# Sly

> District Court, M.D. Florida · December 11, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11221664

## Case

- **Full name:** Rosa Sly and Devona Hollingsworth v. Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** December 11, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11221664

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- applying the lodestar method to a contractual fee-shifting case
- finding the district court did not abuse its discretion in reducing the lodestar figure by 75%

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION

ROSA SLY and
DEVONA HOLLINGSWORTH,

Plaintiffs,

v. Case No. 8:17-cv-1868-AAS

SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT
OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,

Defendant.
___________________________________/

ORDER
The plaintiffs Rosa Sly and Devona Hollingsworth (collectively, the
plaintiffs) move for attorney’s fees in the amount of $808,472.50. (Doc. 192, p.
26). The defendant Secretary, Department of Veteran Affairs (the VA) argues
the plaintiffs are not entitled to more than $102,108.50 in attorney’s fees. (Doc.
194, p. 20). The plaintiffs filed a reply to the VA’s response in opposition. (Doc.
199). Per the Settlement Agreement (Doc. 190) signed on May 29, 2025, the
plaintiffs’ entitlement to attorney’s fees is not disputed.
The plaintiffs also request costs and attorney’s fees for time spent on
litigating their entitlement to attorney’s fees (fees on fees). (Docs. 192, p. 25;
200). The VA is opposed to the plaintiffs’ requests for costs and fees on fees.
(Doc. 202).
I. BACKGROUND
On May 18, 2015, Plaintiff Rosa Sly initiated her EEO complaint. (Doc.

192, p. 1). Ms. Sly went through the Agency’s process and then filed this case
on August 7, 2017. (Id.). Plaintiff Devona Hollingsworth initiated her EEO
complaint on January 28, 2017. Ms. Hollingsworth went through the Agency’s
process. On April 4, 2019, Ms. Sly filed the second amended complaint adding

Ms. Hollingsworth as a plaintiff.
The plaintiffs sued the VA asserting seven claims under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. Each plaintiff asserted a retaliation claim, a
harassment and hostile work environment claim, and racial discrimination

claims against the VA. The plaintiffs also brought a claim for injunctive relief
against the VA, seeking preliminary and permanent injunctions.
The VA moved for summary judgment on July 24, 2019. The third
amended complaint was filed on October 19, 2019. The court granted the

motion for summary judgment on the race discrimination and hostile work
environment claims and denied summary judgment on the retaliation claim.
Subsequently, in April 2020, the parties agreed additional briefing was needed
to address the Supreme Court’s issued opinion in Babb v. Wilkie, 589 U.S. 399

(2020) and the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in Babb v. Sec’y, Dept. of Veterans
Affairs, 992 F.3d 1193 (11th Cir. 2021). Ultimately, on April 22, 2022, the court
determined it was not required to change its prior order.
After extensive discovery including, a total of 27 depositions of 15
witnesses and over 8,000 pages of documents exchanged, the parties reached a

settlement agreement on April 11, 2025, which was signed on May 29, 2025.
The settlement agreement awarded the plaintiffs a total of $175,000 and non-
monetary relief. The court retained jurisdiction to determine the reasonable
amount of the plaintiffs’ attorney’s fees.

II. ANALYSIS
In this case, attorney’s fees are warranted pursuant to the Settlement
Agreement. The Settlement Agreement is a contractual fee-shifting
agreement. See In re Home Depot Inc., 931 F.3d 1065, 1078−79 (11th Cir. 2019)

(identifying the instance “when the parties agree in contract that one party
will pay attorney’s fees” as a fee-shifting case). “Ordinarily, after classifying
the fee arrangement, the next question would be which method the court
should use to calculate the attorney’s fees.” Id. at 1082. “Where the parties

agree that one party will pay the other party’s legal fees, they agree to fee
shifting, and the ‘lodestar’ method is used to calculate reasonable attorneys’
fees.” Griffith v. McDonough, No. 20-14464, 2021 WL 4461605 at *1 (11th Cir.
Sept. 29, 2021); see Home Depot, 931 F.3d at 1082, 1085 (applying the lodestar

method to a contractual fee-shifting case). In addition, the Eleventh Circuit
has applied the statutory fee-shifting precedent to contractual fee-shifting
cases where the reasoning applies with full force. See Home Depot, 931 F.3d at
1085 (acknowledging that “Supreme Court precedents stretching from Hensley
to Perdue” “are not binding outside the statutory context,” but “adhering to

precedent where its reasoning applies”). The precedential reasoning of
statutory fee-shifting cases is inapplicable to a contractual fee-shifting cases
where the reasoning is specific to statutory interpretation. Id.
The lodestar calculation begins by multiplying the hours reasonably

expended on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate. Hensley v. Eckerhart,
461 U.S. 424, 432 (1983). Then the court must determine whether an upward
or downward adjustment to the lodestar is warranted. Id. at 434; but see Home
Depot, 931 F.3d at 1091 (determining courts in the Eleventh Circuit may use

the Johnson factors in determining the lodestar calculation itself, while the
Supreme Court uses the factors in the adjustment stage to adjust the overall
lodestar). The “lodestar,” carries a strong presumption of reasonableness but
may be adjusted by the court. ACLU of Ga. v. Barnes, 168 F.3d 423, 427 (11th

Cir. 1999); Bivins v. Wrap It Up, Inc., 548 F.3d 1348, 1350 (11th Cir. 2008).
“The fee applicant bears the burden of establishing entitlement to an
award and documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates.”
Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437. The applicant must demonstrate reasonableness,

which includes “supplying the court with specific and detailed evidence.”
Norman v. Hous. Auth. of City of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1303 (11th Cir.
1988). Likewise, the opposing party must also submit specific and “reasonably
precise” objections and proof’. Id. at 1301. In addition, a court may use its own
experience to assess the reasonableness of attorney’s fees. Id. at 1303.

A. REASONABLE RATES
This Order will first determine the reasonable hourly rates. The
plaintiffs request the court find the following are reasonable hourly rates: (1)
$550 per hour for Joseph Magri; (2) $200 per hour for Gerard Roble; (3) $489

per hour for Sean McFadden; (4) $125 per hour for Meagan Blackshear Ross-
Culpepper; and (5) $165 per hour for Angela Merkle. (Doc. 192-14). The
plaintiffs support their request with personal declarations and the declaration
of Attorney Robert McCormack. The VA contends the requested hourly rates

are well above the prevailing market rates in this jurisdiction. (Doc. 194, p. 9).
The VA requests the court find the following are reasonable hourly rates: (1)
$360 per hour for Joseph Magri; (2) $260 per hour for Sean McFadden; (3) $130
per hour for Gerard Roble; (4) $95 per hour for Meagan Blackshear Ross-

Culpepper; and (5) a rate not to exceed $95 per hour for Angela Merkle.
The plaintiffs’ attorneys describe the history of their fee agreements with
their clients over the course of the case. (Doc. 192, p. 19). The plaintiffs assert
the last amended fee agreement relates back to the beginning of the case and

lists settlement fees as $425 per hour. They argue the reasonable fees they are
entitled to are higher than the fee agreement.1 The VA contends the fee
agreements do not relate back, and the plaintiffs’ requested attorney’s fees are

not sufficiently supported.
The VA contends awarding the plaintiffs’ attorneys rates significantly
higher than what they received in Griffith would be unreasonable because at
least 1,500 hours (75% of the requested hours) were billed prior to the Griffith

ruling on attorney’s fees. (Doc. 194, p. 9). Griffith v. Wilkie, No. 8:18-CV-432-
T-CPT, 2020 WL 5814235 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 30, 2020), aff’d in part, vacated in
part sub nom. Griffith v. McDonough, No. 20-14464, 2021 WL 4461605 (11th
Cir. Sept. 29, 2021). In Griffith, the court awarded “the contracted hourly rates

of $300 for Joseph Magri, $235 for Sean McFadden, $130 for Gerard Roble, $95
for Meagan Blackshear Ross-Culpepper, and $85 for Angela Merkle.” 2020 WL
5814235 at *5. The plaintiffs argue Griffith is distinguishable from this case.
They argue Griffith “actually just accepted our settlement rate to help federal

employees, as our reasonable hourly rate, rather than determine our
reasonable rate.” (Doc. 199, p. 3). The controlling Settlement Agreement calls
for the court to determine the reasonable hourly rate for each individual.
“A reasonable hourly rate is the prevailing market rate in the relevant

1 The plaintiffs’ attorneys explain their settlement rates and rates charged were
below the reasonable market rate and designed to allow the plaintiffs to afford the
litigation and encourage settlement.
community for similar legal services by lawyers of reasonably comparable
skills, experience, and reputation.” Norman, at 836 F.2d at 1299. The relevant

legal community is the place where the case is filed. Griffith, 2020 WL 5814235
at *3 (citing Barnes, 168 F.3d at 437). The contractual rate between the
attorney and client “is a strong indication of the reasonable rate.” Griffith, 2021
WL 4461605 at *1 (11th Cir.) (quoting Tire Kingdom, Inc. v. Morgan Tire &

Auto, Inc., 253 F.3d 1332, 1337 (11th Cir. 2001)) However, the contracted rate
is not dispositive of the court’s determination.
“The party seeking attorneys’ fees ‘bears the burden of establishing that
his requested rate is in line with prevailing market rates,’ and this requires

more than just ‘the affidavit of the attorney performing the work.’” Griffith v.
McDonough, 2021 WL 4461605 at *1 (11th Cir.) (quoting Norman, 836 F.2d at
1299)). The court, in its capacity as an expert on attorney’s fees, “may consider
its own knowledge and experience concerning reasonable and proper fees.’”

Norman, 836 F.2d at 1303.
i. REASONABLE RATE FOR JOSEPH MAGRI
The plaintiffs request a reasonable hourly rate of $550 for Joseph Magri.
The VA requests an hourly rate of $360. Attorney Magri became a licensed

Florida attorney in 1989. (Doc. 192-1, p. 1). He has over 48 years of practice
experience. (Doc. 192, p. 16). As recognized by the court in Griffith, and further
supported by the record, Attorney Magri’s “skills, experience, and reputation
are impressive.” 2021 WL 4461605 at *1.
In 2010, Tampa Magistrate Judge Thomas B. McCoun awarded Mr.

Magri an hourly rate of $350 in a Title VII case against the VA. The magistrate
judge commented, “Based on my experience in handling matters of this sort . .
. trial counsel billed at hourly rates ranging from $300 to $400 per hour for this
type of work.” Fielder v. Shinseki, No. 8:07-CV-1524-T-TBM, 2010 WL 1708621

at *3 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 26, 2010), aff’d sub nom. Gowski v. Peake, 682 F.3d 1299
(11th Cir. 2012). In 2020, this district in Griffith awarded Attorney Magri an
hourly rate of $300. See also Krop v. Nicholson, No. 8:06-CV-157-T-MSS, 2008
WL 11439394 at *4 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 13, 2008) (awarding Attorney Magri a rate

of $300 per hour in 2008).
The record does not support $550 as a reasonable hourly rate for
Attorney Magri. The plaintiffs’ fee agreements, historic market rates, and the
courts own expertise are the relevant factors used to determine Attorney

Magri’s reasonable hourly rate. See Dillard v. City of Greensboro, 213 F.3d
1347, 1355 (11th Cir. 2000) (determining prior awards may be relevant but, “a
court should hesitate to give controlling weight to prior awards . . . over the
superior evidence of a lawyer’s actual billing rate”). The Settlement Agreement

calls for the court to take “into consideration Plaintiffs’ fee agreement.” (Doc.
192, p. 4). In addition, the rate charged to the client is a “powerful” indicator
of the attorney’s reasonable market rate. Griffith, 2020 WL 5814235 at *3
(citing Dillard, 212 F.3d at 1345).
Over the course of the litigation the fee agreement was amended three

times and Attorney Magri’s rate changed. The initial 2009 fee agreement listed
fees at $250 per hour. The 2017 fee agreement listed settlement fees at $350
per hour. And the final 2021 fee agreement listed settlement fees at $425 per
hour.2 The parties disagree whether the fee agreement amendments relate

back to the beginning of the case. The highest rate Attorney Magri billed at
over the course of the litigation was $425 per hour.
Although the fee agreement is not determinative on reasonable rates,
upon review the court finds $425 per hour is a reasonable hourly rate for

Attorney Magri for all work done since the beginning of the case.
The court acknowledges the plaintiffs’ expert declaration from Attorney
McCormack citing cases awarding attorney’s fees in the Middle District in the
range of $425 to $500 for less experienced attorneys but declines the invitation

to increase the rate. The cases Mr. McCormack relied on to justify his expert
opinion are distinguishable from this case. Two of those cases went to trial and
the fees were unopposed. This case was settled before trial. The other case is
outside the context of employment law.

2 Paragraph 7, “Court Awarded Fees,” states, “Nothing in the Agreement should be
interpreted to limit the firm’s reasonable hourly rate to the rate charged to give
Clients the ability to litigate against the government.” (Doc. 192-16, p. 8).
In addition to relying on its own expertise in determining attorney’s fees,
the court declines to award a downward departure because in 2010 a

reasonable fee for this type of work was found to be between $300 and $400 per
hour. Attorney Magri’s skill, expertise, and reputation has only increased over
this time.
Therefore, the rate of $425 per hour is the reasonable rate for Attorney

Magri. See Griffith, 2021 WL 4461605 (11th Cir. Sept. 29, 2021) (affirming the
Magistrate judge’s determination in a contractual fee-shifting case that the
contractual fee rate for Attorney Magri was a reasonable rate despite the
plaintiff’s argument the agreed upon rates were discounted from the market

rate).
ii. REASONABLE RATE FOR SEAN MCFADDEN
The plaintiffs request a reasonable hourly rate of $489 for Sean
McFadden. The VA requests an hourly rate of $260. Attorney McFadden

became a licensed Florida attorney in 2015. (Doc. 192-10, p. 1). He has
accumulated over a decade of experience in civil litigation with a majority of
that time being spent on civil rights and federal employment matters. (Id.).
Over the course of this litigation, Attorney McFadden billed at a rate of

$180, $210, $250, and $300 per hour. Attorney McFadden’s personal
declaration and expert McCormack’s declaration assert the reasonable hourly
rate is $489 per hour. Attorney McFadden argues $489 per hour is reasonable
because it is the rate the EEOC awarded in McGinn v. McDonough, Sec’y Dept.
of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Appeal No. 2021001021 (March 7, 2022). (Doc. 192-

10, p. 2).
Upon review of the record, the plaintiffs’ requested rate of $489 is
unreasonably high. The requested rate represents a 63% increase of the
highest contractual rate ($300/hr) Attorney McFadden charged over the course

of the case. See Griffith, 2020 WL 5814235 at *5 (finding a rate of $350 per
hour for Attorney McFadden was too high considering the rate represented
“roughly a 50% hike of the agreed-upon rates” when relying on the contractual
settlement rates among other factors). However, the VA’s requested rate of

$260 per hour is unreasonably low given the contracted rate and Attorney
McFadden’s experience in federal employment cases. Based on the last actual
rate charged and the court’s own experience, the reasonable rate for Attorney
McFadden is $300 for all work done since the beginning of the case. This award

accounts for, without solely relying on, the historic market rates, in addition to
Attorney McFadden’s expertise in federal employment litigation.
iii. REASONABLE RATE FOR GERARD ROBLE
The plaintiffs’ request a reasonably hourly rate of $200 per hour for

Attorney Roble. The VA requests an hourly rate of $130. Attorney
McCormack’s expert declaration suggests Attorney Roble’s reasonable rate is
$275 per hour. Attorney Roble became licensed in the State of Florida in 1987
and retired in 2019. (Doc 192-1, p. 2). The plaintiffs state the settlement rate
for Attorney Roble was $200 per hour. (Doc. 192, p. 20). Attorney Roble worked

on the case until September 2019 and charged $130 per hour. Upon reviewing
the record, it appears Attorney Roble’s role in the case heavily consisted of
discovery, research, and document review and production.
The plaintiffs have not met their burden to establish the requested rate

is aligned with the prevailing market rate. In 2020, this district awarded
Attorney Roble an hourly rate of $130. In 2021, the decision was affirmed by
the Eleventh Circuit. Attorney Roble retired and ceased working on this case
in 2019. Therefore, in accordance with Griffith, and the contractual rate

charged to the plaintiffs, Attorney Roble’s reasonably hourly rate is $130 for
all work since the beginning of the case.
iv. REASONABLE RATE FOR MEAGAN BLACKSHEAR
ROSS-CULPEPPER

The plaintiffs request a reasonable hourly rate of $125 per hour for
attorney Ross-Culpepper. The plaintiffs state the settlement rate for Attorney
Ross-Culpepper was $125 per hour. (Doc. 192, p. 20). The VA requests an
hourly rate of $95. Attorney Ross-Culpepper was admitted to the Florida bar
in April 2018, “prior to [being admitted], but after graduation and passing the
Bar, she worked at [the plaintiffs’ attorneys law firm] as a paralegal.” (Doc.

192-1, p. 3). As a paralegal Ms. Ross-Culpepper charged $95 per hour. As an
attorney Ms. Ross-Culpepper charged $175 per hour.
Courts in this jurisdiction have found a reasonable paralegal rate to be

between $95−$150 per hour. See Lemoine v. Copalo, Inc., No. 8:22-CV-702-
JSM-AEP, 2024 WL 1961490 at *2 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 24, 2024) (finding $110 per
hour a reasonable rate for paralegals in “employment discrimination lawsuits
filed in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida”);

Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Legion Media, LLC, No. 8:24-CV-1459-JLB-AAS, 2025
WL 1195544 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 8, 2025), report and recommendation adopted, No.
8:24-CV-1459-JLB-AAS, 2025 WL 1195906 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 24, 2025) (finding
$150 per hour a “generous” reasonable rate in a Federal Trade Commission Act

case); Butdorf v. SC Maint., Inc., No. 8:15-CV-916-T-23TGW, 2015 WL 9694516
(M.D. Fla. Dec. 7, 2015), report and recommendation adopted, No. 8:15-CV-
916-T-23TGW, 2016 WL 112372 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 11, 2016) (finding $95 per hour
a reasonable rate in a FSLA case).

Relying upon the courts own expertise, and considering Ms. Ross-
Culpepper became an attorney, and charged $175 per hour, a blended rate of
$125 per hour is a reasonable rate for Attorney Ross-Culpepper for all work
since the beginning of the case.

v. REASONABLE RATE FOR ANGELA MERKLE
The plaintiffs request a reasonable hourly rate of $165 per hour for
Paralegal Angela Merkle. The VA requests an hourly rate of $95. Ms. Merkle
has been a paralegal with the plaintiffs’ firm since 1996. The plaintiffs state
the settlement rate for Ms. Merkle was $100 per hour. (Doc. 192, p. 20). The

highest rate Ms. Merkle charged per hour was $100. The record indicates Ms.
Merkle has substantial experience in federal employment cases under Title
VII.
Relying upon its own expertise and considering the contracted rate and

Ms. Merkle’s substantial experience Ms. Merkle’s reasonable hourly rate is
$100 per hour. This rate also considers, without solely relying on, the historic
market rates for paralegals in similar employment cases as cited above.
B. REASONABLE HOURS

This Order will next determine the number of hours reasonably
expended on the litigation. The plaintiffs request fees on a total of 1,998.1
hours. (Doc. 192, p. 11). This time includes the time spent on both the
administrative and federal court proceedings by Joseph Magri, Gerard Roble,

Sean McFadden, Megan Ross-Culpepper, and Angela Merkle. In total, the VA
requests an across-the-board reduction of at least 80% of the hours.3 (See Doc.
194). There are two central issues. The first issue is billing, including the

3 Specifically, the VA requests the following across-the-board reductions: (1) at least
a 25% reduction for the plaintiffs’ unsuccessful claims; (2) at least a 25% reduction
for vague and block-billed entries; (3) at least a 5% percent reduction for non-
compensable clerical tasks; (4) at least a 5% percent reduction for non-compensable
independent legal tasks; and (5) at least a 20% reduction for duplicative and
excessive tasks.
sufficiency of the documentation for the hours billed and the type of work
billed. The second issue is whether hours should be offset for the dismissal of

unsuccessful claims.
“To prevail in their request for attorney’s fees, the moving party must
present accurate records that detail the work the timekeepers performed.”
Jacob v. Bais Yisroel Cmty. Ctr. of Tampa Bay, LLC, No. 8:23-CV-2703-KKM-

AAS, 2024 WL 4103601 at *4 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 23, 2024), report and
recommendation adopted (Sept. 10, 2024). Attorneys must exercise billing
judgment, which “means they must exclude from their fee applications
excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary hours, which are hours that

would be unreasonable to bill to a client and therefore to one’s adversary
irrespective of the skill, reputation or experience of counsel.” Barnes, 168 F.3d
at 428 (quotations and citations omitted).
If the moving party requests compensation for unreasonably high hours

expended on a case, a district court may either “conduct an hour-by-hour
analysis or it may reduce the requested hours with an across-the-board cut.”
Bivins, 548 F.3d at 1350. An across-the-board reduction is appropriate to avoid
the “pick and shovel work” of analyzing billing records. Kenny A. v. Perdue, 532

F.3d 1209, 1220 (11th Cir. 2008), rev’d on other grounds, 559 U.S. 542 (2010).
“Trial courts need not, and indeed should not, become green-eyeshade
accountants. The essential goal in shifting fees (to either party) is to do rough
justice, not to achieve auditing perfection. So, trial courts may consider their
overall sense of a suit and may use estimates in calculating and allocating an

attorney’s time.” Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826, 838 (2011). Because the billing
record consists of nearly 200 pages of records and runs from 2015 through 2025
the court will consider whether an across-the-board reduction is warranted.
Cozzolino v. Staff, No. 8:24-CV-01349-AAS, 2025 WL 1721707 at *2 (M.D. Fla.

May 8, 2025) (“Rather than go line by line and identify every
troublesome billing record, the court will just focus on certain areas that justify
the ultimate across-the-board reduction.”).
“Hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary should

be pruned from a fee application.” Miller’s Ale House, Inc. v. Boynton Carolina
Ale House, LLC, No. 09-80918-CIV-MARRA/JOHNSON, 2011 WL 13108095,
at *7 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 7, 2011); see also Hazleton v. City of Orlando, No. 6:10-cv-
342-Orl-36DAB, 2013 WL 5952427, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 4, 2013) (“[A]

reduction is warranted where the attorneys are unreasonably doing the same
work or have made it impossible for the court to recognize the distinct
contributions of each lawyer.”). The fee applicant also bears the burden of
providing specific and detailed evidence so that the court can determine the

necessity and reasonableness of the time claimed for the task. Hensley, 461
U.S. at 427, 432–33. Likewise, “objections and proof from fee opponents” “must
be reasonably precise.” Norman, 836 F. 2d at 1301. In the end, however,
“exclusions for excessive or unnecessary work on given tasks must be left to
the discretion of the district court.” Norman, 836 F. 2d at 1301.

The plaintiffs’ counsel claims they are entitled to fees on a total of 1,998.1
hours for time spent on the administrative and federal court proceedings. The
breakdown is as follows: 1,052.2 hours for Joseph Magri; 221 hours for Sean
McFadden; 155 hours for Gerard J. Roble; 83.5 hours for Megan Ross-

Culpepper; and 486.4 hours for Angela Merkle. As discussed, the VA seeks a
significant reduction.
i. BILLING
The VA argues for reduction in the reasonable hours expended on the

litigation because the billing records contain vague and block-billed entries,
non-compensable clerical tasks, non-compensable work for independent legal
proceedings, and duplicative and excessive entries.
A reduction in hours is appropriate where the description of work “does

not describe the billed task in sufficient detail for the district court . . . to
evaluate the necessity of the task and whether the time billed for the task was
reasonable.” Otto v. City of Boca Raton, Fla., No. 24-10478, 2025 WL 2952783
at *5 (11th Cir. Oct. 20, 2025) Vague billing entries are “particularly

problematic because it makes determining redundancy or duplication
difficult.” Eaton v. Principal Life Ins. Co., No. 8:20-CV-61-KKM-JSS, 2023 WL
5804263 at *7 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 7, 2023) (quoting Lanard Toys Ltd. v.
Dolgencorp, LLC, No. 3:15-CV-849-MMH-PDB, 2022 WL 1597276 at *25 (M.D.
Fla. Feb. 2, 2022)). In Otto, the Eleventh Circuit determined the billing entries

of: “‘[c]ontinued drafting of motion for preliminary injunction,’ ‘prepare initial
disclosures,’ and ‘[a]ttention to preparing search terms and identifying
document custodians for discussion with defense counsel in response to
discovery requests’ all describe the billed task in sufficient detail.” 2025 WL

2952783 at *5.
Upon review of the billing records, an across-the-board reduction is
warranted for vague entries. Numerous billing entries are vague because they
do not describe the subject matter of the work done with sufficient detail for

the court to analyze the services performed or the reasonableness of the time
spent.4 (Doc. 192-3). For example, numerous entries are described as “review
email client” or similar variations without an attached subject matter. These
descriptions differ from the non-vague descriptions in Otto because they are

not accompanied by a further description. Without a description of the subject
matter the court is unable to determine the services performed or
reasonableness of the time spent. Cf. Otto, 2025 WL 2952783 at *5
(determining the billing descriptions were not vague because “nowhere in

4 The plaintiffs argue their “billing statements set out with sufficient particularity
the subject matter of the time expenditures, as long as one does not place their head
in the ground.” (Doc. 199, p. 5).
counsel’s billing records were any of the listed terms [like ‘drafting,’ ‘preparing,’
giving ‘attention to,’ or ‘considering strategy] used without further

explanation.”).
Likewise, block billing warrants a reduction in hours. See Eaton, 2023
WL 5804263 at *7. Block billing “occurs when an attorney lists all the day’s
tasks on a case in a single entry, without separately identifying the time spent

on each task.” Ceres Env’t Servs., Inc. v. Colonel McCrary Trucking, LLC, 476
F. App’x 198, 203 (11th Cir. 2012). Block billing warrants a reduction when it
“obstructs a court’s determination of the number of hours reasonably expended
on the litigation when a single billing entry includes both compensable and

noncompensable tasks or when the time spent on one or more of the block-
billed tasks may be excessive.” Otto, 2025 WL 2952783 at *5. However, a
reduction in hours for block billing is not necessary if the entries “do not impede
the court's task of calculating a reasonable fee award because they describe

only closely related compensable activities billed in small blocks of time that
are easily assessed for reasonableness.” Id. For example, in Otto the Eleventh
Circuit determined a block-billed entry to “[r]eceive and review email
correspondence from Hamilton re[garding] providing initial responses to

discovery request; [and] review same and consider incorporation into
responses” did not warrant a reduction in hours. Id. The court reasoned
“[e]ntries like these that do not include excessive, redundant, or otherwise
unnecessary activities do not support a reduction in billable hours” and “easily
passes review for necessity and reasonableness.” Id.

The plaintiffs argue there should be no reduction for block billing
because the entries are intertwined and set out with sufficient particularity.
(Doc. 199, p. 5). The VA contends “lump[ing] together multiple tasks . . . into
one entry with no time allocation or further detail . . . frustrates . . . the Court’s

ability to ‘ascertain how much time was spent on each task.’” (Doc. 194, p. 15)
(citing Ceres Env’t Servs., Inc. v. Colonel McCrary Trucking, LLC, 476 F. App’x
198, 203 (11th Cir. 2012).
Upon review, the court finds a minor reduction in hours for block billing

is warranted. Many of the entries the VA highlights as block-billed entries
(Doc. 192-3) are intertwined entries set out with sufficient subject matter
particularity allowing the court to determine the billed hours were reasonable.
(See e.g. Doc. 192-3, pp. 22, 24). However, some entries are not described with

sufficient particularity. (See e.g. Doc. 192-3, p. 13). Therefore, a minor across-
the-board reduction is necessary to account for the instances of block billing
where the description frustrates the court’s ability to assess the
reasonableness of the time spent on each task.

The VA also moves for a reduction of hours for non-compensable clerical
tasks billed. “A fee movant can recover only for a service ‘traditionally done’ by
an attorney.” Eaton, 2023 WL 5804263 at *6 (citing Jean v. Nelson, 863 F.2d
759, 778 (11th Cir. 1989)). “Clerical work, such as the compilation of facts and
statistics, coordinating schedules, basic communications, procedural matters,

and housekeeping matters, is usually performed by legal assistants, not
lawyers.” Id. (citation omitted); see Otto, 2025 WL 2952783 at *6 (identifying
“electronic filing and service, organizing exhibits, scheduling, and contacting
the court for updates” as nonbillable clerical activities). Purely clerical tasks

are not billable, even at a paralegal rate. Id. (citation omitted).
Upon review, clerical tasks are included in the billing records.5 Many of
the purely clerical entries are for a relatively small number of hours. In
addition, some purely clerical entries are included in larger block-billed

entries. However, many of the entries identified by the VA as clerical were
properly billed tasks. Therefore, only a minor reduction is warranted
commensurate with the time spent on the non-compensable tasks, and without
striking the entirety of otherwise valid block-billed entries. Id.; see Eaton, 2023

WL 5804263 at *5 (recommending “an across-the-board reduction that takes
time spent on clerical tasks into consideration.”).
Work done on independent legal proceedings is also non-compensable.
The VA argues “time spent on Hollingsworth’s USERRA action and

whistleblower claim . . . are [non-compensable] distinct legal proceedings.” The

5 The clerical tasks include tasks done by Ms. Merkle and Attorney Roble such as
calendaring dates, scheduling, assembling documents, and filing documents.
VA supports this claim by highlighting certain billing entries as “Work related
to independent actions” in purple. (Doc. 194, p. 17). Ms. Merkle’s declaration

(Doc. 199-3) counters the VA claims and describes in detail that the plaintiffs’
firm was diligent to not double bill. Relying on Ms. Merkle’s declaration that
the plaintiffs’ counsel was diligent to ensure no double billing occurred, and
the necessity to discuss the matters at issue with the clients due to the “mixed

nature” of the claims the court finds a reduction in hours is not warranted. The
hours billed to determine to what extent the claims were properly billed
towards the USERRA action, or the whistleblower claim were reasonable.
Lastly, the VA requests a reduction in hours for duplicative and

excessive billing. Eaton lays out the controlling rules and the court’s obligation
as follows:
“Hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary
should be pruned from a fee application.” Creative Choice Homes
XXX, LLC, 2023 WL 2817366, at *6 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). “Redundant hours generally occur where more
than one attorney represents a client.” Norman, 836 F.2d at 1301–
02. While courts must “closely scrutinize cases where more than
one attorney is involved for possible duplication of effort,” Preson
v. Mandeville, 451 F. Supp. 617, 641 (S.D. Ala. 1978), there “is
nothing inherently unreasonable about a client having multiple
attorneys, and they may all be compensated if they are not
unreasonably doing the same work and are being compensated for
the distinct contribution of each lawyer.” Norman, 835 F.3d at
1302; see also Hazleton v. City of Orlando, No. 6:10-cv-342-Orl-
36DAB, 2013 WL 5952427, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 4, 2013) (“[A]
reduction is warranted where the attorneys are unreasonably
doing the same work or have made it impossible for the Court to
recognize the distinct contributions of each lawyer.”).
Eaton, 2023 WL 5804263 at *5. Regarding excessive billing, “[c]ourts are not
authorized to be generous with the money of others, and it is as much the duty
of courts to see that excessive fees and expenses are not awarded as it is to see

that an adequate amount is awarded.” Id. at *6 (citing Am. C.L. Union of Ga.,
168 F.3d at 428).
Upon review and relying on the court’s own expertise, an across-the-
board reduction is warranted for duplicative and excessive billing. Although

attorneys may conference with each other and each attorney may properly bill
for the time, here, the conferencing appears excessive. See Otto, at *6 (“Some
internal discussion is necessary and expected when multiple attorneys are
assigned to a case”). The court notes, without doubly penalizing by reducing

hours, that the vagueness of some billing entries and the volume of the billing
entries creates a challenge to determine if various emails, conferences, and
reviews were redundant. See Fox, 563 U.S. at 838 (The essential goal in
shifting fees (to either party) is to do rough justice”). An across-the-board

reduction is necessary, although not the extent requested by the VA, to account
for excessive and redundant billing.
Accordingly, the reasonable hours are reduced by 20% across-the-board.
This reduction accounts primarily for vague, duplicative, and excessive tasks.

It also factors in block-billed entries and work done on non-compensable
clerical tasks. Consequently, the lodestar calculation is represented by this
chart:

Reasonable Reasonable Pre- Reduction Total
Rate Hours reduction
total
Magri $425/hr 1,052.2 $447,185 20% $357,748

McFadden $300/hr 221 $66,300 20% $53,040
Roble $130/hr 155 $20,150 20% $16,120

Ross- $125/hr 83.5 $10,437.5 20% $8,350
Culpepper
Merkle $100/hr 486.4 $48,640 20% $38,912

Lodestar $474,170

ii. UNSUCCESSFUL CLAIMS
The plaintiffs argue no reduction in hours is warranted for their

unsuccessful claims. (Doc. 192, ¶¶ 10−12). The plaintiffs, relying on Home
Depot, argue that a prevailing party limitation on fees does not apply because
the Settlement Agreement contained no such limitation. (See Id.). They argue
the time spent, including time on successful claims, was reasonable and

properly charged to the clients given the claims involved a common core of
facts. (Doc. 42, ¶¶ 11−12). The VA argues a reduction in fees is appropriate
where the plaintiff obtains only partial or limited success.

When awarding fees pursuant to a settlement agreement, which
contains no prevailing party limitation, the limitation does not apply, and the
court does not need to deduct time spent on discrete and unsuccessful claims.
Home Depot, 931 F.3d at 1087; Griffith, 2020 WL 5814235 at *7 (rejecting

“[t]he position that it should now be excused from paying the reasonable fees
incurred as a result of the entirety of the litigation” where the settlement
agreement provided for the VA to pay reasonable attorney’s fees as determined
by the court with no prevailing party limitation).

The plaintiffs are correct in the sense that the statutory prevailing party
limitation does not apply. See Home Depot, 931 F.3d at 1087 (finding because
“the fees are awarded pursuant to a contract, not a statute, and there is no
prevailing-party limitation in the settlement agreement” that “the prevailing

party limitation does not apply, and the District Court did not need to deduct
time spent on discrete and unsuccessful claims”).
However, a reduction in fees is still warranted. The reduction is
warranted not based upon a prevailing party theory but rather based upon the

“results obtained” factor, which is considered in determining reasonable fees
pursuant to the Settlement Agreement. See Home Depot, 913 F.3d at 1091 (“We
[the Eleventh Circuit] use the Johnson factors to adjust the hourly rate, the
Supreme Court uses the Johnson factors to adjust the overall lodestar.”).6
Although Hensley and the subsumed lodestar factors come from

statutory cases, thus non-binding on this contractual case, Hensley’s reasoning
on the results obtained factor on the lodestar has precedential value. Hensley
states:
The product of reasonable hours times a reasonable rate does not
end the inquiry. There remain other considerations that may lead
the district court to adjust the fee upward or downward, including
the important factor of the “results obtained.”[] This factor is
particularly crucial where a plaintiff is deemed “prevailing” even
though he succeeded on only some of his claims for relief. In this
situation two questions must be addressed. First, did the plaintiff
fail to prevail on claims that were unrelated to the claims on which
he succeeded? Second, did the plaintiff achieve a level of success
that makes the hours reasonably expended a satisfactory basis for
making a fee award? “[t]his [results obtained] factor is particularly
crucial where a plaintiff is deemed “prevailing” even though he
succeeded on only some of his claims for relief.”

Id. at 434. The above language indicates the results obtained factor is crucial
in statutory cases where fees are granted to the prevailing party. Yet, the
language quoted above from Hensley, combined with the Eleventh Circuit’s
decision to “not lightly cast aside the statutory fee-shifting precedent if its
reasoning applies with full force” in Home Depot, indicate the results obtained
factor remains an important factor subsumed within the court’s lodestar

6 Here, the results obtained factor is used to adjust the overall lodestar. In making
this calculation the court was careful to not doubly penalize the plaintiffs for factors
subsumed in the lodestar calculation represented by the chart.
calculation in a contractual fee-shifting case. The reasoning applies here
because the lodestar method is used to determine reasonable attorney’s fees in

contractual fee-shifting agreements and “results obtained” is a factor
subsumed by the lodestar calculation. See Home Depot, at 1091. Therefore, to
determine the final amount of reasonable attorney’s fees the court analyzed
whether “the plaintiff[s] achieve[d] a level of success that makes the hours

reasonably expended a satisfactory basis for making a fee award.” Hensley, 461
U.S. at 434; see Norman, 836 F.2d at 1302 (“If the result was partial or limited
success, then the loadstar must be reduced to an amount that is not excessive”).
Upon review, a 20% downward adjustment to the lodestar is warranted.

See Vidovic v. City of Tampa, No. 8:16-CV-714-T-17CPT, 2018 WL 4603294 at
*3 (M.D. Fla. May 3, 2018) (reducing the lodestar by 20% in a pregnancy
discrimination and Title VII retaliation case that went to trial); Martinez v.
Hernando Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 579 F. App’x 710, 715 (11th Cir. 2014) (finding

the district court did not abuse its discretion in reducing the lodestar figure by
75%).7 Following the 20% downward adjustment the total attorney’s fee award
is $379,336.
The reduction is warranted not based upon the unsuccessful claims

7 The court does not rely on the prevailing party limitation present in Vidovic or
Martinez. The district court may adjust the lodestar for “results obtained.” See
Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434.
themselves but is based upon the overall results obtained. See Norman, 836
F.2d at 1302 (“A reduction is appropriate if the relief, however significant, is

limited in comparison to the scope of the litigation as a whole”). The plaintiffs
request attorney’s fees on a total of 1,998.1 hours (amounting to over $800,000
in attorney’s fees). (Doc. 192, p. 11). Minus reasonable attorney’s fees, the
plaintiffs’ attorneys achieved the following results: (1) a total settlement sum

of $175,000; (2) a favorable modification of Ms. Sly’s 2015 and 2016
performance appraisals; and (3) a favorable modification of Ms.
Hollingsworth’s SF-50 to reflect a resignation. Although successful, the
plaintiffs’ case generated a lodestar significantly above the results obtained. In

other words, the relief obtained was limited in comparison to the scope of the
litigation as a whole. Norman, 836 F.2d at 1302. Therefore, accounting for the
20% downward adjustment, the plaintiffs are entitled to a total of $379,336 in
attorney’s fees.

C. COSTS AND FEES ON FEES
The plaintiffs also seek post settlement fees and costs. (Doc. 192, p. 25).
In support the plaintiffs filed a Supplemental Motion for Attorneys Fees and
Costs. (Doc. 200). The VA responded in opposition. (Doc. 202).

As an initial matter, the plaintiffs are not entitled to costs or fees under
prevailing party fee-shifting statues because the plaintiff is not a prevailing
party and this is a contractual fee-shifting case, not a statutory fee-shifting
case. The Settlement Agreement contract controls whether the plaintiffs are
entitled to costs and fees for litigating reasonable attorney’s fees (fees on fees).

The VA contends it only agreed to pay reasonable attorney’s fees and
that it never agreed to pay costs. (Doc. 194, p. 20). The plaintiffs “believed costs
were inherently part of the settlement because Defendant agreed to reasonable
fees in this type of case.” (Doc. 199, p. 7). Importantly, the plaintiffs

acknowledge the VA objected to putting “costs” in the Settlement Agreement.
(Doc. 199, p. 7) (“Defendant objected to putting those words [referring to “costs”
language] in the settlement agreement”). Despite being aware of the VA’s
objection to including costs in the Settlement Agreement the plaintiffs now

argue they did not “agree because the cases cited on pages 24, 25 of our motion
establish cost are part of reasonable fees.” (Doc. 199, p. 7).
The court is presented with a contractual interpretation dispute,
whether “reasonable attorney’s fees” includes costs and fees on fees. “Only

when the terms of a contract are ambiguous or susceptible to different
interpretations is parol evidence admissible to “explain, clarify or elucidate”
the ambiguous term.” Tingley Sys., Inc. v. HealthLink, Inc., 509 F. Supp. 2d
1209, 1214 (M.D. Fla. 2007) (citation omitted). Here, exactly what costs and

fees are included in the term “reasonable attorney’s fees” is ambiguous. Upon
consideration of the parties’ briefs, it appears the VA did not intend for costs
or fees for litigating fees to be included in the Settlement Agreement. In
addition, it appears the plaintiffs were aware of the VA’s position and yet they
still executed the Settlement Agreement with the intention to dispute whether
costs and fees on fees were included within the meaning of “reasonable
attorney’s fees.” Indeed, the VA “expressly refused to include such provision
for fear that the Court may mistakenly infer that Defendant was agreeing to

pay fees on fees.” (Docs. 202, p. 5; 199-8, pp. 18, 15). Accordingly, the plaintiffs
are not entitled to costs or fees on fees for litigating reasonable attorney’s fees.
Ill. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above the plaintiffs’ motion for attorney’s fees
(Doc. 192) is GRANTED in part. The plaintiffs are entitled to a total award of
$379,336 in attorney fees. The plaintiffs request for costs and fees on fees (Doc.
200) is DENIED.
Ordered in Tampa, Florida, on December 11, 2025.

Aranda. Asned Saving
AMANDA ARNOLD SANSONE
United States Magistrate Judge

30

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11221664. Public record. Not legal advice.