# Burton

> District Court, M.D. Florida · December 12, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11221780

## Case

- **Full name:** Jonathan Michael Burton v. Officer G. Smith, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** December 12, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11221780

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that “a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the nonmoving party’s position is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION
JONATHAN MICHAEL BURTON,

Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 3:23-cv-1195-BJD-SJH
OFFICER G. SMITH, et al.,
Defendants.

ORDER
THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. 65) and Plaintiff’s Opposition (Doc. 69) thereto.

I. Status and Allegations
Plaintiff Jonathan Michael Burton, an inmate of the Florida penal
system, is proceeding on a pro se Complaint for violation of civil rights under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Officer G. Smith, Sergeant D. Mitchell, and Sergeant

E. Prock, in their individual capacities.1 Doc. 1. Plaintiff alleges that on April
21, 2020, while housed at Florida State Prison (“FSP”), he refused to leave the
doctor’s office and had to be carried down the hallway. Id. at 5. At some point
after Plaintiff began to walk normally, Smith and Mitchell became upset and

1 The Court previously dismissed Plaintiff’s official-capacity claims against
Defendants. See Doc. 18.
pushed Plaintiff’s wrists against the restraints by forcing his arms upwards,
then forced him into his cell, and attacked him without justification. Id. at 5–

6. Plaintiff alleges that Smith and Mitchell punched and stomped on him while
he was still in full restraints, and Smith hit Plaintiff’s head with his radio,
“bust[ing] [his] head.” Id. at 6. After this altercation, Prock and other officers
had to escort Plaintiff back to the doctor’s office. Id. At that point, Plaintiff was

“very upset” because of the beating and “tried to step to the officer.” Id. After
Plaintiff returned to his cell, Prock allegedly put his finger in Plaintiff’s
buttocks. Id. Based on these events, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated
his Eighth Amendment rights: Smith and Mitchell – through their excessive

use of physical force, and Prock – through his commission of a sexual act. Id.
at 7. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages.2 Id.
Defendants move for summary judgment in their favor, arguing that: (1)
the undisputed material facts establish no constitutional violation; and (2)

Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. See Doc. 65 at 1, 7–20. Plaintiff
responds there are factual disputes that preclude entry of summary judgment.3
See generally Doc. 69.

2 Plaintiff amended his injury and damages allegations on January 3, 2025.
See Docs. 21, 22.
3 The Court advised Plaintiff of the provisions of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56, notified him that the granting of a motion to dismiss or a motion for
2
II. Summary of the Evidence
A. Defendants’ Evidence

In support of their Motion, Defendants provide the following exhibits: (1)
Plaintiff’s deposition transcript, Doc. 65-1; (2) the incident report with
attachments, Doc. 65-2; and (3) eight videos from the date of the incident, Doc.
66. See Doc. 65-3.

1. Plaintiff’s Deposition
At his deposition, Plaintiff described the April 21, 2020 incident as
“[e]xcessive use of force without justification while in full restraints.” Doc. 65-
1 at 9. On the day of the incident, Plaintiff was ordered to leave the mental

health room, but he refused because he “needed medication.” Id. at 9–10.
Ultimately, Plaintiff had to be carried away by Mitchell and Smith because he
“was refusing to walk down the main hallway.” Id. at 10. When they reached
Bravo wing, Plaintiff “began to walk regularly,” but the officers continued the

“custodial hold,” causing him wrist and nerve pain. Id. at 11–14. When they
reached Plaintiff’s cell, Plaintiff did not enter, but rather “leaned up against

summary judgment would represent a final adjudication of this case which may
foreclose subsequent litigation on the matter, and gave him an opportunity to respond
to such motions. See Doc. 7.
3
the wall to get the restraints taken off.” Id. at 13–15. Plaintiff testified he
“didn’t grab the door frame” while standing outside the cell. Id. at 16.

Plaintiff “was pushed in the cell,” while still “in cuffs.”4 Id. at 15, 17, 21–
22. At that time, Mitchell and Smith were punching Plaintiff “from both
directions.” Id. at 22. Smith hit Plaintiff’s head with the radio, causing
bleeding. Id. Mitchell grabbed Plaintiff’s left ring finger and “snapped it . . . to

the left.” Id. at 22–23. The officers were in Plaintiff’s cell for fourteen seconds.
Id. at 21. Then, “they backed out”—Mitchell first, Smith second. Id. at 23.
After the officers left the cell, they came back with a hand-held camera.
Id. At that point, Plaintiff was “very, very upset, [and] hostile because [he had]

just been beaten in full restraints.” Id. While Plaintiff was still in full
restraints, Defendants attempted to take him to medical for examination of his
injuries, but Plaintiff “was mad” and “tried to step on” the officer, which was
unsuccessful because Officer Carlos Posada applied “a custodial touch” on

Plaintiff. Id. at 23–25. Because of Plaintiff’s attempt to “head butt” the officer,

4 According to Plaintiff, it was against “policy” to direct him to enter the cell
“in cuffs.” Doc. 65-1 at 17.
4
Plaintiff “never made it to medical.” Id. at 24.5 Instead, he was escorted back
to his cell by Prock and Posada. Id.

Once inside the cell, Plaintiff kneeled on his bed so the officers could
“take the shackles off,” but they decided to let him lay down because he was
“upset.” Id. at 26. Plaintiff was laying on his hands. Id. at 27. Posada was
positioned near his head, Gustafson was near his feet, and Prock was in the

middle. Id. Then, pursuant to an informal FSP policy, the captain tapped Prock
on the shoulder, which was a signal to make Plaintiff move by sticking a finger
in his butt so the officers could then use force on Plaintiff under the pretext
that he resisted. Id. at 27–28. Unaware of the signal, Gustafson had already

removed Plaintiff’s shackles. Id. at 28–29. Prock then gave Gustafson a signal
to block the camera with his body so that Prock could touch Plaintiff outside
the camera’s view. Id. at 29. To that end, Gustafson put his knee over Plaintiff’s
ankles. Id. Plaintiff yelled: “Hey, man, why [do] you keep putting your hand in

my ass?” Id. Plaintiff alleges that some unidentified parts of the audio
recording were removed. Id.

5 At some point, nurse Kayla Cribb documented Plaintiff’s injuries at cell front.
Doc. 65-1 at 31–32.
5
At some point after Plaintiff was taken to medical, he “head butted” an
officer, resulting in another use of force against him. Id. at 39. At that time,

Officer Patrick Williams snapped Plaintiff’s right index finger. Id. at 40.
According to Plaintiff, all his hand X-rays were falsified to avoid liability. Id.
at 33–36, 38.
2. Video Evidence6

The video evidence shows that at around 2:31 p.m., Plaintiff was
removed from the mental health room and carried by two officers on each side,
with several others following, from the second to the third floor. See Videos 1,
2. At around 2:32 p.m., the group reached Plaintiff’s cell. See Videos 3, 4. When

Plaintiff refused to enter, the officers started pushing him rugby-style into the
cell.7 See id. Within ten seconds of entering, at 2:32:54 p.m., the officers started

6 Defendants provide the following eight videos from the date of the incident:
(1) B-wing, second floor, Q deck, left side video of 1:14 minutes starting at 2:30 p.m.
(“Video 1”); (2) B-wing, second-to-third-floor stairwell video of 52 seconds starting at
2:30 p.m. (“Video 2”); (3) B-wing, third floor, front-camera video of 9:57 minutes
starting at 2:30 p.m. (“Video 3”); (4) B-wing, third floor, rear-camera video of 9:59
minutes starting at 2:30 p.m. (“Video 4”); (5) B-wing, second-to-third-floor stairwell
video of 1:23 minutes starting at 2:40 p.m. (“Video 5”); (6) B-wing, second floor, Q
deck, left-side video of 2:11 minutes starting at 2:40 p.m. (“Video 6”); (7) B-wing, third
floor, front-camera video of 7:36 minutes starting at 2:42 p.m. (“Video 7”); and (8)
main hand-held video of 22:44 minutes starting at 2:35 p.m. (“Video 8”). See Docs. 65-
3, 66.
7 It took about seventeen seconds from the time they reached Plaintiff’s cell
(2:32:27 p.m.) to the time they entered it (2:32:44 p.m.). See Videos 3, 4.
6
exiting Plaintiff’s cell one by one, and by 2:33:00 p.m., they were all out. See id.
There is no video footage of what happened inside the cell during the ten

seconds that the officers were inside.
At 2:35 p.m., Officer Cortez appeared at the scene and started recording
with a hand-held camera. See Video 8. He stated that Smith and Mitchell had
just used reactionary force on Plaintiff. See id. At around 2:37 p.m., the officers

opened Plaintiff’s door, he stepped outside still in restraints, and leaned on the
outside wall with his back to the officers. See id. At 2:38 p.m., a nurse
approached Plaintiff and the group of officers standing near him. See Videos 3,
4. When the nurse tried to examine Plaintiff, he appeared uncooperative and

talked back at her and the officers. See Video 8. The nurse recorded something
in her notes and left at around 2:40 p.m. See Videos 3, 4, 5. Plaintiff and the
officers started walking behind her. See id. Plaintiff was loud and belligerent.
See Video 8. The group walked down the stairs to the second floor where

Plaintiff entered a room and came back a minute later. See Videos 5, 6. The
group headed back to the third floor at 2:42 p.m. See Videos 6, 7, 8.
At 2:43 p.m., Plaintiff entered his cell with three officers—Posada, Prock,
and Gustafson—while the rest of the group remained outside. See Videos 7, 8.

Plaintiff kneeled on his bed for removal of the restraints. See Video 8. Plaintiff
refused to lean his head on the wall, yelling something incoherent. See id. At
7
that point, the female captain, who could be heard giving orders from behind,
entered the camera’s view and continued giving orders. See id. The officers

placed Plaintiff on his stomach while continuing to hold his body down. See id.
With his knee on Plaintiff’s ankles, Gustafson started removing Plaintiff’s
shackles. See id. Meanwhile, the captain was observing the scene and tapping
the officers on their backs. See id. While Gustafson was still holding Plaintiff’s

legs and was blocking the camera with his body, Prock made a motion with his
hand while removing the chain from Plaintiff’s waist. See id. Plaintiff yelled:
“What the f*** you keep putting your hand by my ass for?” Id. Immediately,
the captain responded: “He is not putting his hand there.” Id. At that moment,

several officers yelled at Gustafson to move his body for an unobstructed view
of the scene. See id. When Prock was finished removing the chain, the officers
told Plaintiff to keep his face down. See id. Plaintiff was still on his bed when
the captain ordered the officers to “back out” one at a time, in a chain pattern.

Id. The operator announced the time was 2:44 p.m. See id. Within two minutes
of entering, all officers had exited Plaintiff’s cell. See Video 7.
After the officers closed Plaintiff’s door, he placed his hands out in the
door slid and his handcuffs were removed. See Video 8. At 2:45 p.m., Plaintiff

started extending his hands one at a time—first his right hand, then his left
hand—through the door slid. See id. Then, he started wrapping a white shirt
8
around the door flap, making knots and showing good dexterity and no obvious
sign of impairment in his hands or fingers. See id. While Plaintiff was doing

all of that, he was yelling profanities and complaining about what the officers
had done to him. See id. The recording ended a few minutes later, at 2:57 p.m.
See id.
3. Incident Report Attachments

In a statement attached to the incident report, Plaintiff states that after
the officers escorted him from the mental health room to his cell and opened
his cell door, he “was standing still” because he was waiting for them to remove
his restraints. Doc. 65-2 at 2. When Plaintiff realized that was not happening,

he “attempted to grab the door frame [because he knew] they [were] going to
commit felony battery inside the cell.” Id. Plaintiff also states that when the
officers pushed him inside the cell, Mitchell hit him eight times, Smith hit him
twelve times, and Sergeant Gary Keegan punched him with handcuffs twice,

which “bust[ed] [his] head open.” See id.
A post-use-of-force examination of Plaintiff on April 21, 2020 at cell front
showed a knot on the left side and a minor scratch on the right side of his head.
See id. at 3. Plaintiff could not be pulled out of his cell for further assessment

because he was belligerent. See id. Another post-use-of-force examination from

9
the same date showed a 1.5 cm laceration on the left side of his head and an
abrasion on his middle and ring fingers. See id. at 5.

B. Plaintiff’s Evidence
Plaintiff submits his declaration, Doc. 69 at 19–20, his “general
affidavit,” Doc. 69-1 at 37–38, and multiple exhibits, Doc. 69-1.8
1. Plaintiff’s Declaration and Affidavit

In his declaration, Plaintiff avers:
I . . . was escorted by force for refusing to leave a [mental health]
meeting[.] [U]pon enter[ing] my housing wing (Bravo)[,] I became
compliant with all orders[.] [O]fficers Mitchell [and] Smith had a
grip on me that hurt my wrist and damaged my nerves in my
arms/wrist[s.] [T]his nerve damage has been going on for five
years[.] [H]owever[,] I walked up the stairs to the third floor in
compliance[.] I also walked down the hallway in compliance[.]
Smith was the aggress[o]r and was upset I made them carry me
down the hallway[,] and chose to punish me for my . . . past
misconduct by pushing me for not walking down the walkway[.]
Smith pushed me into my housing cell with the force of a
madman[.] [Smith] and Mitchell started punching me[.] [T]hey
both kicked me twice or better[,] then Smith hit me with his radio
twice[,] and Mitchell grab[bed] my left ring finger and snapped it
to the left[.] [W]hen Smith hit me[,] my head bust[ed] wide open
[and] blood was everywhere on the left side[.] [T]hey backed out[.]
[T]he entire time[,] I was in full restraints and did not resist or
refuse any orders.

8 To the extent Plaintiff’s exhibits are duplicative to Defendants’ exhibits or
irrelevant to the issues on summary judgment, the Court does not address them. See
Doc. 69-1 at 12, 15, 22–27, 40–101. For example, some of Plaintiff’s medical records
pertain to injuries unrelated to the April 21, 2020 incident. See id. at 12, 15, 22–27.
10
. . . [I] was being escorted by E. Prock to medical due to me being
physically beaten by Mitchell [and] Smith[.] [U]pon approaching
the second floor where the front door to exit is[,] a[n] officer
laughed at my head bleeding[.] I tried to head butt him and was
taken back to my housing cell[.] [T]he supervisor told the officers
to take the full set of restraints off [at] cell front as the procedure
was . . . but another supervisor told him to take me into my cell. I
refused to put my head against the wall because my head was bust
wide open[.] Prock told me to lay face down to take the “red lock
and waist chain” off at this time[.] [T]he officer took off my leg irons
and put his leg over my ankles[.] Prock was blocked by the officer
so the camera did not see Prock place his finger in my buttocks[.]
Prock’s finger went in my ass crack [and] entered my ass cheeks
(not my hole) because his finger was to[o] big to fit but Prock . . .
slightly penetrated my anus[.] No injuries [were] documented
because I was scared and yelled for Prock to get his finger out my
ass[.] [T]he sexual assault is de minimis in nature but emotionally
I[’]m damaged[.] [I am] a heterosexual male who never got into the
homosexual acts in prison and this has made my mind shocked[.]
I did not think Prock was doing this even though I heard how he
has a long history of this until I became a victim[.] [H]e is a very
hurtful person[.] I had to tell.

Doc. 69 at 19–20. Plaintiff’s “general affidavit” matches the averments in his
declaration. See Doc. 69-1 at 37–38.
2. Plaintiff’s Medical Records
Plaintiff’s emergency room records from April 21, 2020 show that he had
laceration with minimal bleeding on the left side of his head and abrasions on
his ring and middle fingers. Doc. 69-1 at 7–10. Plaintiff’s treatment records
from June 29, 2022 show that no treatment was indicated for his fingers
despite previous “fractures with very mild deformity.” Id. at 17.
11
On April 27, 2020, Plaintiff’s left-hand X-ray showed no evidence of acute
osseous injury. Id. at 11. On October 30, 2020, his left-hand X-ray showed no

evidence of fracture. Id. at 16. On May 16, 2023, his left-hand X-ray showed no
fracture or dislocation. Id. at 18. On December 15, 2023, his left-hand X-ray
showed no gross osseous abnormality and noted that fracture was not
excluded. Id. at 19. On March 8, 2024, his left-hand X-ray showed no acute

osseous abnormality. Id. at 21.
III. Summary Judgment Standard
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[t]he court shall grant
summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to

any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). An issue is genuine when the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the nonmovant. Mize v.
Jefferson City Bd. of Educ., 93 F.3d 739, 742 (11th Cir. 1996) (quoting Hairston

v. Gainesville Sun Publ’g Co., 9 F.3d 913, 919 (11th Cir. 1993)). “[A] mere
scintilla of evidence in support of the non-moving party’s position is insufficient
to defeat a motion for summary judgment.” Kesinger ex rel. Kesinger v.

12
Herrington, 381 F.3d 1243, 1247 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)).

The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of
demonstrating to the court, by reference to the record, that there are no
genuine issues of material fact to be determined at trial. See Clark v. Coats &
Clark, 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991). The record to be considered on a

motion for summary judgment may include “depositions, documents,
electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations
(including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions,
interrogatory answers, or other materials.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A).

When the moving party has discharged its burden, the non-moving party
must point to evidence in the record to demonstrate a genuine dispute of
material fact. Id. Substantive law determines the materiality of facts, and
“[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the

governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.”
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. In determining whether summary judgment is
appropriate, a court “must view all evidence and make all reasonable
inferences in favor of the party opposing [the motion].” Haves v. Miami, 52 F.3d

13
918, 921 (11th Cir. 1995) (citing Dibrell Bros. Int’l, S.A. v. Banca Nazionale Del
Lavoro, 38 F.3d 1571, 1578 (11th Cir. 1994)).

IV. Discussion9
It is well understood that prison guards, who are charged with
maintaining order and security, may use force when necessary. Whitley v.
Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320–21 (1986); Williams v. Burton, 943 F.2d 1572, 1575

(11th Cir. 1991). However, the Eighth Amendment “prohibits the unnecessary
and wanton infliction of pain, or the infliction of pain totally without
penological justification.” Ort v. White, 813 F.2d 318, 321 (11th Cir. 1987). As
such, gratuitous beatings, even those that do not cause serious injury, violate

the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual punishments.
See Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 38 (2010) (“An inmate who is gratuitously
beaten by guards does not lose his ability to pursue an excessive force claim
merely because he has the good fortune to escape without serious injury.”). The

Supreme Court has held, “The ‘core judicial inquiry’ . . . [is] not whether a
certain quantum of injury was sustained, but rather ‘whether force was applied

9 As previously noted, for purposes of summary judgment, the Court views the
evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party. Thus, the facts described in the Court’s analysis may differ from
those that ultimately can be proven.
14
in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and
sadistically to cause harm.’” Id. at 37 (internal punctuation omitted).

When an officer uses force to restore order or maintain security, whether
that force can be classified as “excessive” requires courts to consider various
factors, including the need for force, the extent of force used in relation to the
prisoner’s conduct, the threat of harm the prisoner posed to staff and inmates,

whether the officer tried to “temper the severity of a forceful response,” and
the injuries inflicted. See Williams, 943 F.2d at 1575; Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321
(“Whitley factors”); see also Skrtich v. Thornton, 280 F.3d 1295, 1300 (11th Cir.
2002). When considering these factors, the courts must “give a ‘wide range of

deference to prison officials acting to preserve discipline and security,’
including when considering ‘[d]ecisions made at the scene of a disturbance.’”
Cockrell v. Sparks, 510 F.3d 1307, 1311 (11th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).
Not “every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal

cause of action.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992). De minimis uses
of physical force are excluded from constitutional recognition provided they are
“not of a sort repugnant to the conscience of mankind.” Id. at 9–10. “Although
the extent of the injury is a relevant factor in determining the amount of force

applied, it is not solely determinative of an Eighth Amendment claim.”

15
Muhammad v. Sapp, 494 F. App’x 953, 957 (11th Cir. 2012)10 (citing Wilkins,
559 U.S. at 37). “Injury and force . . . are only imperfectly correlated, and it is

the latter that ultimately counts. An inmate who is gratuitously beaten by
guards does not lose his ability to pursue an excessive force claim merely
because he has the good fortune to escape without serious injury.” Wilkins, 559
U.S. at 38. “A prisoner may avoid summary judgment, ‘only if the evidence

viewed in the light most favorable to him goes beyond a mere dispute over the
reasonableness of the force used and will support a reliable inference of
wantonness in the infliction of pain.’” Stallworth v. Tyson, 578 F. App’x 948,
953 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting Brown v. Smith, 813 F.2d 1187, 1188 (11th Cir.

1987)).
A. The First Incident – Handcuffs
Plaintiff alleges that while he was being escorted from the mental health
room to his cell, the officers pushed his wrists against his handcuffs by forcing

his arms upwards even after Plaintiff had begun walking on his own, and this
unnecessary “custodial hold” caused him wrist and nerve pain. See Doc. 1 at 5–

10 The Court does not rely on unpublished opinions as binding precedent;
however, they may be cited in this Order when the Court finds them persuasive on a
particular point. See McNamara v. GEICO, 30 F.4th 1055, 1060–61 (11th Cir. 2022);
see generally Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 11th Cir. R. 36-2 (“Unpublished opinions are not
considered binding precedent, but they may be cited as persuasive authority.”).
16
6; Doc. 65-1 at 9–14; Doc. 69 at 19. Plaintiff argues that the “custodial grip”
should have ended the moment he started walking on his own. Doc. 69 at 7, 13.

Affording Defendants a wide range of deference in preserving discipline
and security, the Court finds the Whitley factors balance in Defendants’ favor.
First, considering the undisputed evidence that Plaintiff refused to leave the
mental health room, Defendants reasonably perceived the need to use force to

carry him from the second to the third floor when he was dragging his feet, and
then to keep him in a “custodial grip” after he started walking. Doc. 1 at 5; Doc.
65-1 at 9–10; Doc. 69 at 19. Plaintiff asserts that the “custodial grip” should
have ended the moment he started walking, but his story conflicts as to when

that moment began. Doc. 69 at 7, 13. In his Complaint and at his deposition,
Plaintiff claims he “began to walk regularly” when they reached Bravo wing.
Doc. 1 at 5–6, Doc. 65-1 at 11–14. However, in his declaration, Plaintiff claims
he “walked up the stairs to the third floor in compliance.” Doc. 69 at 19.

Regardless of this inconsistency, the videos show that the entire walk took only
a minute. Under the circumstances, the Court must give Defendants deference
in deciding how to safely escort Plaintiff to his cell, considering his very recent
and undisputed non-compliance with the officers’ orders and the potential risks

to the safety of staff and inmates if Plaintiff were given an opportunity to
withdraw his compliance. And although the video evidence does not show a
17
close-up of the parties’ movements, it reveals a calm, organized, and
professional effort to escort Plaintiff back to his cell without any indication that

the officers applied force maliciously and sadistically to cause harm. See Videos
1, 2, 3, 4. Additionally, the medical records submitted by the parties do not
indicate any complaints, diagnoses, or treatment plans pertaining to any wrist
and/or nerve pain. Even assuming Plaintiff suffered such pain, the pain does

not necessarily indicate that Defendants’ force was excessive. Thus, there is no
genuine issue of material fact about Defendants’ use of force during the first
incident.
B. The Second Incident – Forced Into Cell

Plaintiff alleges that he was forced inside his cell and attacked without
justification while he was still fully restrained. Doc. 1 at 5–6. Specifically, he
alleges that Smith and Mitchell punched and stomped on him, and Smith also
hit him with his radio “bust[ing]” his head. Id. at 6.

Again, affording Defendants a wide range of deference in preserving
discipline and security, the Court finds the Whitley factors generally balance
in Defendants’ favor. First, Defendants reasonably perceived the need to use
force when Plaintiff refused to enter his cell. To the extent Plaintiff’s account

of this incident is somewhat inconsistent, the “Court will accept the video’s
depiction over [Plaintiff’s] account of the facts [because] the video obviously
18
contradicts [his] version of the facts.” Logan v. Smith, 439 F. App’x 798, 800
(11th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted); see also Perez v. Suszczynski, 809 F.3d

1213, 1221 (11th Cir. 2016) (“[W]hen opposing parties tell two different stories,
one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury
could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes
of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” (quotations and citation

omitted)); Singletary v. Vargas, 804 F.3d 1174, 1183 (11th Cir. 2015) (“[W]hen
the non-movant’s assertion is ‘so utterly discredited’ by the record, no ‘genuine’
dispute of material fact exists sufficient to prompt an inference on behalf of the
non-movant.” (citing Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007))).11 Specifically,

the video evidence shows that when Plaintiff reached his cell, he refused to
enter, prompting the officers to start a series of rugby-style pushes for the next
seventeen seconds until they were finally able to push Plaintiff inside the cell.
See Videos 3, 4. In resisting the officers, Plaintiff was holding onto something,

which explains why he was able to resist them for as long as he did.12

11 To the extent there are other inconsistencies between the video evidence and
Plaintiff’s averments, the Court accepts the facts as demonstrated in the videos.
12 In a statement attached to the incident report, Plaintiff admits that he
“attempted to grab the door frame,” Doc. 65-2 at 2, but he later tried to retract his
statement by saying that he was describing another incident. See Doc. 65-2 at 2; Doc.
69 at 14. Also, at his deposition, Plaintiff stated that he “didn’t grab the door frame”
but only “leaned up against the wall to get the restraints taken off.” Doc. 65-1 at 13–
19
Second, the relationship between the need and the amount of force used
to push Plaintiff inside his cell also weighs in Defendants’ favor. Third,

Plaintiff does not allege that he suffered any injury from Defendants’ pushes.
Fourth, considering Plaintiff’s resistance, the extent of the threat to the safety
of staff and inmates also appears to weigh in Defendants’ favor. And finally,
the officers acted reasonably when they used rugby-style pushes to move

Plaintiff into his cell.
Plaintiff asserts that once he was inside the cell and subdued, the officers
improperly used gratuitous force on him. Doc. 69 at 14–15. He explains that
the video evidence provides only a chronology of the events, but fails to capture

Defendants’ reactionary use of force and their specific interactions with
Plaintiff. Id. at 15. Plaintiff is correct that there is no direct video footage of
the officers’ actions inside Plaintiff’s cell during the second incident.
Nevertheless, based on the evidence that is before the Court and the wide

range of deference that Defendants are afforded in preserving discipline and
security, the Court does not find that Defendants used force maliciously and
sadistically.

16. However, Plaintiff’s claim that he was just standing near his cell and waiting for
his restraints to be removed is unsupported by the videos. See Videos 3, 4.
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First, Defendants reasonably perceived the need to use force when
Plaintiff refused to enter his cell. The video evidence corroborates Defendants’

position that Plaintiff resisted them and negates Plaintiff’s position that he
was punished for his past behavior. Second, it is unclear whether the
relationship between the need and the amount of force used by Defendants
inside the cell favors either party. However, it is undisputed that Defendants

did not stay in the cell for more than ten to fourteen seconds. See Videos 3, 4
(showing that at 2:32:54 p.m., or ten seconds after entering, the officers started
exiting the cell); Doc. 65-1 at 21 (conceding that the officers were inside
Plaintiff’s cell for no more than fourteen seconds). In such a short amount of

time, it is implausible that the officers would manage to hit, kick, or punch
Plaintiff as many times as he claims. See Doc. 65-2 at 2 (claiming that Mitchell
hit Plaintiff eight times, Smith hit him twelve times, and Sergeant Gary
Keegan punched him with handcuffs twice in the head). Additionally,

Plaintiff’s account of how he received his injuries varies. For example, while
Plaintiff generally alleges that Smith hit him with the radio and “bust[ed] [his]
head,” Doc. 1 at 6, Doc. 65-1 at 22, Doc. 69 at 19, he also states that Sergeant
Keegan, a non-party, punched him with handcuffs and “bust[ed] [his] head

open,” Doc. 65-2 at 2.

21
Therefore, considering the inconsistencies in Plaintiff’s recollection of
the events, his resistance to the officers, his combative behavior, and the short

amount of time that Defendants spent inside the cell, the Court finds it
implausible that Defendants used gratuitous force against Plaintiff.13 In
reaching this conclusion, the Court also considers the extent of Plaintiff’s
injuries—laceration with minimal bleeding on the left side of his head and

abrasions on his ring and middle fingers. See Doc. 69-1 at 7–10. These injuries
are consistent with getting a combative inmate to comply with orders and are
not necessarily indicative of use of excessive force. Further, considering
Plaintiff’s resistance, it is possible that the extent of the threat to the safety of

staff and inmates weighs in Defendants’ favor. But, in the absence of specific
evidence, the Court finds the last two Whitley factors neutral.
“Although [the Court] cannot pinpoint with precision the amount of force
used” by Defendants, the fact that “some amount of force was justified” to

overcome Plaintiff’s resistance, that Plaintiff provides an inconsistent account
of the events, and that his injuries (except perhaps his head injury) were de

13 Again, the officers’ conduct outside the cell was professional, calm, and
organized, whereas Plaintiff was combative, loud, and belligerent at times. See Video
8. Plaintiff was uncooperative even with the nurse who attempted to examine and
record his post-use-of-force injuries. See id.; see also Doc. 65-2 at 3 (noting that
Plaintiff could not be pulled out of his cell for further medical assessment because he
was belligerent).
22
minimis, persuades the Court that “the evidence in this case raises only a ‘mere
dispute over the reasonableness of the particular use of force’ and could not

support ‘a reliable inference of wantonness in the infliction of pain.’” Brown,
813 F.2d at 1189–90 (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 322). Thus, the Court will
grant Defendants’ Motion with respect to Plaintiff’s claims of excessive use of
force.

C. The Third Incident – Sexual Assault
The final incident concerns an allegation of sexual assault against Prock
after Plaintiff was removed from his cell for a medical evaluation, but then
returned to his cell because he attempted to “head butt” an officer on the way.

Doc. 1 at 6; Doc. 65-1 at 23–25. Plaintiff alleges that while he was lying face
down on his bed and the officers were removing his restraints, Prock put his
finger in Plaintiff’s buttocks. Doc. 1 at 6; Doc. 65-1 at 23–25; Doc. 69-1 at 37–
38. Plaintiff describes the sexual assault as “de-minimis in nature.” Doc. 69 at

5, 16; see also id. at 19 (“No injuries [were] documented . . . .”).
At his deposition, Plaintiff gave an elaborate story of what happened
while he was lying on his bed for removal of the restraints. See Doc. 65-1 at
26–29 (stating that according to an unofficial FSP policy, the captain tapped

Prock on the shoulder, which was a signal to make Plaintiff move by sticking
a finger in his butt so the officers could then use force on him under the pretext
23
that he resisted; and then Prock gave Gustafson the signal to block the camera
with his body so that Prock could put a finger in Plaintiff’s buttocks). However,

the video footage of this entire incident makes Plaintiff’s story implausible.
According to the video, Plaintiff entered the cell and kneeled on his bed
for removal of the restraints. See Videos 7, 8. When Plaintiff refused to lean
his head on the wall, the female captain moved into the camera’s view and

continued observing and directing everyone’s actions. See Video 8. The three
officers who were already inside the cell—Posada, Prock, and Gustafson—
placed Plaintiff face down on his bed while continuing to hold down his body.
See id. With his knee on Plaintiff’s ankles, Gustafson started removing

Plaintiff’s shackles.14 See id. In the meantime, the captain was moving behind
the officers and tapping them on their backs as she was giving out orders. See
id. While Gustafson was still holding Plaintiff’s legs and was somewhat
blocking the camera’s view, Prock was in the process of removing the chain

from Plaintiff’s waist. See id. Then, Plaintiff yelled: “What the f*** you keep
putting your hand by my ass for?” Id. Immediately, the captain responded: “He

14 Plaintiff argues that after Gustafson had already removed his shackles,
Prock gave Gustafson a signal to put his leg over Plaintiff’s ankles so that Gustafson
would block the camera from capturing Prock’s movements. Doc. 69 at 16. However,
the video does not reveal any specific signal from Prock to Gustafson. See Video 8.
Moreover, Gustafson’s knee was already on Plaintiff’s ankles and had been there the
entire time that Plaintiff was lying face down on his bed. See id.
24
is not putting his hand there.” Id. Then, several officers asked Gustafson to
clear the camera’s view so they could get an unobstructed view of the scene.

See id. When Prock was finished removing the chain, the officers and the
captain exited the cell in a chain pattern. See id.
As the video shows, the captain was tapping everyone on the back, not
just Prock, while she was observing the scene and giving out orders. The

officers followed procedure and everything ran smoothly until Plaintiff yelled.
Notably, in that moment, Plaintiff did not accuse Prock of putting a finger in
his buttocks as he alleged in his court filings. See Doc. 1 at 6; Doc. 69 at 19.
When Plaintiff yelled: “What the f*** you keep putting your hand by my ass

for?”; the captain interjected that Prock was “not putting his hand there,” and
that was the end of the discussion. Video 8.15 There were no other accusations
against Prock, who was still working on removing the chain from Plaintiff’s
waist and, understandably, his hands were near Plaintiff’s waist and boxers.

Therefore, to the extent Plaintiff asserts that the video footage supports his
version of the facts, the Court finds this assertion to be inaccurate and

15 Plaintiff’s allegation that the audio recording was manipulated after the fact
is implausible and unsupported.
25
“accept[s] the video’s depiction over [Plaintiff’s] account of the facts.” Logan,
439 F. App’x at 800.

Upon review of the record, the Court finds that Defendants have
presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of
material fact with respect to Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims. Plaintiff
has not presented evidence sufficient to demonstrate a genuine issue of

material fact to defeat entry of summary judgment. The evidence Plaintiff
offers is either duplicative of Defendants’ exhibits, immaterial to the issues on
summary judgment, conclusory, self-serving, and/or unsupported by the
videos. Indeed, drawing all inferences in favor of Plaintiff “to the extent

supported by the record,” Scott, 550 U.S. at 381 n.8 (emphasis omitted), no
reasonable juror could find that Plaintiff suffered a violation of his Eighth
Amendment rights. See generally Goodman v. Kimbrough, 718 F.3d 1325, 1332
(11th Cir. 2013) (recognizing that “to defeat a motion for summary judgment,

[the plaintiff] must adduce specific evidence from which a jury could
reasonably find in his favor; [t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in
support of [his] position will be insufficient” (quotations and citation omitted));
Kesinger, 381 F.3d at 1247 (stating that “a mere scintilla of evidence in support

of the nonmoving party’s position is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary
judgment”); see also Bryant v. Rich, 530 F.3d 1368, 1382 (11th Cir. 2008)
26
(Wilson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (“A prisoner cannot defeat
summary judgment by relying on sham affidavits, bare and self-serving

allegations, or other evidence that is incredible as a matter of law. He must
raise more than a mere scintilla of evidence in support of his position: in order
to defeat summary judgment, there must be evidence on which the jury could
reasonably find for the prisoner.”). Accordingly, the Court will grant

Defendants’ Motion on the substance of Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims
and will not address Defendants’ arguments as to qualified immunity.
Accordingly, it is now
ORDERED:

1. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 65) is
GRANTED.
2. The Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of Defendants Officer G.
Smith, Sergeant D. Mitchell, and Sergeant E. Prock, and against Plaintiff

Jonathan Michael Burton.

27
3. The Clerk shall terminate all pending motions and close this case.
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 12th day of
December, 2025.

BRIAN/J . DAVIS
United States District Judge

Jax-11 11/20
C:
Jonathan Michael Burton, #Y50899
Counsel of Record

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11221780. Public record. Not legal advice.