# Hairston

> District Court, S.D. California · December 9, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11221845

## Case

- **Full name:** Kevin Tyrone Izal Hairston v. K. Juarez
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. California
- **Decided:** December 9, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11221845

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- observing that courts are not required to reach issues that are 10 |/“‘unnecessary to the results they reach”

## Opinion text

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
11 KEVIN TYRONE IZAL HAIRSTON, Case No.: 22-cv-01801-BAS-VET

12 Plaintiff,
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S
13 v. UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
14 K. JUAREZ,

15 (ECF No. 51)
Defendant.

16

17
18 Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (“Motion”). (ECF
19 No. 51.) Plaintiff Kevin Hairston (“Plaintiff”), a prisoner proceeding pro se, does not
20 oppose the Motion. (ECF No. 53.) For the reasons detailed below, the Court GRANTS
21 the Motion (ECF No. 51).
22 I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
23 On August 22, 2022, while housed at Richard J. Donovan Correction Facility,
24 Plaintiff broke free from an escort and rushed towards Defendant K. Juarez (“Defendant”)
25 with a flying kick, hitting him in the knee. (ECF No. 51 at 6.) Plaintiff continued to attack
26 Defendant, eventually knocking him off balance. (Id. at 6–7.) At the same time, a non-
27 party officer used pepper spray, spraying both Plaintiff and Defendant. (Id. at 7.)
28 Defendant then wrapped his arms around Plaintiff and forced him to the ground. (Id.)
1 While on the ground, Plaintiff continued to resist by kicking and thrusting his body, despite
2 repeated instructions to stop resisting. (Id.)
3 During the encounter, Defendant punched Plaintiff in the face three separate times.
4 (ECF No. 51 at 7.) Defendant describes the punches as a “distraction strike,” and contends
5 that each time, he was aiming for Plaintiff’s upper chest but inadvertently struck Plaintiff’s
6 face because Plaintiff was thrusting his body and resisting by kicking his feet. (Id.) During
7 this sequence of events, several officers gave Plaintiff loud and clear instructions to stop
8 resisting. (Id.) Plaintiff stopped resisting only after Defendant was able to apply leg
9 restraints. (ECF No. 51 at 7–8.) Officers removed Plaintiff from the area and placed him
10 in a holding cell in a climate-controlled area to relieve the effects of the pepper spray. (Id.
11 at 8.) Defendant alleges that he suffered the following injuries: (1) swelling and throbbing
12 pain to his third finger; (2) abrasions and pain to both knees; (3) swelling to his inside upper
13 lip; (4) pepper spray to right side of his chest/head area; and (5) lower back pain and
14 stiffness. (Id.)
15 Plaintiff asserts a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violation of the Eighth
16 Amendment based on excessive force. (ECF No. 8 at 3.) Plaintiff contends that Defendant
17 punched him in the face multiple times, while Plaintiff was lying down, completely
18 defenseless, and no longer a threat.1 (Id.)
19 On April 18, 2025, Defendant filed the instant Motion, arguing that Plaintiff cannot
20 meet his burden of proof of showing that Defendant used excessive force. (ECF No. 51.)
21 Defendant further contends that Defendant’s use of force was appropriate given Plaintiff’s
22 physical attack. (Id. at 11–14.) Finally, Defendant claims he is entitled to qualified
23 immunity against Plaintiff’s excessive force claim. (Id. at 6, 12.) Plaintiff filed a Notice
24 of Non-Opposition on May 2, 2025. (ECF No. 53.)
25
26
27 1 Plaintiff also alleges that he was left in a room with no medical attention after being pepper-sprayed,
which left him unable to breathe while experiencing a burning sensation. ECF No. 8 at 3. However,
28
1 II. LEGAL STANDARD
2 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, the Court may enter judgment on
3 factually unsupported claims or defenses, and thereby “secure the just, speedy, and
4 inexpensive determination of every action.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327
5 (1986). Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, discovery, and affidavits
6 show there is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to
7 judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A fact is material when it affects the
8 outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The
9 moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating an absence of genuine issues of
10 material fact. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. The moving party satisfies this initial burden
11 in two ways: “(1) by presenting evidence that negates an essential element of the
12 nonmoving party’s case; or (2) by demonstrating the nonmoving party failed to establish
13 an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case on which the nonmoving party bears
14 the burden of proving at trial.” Montgomery v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 12-cv-3057-
15 AJB (DHB), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185217, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2015). If the moving
16 party fails to meet this initial burden, summary judgment must be denied, and the court
17 need not consider the nonmoving party’s evidence. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 332.
18 If the moving party establishes the absence of genuine issues of material fact, then
19 the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and designate
20 “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 324. Courts view the
21 record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, “so long as their version of the facts
22 is not blatantly contradicted by the video evidence.” See Vos v. City of Newport Beach,
23 892 F.3d 1024, 1028 (9th Cir. 2018). However, “[t]he mere existence of video footage of
24 the incident does not foreclose a genuine factual dispute as to the reasonable inferences
25 that can be drawn from that footage.” Id.
26 The Court does not engage in credibility determinations, weighing of evidence, or
27 drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts; these functions are reserved for the trier
28 of fact. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. Further, a nonmovant’s bare assertions, standing alone,
1 are insufficient to create a material issue of fact and defeat a motion for summary
2 judgment. Id. at 247–48.
3 III. DISCUSSION
4 “In excessive force cases brought under the Eighth Amendment, the relevant inquiry
5 is whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or
6 maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hughes v. Rodriguez, 31 F.4th 1211, 1221
7 (9th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S.
8 1, 7 (1992)); see also Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320 (1986). To determine whether
9 force was “malicious and sadistic,” the Ninth Circuit applies the following five-factor test
10 referred to as the Hudson factors: “(1) the extent of injury suffered by an inmate; (2) the
11 need for application of force; (3) the relationship between that need and the amount of force
12 used; (4) the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials; and (5) any efforts
13 made to temper the severity of the forceful response.” Hughes, 31 F.4th at 1221 (quoting
14 Furnace v. Sullivan, 705 F.3d 1021, 1028 (9th Cir. 2013)). Courts accord wide-ranging
15 deference to prison administrators in the exercise of policies and practices that in their
16 judgment are needed to preserve internal security, safety and discipline. Whitley, 475 U.S.
17 at 321–22.
18 In support of the contention that his use of force was reasonable and not excessive,
19 Defendant offers, in part, his sworn declaration, Plaintiff’s deposition testimony, and video
20 footage of the incident generated by the correctional facility’s Audio-Visual System
21 Surveillance (“AVSS”) and a Body Worn Camera (“BWC”). See ECF Nos. 51-2 at Ex. A,
22 Depo. of Kevin Hairston, dated Mar. 4, 2025 (“Hairston Depo.”);2 51-3, Decl. of K. Juarez
23 (“Juarez Decl.”); 51-4, Decl. of E. Taboada at Exs. A (“AVSS Video”) and B (“BWC
24
25
26
27
2 Plaintiff’s deposition is attached as Exhibit A to the Declaration of S. Gray Gilmore.
28
1 Video”). In response, Plaintiff does not dispute any of Defendant’s evidence or otherwise
2 oppose the Motion. (See ECF No. 53.) Therefore, because the Motion is unopposed, the
3 Court considers all properly supported facts asserted by Defendant as undisputed. See Fed.
4 R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2) (if a party fails to properly address another party’s assertion of fact, the
5 court may consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion); see also Hartford Fire
6 Ins. Co. v. NBC Gen. Contractors Corp., No. C 09-5363 SBA, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
7 25629, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2013) (considering all properly supported facts as
8 undisputed because motion was unopposed).
9 Here, the undisputed evidence shows that Defendant was acting in response to
10 Plaintiff’s initial attack, an unprovoked attack that required seven officers to subdue him.
11 Plaintiff admits to kicking at the officers three or four times, which the AVSS Video
12 confirms. (See AVSS Video; Hairston Depo. at 32:7-19, 43:25, 44:1-3.) The same video
13 footage and testimony also confirm that Plaintiff initiated the altercation when he broke
14 free while being escorted to medical, ran towards officers, including Defendant, and lunged
15 at them with a “flying kick.” (See AVSS Video; Hairston Depo. at 24:6-20; 32:3-9; see
16 also Juarez Decl. at ¶ 3.) Plaintiff’s initial kick struck Defendant in the knee/thigh area,
17 and Plaintiff’s continued advancement forced Defendant backwards and eventually
18 knocked Defendant off balance. (See AVSS Video; see also Juarez Decl. at ¶¶ 3–4.) And
19 despite repeated commands by prison staff to stop resisting, Plaintiff kept kicking his feet,
20 thrashing his body, and attempting to stand up after Defendant forced him to the ground
21 following his initial attack. (See AVSS Video; Juarez Decl. at ¶¶ 4–6; see also BWC
22 Video.) The AVSS Video further shows that Defendant delivered the distraction strikes
23 when Defendant was resisting, thrashing on the ground, and refusing to follow commands.
24 (See AVSS Video; see also Juarez Decl. at ¶¶ 7–8.) Critically, Plaintiff charged at
25 Defendant and other officers while they were addressing a separate situation with another
26
27
3 Pursuant to the Court’s Order, Defendant lodged, in electronic format, for the Court’s
28
1 inmate who had manipulated his waist restraints by removing them from his waist and was
2 refusing orders to relinquish the waist restraints. (ECF No. 51-5 at 4.)
3 Moreover, Hairston suffered what appear to be minor injuries, consisting of pain in
4 his nose (not a broken nose) and “little cuts” inside of his mouth. (Hairston Depo. at 57:12–
5 58:3.) There is no evidence that those injuries required any significant medical care or
6 resulted in lasting injury. (Id. at 58:4–10.) To the extent Plaintiff suffered discomfort or
7 pain from being pepper-sprayed, that conduct is not at issue because another a non-party
8 officer is responsible for pepper-spraying Plaintiff, not Defendant. See Barren v.
9 Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (“Liability under § 1983 must be based
10 on the personal involvement of the defendant.”).
11 Considering the Hudson factors, Defendant reasonably perceived a need for the
12 application of force given that Plaintiff broke free from his escort and kicked Defendant
13 and other officers while they were tending to another inmate who had removed his waist
14 restraints. Further, following Plaintiff’s initial, unprovoked attack, Defendant applied
15 force only after Plaintiff failed to comply with commands and physically resisted efforts to
16 subdue him. By physically resisting Defendant and other officers, including kicking and
17 thrashing, Plaintiff threatened the safety of Defendant, other correctional officers, and at
18 least one other inmate. Defendant’s expert confirms that even while thrashing on the
19 ground, Plaintiff presented a threat given his ability to bite or headbutt officers. (See ECF
20 No. 51-6 at 5.) Plaintiff also created an institutional security risk given the presence of a
21 separate inmate who removed his restraints and was similarly resisting directions from
22 officers. Under these circumstances, a need for the application of force existed to effect
23 custody of Plaintiff.
24 Moreover, Defendant did not intentionally strike Plaintiff in the face. Instead,
25 Defendant used distraction strikes intended to strike Plaintiff in the upper torso/chest area,
26 a technique available to officers trying to defend against an attack and effect custody. (Id.)
27 Defendant inadvertently struck Plaintiff in the face because Plaintiff was thrashing on the
28 ground uncontrollably. While those strikes caused Plaintiff pain, specifically pain in his
1 nose, Plaintiff suffered minor injuries consisting of small cuts that required no medical
2 attention. See McCoy v. Stratton, No. 2:12-cv-1137 WBS DB, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
3 29940, at *17-18 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2017) (“The infliction of pain in the course of
4 implementing prison security measures does not amount to cruel and unusual punishment
5 even though it may appear, in hindsight, the degree of force was unreasonable.”).
6 In short, the evidence shows that Defendant struck Plaintiff with distraction blows
7 in a reasonable attempt to effect custody and eliminate the threat and security risk Plaintiff
8 posed. Plaintiff’s continued attempts to physically resist demonstrate that Plaintiff was not
9 amenable to verbal orders and that the force at issue was used after other attempts to subdue
10 Plaintiff failed. Defendant’s use of force was necessary to restore order following
11 Plaintiff’s unprovoked attack and did not result in a wanton and unnecessary infliction of
12 pain. Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendant applied force in a good-faith effort to
13 maintain or restore discipline, and not maliciously and sadistically to cause harm. As such,
14 Defendant meets his initial burden of presenting evidence that negates an essential element
15 of Plaintiff’s claim.
16 The burden now falls to Plaintiff to go beyond the pleadings and demonstrate a
17 dispute of material fact that could lead a jury to find that Defendant used excessive force
18 in response to Plaintiff’s attack. Plaintiff introduces no evidence to contest the evidence
19 Defendant presents and thus does not meet his burden of demonstrating a genuine issue of
20 material fact. As a result, Plaintiff cannot establish that Defendant used excessive force in
21 violation of the Eighth Amendment and summary judgement in favor of Defendant is
22 appropriate. See Montgomery, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185217, at *4 (granting summary
23 judgment when the moving party established the absence of a genuine issue of material
24 fact and Plaintiff filed a statement of non-opposition); see also Burnett v. Sedillo, No. 1:16-
25 cv-01672-LJO-GSA-PC, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189161, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2018)
26 (order adopting Magistrate Judge recommendation to grant summary judgment where
27 Defendant demonstrated that Plaintiff cannot establish a necessary element of claim and
28 Plaintiff filed a statement of non-opposition); Walashek v. Asbestos Corp., No. 14-cv-
1 ||} 1567-BTM (BGS), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99712, at *7 (S.D. Cal. July 23, 2015) (granting
2 ||summary judgment where Defendant’s motion established that Plaintiffs have insufficient
3 |}evidence of an essential element of their case and Plaintiffs filed a notice of non-
4 || opposition).
5 Lastly, Defendant argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity because he did not
6 || violate Plaintiff's constitutional rights, and his conduct was objectively reasonable. (ECF
7 ||No. 51 at 17-18.) The Court declines to address the issue of qualified immunity as it is
8 || unnecessary for purposes of ruling on the Motion. See Simeonov v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 532,
9 (9th Cir. 2004) (observing that courts are not required to reach issues that are
10 |/“‘unnecessary to the results they reach”); see also Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v.
11 || Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (“[a]s a general rule courts and agencies are not
12 ||required to make findings on issues the decision of which is unnecessary to the results they
13 reach’).
14 || IV. CONCLUSION
15 For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion for Summary
16 || Judgment (ECF No. 51). IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that judgment be entered in favor
17 ||of Defendant and against Plaintiff. The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to close this
18 || action.
19 IT IS SO ORDERED.
20
21 || DATED: December 9, 2025 (yi. (Doha
H n. Cynthia Bashant, Chief Judge
United States District Court
23
24
25
26
27
28

°

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11221845. Public record. Not legal advice.