Although I am unaware of any applicable federal or local rules prohibiting the use of AI
during the course of litigation, see Gordon v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A. Inc., No. 24-CV-388, 2025
WL 1057211, at *3 (M.D. Ga. Apr. 8, 2025); Nelson v. Wash. Bd. of Indus. Appeals, No. 25-CV-
5551, 2025 WL 1772085, at *1 (W.D. Wash. June 26, 2025), and my Individual Rules do not
address the use of AI, litigants, including pro se parties, must adhere to their obligations under
Rule 11(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 11(b) states, in part, that “[b]y
presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or other paper . . . [an] unrepresented party

certifies that to the best of the person’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an
inquiry reasonable under the circumstances . . . the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions
are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or
reversing existing law or for establishing new law; [and] the factual contentions have evidentiary
support or, if specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable
opportunity for further investigation or discovery.” At the bare minimum, this obligation
requires litigants to carefully review every statement and citation drafted by AI to ensure that it is
legally and factually correct, particularly given that AI tools make it much easier for pro se

1 ChatGPT is a generative artificial intelligence (“AI”) tool.
litigants to submit “voluminous” briefing. See Thornock v. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, No. 25-CV-56, 2025 WL 1900314, at *4 n.5 (E.D.
Va. July 9, 2025).
Here, Plaintiff failed to meet his obligations under Rule 11. At least two citations in
Plaintiff’s objections appear to be “hallucinated,” a term used for citations produced by AI “that

conform to the Bluebook, but ultimately are not real.” Benjamin v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 779
F. Supp. 3d 341, 342 (E.D.N.Y. 2025); see also Legal ChatGPT: Tips, Prompts, and Use Cases,
American Bar Association (Mar. 21, 2025),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/law_practice/resources/law-technology-today/2025/legal-
chatgpt-tips-prompts-and-use-cases/ (“AI-powered chatbots are prone to hallucinations, have
trouble understanding contextual nuances of the law, and have trained-in biases.”). Since the
advent of generative AI, hallucinated cases have become a disturbing problem in legal filings,
and the “epidemic of citing fake cases has continued unabated.” Benjamin, 779 F. Supp. 3d at
343; see also Hall v. Acad. Charter Sch., No. 24-CV-08630, 2025 WL 2256653, at *4 (E.D.N.Y.

Aug. 7, 2025) (“Regrettably, the number and regularity with which courts have been faced with
hallucinations in court filings continues to rise both in this country and abroad.”); Pegnatori v.
Pure Sports Techs. LLC, No. 23-CV-01424, 2023 WL 6626159, at *5 n.5 (D.S.C. Oct. 11, 2023)
(“[T]hus far ChatGPT’s batting average in legal briefs leaves something to be desired.”). Not
only do citations to hallucinated cases run afoul of a litigant’s obligation to verify that legal
contentions are “warranted by existing law” under Rule 11(b), fake citations are also a profound
waste of the opposing party’s time, as well as the Court’s time. As one court put it:
When used carelessly, [AI] produces frustratingly realistic legal fiction that takes
inordinately longer to respond to than to create. While one party can create a fake
legal brief at the click of a button, the opposing party and court must parse through
the case names, citations, and points of law to determine which parts, if any, are
true. As AI continues to proliferate, this creation-response imbalance places
significant strain on the judicial system.
Ferris v. Amazon.com Servs., LLC, 778 F. Supp. 3d 879, 880–81 (N.D. Miss. 2025).

Here, Plaintiff’s argument that service of process on Defendant Mark Mulligan was
substantially compliant utilizes the quotation “[w]hen there is actual notice, every technical
violation of the rule or failure of strict compliance may not invalidate the service of process.”
(Obj. 28.) Plaintiff attributes that quotation to Concepcion v. City of New York, No. 05 Civ. 8501
(RJS), 2008 WL 5395720, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2008). (Id.) This citation appears real
because Concepcion v. City of New York, No. 05 Civ. 8501 (RJS), is a real case. However, there
is no December 17, 2008 decision in Concepcion, nor is there any opinion in the Southern
District of New York that corresponds to 2008 WL 5395720. Instead, through research I was
able to find the quoted language in Armco, Inc. v. Penrod-Stauffer Building Systems, Inc., 733
F.2d 1087, 1089 (4th Cir. 1984). In Armco, immediately after stating that not every technical
violation invalidates service where there is actual notice, the Fourth Circuit stated “[b]ut the rules
are there to be followed, and plain requirements for the means of effecting service of process
may not be ignored.” Id. The Armco court held that service of process was not valid and
remanded the case to the district court with instructions to vacate the default judgment entered
against the defendant as void on that basis. Id. at 1089–90. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s version of
the Armco quotation is not only falsely attributed to a hallucinated case, but it leaves out crucial

context undermining Plaintiff’s legal argument.
Similarly, in the PREP Act portion of Plaintiff’s objections, (Obj. 38–45), Plaintiff cites
United States v. Peterson, No. 3:17-cr-00065 (D. Conn. 2018), and states that “[i]n this case, the
court found that deception about the officers’ identity and intent undermined the validity of the
consent given.” (Obj. 41.) The case corresponding to No. 3:17-cr-00065 in the District of
Connecticut is actually United States v. Cook, et al., and there is no defendant in that case by the
name of Peterson or any language in that case that support Plaintiff’s statement. I suspect that
Defendant’s hallucinated citation is a scrambled version of United States v. Peterson, No. 3:18-
CR-00049, 2018 WL 6061571 (D. Conn. Nov. 20, 2018), a case which discusses the issue of law
enforcement officers making misrepresentations to a criminal defendant. However, the holding

of Peterson is the opposite of what Defendant claims. The Peterson court found that while
police began their interview with the defendant in a “somewhat misleading” manner, the
defendant nonetheless “voluntarily consented to the officers entering into and remaining in his
home” given the totality of the circumstances. Id. at *6–7. Use of these “hallucinations” are a
violation of Rule 11(b) and a tremendous waste of my time and the parties’ time.2 Nonetheless, I
decline to impose sanctions on Plaintiff for his violation of Rule 11(b), in part due to Plaintiff’s
admission to using ChatGPT. Setting aside for the moment the AI-related issues with Plaintiff’s
submission, the majority of the objections do not warrant my consideration under the law.
Indeed, for the reasons stated below, I would overrule Plaintiff’s objections without the

identified AI issues.
Plaintiff attempts to relitigate nearly every aspect of the motions to dismiss that were
before Magistrate Judge Netburn and which were analyzed and addressed in the Report. In
addition, Plaintiff introduces many new factual contentions and lines of argument. It is well-
settled that when the objecting party “simply reiterates the original arguments,” the court will
review the report only for clear error. See Jones, 2012 WL 1592190, at *1 (collecting cases). It
is equally well settled that “new arguments and factual assertions cannot properly be raised for

2 It is possible that Plaintiff’s brief contains other “hallucinated” citations. Due to its substantial length and the fact
that I find the objections without merit, I have not expended the time to verify each citation in the brief.
the first time in objections to the report and recommendation, and indeed may not be deemed
objections at all.” Piligian v. Icahn Sch. of Med. at Mount Sinai, 490 F. Supp. 3d 707, 716
(S.D.N.Y. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted); Advanced Access Content Sys. Licensing
Adm’r, LLC v. Shen, No. 14-CV-1112, 2023 WL 4348030, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 5, 2023) (same).
As most of Plaintiff’s objections seek to rehash arguments considered by Magistrate Judge

Netburn or to introduce new allegations and arguments, I need not and will not consider these
objections on an individual basis. (See, e.g., Obj. 71 (rehashing argument that Plaintiff asserts a
colorable claim under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act because he alleges unauthorized
access to his electronic health records, a claim which the Report comprehensively examined and
rejected (see Report at 17–20)); Obj. 35 (introducing new and unsubstantiated allegations that
Dr. Mulligan’s defense counsel is colluding with the FBI and Buffalo law enforcement to run a
“coercive harassment system” against Plaintiff)). See also Morris, 167 F. App’x at 232 (“The
district court need not . . . specifically articulate its reasons for rejecting a party’s objections or
for adopting a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation in its entirety.”). Nonetheless, I

address a few objections individually below.
At the beginning of Plaintiff’s lengthy objections, he asserts that “[t]he R&R
fundamentally misconstrues the factual basis and applicable law in this case” and “adopts the
Defendants’ arguments wholesale without construing the pro se Plaintiff’s claims liberally.”
(Obj. 1–2.) On this basis, he “objects to the R&R in full.” (Id. at 2.) A “conclusory or general
objection[]” will not be considered by a court. See Jones, 2012 WL 1592190, at *1 (collecting
cases). Thus, Plaintiff’s overarching conclusory and general objection to the Report does not
warrant consideration. However, even if I were to consider this objection, Plaintiff’s claim that
the Report fails to construe his claims liberally is simply not true. The Report repeatedly makes
clear not only that Plaintiff’s arguments were considered in their entirety but also that the
arguments were construed liberally. (See, e.g., Report at 18 (“The Court construes Plaintiff’s
pleadings liberally to assert a claim under 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g).”); see also Report at 22, 24, 26.)
The Report is replete with citations to the record, as well as to case law addressing the legal
standard for each of Plaintiff’s claims, most of which Plaintiff does not address in his objections.

Plaintiff’s objection to the Report on the basis that it failed to construe his pleadings liberally is
OVERRULED.
Next, Plaintiff objects to the Report’s finding that the action can be dismissed in its
entirety as to Dr. Mark Mulligan for insufficient service of process. (Obj. 28–35.) Plaintiff
argues that “(1) Dr. Mulligan received actual notice; (2) Plaintiff made multiple good-faith
efforts to serve him; and (3) Defense counsel refused to waive service.” (Id. at 28.) Notably,
these are all arguments for why Plaintiff’s failure to serve Mulligan should be excused. In other
words, Plaintiff does not contest that he failed to properly serve Mulligan.
Plaintiff’s arguments fail. First, “actual notice of suit [cannot] cure a failure to comply

with the statutory requirements for serving process.” Sartor v. Toussaint, 70 F. App’x 11, 13 (2d
Cir. 2002) (summary order); see also United States v. Thompson, 921 F.3d 82, 87 (2d Cir. 2019)
(“Actual notice of the suit does not cure defective service” (alterations adopted and internal
quotation marks omitted)). Second, although Plaintiff did attempt to serve Mulligan, he did not
show “good cause” for his failure to properly serve him. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). To the
contrary, the Report describes how, on various occasions, “Plaintiff was instructed by both
opposing counsel and the Court how to properly effectuate service,” and still failed to do so.
(Report at 7–8.) Third, it is true that an individual such as Mulligan “has a duty to avoid
unnecessary expenses of serving the summons” when a plaintiff requests a waiver of service and
complies with the procedural requirements of Rule 4(d) in doing so. However, Perez has not
shown that he triggered Mulligan’s duty to waive service by submitting a request to waive
service in writing with the information required by Rule 4(d). Furthermore, the only case law
Plaintiff cites in support of his argument that his failure to serve Mulligan should be excused is
Concepcion v. City of New York, No. 05 Civ. 8501 (RJS), 2008 WL 5395720, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.

Dec. 17, 2008), a hallucinated case that does not contain the quoted language Plaintiff attributes
to it. In any event, the Report also analyzes Plaintiff’s claims against Mulligan on the merits and
finds dismissal warranted under Rule 12(b)(6), stating that “Plaintiff should not be granted leave
to serve Dr. Mulligan because the claims against him are without merit.” (Report at 13.) Thus,
even if Plaintiff had properly served Mulligan or were to properly serve Mulligan in the future, it
would not resurrect the claims against him. Plaintiff’s objection regarding his failure to serve
Mulligan is OVERRULED.
Plaintiff also objects to the Report’s dismissal of all claims brought under the PREP Act
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff argues that jurisdiction is proper under the willful

misconduct exception to the PREP Act, and that the willful misconduct standard was satisfied.
(Obj. 38, 45.) Even if this were true, this would not save Plaintiff’s claims. The PREP Act
provides immunity from suit for the United States and manufacturers, distributors, program
planners, and other qualified persons who prescribed, administered, or dispensed a qualified
countermeasure, such as various COVID-19 vaccines. See 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d. Plaintiff is
correct that there is an exception to this immunity for “death or serious physical injury
proximately caused by willful misconduct.” 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(d)(1). However, the PREP
Act is clear that any suit brought pursuant to the willful-misconduct exception to immunity “shall
be filed and maintained only in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.” 42
U.S.C. § 247d-6d(e)(1); see also Palma v. Cabrini of Westchester, No. 22-CV-5430, 2022 WL
4240823, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2022) (“[E]ven if plaintiff alleged willful misconduct PREP
Act claims, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia is the exclusive forum for such
claims.”). Therefore, even assuming Plaintiff alleges a viable claim for willful misconduct under
the PREP Act, the Report correctly notes that I lack subject-matter jurisdiction over all PREP

Act claims and must dismiss any such claims under Rule 12(b)(1). Plaintiff’s objection
regarding the PREP Act is OVERRULED.
Plaintiff objects to the Report’s recommendation that his Racketeer Influenced & Corrupt
Organizations Act (“RICO”) claim against the AstraZeneca Defendants and Mulligan should be
dismissed for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff states that his “RICO claims were plausibly
alleged,” (Obj. 60), and that “Plaintiff alleges a coordinated scheme involving multiple predicate
acts including document falsification, fraud, and data manipulation,” (id. at 64). These
objections are conclusory, and I decline to consider them. See Jones, 2012 WL 1592190, at *1.
Plaintiff also asserts new factual allegations regarding an alleged RICO conspiracy. For

instance, Plaintiff states:
Plaintiff states that Astra Zeneca operates like a criminal enterprise. First, they
analyzed The market at hand and the laws which essentially stated that they could
sell poison to the world and face no consequences. Second, they had to enlist key
players in the United States government to enforce their scheme which include and
is not limited to coercion, targeting, Courts, and PRISM on various targets. Third,
emplace a network cyber war specialist within the agencies that would perform
various data replications, data modifications, and deletions within various agency
databases. . . . In this case AG Damian Williams colluded and joined forces with
the Middle District of Florida, Pasco County Sheriff’s Office to coerce and control
plaintiff EAP. Mr. Williams put maximum effort into the coercion and control of
plaintiff EAP through a covert network of confidential informants, con men,
network of Florida & NY Correctional Officers & Cadre, Religious organizations,
realtors, law enforcement owned construction companies, and home builders.
Plaintiff states that the SDNY led by Mr. Williams targeted plaintiff by using the
construction supervisor of his present neighborhood and the home builder DR
Horton to engineer purchases for collaborators, cooperators, and law enforcement
active and retired that are kin to and entered partnerships with Army CID and
Sandusky.
(Obj. 60–61.) I need not consider these allegations because “new arguments and factual
assertions cannot properly be raised for the first time in objections to the report and
recommendation.” WFCM 2016-LC25 W. Bay Area Boulevard, LLC v. Tyler, No. 21-CV-8865,
2025 WL 2424353, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2025) (quoting Garcia v. Lamanna, No. 18-CV-
5454, 2022 WL 3445433, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2022)).
Even if I were to consider these statements, Plaintiff’s new allegations amount to “vague
assertions of fraud and conspiracy” insufficient to make out a civil RICO claim. (Report at 16.)
Among other things, to allege a civil RICO claim Plaintiff must show the existence of an

enterprise, defined as “‘a group of persons associated together for a common purpose of
engaging in a course of conduct,’ the existence of which is proven ‘by evidence of an ongoing
organization, formal or informal, and by evidence that the various associates function as a
continuing unit.’” First Cap. Asset Mgmt., Inc. v. Satinwood, Inc., 385 F.3d 159, 173 (2d Cir.
2004) (quoting United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981). “Plaintiff[’s] conclusory
naming of a string of entities does not adequately allege an enterprise.” Id. at 175 (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 174 (finding that Plaintiffs failed to allege an enterprise
where they “failed to provide . . . any solid information regarding the hierarchy, organization,
and activities of this alleged association-in-fact enterprise, from which we could fairly conclude

that its members functioned as a unit” (internal quotation marks omitted)). In addition, Plaintiff
does not allege a “clear and definite” injury to business or property, as he must to make out a
civil RICO claim. See Denney v. Deutsche Bank AG, 443 F.3d 253, 266 (2d Cir. 2006). Instead,
Plaintiff alleges physical and emotional injury, (see, e.g., Obj. 79 (“Plaintiff has experienced
severe neurological symptoms, including paresthesia, muscle dysfunction, and autonomic
dysregulation”)), which are not cognizable forms of injury under RICO. See Williams v. Dow
Chem. Co., 255 F. Supp. 2d 219, 225 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“RICO provides recovery for injury to
business and property; it does not provide recovery for physical and emotional injuries.”); see
also Laborers Loc. 17 Health & Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 191 F.3d 229, 241 (2d Cir.
1999) (noting “the lack of a RICO damages remedy for even direct personal injuries”). Thus,

Plaintiff’s objection regarding his RICO claim is OVERRULED.
Finally, Plaintiff objects to the Report’s recommendation that Plaintiff should not be
granted leave to amend, stating “[p]ro se plaintiffs should be granted at least one opportunity to
amend absent futility.” (Obj. 80.) This is a correct statement of the law. The Report
acknowledges this, stating that “[g]enerally, a pro se litigant should be granted leave to amend to
cure any deficiencies in a complaint.” (Report at 24.) However, as Plaintiff acknowledges,
leave to amend need not be granted when amendment would be futile. See Kallas v. Fiala, 591
F. App’x 30, 31 (2d Cir. 2015) (summary order). Here, the Report correctly found that
amendment would be futile because “Plaintiff cannot allege new facts to cure the deficiencies in

his pleadings.” (Report at 24.) Plaintiff’s objections do not explain what additional facts he
would allege to salvage his claims, describe proposed amendments to his complaint, or assert in
what way the Report’s finding of futility is incorrect.3 Furthermore, as the Report notes, this is
Plaintiff’s fourth lawsuit bringing claims to redress the harm he believes he suffered through his
participation in the clinical trial of AstraZeneca’s COVID-19 vaccine, and each lawsuit has
failed “because of both substantive and procedural defects,” (Report at 26). See Perez v. Oxford

3 I liberally construe Plaintiff’s objection stating that there is no waiver of sovereign immunity for claims brought
under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), (see
Obj. 46–47), as a motion for leave to amend, as Plaintiff did not bring any claims under the FTCA or Bivens in his
Amended Complaint. As Plaintiff does not indicate what specific facts he would allege to make out a FTCA or
Bivens claim, leave to amend to add such claims is DENIED.
Univ., No. 21-CV-4844, 2022 WL 1468438 (S.D.N.Y. May 10, 2022); Perez v. Oxford Univ.,
No. 22-CV-1560 (D.D.C. Sept. 23, 2022); Perez v. Oxford Univ., No. 22-CV-7830, 2022 WL
15523951 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2022). There is no reason to believe that Plaintiff can remedy the
substantive and jurisdictional defects identified by the Report. Plaintiff’s objection to the
Report’s recommendation to deny leave to amend is OVERRULED.

Having overruled Plaintiff’s objections, I review the remainder of the Report for clear
error. See Wilds v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 262 F. Supp. 2d 163, 169 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
Finding no error, let alone clear error, I hereby ADOPT the entirety of the Report and DISMISS
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint in its entirety without leave to amend. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s
motions for preservation of evidence are hereby DENIED AS MOOT.
Temporary Restraining Order
Plaintiff also moves for a temporary restraining order prohibiting the VA from accessing,
modifying, or disseminating Plaintiff’s mental health records or relying upon or referencing a
fabricated diagnosis in any pending or future administrative or medical proceedings. (Doc. 141

at 11–12.) To obtain a temporary restraining order, the movant must show, among other things,
either a likelihood of success on the merits of his underlying claims or sufficiently serious
questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation. See Spencer Trask
Software & Info. Servs., LLC v. RPost Int’l Ltd., 190 F. Supp. 2d 577, 580 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)
(citing Jackson Dairy, Inc. v. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 596 F.2d 70, 72 (2d Cir. 1979)). As all of
Plaintiff’s claims are subject to dismissal, Plaintiff cannot make that showing here. J Bragg v.
Jordan, 669 F. Supp. 3d 257, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 2023) (“Where a party seeking a temporary
restraining order fails to establish a likelihood of success on the merits, ‘there is no need to
address the other prongs of the analysis.’” (quoting Oneida Nation of N.Y. v. Cuomo, 645 F.3d
154, 164 (2d Cir. 2011))); Jones v. Healthfirst, No. 18-CV-6834, 2018 WL 6706313, at *3
(E.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2018) (“Given the dismissal of the Complaint, there is no likelihood of
success on the merits of [pro se] Plaintiff's claims and therefore [the motion] seeking injunctive
relief is DENIED.”). Therefore, Plaintiff's motion for a temporary restraining order is DENIED.
VI. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Magistrate Judge Netburn’s Report and Recommendation is
ADOPTED in full. The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to terminate Docs. 99, 101, 103,
141, 144, and 145, dismiss this action with prejudice, and close the case.
The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this Opinion &
Order would not be taken in good faith and, therefore, in forma pauperis status is denied for
purposes of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962) (holding
that appellant demonstrates good faith when seeking review of a non-frivolous issue).
SO ORDERED.
Dated: September 25, 2025
New York, New York J _

Vernon S. Broderick
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11222035. Public record. Not legal advice.