# Bridges

> District Court, W.D. North Carolina · December 10, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11221470

## Case

- **Full name:** Shelley Bridges, Lisa Blakemore, and Teresa Lukaszewicz, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. Raycen Raines, Wakpamni Lake Community Corporation, WLCC II d/b/a Arrowhead Advance, WLCC Lending JEM d/b/a Explore Credit, WLCC Lending FDL d/b/a Fast Day Loans, WLCC Lending FDL d/b/a First Day Loan, and John Does Nos. 1–40
- **Court:** District Court, W.D. North Carolina
- **Decided:** December 10, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11221470

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding arbitration agreement unenforceable where contract “mandate[d] the primary and effective control of tribal law in resolving disputes”
- concluding that an arbitration agreement which excluded the application of “any law other than” tribal law “almost surreptitiously waives a potential claimant’s federal rights through the guise of a choice of law clause”
- concluding that the arbitration agreement “evince[s] an explicit attempt to disavow the application of federal or state law” and thus was unenforceable

## Opinion text

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
ASHEVILLE DIVISION
CIVIL CASE NO. 1:24-cv-00087-MR-WCM

SHELLEY BRIDGES, LISA )
BLAKEMORE, and TERESA )
LUKASZEWICZ, individually and on )
behalf of all others similarly )
situated, )
)
Plaintiffs, )
) MEMORANDUM OF
vs. ) DECISION AND ORDER
)
RAYCEN RAINES, WAKPAMNI )
LAKE COMMUNITY CORPORATION, )
WLCC II d/b/a ARROWHEAD )
ADVANCE, WLCC LENDING JEM )
d/b/a EXPLORE CREDIT, WLCC )
LENDING FDL d/b/a FAST DAY )
LOANS, WLCC LENDING FDL )
d/b/a FIRST DAY LOAN, and JOHN )
DOES Nos. 1–40, )
)
Defendants. )
________________________________ )

THIS MATTER is before the Court on the Defendants’ Motion to
Compel Arbitration [Doc. 14] and the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and/or
Strike Class Allegations [Doc. 16].
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On March 25, 2024, the Plaintiffs Shelley Bridges, Lisa Blakemore, and
Teresa Lukaszewicz initiated this action against the Defendant Raycen
Raines, Wakpamni Lake Community Corporation, several lending entities,
and John Does Nos. 1–40, alleging that the Defendants operated a predatory

lending scheme in which the Defendants attempted to “cloak themselves
with sovereign immunity . . . to shield plainly illegal commercial conduct.” [Id.
at 1–2]. The Plaintiffs assert a putative class action and allege that the

Defendants’ scheme violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c), (d) (“RICO”); North Carolina’s
Usury Law; North Carolina’s Consumer Finance Act; North Carolina’s Unfair
and Deceptive Trade Practices Act; Tennessee’s Usury Law; and

Wisconsin’s Usury Law. [Id. at 19–28]. The Plaintiffs also allege claims for
unjust enrichment and civil conspiracy. [Id. at 28–29].
The Defendants now move to compel arbitration and to dismiss and/or

strike the class allegations in the Plaintiffs’ Complaint. [Docs. 14, 16]. The
Plaintiffs have responded to these motions [Docs. 20, 21], and the
Defendants have replied [Docs. 22, 23]. Having been fully briefed, this
matter is ripe for disposition.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The Plaintiffs collectively allege that the Defendants are predatory
lenders who have attempted to associate themselves with an American

Indian tribe to engage in a predatory lending scheme seeking to have the
tribe’s sovereign immunity shield the Defendants from civil liability and
government enforcement. [Doc. 1 at 1-2]. As part of the alleged scheme,

the Defendants formed organizations to provide individuals with short-term
loans with interest rates exceeding six hundred percent. [Id.]. The Plaintiffs
each took out one or more of these loans and, in doing so, signed Loan

Agreements that contained the following provisions:
Governing Law. This Agreement is governed by the
laws of the Oglala Sioux Nation of the Pine Ridge
Reservation Tribe (“Tribal Law”), a federally
recognized Indian Tribe, the Indian Commerce
Clause of the United States Constitution, and
applicable federal law. The Arbitration provision
below is governed by Tribal Law, the Federal
Arbitration Act (“FAA”), decisions of the United States
Supreme Court interpreting the FAA, and other
applicable federal law without regard to the laws of
any state, including the conflict of laws rules of any
state. We do not have a presence in South Dakota
or any other State of the United States of America.
Neither this Agreement nor the Lender is subject to
the law of any State of the United States. You agree
to be bound by Tribal Law, and in the event of a bona
fide dispute between you and us, Tribal Law and
applicable federal law shall exclusively apply to such
dispute.
. . . .

BINDING CONFIDENTIAL ARBITRATION
AGREEMENT AND CLASS ACTION WAIVER
. . . .

PLEASE READ THIS PROVISION OF THE
AGREEMENT CAREFULLY. Unless you exercise
your right to opt-out of arbitration in the manner
described below, any Claim you have with Lender or
anyone else under this Agreement will be resolved by
binding arbitration. Arbitration replaces the right to
go to court, including the right to have a jury, . . . and
to participate in a class action or similar
proceeding....

Any issues regarding the validity, effect and
enforceability of this Agreement to Arbitrate (or any
provision thereof) shall be determined solely by the
Arbitrator.
. . . .

Agreement to Arbitrate. You agree that any Claim
. . . will be resolved on an individual basis by
arbitration in accordance with this Arbitration
Provision, applicable Oglala Sioux tribal law, and
Applicable Federal Law.
. . . .

YOU ARE GIVING UP YOUR RIGHT TO SERVE AS
A REPRESENTATIVE, AS A PRIVATE ATTORNEY
GENERAL, OR IN ANY OTHER
REPRESENTATIVE CAPACITY, AND/OR TO
PARTICIPATE AS A MEMBER OF A CLASS OF
CLAIMANTS, IN ANY LAWSUIT AGAINST US
AND/OR RELATED THIRD PARTIES . . . .
. . . .

Waiver of Jury Trial and Waiver of Ability to
Participate in a Class Action. YOU HEREBY
AGREE THAT YOU ARE WAIVING YOUR RIGHT
TO A JURY TRIAL, TO HAVE A COURT DECIDE
YOUR CLAIM, AND YOU ARE WAIVING YOUR
ABILITY TO SERVE AS A REPRESENTATIVE, AS A
PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL, TO PARTICIPATE
IN A CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT, OR IN ANY OTHER
REPRESENTATIVE CAPACITY FOR OTHERS IN
THE ARBITRATION, AND TO CERTAIN
DISCOVERY AND OTHER PROCEDURES THAT
WOULD BE AVAILABLE IN A LAWSUIT. The
arbitrator has the ability to award all remedies
available under the Oglala Sioux Tribe’s tribal law
and applicable federal law, whether at law or in
equity, to the prevailing party, except that the parties
agree that the arbitrator has no authority to conduct
class-wide proceedings and will be restricted to
resolving the individual claims between the parties....
. . . .

Applicable Law and Judicial Review. You and we
choose Oglala Sioux tribal law, and Applicable
Federal Law to govern the loan Agreement, the
Arbitration Agreement and all Claims.

[Doc. 18-1: Bridges September 2023 Loan Agreement at 5–7; see also Doc.
18-2: Bridges November 2023 Loan Agreement at 5–8; Doc. 18-3:
Blakemore June 2022 Loan Agreement at 5–7; Doc. 18-4 Blakemore June
2023 Loan Agreement at 9–15; Doc. 18-5 Lukaszewicz May 2022 Loan
Agreement at 4–8].1 The Defendants argue that these provisions mandate
that the Plaintiffs’ claims be resolved in arbitration, and that each Plaintiff
pursue his or her claims individually and not as a class action. [Docs. 15,
17].

1 While the Loan Agreements are not attached to the Complaint, they are explicitly
incorporated into the Complaint by reference and their authenticity is not in dispute.
Therefore, they may be considered. See Goines v. Valley Cmty. Servs. Bd., 822 F.3d
159, 166 (4th Cir. 2016). Additionally, the language in each Loan Agreement is materially
the same. Therefore, throughout this opinion, the Court will cite only to the Bridges
September 2023 Loan Agreement in referencing the language contained in each of the
Plaintiffs’ Loan Agreements.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., establishes

“a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements in order to reverse
the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements . . . and to place
arbitration agreements upon the same footing as other contracts.” Murray v.

United Food & Com. Workers Int'l Union, 289 F.3d 297, 301 (4th Cir. 2002)
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). In treating an arbitration
agreement like any other contract, courts “may invalidate an arbitration
agreement based on ‘generally applicable contract defenses.” Kindred

Nursing Ctrs. Ltd. P’ship v. Clark, 581 U.S. 246, 251 (2017) (quoting AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011)).
Under the FAA, “any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues

should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the
construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay,
or a like defense to arbitrability.” Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury
Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983). “When parties have entered into a

valid and enforceable agreement to arbitrate their disputes and the dispute
at issue falls within the scope of that agreement, the FAA requires federal
courts to stay judicial proceedings and compel arbitration in accordance with
the agreement’s terms.” Murray, 289 F.3d at 301 (citations omitted); see also
9 U.S.C. §§ 3-4.

The party seeking to compel arbitration under the FAA has the burden
of establishing the existence of a valid agreement to arbitrate. Minnieland
Priv. Day Sch., Inc. v. Applied Underwriters Captive Risk Assurance Co., Inc.,

867 F.3d 449, 456 (4th Cir. 2017).
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Delegation Clause
“The question whether the parties have submitted a particular dispute

to arbitration, i.e., the ‘question of arbitrability,’ is an issue for judicial
determination unless the parties clearly and unmistakably provide
otherwise.” Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83 (2002)

(quoting in part AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S.
643, 649 (1986)) (emphasis in original). The parties may manifest such clear
and unmistakable intent through the inclusion of a delegation clause. See
Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer and White Sales, Inc., 586 U.S. 63, 69 (2019).

Here, the Loan Agreements at issue provide that “[a]ny issues
regarding the validity, effect and enforceability of this Agreement to Arbitrate
(or any provision thereof) shall be determined solely by the Arbitrator.” [See

Doc. 18-1: Bridges September 2023 Loan Agreement at 6]. This delegation
clause evidences a clear and unmistakable intent to have any claims
regarding the “validity, effect, or enforceability” of the Agreements to be

resolved by an arbitrator, not the Court. However, the Plaintiffs contend that
this delegation clause, along with the arbitration agreement in general, is
unenforceable because it operates as a prospective waiver of their statutory

rights. [See Doc. 20 at 27-29].
When a party makes a specific challenge to a delegation clause, the
Court must evaluate the validity of such clause before compelling
compliance with the arbitration agreement. Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v.

Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 71 (2010). Thus, despite the existence of delegation
clauses within the parties’ agreements, the Court will consider the merits of
the Plaintiffs’ invalidity argument based on the prospective waiver doctrine.

B. Prospective Waiver
1. Federal Law
Under the prospective waiver doctrine, “an agreement that
prospectively waives a party’s right to pursue statutory remedies is

unenforceable as a violation of public policy.” Hengle v. Treppa, 19 F.4th
324, 334 (4th Cir. 2021) (quoting in part Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 637 n. 19 (1985) (internal quotation marks

omitted). The mere inclusion of a foreign choice of law provision, however,
“will not trigger application of the prospective waiver doctrine.” Dillon v. BMO
Harris Bank, N.A., 856 F.3d 330, 334 (4th Cir. 2017). As the Supreme Court

has recognized, the FAA “allows parties to an arbitration contract
considerable latitude to choose what law governs some or all of its
provisions, including the law governing enforceability of a class-arbitration

waiver. In principle, [the parties] might choose to have portions of their
contract governed by the law of Tibet” or even “the law of pre-revolutionary
Russia . . . .” DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 577 U.S. 47, 53-54 (2015) (citations
omitted). Thus, the salient inquiry is “whether, as a matter of law, the choice-

of-forum and choice-of-law clauses operate in tandem as a prospective
waiver of a party’s right to pursue statutory remedies.” Gibbs v. Haynes
Investments, LLC, 967 F.3d 332, 340 (4th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted).

In the context of tribal lending, the Fourth Circuit has held that
arbitration agreements which apply tribal law to the exclusion of any federal
substantive statutory remedies are unenforceable as a prospective waiver of
federal rights. See Hengle, 19 F.4th at 339 (invalidating arbitration

agreement where it effectively dictated the “exclusive application of tribal law
in arbitration”); Gibbs v. Sequoia Cap. Operations, LLC, 966 F.3d 286, 293
(4th Cir. 2020) (finding arbitration agreement unenforceable where contract

“mandate[d] the primary and effective control of tribal law in resolving
disputes”); Dillon 856 F.3d at 336 (concluding that the arbitration agreement
“evince[s] an explicit attempt to disavow the application of federal or state

law” and thus was unenforceable); Hayes v. Delbert Servs. Corp., 811 F.3d
666, 675 (4th Cir. 2016) (concluding that an arbitration agreement which
excluded the application of “any law other than” tribal law “almost

surreptitiously waives a potential claimant’s federal rights through the guise
of a choice of law clause”).
Here, the Loan Agreements provide that the arbitration provisions are
“governed by Tribal Law, the Federal Arbitration Act (‘FAA’), decisions of the

United States Supreme Court interpreting the FAA, and other applicable
federal law without regard to the laws of any state, including the conflict of
laws rules of any state” and that “Oglala Sioux tribal law, and Applicable

Federal Law” would “govern the loan Agreement, the Arbitration Agreement
and all Claims.” [Doc. 18-1: Bridges September 2023 Loan Agreement at 5–
7]. These provisions do not, either explicitly or implicitly, operate to
prospectively waive the Plaintiffs’ federal statutory rights.

2. State Law
Despite the preservation of their rights under federal law, the Plaintiffs
argue that the arbitration provisions are nevertheless unenforceable
because they prospectively waive the Plaintiffs’ statutory rights and remedies
under state law. [Doc. 20 at 11-21].

In so arguing, the Plaintiffs rely on three sentences in a footnote in
Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana, 596 U.S. 639 (2022), in which the
Supreme Court stated in dicta as follows:

In briefing before this Court, Viking argued that the
principle that the FAA does not mandate enforcement
of provisions waiving substantive rights is limited to
federal statutes. This argument is erroneous. The
basis of this principle is not anything unique about
federal statutes.

596 U.S. at 653 n.5. The Court went on in that same footnote, however, to
clarify that statement as follows:
It is that the FAA requires only the enforcement of
“provision[s]” to settle a controversy “by arbitration,”
§ 2, and not any provision that happens to appear in
a contract that features an arbitration clause. That is
why we mentioned this principle in Preston [v. Ferrer,
552 U.S. 346 (2008)], which concerned claims
arising under state law. See 552 U.S. at 360, 128
S.Ct. 978 (noting that under the agreement, a party
“relinquishe[d] no substantive rights ... California law
may accord him”).

Id. Moreover, the paragraph of the Court’s opinion where that footnote is
placed reads, in pertinent part:
An arbitration agreement thus does not alter or
abridge substantive rights; it merely changes
how those rights will be processed. And so we
have said that “‘[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory
claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights
afforded by the statute; it only submits to their
resolution in an arbitral ... forum.’” Preston v. Ferrer,
552 U.S. 346, 359, 128 S.Ct. 978, 169 L.Ed.2d 917
(2008) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at
628, 105 S.Ct. 3346).

Id. at 653 (emphasis added). Thus, at most, the passage in Viking River
cited by the Plaintiffs, when read in context of the Court’s main analysis,
stands for the proposition that substantive statutory rights, whether state or
federal, are not forfeited simply by the fact that they are resolved in an
arbitral, as opposed to a judicial, forum. In other words, the Supreme Court
recognized that the inclusion of a clause requiring arbitration under the FAA
is not some magical incantation that voids a choice of law provision.
Under the prospective waiver doctrine, one cannot invoke rights under
federal law, i.e., the FAA, while simultaneously waiving rights under federal
law. “Because the FAA stands on equal footing with other federal statutes,
the prospective waiver [doctrine] becomes relevant only where compelling

arbitration, as the FAA instructs, simultaneously jeopardizes federally
protected interests.” Walton v. Uprova Credit LLC, 722 F.Supp.3d 824, 836
(N.D. Ill. 2024) (emphasis added). There is no inconsistency, however, in

invoking federal law regarding arbitration and other federal rights, while also
choosing certain other substantive law (whether that be a specific state’s law,
tribal law or the law of pre-revolutionary Russia) as controlling. The waiver
of other rights as may be conferred by other jurisdictions presents no
conflict.2

Other federal courts have construed the prospective waiver doctrine in
a similar manner. See Walton, 722 F.Supp.3d at 836 (“we ultimately remain
unpersuaded that the prospective waiver doctrine was intended to preserve

state statutory rights”); Johnson v. Opportunity Fin., LLC, No. 3:22cv190,
2023 WL 2636712, at *5-6 (E.D. Va. Mar. 24, 2023) (“the prospective waiver
doctrine only applies to the waiver of federal, not state, statutory rights”).
Limiting application of the prospective waiver doctrine to federal statutory

rights is consistent with the principle that “parties to an arbitration contract
[have] considerable latitude to choose what law governs some or all of its
provisions.” DIRECTV, 577 U.S. at 53-54. Thus, parties agreeing to arbitrate

under the FAA could choose the law of North Carolina, North Dakota, or the
tribal law of a federally recognized Indian tribe, so long as there is no explicit
or implicit preclusion of other federal statutory rights. As the parties’
agreements do not prospectively waive the Plaintiffs’ federal statutory rights,

the prospective waiver doctrine does not render the arbitration provisions of
these agreements unenforceable.

2 If, for example, the parties had invoked the arbitration act of a particular state, while also
purporting to waive any substantive rights under that state’s laws, then such an
inconsistency may be found. But that is not the circumstance presented here.
3. RICO
The Plaintiffs next argue that because the choice-of-law provisions in

the Loan Agreements preclude even the consideration of state law, the
Plaintiffs will not be able to establish a RICO claim in arbitration.3 As such,
the Plaintiffs contend, the arbitration provisions are unenforceable because

they implicitly waive their federal substantive rights under RICO. [Doc. 20 at
21-22]. [Id.].
In arguing that the language of the arbitration provisions constitutes an
implicit waiver of their right to bring RICO claims, the Plaintiffs cite Hengle

and Dillon, supra. The Plaintiffs’ reliance on Hengle and Dillon, however, is
misplaced. In both cases, the delegation clauses required the application of
tribal law in arbitration to the exclusion of all federal substantive law. Hengle,

19 F.4th at 342; Dillon, 856 F.3d at 335. As such, the Fourth Circuit held that
the arbitration provisions “function[ed] as a prospective waiver of the
[plaintiffs’] rights to pursue federal statutory remedies,” including under
RICO. Hengle, 19 F.4th at 342; see also Dillon, 856 F.3d at 336. By

contrast, in the present case, the arbitration provisions explicitly provide for
the application of both tribal and federal law. As such, it is undisputed that

3 The federal RICO statute defines “unlawful debt” in part as a debt “which is
unenforceable under State or Federal law in whole or in part as to principal or interest
because of the laws relating to usury.” 18 U.S.C. § 1961(6) (emphasis added).
the Plaintiffs can pursue their RICO claims at arbitration. While the Plaintiffs
argue that they will be precluded from relying on their respective state usury

laws to establish a RICO violation and thus will not prevail, this is of no
moment. “[A] plaintiff’s chance of success plays no role in the analysis
deciding whether arbitration must be had.” Johnson, 2023 WL 2636712, at

*5. “It is enough that the plaintiff is not barred from bringing her claim, even
if it is bound for defeat.” Id.
4. Tribal Credit Code
Finally, the Plaintiffs argue that the Tribal Credit Code prospectively

waives a borrower’s rights and deprives them of any meaningful opportunity
to vindicate their federal claims. [Doc. 20 at 22-27]. Specifically, the Plaintiffs
contend that the language contained in the Loan Agreements’ choice-of-law

provisions—“the laws of the tribe and applicable federal law”—does not
sufficiently encompass all federal substantive law. [Id. at 25]. The Plaintiffs
proclaim that the Court must read references to “‘applicable federal law’ . . .
in conjunction with the contract as a whole,” including the “incorporation of

the Tribal Credit Code” which, according to the Plaintiffs, excludes some
federal law. [Id. at 26].
The Defendants concede, however, that, under the Loan Agreements,

“[f]ederal law is equally available along with tribal law” in arbitration. [Doc.
15 at 20]. In this respect, this matter is similar to Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614 (1985), the case in which the

Supreme Court introduced the prospective waiver doctrine. In Mitsubishi,
the Supreme Court determined that, after a party conceded that federal law
applied in arbitration, there was no need to speculate on either (1) “the

possibility that the arbitral panel will read [a] provision . . . to displace
American law,” or (2) “the capacity” of an aggrieved party “to reinitiate suit in
federal court” if the arbitral panel failed to apply American law. 473 U.S. at
637 n.19. Similarly, here, because the Defendants concede that federal law

will apply in arbitration, this Court need not speculate on how an arbitrator
may interpret the language “applicable federal law.”
For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that the choice-of-law

provisions contained in the Loan Agreements do not implicate the
prospective waiver doctrine. Accordingly, the Court will grant the
Defendants’ Motion to Compel Arbitration and stay this action pending
arbitration in accordance with the Loan Agreements.

C. Class Allegations
The Defendants state that their Motion to Dismiss and/or Strike Class
Allegations “need only be decided in the event that the motion to compel

arbitration is denied.” [Doc. 16 at 2 n.2]. Because the Court is granting the
Defendants’ Motion to Compel Arbitration [Doc. 14], the Court will deny the
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and/or Strike Class Allegations [Doc. 16] as

moot and dismiss the Motion without prejudice to the Defendants filing a
similar motion in arbitration.
V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that the choice-of-law
provisions contained in the Loan Agreements do not implicate the
prospective waiver doctrine. Accordingly, the Court will grant the
Defendants’ Motion to Compel Arbitration and stay this action pending

arbitration in accordance with the Loan Agreements. Because the Court is
granting the Defendants’ Motion to Compel Arbitration, the Court will deny
the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and/or Strike Class Allegations as moot

and dismiss the Motion without prejudice to the Defendants filing a similar
motion in arbitration.

ORDER

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Defendants’ Motion to
Compel Arbitration [Doc. 14] is GRANTED, and the parties are hereby
ordered to arbitrate their dispute in accordance with the terms of the parties’
agreements. This matter is hereby STAYED pending arbitration in
accordance with the parties’ agreements.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
and/or Strike Class Allegations [Doc. 16] is DENIED and DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed: December 10, 2025

Martifi Reidinger ee
Chief United States District Judge “AES

18

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11221470. Public record. Not legal advice.