# Brown

> District Court, M.D. Florida · December 9, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11219120

## Case

- **Full name:** Christopher Brown v. Secretary, Department of Corrections
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** December 9, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11219120

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- rejecting Eighth Amendment challenge to ten-year sentence for “conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute methamphetamine,” an offense that “threatened grave harm to society”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION

CHRISTOPHER BROWN,

Petitioner,

v. Case No. 8:25-cv-1685-WFJ-AAS

SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONS,

Respondent.
/

ORDER

Christopher Brown, a Florida prisoner, initiated this action by filing a pro se petition
for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1). Respondent filed a response
opposing the petition. (Doc. 9). Mr. Brown filed a reply. (Doc. 11). After careful review,
the petition is DENIED.
I. Background
On the evening of March 25, 2019, an officer with the Sarasota Police Department
spotted a suspicious vehicle in front of a housing complex. (Doc. 10-1, Ex. 6, at 23). The
car was parked “diagonally” “across multiple parking spaces,” and the officer had “never
seen it before” in the area. (Id.) He exited his patrol car and walked toward the vehicle. (Id.
at 26-27). As he approached, the officer “smell[ed] the distinct odor of . . . burnt
marijuana.” (Id. at 27). He shined a flashlight into the car, and one of the occupants rolled
down the front passenger window. (Id.) The officer again smelled “burnt marijuana”; this
time the “odor” was “a lot stronger.” (Id.) He also saw what appeared to be a “marijuana
cigarette in the cupholder of the center console.” (Id.)

Mr. Brown sat in the back of the car, and two women sat in front. (Id. at 33). The
officer told the occupants to stay in the vehicle, but Mr. Brown “began to exit.” (Id. at 28).
He “pushed past” the officer and “tried to flee,” saying, “[T]his isn’t my f*cking car.” (Id.)
The officer grabbed Mr. Brown, and a struggle ensued. (Id. at 29). Another officer arrived,
whereupon Mr. Brown was taken to the ground and handcuffed. (Id.) A search of Mr.
Brown’s bag revealed a “large amount of narcotics and a firearm.” (Id. at 34). He was

charged with armed trafficking in eutylone,1 possession of a firearm by a convicted felon,
carrying a concealed firearm, possession of marijuana and drug paraphernalia, and resisting
an officer without violence. (Id., Ex. 3).
While he was out on bond, Mr. Brown committed additional offenses. Around 3:50
a.m. on December 30, 2020, an officer with the Sarasota Police Department responded to

a call about a “vehicle sitting in [a McDonald’s] drive-through for thirty-plus minutes.”
(Id., Ex. 20, at 7-8). The officer approached the car on foot and saw Mr. Brown
“unconscious” in the driver’s seat with a “semi-automatic style handgun in [his] lap.” (Id.
at 9). As the officer began to radio for backup, Mr. Brown woke up, “immediately” grabbed
the handgun, and made “furtive movements to try to conceal it.” (Id. at 10). He eventually

“let[] go of the gun” and exited the vehicle. (Id. at 11). Mr. Brown was arrested and charged

1 “Eutylone is a synthetic drug that has similar psychoactive effects on the body to drugs like
methamphetamine, MDMA, and cocaine.” Curtis v. State, No. 1642, 2022 WL 16986639, at *2 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. Nov. 17, 2022).
with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and possession of a firearm with an
altered serial number. (Id., Ex. 17).

Mr. Brown moved to suppress all evidence obtained during the March 2019 and
December 2020 incidents. (Id., Exs. 4-7, 9, 10-11, 18-21). Both motions were denied after
evidentiary hearings. (Id., Exs. 6-7, 9, 20-21). In addition, Mr. Brown unsuccessfully
moved to dismiss the charge for resisting an officer without violence. (Id., Ex. 4; Ex. 7 at
16).
Mr. Brown ultimately resolved all charges by pleading nolo contendere. (Id., Exs.

14, 22; see also id., Ex. 12, at 27; Ex. 22, at 3-4). He received a total sentence of ten years’
imprisonment. (Id., Exs. 15, 25). This represented the mandatory minimum for armed
trafficking in eutylone, the most serious offense Mr. Brown committed. (Id., Ex. 26, at 69-
74). Mr. Brown appealed his convictions, and the Second District Court of Appeal affirmed
in unexplained decisions. (Id., Exs. 32, 35). This federal habeas petition followed. (Doc.

1).
II. Standards of Review
A. AEDPA
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) governs this
proceeding. Carroll v. Sec’y, DOC, 574 F.3d 1354, 1364 (11th Cir. 2009). Habeas relief

can be granted only if a petitioner is in custody “in violation of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Section 2254(d) provides that federal
habeas relief cannot be granted on a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court unless
the state court’s adjudication:
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of
the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

A decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law “if the state court arrives
at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if
the state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially
indistinguishable facts.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413 (2000). A decision involves
an “unreasonable application” of clearly established federal law “if the state court identifies
the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court’s decisions but
unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id.
AEDPA was meant “to prevent federal habeas ‘retrials’ and to ensure that state-
court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under law.” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S.
685, 693 (2002). Accordingly, “[t]he focus . . . is on whether the state court’s application
of clearly established federal law is objectively unreasonable, and . . . an unreasonable
application is different from an incorrect one.” Id. at 694; see also Harrington v. Richter,
562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011) (“As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court,
a state prisoner must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in
federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and
comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.”).
The Second District Court of Appeal affirmed Mr. Brown’s convictions without

discussion. This decision warrants deference under § 2254(d)(1) because “the summary
nature of a state court’s decision does not lessen the deference that it is due.” Wright v.
Moore, 278 F.3d 1245, 1254 (11th Cir. 2002). When a state appellate court issues a silent

affirmance, “the federal court should ‘look through’ the unexplained decision to the last
related state-court decision that does provide a relevant rationale” and “presume that the
unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning.” Wilson v. Sellers, 584 U.S. 122, 125
(2018).
B. Exhaustion of State Remedies; Procedural Default
A federal habeas petitioner must exhaust his claims in state court before presenting

them in his federal habeas petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A); O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526
U.S. 838, 842 (1999) (“[T]he state prisoner must give the state courts an opportunity to act
on his claims before he presents those claims to a federal court in a habeas petition.”). The
exhaustion requirement is satisfied if the petitioner fairly presents his claim in each
appropriate state court and alerts that court to the federal nature of the claim. Picard v.

Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275-76 (1971).
The doctrine of procedural default provides that “[i]f the petitioner has failed to
exhaust state remedies that are no longer available, that failure is a procedural default which
will bar federal habeas relief, unless either the cause and prejudice or the fundamental
miscarriage of justice exception is established.” Smith v. Jones, 256 F.3d 1135, 1138 (11th

Cir. 2001). A fundamental miscarriage of justice occurs in an extraordinary case where a
constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of someone who is actually
innocent. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995); Henderson v. Campbell, 353 F.3d 880,
892 (11th Cir. 2003). To establish cause for a procedural default, a petitioner “must
demonstrate that some objective factor external to the defense impeded the effort to raise
the claim properly in state court.” Wright v. Hopper, 169 F.3d 695, 703 (11th Cir. 1999).

A petitioner demonstrates prejudice by showing that “there is at least a reasonable
probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different” absent the
constitutional violation. Henderson, 353 F.3d at 892.
III. Discussion
A. Ground One—Denial of Motion to Suppress

Mr. Brown argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress
evidence obtained during the March 2019 incident. (Doc. 1 at 5). As noted above, this
search led to the recovery of eutylone, marijuana, drug paraphernalia, and a firearm. (Doc.
10-1, Ex. 3; Ex. 6, at 34). According to Mr. Brown, the search violated the Fourth
Amendment because the “smell of marijuana coming from the vehicle, standing alone,
[did] not provide reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.” (Doc. 1 at 5; see also Doc. 10-

1, Ex. 30, at 12-19).
This claim is not cognizable on federal habeas review. “[F]ederal habeas courts are
precluded from addressing Fourth Amendment exclusionary claims that have had a full
and fair opportunity for litigation in the state courts.” Agee v. White, 809 F.2d 1487, 1490
(11th Cir. 1987) (citing Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976)). An opportunity for

“full and fair” litigation “includes at least one evidentiary hearing in a trial court and the
availability of meaningful appellate review when there are facts in dispute.” Lawhorn v.
Allen, 519 F.3d 1272, 1287 (11th Cir. 2008). Mr. Brown received that opportunity,
litigating his suppression motion at an evidentiary hearing and challenging its denial on
appeal. (Doc. 10-1, Exs. 6-7, 9-11, 30, 32). Thus, Mr. Brown cannot obtain federal habeas
review of his Fourth Amendment claim.2

B. Ground Two—Denial of Motion to Dismiss Charge of Resisting Officer
Without Violence

As noted above, Mr. Brown was charged with resisting an officer without violence
based on his conduct during the March 2019 incident. (Doc. 10-1, Ex. 3). He argues that
the trial court “erred in denying” his motion to dismiss the resisting charge because “the
officer was not engaged in the lawful execution of his legal duties at the time of the alleged
resisting.” (Doc. 1 at 7).
Even under de novo review, this claim lacks merit. First, it is not cognizable on
federal habeas review because it rests on an alleged misapplication of Florida law. “[S]tate
courts are the final arbiters of state law, and federal habeas courts should not second-guess
them on such matters.” Herring v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 397 F.3d 1338, 1355 (11th Cir.
2005). Thus, “a habeas petition grounded on issues of state law provides no basis for habeas
relief.” Branan v. Booth, 861 F.2d 1507, 1508 (11th Cir. 1988). Mr. Brown filed his motion
to dismiss under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(c)(4), which “provides for

dismissal of a charge against a defendant when ‘[t]here are no material disputed facts and
the undisputed facts do not establish a prima facie case of guilt against the defendant.’”
State v. Yarn, 63 So. 3d 82, 84 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (quoting Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.190(c)(4)).
Whether the trial court erred in applying this standard “is a question of state law.” Clark v.

2 To the extent Mr. Brown also seeks to challenge the denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained
during the December 2020 incident, any such claim is also foreclosed from federal habeas review.
Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., No. 8:18-cv-2670-MSS-AEP, 2022 WL 485229, at *15 (M.D. Fla.
Feb. 17, 2022); see also Noel v. Inch, No. 19-60373-CV, 2020 WL 906978, at *5 n.7 (S.D.

Fla. Feb. 3, 2020) (claim that trial court erred in denying motion to dismiss under Rule
3.190(c)(4) “is not cognizable” on federal habeas review), adopted by 2020 WL 905223
(S.D. Fla. Feb. 25, 2020).
Second, even if it were cognizable, Mr. Brown’s claim would fail on the merits
because “the State’s evidence was sufficient to establish a prima facie case” of resisting an
officer without violence. State v. Williamson, 348 So. 3d 48, 51 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022). “To

support a conviction [for resisting an officer without violence], the State must show: (1)
the officer was engaged in the lawful execution of a legal duty; and (2) the action by the
defendant constituted obstruction or resistance of that lawful duty.”3 Mosley v. State, 739
So. 2d 672, 675 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). The “element of a lawful execution of a legal duty
is satisfied if an officer has either a founded suspicion to stop the person or probable cause

to make a warrantless arrest.” I.B. v. State, 239 So. 3d 773, 775 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018). “Stated
another way, if the officer does not have a founded suspicion to stop an individual, that
individual does not commit the offense of resisting an officer without violence by simply
walking away from the officer or by ignoring his command to stop.” Id.
Mr. Brown contends that “the officer was not engaged in the lawful execution of his

legal duties at the time of the alleged resisting.” (Doc. 1 at 7). But the officer testified that,
when he approached the vehicle in which Mr. Brown was a passenger, he “smell[ed] the

3 Mr. Brown does not dispute that the evidence supported the second element of the offense—namely, that
his conduct “constituted obstruction or resistance.” Mosley, 739 So. 2d at 675.
distinct odor of . . . burnt marijuana.”4 (Doc. 10-1, Ex. 6, at 27). The “smell of marijuana
alone may provide a basis for reasonable suspicion for further investigation of possible

criminal conduct.” United States v. White, 593 F.3d 1199, 1203 (11th Cir. 2010); see also
United States v. Roberts, 849 F. App’x 863, 866 (11th Cir. 2021) (“[T]he smell of
marijuana alone can provide reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop.”). Thus, the
“element of a lawful execution of a legal duty [was] satisfied” because the officer had “a
founded suspicion to stop” Mr. Brown upon detecting the smell of marijuana. I.B., 239 So.
3d at 775. The trial court correctly rejected Mr. Brown’s argument for dismissing the

charge of resisting an officer without violence.5
C. Ground Three—Ten-Year Mandatory Minimum for Armed
Trafficking in Eutylone

Florida law “provides for a minimum mandatory sentence of ten years for armed
trafficking” in certain illegal drugs. Magana v. State, 846 So. 2d 1231 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003);
see also Fla. Stat. § 775.087(2)(a)1p. Mr. Brown was sentenced under this law, receiving
the mandatory minimum of ten years’ imprisonment for armed trafficking in eutylone.
(Doc. 10-1, Ex. 26, at 72). He contends that his ten-year sentence violated the Eighth
Amendment because it constituted “cruel and unusual punishment.” (Doc. 1 at 8).

4 The officer’s initial approach to the vehicle did not constitute a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. See
United States v. Colvin, 822 F. App’x 956, 959 (11th Cir. 2020) (“A police officer does not seize an
individual merely by approaching the person in a parked car.”).

5 In his memorandum of law, Mr. Brown asserts that the “habitual felony offender statute” and the “prison
releasee reoffender statute” are “unconstitutional.” (Doc. 1 at 21). Respondent correctly contends that this
claim is unexhausted and procedurally defaulted because it was never raised in state court. (Doc. 9 at 13).
Regardless, the claim lacks merit because Mr. Brown was not sentenced as a habitual felony offender or a
prison releasee reoffender. (Doc. 10-1, Exs. 15, 25-26).
Mr. Brown raised this argument on direct appeal, and the Second District Court of
Appeal rejected it without explanation. (Doc. 10-1, Ex. 30, at 27-34). Where, as here, “a

state court’s decision is unaccompanied by an explanation, the habeas petitioner’s burden
still must be met by showing there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny
relief.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 98. In this situation, “a habeas court must determine what
arguments or theories . . . could have supported[] the state court’s decision.” Id. at 102.
Mr. Brown cannot show that “there was no reasonable basis for the state court to”
reject his Eighth Amendment challenge. Id. at 98. “The Eighth Amendment, which forbids

cruel and unusual punishments, contains a narrow proportionality principle that applies to
noncapital sentences.” Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 20 (2003). “[F]ederal courts
should be reluctant to review legislatively mandated terms of imprisonment, and []
successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences should be exceedingly
rare.” Id. at 22. “[A] reviewing court must make a threshold determination that the sentence

imposed is grossly disproportionate to the offense committed and, if it is grossly
disproportionate, the court must then consider the sentences imposed on others convicted
in the same jurisdiction and the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in
other jurisdictions.” United States v. Moriarty, 429 F.3d 1012, 1024 (11th Cir. 2005). ‘‘In
general, a sentence within the limits imposed by statute is neither excessive nor cruel and

unusual under the Eighth Amendment.” Id. Moreover, “the mandatory nature of a non-
capital penalty is irrelevant for proportionality purposes.” United States v. Farley, 607 F.3d
1294, 1343 (11th Cir. 2010).
For armed trafficking in eutylone, Mr. Brown faced a mandatory minimum of ten
years’ imprisonment and a statutory maximum of life. Fla. Stat. §§ 775.087(1)(a),

775.087(2)(a)1p, 893.135(1)(k)1. His ten-year sentence thus fell “within the limits imposed
by statute,” which weighs against finding that it violated the Eighth Amendment. United
States v. Flores, 572 F.3d 1254, 1268 (11th Cir. 2009). Next, the appellate court could
reasonably have concluded that the ten-year sentence was not “grossly disproportionate to
the offense committed.” Moriarty, 429 F.3d at 1024. The Supreme Court has “set a high
bar for a sentence to be ‘grossly disproportionate,’” holding in one case that “a sentence of

life without parole was not grossly disproportionate for a first-time offender convicted of
cocaine possession.” United States v. Bowers, 811 F.3d 412, 432 (11th Cir. 2016) (citing
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991)). Given this precedent, a reasonable
jurist could conclude that a ten-year sentence for armed trafficking in eutylone did not
violate the Eighth Amendment.6 See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1002 (“Possession, use, and

distribution of illegal drugs represent one of the greatest problems affecting the health and
welfare of our population.”); United States v. Pizarro-Campos, 506 F. App’x 947, 951
(11th Cir. 2013) (rejecting Eighth Amendment challenge to ten-year sentence for
“conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute methamphetamine,” an offense that
“threatened grave harm to society”).

6 In his memorandum of law, Mr. Brown argues that the trial court erred in denying his request for a
downward departure. (Doc. 1 at 23). As Respondent notes, this argument is unexhausted and procedurally
defaulted because Mr. Brown did not raise it on direct appeal. (Doc. 9 at 13; Doc. 10-1, Ex. 30). Even if it
were exhausted, the claim cannot support federal habeas relief because it rests entirely on an alleged
misapplication of Florida law. See Branan, 861 F.2d at 1508 (“In the area of state sentencing guidelines in
particular, [the Eleventh Circuit] consistently ha[s] held that federal courts cannot review a state’s alleged
failure to adhere to its own sentencing procedures.” (collecting cases)).
D. Ground Four—Denial of Motion to Dismiss Charge of Possession of a
Firearm by a Convicted Felon

Lastly, Mr. Brown contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to
dismiss the “charge of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.” (Doc. 1 at 10). As
noted above, Mr. Brown faced two felon-in-possession counts arising from two separate
incidents. (Doc. 10-1, Exs. 3, 17). In his petition, Mr. Brown does not specify which felon-
in-possession count should have been dismissed. (Doc. 1 at 10, 25). On direct appeal,
however, he argued that the trial court should have dismissed the felon-in-possession
charge arising from the December 2020 incident at the McDonald’s in Sarasota.7 (Doc. 10-
1, Ex. 34, at 13-14, 23-26). It thus appears that Mr. Brown seeks to renew this claim in his
petition.

Regardless of how it is construed, the claim fails under de novo review because Mr.
Brown never asked the trial court to dismiss either of the felon-in-possession charges.
Instead, as discussed above, he moved only to dismiss the charge of resisting an officer
without violence. (Id., Ex. 4). The trial court can hardly be faulted for failing to dismiss
charges that Mr. Brown never asked it to dismiss. In any event, the claim cannot support

federal habeas relief because it turns on a question of state law—whether the court should
have dismissed charges under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(c)(4). See Noel,
2020 WL 906978, at *5 n.7. As explained above, a claim “grounded on issues of state law
provides no basis for habeas relief.” Branan, 861 F.2d at 1508. Finally, Mr. Brown waived

7 Mr. Brown proceeded pro se in his direct appeal of the convictions stemming from the December 2020
incident. (Doc. 10-1, Ex. 34).
his challenge to the felon-in-possession charges by pleading nolo contendere.8 See Martin
v. Kemp, 760 F.2d 1244, 1246 (11th Cir. 1985) (“A defendant who knowingly and

voluntarily enters a plea of guilty [or nolo contendere] waives all nonjurisdictional
challenges to his conviction.”); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 495 n.5 (1983) (under
Florida law, “a plea of nolo contendere is equivalent to a plea of guilty”); see also United
States v. Arnaiz, 144 F. App’x 27, 31 (11th Cir. 2005) (“With regard to [defendant’s]
motion to dismiss the indictment, because he voluntarily pleaded guilty with the advice of
competent counsel, he has waived any nonjurisdictional challenges to his indictment.”).

IV. Conclusion
Accordingly, the Court ORDERS:
1. Mr. Brown’s petition (Doc. 1) is DENIED.
2. The CLERK is directed to enter judgment against Mr. Brown and to CLOSE this
case.

3. Mr. Brown is not entitled to a certificate of appealability. A prisoner seeking a writ
of habeas corpus has no absolute entitlement to appeal a district court’s denial of his
petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). “A certificate of appealability may issue . . . only
if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional
right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To obtain a certificate of appealability, Mr. Brown

must show that reasonable jurists would find debatable both the merits of the

8 In his plea agreement, Mr. Brown reserved the right to appeal the denial of his motions to suppress and
the denial of his motion to dismiss the charge of resisting an officer without violence. (Doc. 10-1, Exs. 14,
24). But he did not reserve the right to challenge any ruling with respect to the felon-in-possession counts,
presumably because he never moved to dismiss those charges. (Id.)
underlying claims and the procedural issues he seeks to raise. See Slack v.
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Mr. Brown has not made the requisite
showing. Because Mr. Brown is not entitled to a certificate of appealability, he is
not entitled to appeal in forma pauperis.
DONE AND ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, on December 9, 2025.

WILLIAM F.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

14

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11219120. Public record. Not legal advice.