# Jones > District Court, S.D. California · December 8, 2025 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11221754 ## Case - **Full name:** Rayon Jones v. J. Hill, Warden; A. Andrade Garcia, Correctional Officer; A. Lewis, Captain - **Court:** District Court, S.D. California - **Decided:** December 8, 2025 - **Opinion:** 100trialcourt - **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11221754 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - stating that a court may 26 take judicial notice of its own records in other cases, as well as other courts’ records ## Opinion text 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 RAYON JONES, Case No. 25-cv-3375-AJB-AHG CDCR #G-35669, 12 ORDER: (1) DENYING MOTION Plaintiff, 13 TO PROCEED IN FORMA vs. PAUPERIS AS BARRED BY 14 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) AND 15 (2) DISMISSING CIVIL ACTION J. HILL, Warden; A. ANDRADE WITHOUT PREJUDICE FOR 16 GARCIA, Correctional Officer; FAILURE TO PAY FILING FEE A. LEWIS, Captain, 17 REQUIRED BY Defendants. 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) 18 19 [Doc. No. 2] 20 21 Plaintiff Rayon Jones, proceeding without counsel while incarcerated at Salinas 22 Valley State Prison (“SVSP”) in Soledad, California, has filed has filed a civil rights 23 complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. No. 1), together with a motion to proceed in 24 forma pauperis (“IFP”) (Doc. No. 2). Plaintiff, who identifies as transgender and uses 25 feminine pronouns, claims correctional officials at Richard J. Donovan Correctional 26 Facility (“RJD”) placed her in danger on June 20, 2024, by revealing to other prisoners that 27 she had been charged with indecent exposure (“IEX”) pursuant to a CDCR 115 Rules 28 Violation Report (“RVR”). (See Doc. No. 1 at 3.) 1 Plaintiff’s litigation history precludes her from proceeding IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2 § 1915(g), however, and the allegations in her complaint do not plausibly show imminent 3 danger. Therefore, the Court denies Plaintiff leave to proceed IFP and dismisses her case 4 for the reasons explained below. 5 I. IFP MOTION 6 A. Legal Standard 7 When someone files a lawsuit (other than a writ of habeas corpus) in a federal district 8 court, the filer must pay a statutory fee of $350. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a).1 Absent fee 9 payment, the action may proceed only if the filer seeks and the court grants her leave to 10 IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th 11 Cir. 2007) (“Cervantes”). “All persons, not just prisoners, may seek IFP status.” Moore v. 12 Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office, 657 F.3d 890, 892 (9th Cir. 2011). Prisoners, like 13 Plaintiff, however, “face an additional hurdle.” Id. 14 “To help staunch a ‘flood of non-meritorious’ prisoner litigation, the Prison 15 Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA) established what has become known as the three- 16 strikes rule.” Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez, 140 S. Ct. 1721, 1723 (2020) (quoting Jones v. 17 Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 203 (2007)). “That rule generally prevents a prisoner from bringing 18 suit in forma pauperis (IFP)—that is, without first paying the filing fee—if [s]he has had 19 three or more prior suits ‘dismissed on the grounds that [they were] frivolous, malicious, 20 or fail[ed] to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.’” Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. 21 § 1915(g)); Ray v. Lara, 31 F.4th 692, 697 (9th Cir. 2022). 22 When courts “review a dismissal to determine whether it counts as a strike, the style 23 of the dismissal or the procedural posture is immaterial. Instead, the central question is 24 whether the dismissal ‘rang the PLRA bells of frivolous, malicious, or failure to state a 25 26 27 1 The court charges an additional $55 administrative fee, but “[t]his fee does not apply to . . . persons granted in forma pauperis status under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.” 28 U.S.C. § 1914 (Jud. Conf. Schedule of Fees, 28 1 claim.’” El-Shaddai v. Zamora, 833 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Blakely v. 2 Wards, 738 F.3d 607, 615 (4th Cir. 2013)). In other words, “[a] strike-call under Section 3 1915(g) . . . hinges exclusively on the basis for the dismissal, regardless of the decision’s 4 prejudicial effect.” Lomax, 140 S. Ct. at 1724–25. “[I]f a case was not dismissed on one of 5 the specific enumerated grounds, it does not count as a strike under § 1915(g).” Harris v. 6 Harris, 935 F.3d 670, 673 (9th Cir. 2019); see also Hoffman v. Pulido, 928 F.3d 1147, 7 1152 (9th Cir. 2019) (“[T]o qualify as a strike for § 1915(g), a case as a whole, not just 8 some of its individual claims, must be dismissed for a qualifying reason.”) (citing 9 Washington v. Los Angeles Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 833 F.3d 1048, 1057 (9th Cir. 2016)). 10 Once a prisoner accumulates three strikes, however, Section 1915(g) precludes her ability 11 to proceed IFP in any other civil actions or appeals in federal court unless she “makes a 12 plausible allegation that [she] faced ‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’ at the 13 time of filing.” Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1051‒52 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)). 14 B. Discussion 15 Defendants typically carry the initial burden to produce evidence demonstrating a 16 prisoner is not entitled to proceed IFP, but “in some instances, the district court docket 17 records may be sufficient to show that a prior dismissal satisfies at least one on the criteria 18 under § 1915(g) and therefore counts as a strike.” Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1120 19 (9th Cir. 2005). This is one of those instances. A review of dockets in all four California 20 district courts clearly shows Plaintiff is no longer eligible to proceed IFP because while 21 incarcerated, she has had more than three prior prisoner civil actions or appeals dismissed 22 on the grounds that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim upon which 23 relief may be granted. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b)(2), this Court may take 24 judicial notice of the docket records in Plaintiff’s prior cases. See Andrews, 398 F.3d at 25 1120; United States v. Wilson, 631 F.2d 118, 119 (9th Cir. 1980) (stating that a court may 26 take judicial notice of its own records in other cases, as well as other courts’ records). 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 The following docket records reveal Plaintiff has eight qualifying strikes: 2 1. Jones v. Swartz, Case No. 2:14-CV-2877 WBS KJN, 2015 WL 1039301, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2015) (Order dismissing complaint pursuant to 28 3 U.S.C. § 1915A with leave to amend for failure to state a claim) (Doc. No. 4 15), id. (E.D. Cal. June 22, 2015) (Doc. No. 20) (Findings and Recommendations [“F&Rs”] re dismissal for failure to amend); id. (E.D. 5 Cal. Aug. 13, 2015) (Doc. No. 21) (Order adopting F&Rs and dismissing 6 action);2 7 2. Jones v. Madden, et al., Case No. 3:22-CV-01681-MMA-LR (S.D. Cal. 8 Nov. 10, 2022) (Doc. No. 6) (Order dismissing civil action as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)); 9 10 3. Jones v. Madden, Case No. 2:22-CV-01592-EFB PC, 2023 WL 5055684, 11 at *1 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2023) (Doc. No. 23) (Order and F&Rs to dismiss second amended complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A for failing to 12 state a claim without leave to amend), report and recommendation adopted, 13 2024 WL 363621 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2024) (Doc. No. 24); 14 4. Jones v. Bonta, Case No. 2:24-CV-3338 CSK P, 2024 WL 5008030, at *5 15 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2024) (Doc. No. 10) (Order dismissing complaint 16 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A with leave to amend for failure to state a claim); id. (E.D. Cal. April 21, 2025) (Doc. No. 13) (Order and F&Rs re 17 dismissal for failure to amend); id. (E.D. Cal. June 6, 2025) (Doc. No. 14) 18 (Order adopting F&Rs and dismissing action); 19 5. Jones v. Armenta-Morales, Case No. 3:24-CV-3902 CRB (N.D. Cal. Dec. 20 16, 2024) (Doc. No. 11) (Order dismissing complaint with leave to amend 21 for failing to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)); id. (N.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2025) (Doc. No. 13) (Order of dismissal for failure to amend); 22 23 6. Jones v. Castaneda, Case No. 3:24-CV-5076 CRB (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 24 2024) (Doc. No. 10) (Order dismissing complaint with leave to amend for 25 26 2 See Harris, 863 F.3d at 1142 (finding that a failure to amend does “not negate the determination already 27 made by the Court that the complaint [plaintiff] had filed . . . failed to state a claim.”). “A prisoner may not avoid incurring strikes simply by declining to take advantage of [an] opportunit[y] to amend.” Id. at 28 1 failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)), id. (N.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2025) (Doc. No. 12) (Order of dismissal for failure to amend); 2 3 7. Jones v. Arce, Case No. 3:24-CV-7346 CRB (N.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2025) (Doc. 4 No. 6) (Order of dismissal with leave to amend for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)); id. (N.D. Cal. March 18, 2025) (Doc. 5 No. 8) (Order of dismissal for failure to amend); and 6 7 8. Jones v. Ruiz, Case No. 3:25-CV-5301-CRB ((N.D. Cal. Oct. 6, 2025) (Doc. No. 7) (Order of dismissal with leave to amend for failure to state a 8 claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)); id., (N.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2025) 9 (Doc. No. 10) (Order of dismissal for failure to amend). 10 Because Plaintiff accumulated these prior strike dismissals while incarcerated, she 11 may not proceed IFP in this case unless she meets § 1915(g)’s “imminent danger” 12 exception.3 To do so, her pleadings must contain a “plausible allegation that [she] faced 13 ‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’ at the time of filing.” Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 14 1055 (quoting U.S.C. § 1915(g)). Imminent danger requires plausible allegations of harm 15 “ready to take place,” or “hanging threateningly over one’s head,” id. at 1056, and must 16 also “stem[] from the violations of law alleged in [the] complaint.” Ray, 31 F.4th at 701. 17 The exception “functions as a limited safety valve,” id., but it “cannot be triggered solely 18 by complaints of past injury or generalized fears of possible future harm.” Hernandez v. 19 Williams, 2021 WL 1317376, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2021). 20 The complaint before the Court contains no plausible allegations of immediate or 21 “ongoing danger” of serious physical injury. Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1057. Instead, 22 23 24 25 3 In fact, a Section 1915(g) bar has recently been noted for Plaintiff in the Eastern District of California. See Jones v. Allen, No. 1:25-CV-01088-SAB (PC), 2025 WL 2697469, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2025) 26 (F&R to deny Plaintiff leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)), report and recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 2695580 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2025)); see also Jones v. Cavello, No. 2:25-CV-2314 AC 27 P, 2025 WL 2410609, at *1–2 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2025) (F&R to deny Plaintiff leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)), report and recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 2710553 (E.D. Cal. 28 1 || Plaintiff, who has since been transferred to SVSP, claims RJD prison officials placed her 2 danger well more than a year ago while she was incarcerated there in June 2024. (See 3 ||Doc. No. 1 at 1, 3.) She further seeks injunctive relief preventing SVSP staff, who are not 4 ||named as Defendants, from transferring her from SVSP to six different CDCR facilities, a 5 ||“Level IV 180 prison,” or any “no[n] ... transgender prison.” (/d. at 7-9.) But § 1915(g)’s 6 || “imminence prong of the three-strikes exception” cannot be triggered by past injury or by 7 speculative fear of future harm. Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1053, 1057; see also Hammler y. 8 || Godfry, 2025 WL 2391075, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2025) (finding “possible future harm 9 ||[due to prison transfer] insufficient to trigger the ‘imminent danger of serious physical 10 || injury’ exception to dismissal under § 1915(g).”); Perez v. Diaz, 2019 WL 3229622, at *3 11 |/(E.D. Cal. July 18, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 3986657 (E.D. 12 ||Cal. Aug. 22, 2019) (“Generalized allegations of past incidents of violence fail to show 13 || that plaintiff... faces imminent harm.’’). 14 For these reasons, the Court finds Plaintiff is not entitled to the privilege of 15 || proceeding IFP in this case. “A negative consequence that may impact a prisoner who files 16 ||... frivolous complaint[s] is a restriction on [her] ability to file future cases without 17 || prepaying filing fees.” Harris, 863 F.3d at 1139. 18 II. CONCLUSION 19 Accordingly, the Court: (1) DENIES Plaintiff's Motion to Proceed IFP (Doc. No. 20 ||2) as barred by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); (2) DISMISSES this civil action without prejudice 21 ||based on Plaintiff's failure to pay the full $405 civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. 22 1914(a); (3) CERTIFIES that an IFP appeal would not be taken in good faith pursuant 23 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), and (4) DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to close the file. 24 IT IS SO ORDERED. 25 ||Dated: December 8, 2025 27 United States District Judge 28 6 ee --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11221754. Public record. Not legal advice.