# Eddy

> District Court, E.D. Missouri · December 11, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11220996

## Case

- **Full name:** Julie Ann Eddy v. Arnold Police Department, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Missouri
- **Decided:** December 11, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11220996

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- affirming dismissal of county jail and sheriff’s department because they are not suable entities

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
JULIE ANN EDDY, )
)
Plaintiff, )
v. ) No. 4:25-cv-00975-SEP
)
ARNOLD POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Before the Court is self-represented Plaintiff Julie Ann Eddy’s application for leave to
proceed without prepayment of fees and costs, Motion to Appoint Counsel, and Motion to
Remove her Municipal Court Proceedings. Docs. [2], [3] and [5]. For the reasons set forth
below, Plaintiff's Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis is granted, and her other motions are
denied. Plaintiff will be required to file an amended complaint on a Court-provided form.
LEGAL STANDARD ON INITIAL REVIEW
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court is required to dismiss a complaint filed in forma
pauperis if it is frivolous or malicious, or if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate a plausible claim
for relief, which is more than a “mere possibility of misconduct.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 679 (2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief” is “a
context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and
common sense.” Id. at 679. The Court must “accept as true the facts alleged, but not legal
conclusions or threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements.” Barton v. Taber, 820 F.3d 958, 964 (8th Cir. 2016); see also Brown v.
Green Tree Servicing LLC, 820 F.3d 371, 372-73 (8th Cir. 2016) (court not required to “accept
as true any legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation”).
When reviewing a pro se complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court must give it
the benefit of a liberal construction. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). A “liberal
construction” means that, “if the essence of an allegation is discernible . . . then the district court
should construe the complaint in a way that permits the layperson’s claim to be considered within
the proper legal framework.” Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting Stone
v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir.2004)). But even pro se complaints must “allege facts, which
if true, state a claim as a matter of law.” Martin v. Aubuchon, 623 F.2d 1282, 1286 (8th Cir. 1980);
see also Stone, 364 F.3d at 914-15 (federal courts not required to “assume facts that are not alleged,
just because an additional factual allegation would have formed a stronger complaint”). And
“procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation” need not be “interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by
those who proceed without counsel.” McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993).
THE COMPLAINT
Plaintiff filed the instant action against the Arnold Police Department and the City of
Arnold, Missouri, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Doc. [1]. Plaintiff claims that her civil rights
were violated in July 2024 when Arnold Police Officer Unknown Propost “trespassed” onto
Plaintiff’s property “without a warrant to obtain VIN numbers” from two vehicles in her
driveway. Doc. [1] at 6; see also Doc. [3] at 6. Plaintiff claims that Officer Propost was
attempting to see if her vehicles were properly licensed under Arnold’s Ordinance 6.17.
On August 12, 2024, Plaintiff posted a “No Trespassing” sign at the edge of her property
and placed a “For Sale” sign on her truck. Doc. [3] at 6. She asserts, however, that despite the
“No Trespassing” sign, on January 7, 2025, Officer Unknown Zoellner “trespassed” onto her
driveway, “without warrant or notice, conducted a search, and obtained VINs to seize [her]
vehicles.” Doc. [3] at 6. Plaintiff documented the incident by video. Id. She alleges that on
February 21, 2025, Officer Zoellner returned to her property to issue two summonses for vehicle
abandonment, “based solely on his prior illegal search.” Doc. [1] at 5.
In the 110 pages of her Complaint and accompanying documents, Plaintiff appears to
concede that the two vehicles parked in her driveway were unregistered and unlicensed.
Nonetheless, she insists that City of Arnold employees cannot enter her driveway to ticket her for
such unlicensed vehicles. Doc. [1] at 5. Plaintiff claims she has attempted to address this matter
through communications with several members of the Arnold Police Department, both in person
and in writing, to no avail. Doc. [1] at 7; see also Doc. [3] at 6-7.
According to a review of Missouri Case.Net, Plaintiff was charged with two citations in
Arnold Municipal Court on February 24, 2025, based on the two Code Violations issued by
Officer Zoellner. See City of Arnold v. Eddy, Nos. 230711701 and 230711702 (23rd Jud. Cir.,
Jefferson County Court). The cases were assigned to Municipal Court Judge Stephen Hamby,
and a bench trial was set in both cases for February of 2026. Id.
Liberally construed, the Complaint alleges two unlawful searches and seizures in
violation of Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights—first, on July 30, 2024, by Officer Propost,
and then on January 7, 2025, by Officer Zoellner. But only the City of Arnold and the Arnold
Police Department are named as Defendants in this action—no individuals.
Plaintiff may also be seeking to have City of Arnold Ordinance 6.17, also known as §
385.070 Access to Abandoned Vehicles – Interference with City Agents, declared
unconstitutional.1 Doc. [1] at 5; see also Doc. [3] at 9-11. But Plaintiff fails to articulate any
basis for the ordinance to be declared unconstitutional.
As relief, Plaintiff seeks dismissal of the Municipal Court actions against her, as well as
compensatory and punitive damages. Doc. [1] at 5-6; see also Doc. [3] at 12-13.
DISCUSSION
Even with the benefit of a liberal construction, the Complaint in its current form cannot
survive initial review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). But in light of Plaintiff’s pro se status,
Court will give her the opportunity to amend it.
Plaintiff names as Defendants the City of Arnold and the Arnold Police Department. Her
claims against both of those entities fail. The Arnold Police Department is not a suable entity
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Owens v. Scott Cty. Jail, 328 F.3d 1026, 1027 (8th Cir. 2003)
(“jails are not legal entities amenable to suit”); De La Garza v. Kandiyohi Cty. Jail, 18 Fed.
Appx. 436, 437 (8th Cir. 2001) (affirming dismissal of county jail and sheriff’s department
because they are not suable entities). And Plaintiff has not properly stated a Fourth Amendment
claim for unlawful search and seizure against the City of Arnold. In order to hold a municipality
liable for a § 1983 violation, a plaintiff must allege that the municipality has committed a
constitutional violation through “a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially
adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers.” Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs. of the City of

1 City of Arnold Ordinance 6.17 states in relevant part:
A. No person shall deny access to a member of the Police Department or any authorized agent of the
City to any property upon which is located an abandoned or derelict vehicle.
B. No person shall interfere with any member of the Police Department or any authorized agent of the
City engaged in the removal of an abandoned or derelict vehicle.
New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). Plaintiff has not indicated why she believes Ordinance
6.17, is unconstitutional; nor has she indicated whether she believes the statute is
unconstitutional as applied to her or on its face. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n,
558 U.S. 310, 331 (2010) (the distinction between as-applied and facial challenges “goes to the
breadth of the remedy employed by the Court”). Accordingly, Plaintiff will be required to
amend her Complaint on a Court-provided form.
INSTRUCTIONS FOR AMENDING THE COMPLAINT
An amended complaint will entirely replace the original Complaint. See In re Wireless
Telephone Federal Cost Recovery Fees Litigation, 396 F.3d 922, 928 (8th Cir. 2005). Any
claims that is not realleged in an amended complaint will be deemed abandoned. See id.
Plaintiff must type or neatly print the amended complaint on the Court’s Civil Rights Complaint
Form, which will be provided to her. See E.D. Mo. L.R. 2.06(A).
In the “Caption” section of the form, Plaintiff should write the name of any defendant she
intends to sue. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a). Plaintiff must specify whether she sues each defendant
in his official or individual capacity. Failure to sue a defendant in his or her individual capacity
may result in the dismissal of that defendant.
In the “Statement of Claim” section, Plaintiff should begin by writing a defendant’s
name. Then, in separate, numbered paragraphs under that name, Plaintiff should: (1) set forth
the factual allegations supporting her claim against that defendant, and (2) state what
constitutional or federal statutory right(s) that defendant violated. If Plaintiff is suing more than
one defendant, she shall proceed similarly with each one, separately writing each defendant’s
name and, under that name, in numbered paragraphs, the allegations specific to that defendant
and the right(s) that defendant violated. Plaintiff should avoid including unnecessary detail in
the amended complaint. Plaintiff will have the opportunity to present evidence and argument in
support of her claims if the case proceeds to the next stage of litigation.
If Plaintiff names a single defendant, she may set forth as many claims as she has against
that defendant. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a). If Plaintiff names more than one defendant, she may
include only claims that arise out of the same transaction or occurrence—that is, claims that are
related to each other. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). Plaintiff may file a separate civil action to
assert any unrelated claims.
Plaintiff must allege facts explaining how each defendant was personally involved in or
directly responsible for harming her. See Madewell v. Roberts, 909 F.2d 1203, 1208 (8th Cir.
1990). Plaintiff must explain the role of each defendant sufficiently to provide notice to the
Defendant regarding what he is accused of doing or failing to do. See Topchian v. JPMorgan
Chase Bank, N.A., 760 F.3d 843, 848 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Hopkins v. Saunders, 199 F.3d
968, 973 (8th Cir. 1999)) (“The essential function of a complaint under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure is to give the opposing party ‘fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds for a
claim, and a general indication of the type of litigation involved.’”).
MOTION TO REMOVE MUNICIPAL COURT PROCEEDINGS
Simultaneously with the filing of her Complaint, Plaintiff moved to remove her
municipal court proceedings to this Court, see Doc. [3]. That request is denied. A defendant
may remove an action brought in a state court that could have originally been heard in a federal
court. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Because the municipal violation cases, City of Arnold v. Eddy, Nos.
230711701 and 230711702 (23rd Jud. Cir., Jefferson County Court), relate to whether Plaintiff
violated City of Arnold Ordinance 6.17 and not to the statute’s constitutionality, they could not
have originally been brought in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332; see also Georgia v.
Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 800 (1966). Accordingly, they cannot now be removed.
MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL
Plaintiff has also moved for appointment of counsel. Doc. [5]. That motion is denied
without prejudice. An indigent litigant has “neither a constitutional nor a statutory right to
appointed counsel in civil cases.” Patterson v. Kelley, 902 F.3d 845, 850 (8th Cir. 2018) (citing
Phillips v. Jasper Cnty. Jail, 437 F.3d 791, 794 (8th Cir. 2006)). A district court may appoint
counsel in a civil case if it is “convinced that an indigent plaintiff has stated a non-frivolous
claim and where ‘the nature of the litigation is such that plaintiff as well as the court will benefit
from the assistance of counsel.’” Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Johnson v. Williams, 788 F.2d
1319, 1322 (8th Cir. 1986)) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)). When determining whether to appoint
counsel for an indigent litigant, a court considers such factors as “the factual complexity of the
issues, the ability of the indigent person to investigate the facts, the existence of conflicting
testimony, the ability of the indigent person to present the claims, and the complexity of the legal
arguments.” Id. (quoting Phillips, 437 F.3d at 794).
On review of the factors, the Court finds that appointment of counsel is not warranted at
this time. Plaintiff has yet to file a complaint that survives initial review. There is no indication
that Plaintiff is unable to present her claims, and neither the factual nor the legal issues in this
case appear to be especially complex. Because the Court recognizes that circumstances may
change, the motion is denied without prejudice, meaning that the Court might reconsider
appointing counsel if it becomes appropriate as the case progresses.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis, Doc.
[2], is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk shall mail to Plaintiffa blank Civil
Complaint form. Plaintiff may request additional forms as needed.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint on the
Court-provided form in accordance with the instructions set forth above within 30 days of the
date of this Order. Any amended complaint will replace the original Complaint and will be the
only pleading that this Court will review.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion to Remove her Municipal Court
Proceedings, Doc. [3] is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion to Appoint Counsel, Doc. [5], is
DENIED without prejudice.
IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that Plaintiffs failure to timely comply with this Order
may result in dismissal of this action, without prejudice and without further notice.
Dated this 11th day of December, 2025.

SARAHE.PITLYK) &
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11220996. Public record. Not legal advice.