# Halloum

> District Court, D. Oregon · December 10, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11219031

## Case

- **Full name:** Mohammad A. Halloum v. Northern Arizona University
- **Court:** District Court, D. Oregon
- **Decided:** December 10, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF OREGON

MOHAMMAD A. HALLOUM, Case No. 6:25-cv-01792-MTK

Plaintiff, OPINION AND ORDER
v.
NORTHERN ARIZONA UNIVERSITY,
Defendant.

KASUBHAI, United States District Judge:
Mohammad A. Halloum, proceeding self-represented, brings this action against
Defendant Northern Arizona University. Compl., ECF No. 2. Before the Court is Plaintiff’s
Application for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). ECF No. 1. For the following
reasons, Plaintiff’s Application for Leave to Proceed IFP is granted. However, the Clerk of the
Court shall not issue process until further order of the Court because Plaintiff’s Complaint is
dismissed with leave to amend.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff asserts violations of his statutory and constitutional rights under Title IX and the
Equal Protection Clause. Compl. 3. His statement of his claim reads, in full:
The defendant [Northern Arizona University] concocted a most egregious slavery
scheme to target, isolate, and rob the plaintiff of owed legal compensation for
damages caused to him before, during, and after his military service. This long con
involved using the defendant's former family, friends, colleagues, classmates and
coworkers to wear disguises and partner with the university to carry out an assault
on the competent and independent plaintiff’s legal autonomy by falsely collectively
alleging mental health issues. Defendant anesthetized and raped the plaintiff nightly
to falsify notions of a relationship and boasted about it in university lectures.
Defendant retaliated ·against plaintiff for reporting many campus abuses including
a proven scathing title IX report with irrefutable evidence of disguises, false
identities, fake professors, stalker students, destroyed dorm room, intentional
infestations, repeated break ins, overdose poisonings as attempted murders, and
other abuses. Defendant kidnapped student plaintiff claiming mental illness and
making staff and students feel unsafe. Plaintiff was hospitalized by abusers for
months in hospital ran by abusers, staffed by abusers, and even used abusers as
patients. [Northern Arizona University] coordinated to have plaintiff falsely
diagnosed with psychiatric condition to further retaliate and carry out scheme.

Compl. 4.
Plaintiff states that many of the abuses were carried out on the university campus by an
“organization that operates within the university itself.” Id. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s
actions caused Plaintiff to lose his “belongings, housing, education, scholarships, and grants, and
forced him to be homeless.” Id. Plaintiff seeks damages in the amount of $6.5 trillion. Id.
DISCUSSION
I. Financial Status
“The right to proceed in forma pauperis is not an unqualified one; it is a privilege, rather
than a right.” Jefferson v. United States, 277 F.2d 723, 725 (9th Cir. 1960) (citations omitted).
The Court shall dismiss a case if it determines that the allegation of poverty is untrue. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(A). While a plaintiff need not be completely destitute to qualify for IFP status, a
plaintiff must allege poverty with “some particularity, definiteness and certainty.” Escobedo v.
Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 2015) (citations omitted).
Here, Plaintiff states in his IFP application that he is currently unemployed and earns no
income. Plaintiff states he has $1,500 in cash or bank accounts and lists his personal vehicle as a
$4,000 asset. ECF No. 1 at 2-3. Plaintiff outlines his monthly expenses of $890 with particularity
as to each recurring expenses. Id. at 4. Based on the Court’s review of Plaintiff’s stated expenses
and assets, barely any livable funds will remain after Plaintiff pays his recurring monthly
expenses. The Court finds Plaintiff is unable to pay the cost of commencing the action and
therefore grants Plaintiff’s Application for Leave to Proceed IFP.
II. Mandatory Screening

Congress has mandated that district courts screen IFP applications and dismiss any case
that is frivolous or malicious; fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or seeks
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Screening Plaintiff’s Complaint here, it is dismissed because the (A) Court does not have
personal jurisdiction over Defendant, (B) venue is not proper, (C) and Plaintiff’s Complaint fails
to state a claim.
A. Personal Jurisdiction
First, under the facts Plaintiff has pled, this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over
Defendant. “Federal courts ordinarily follow state law in determining the bounds of their
jurisdiction over [defendants].” Picot v. Weston, 780 F.3d 1206, 1211 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting

Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 125 (2014)). Oregon law authorizes personal jurisdiction
over defendants to the full extent permitted by the United States Constitution. See Or. R. Civ. P.
4 L; Gray & Co. v. Firstenberg Mach. Co., Inc., 913 F.2d 758, 760 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Oregon’s
long-arm statute confers jurisdiction to the extent permitted by due process.”). “Due process
requires that the defendant have certain minimum contacts with the forum state such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”
Picot, 780 F.3d at 1211 (internal quotations and citation omitted). There are two types of
personal jurisdiction that a court may exercise over a defendant: general jurisdiction and specific
jurisdiction. Boschetto v. Hansing, 539 F.3d 1011, 1016 (9th Cir. 2008). The Court will address
each in turn.
Turning first to general personal jurisdiction, a defendant is typically only subject to a
court’s general jurisdiction in the state where they are domiciled or “at home.” Daimler AG v.

Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137 (2014). A court may not assert general jurisdiction over an out-of-
state defendant unless the defendant’s contacts with the forum state “are so ‘continuous and
systematic’ as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum [s]tate.” Goodyear Dunlop Tires
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310, 317 (1945)). Here, Defendant’s principal place of business is Arizona. Compl. 4.
Plaintiff has not alleged facts showing Defendant has continuous and systematic contacts with
Oregon, the forum state. Thus, the Court does not have general personal jurisdiction over
Defendant.
Turning next to specific personal jurisdiction, the Ninth Circuit utilizes a three-prong test
to determine whether a court has personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant: (1) The

non-resident defendant must purposefully direct his activities or consummate some transaction
with the forum or resident thereof; or perform some act by which he purposefully avails himself
of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and
protections of its laws; (2) the claim must be one which arises out of or relates to the defendant’s
forum-related activities; and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with fair play and
substantial justice. Picot, 780 F.3d at 1211 (citing Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co.,
374 F.3d 797, 802 (9th Cir. 2004)). Here, Defendant does not reside in Oregon and is therefore a
non-resident defendant. Plaintiff does not allege that any event giving rise to his claims took
place in Oregon. Plaintiff has not pled that Defendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege
of conducting activities in Oregon or that Plaintiff’s claims arise out of any such activities.
Thus, the Court does not have specific personal jurisdiction over Defendant and the
Complaint is dismissed on that basis.1

B. Venue
In addition, under the facts Plaintiff has pled, venue is not proper in the District of
Oregon. Venue is proper in
(1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents
of the State in which the district is located;

(2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving
rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the
action is situated; or

(3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided
in this section, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court’s
personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.

28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).
Here, Defendant is not a resident of Oregon for the reasons set forth with respect to
personal jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2) (“an entity with the capacity to sue and be sued
. . . shall be deemed to reside, if a defendant, in any judicial district in which such defendant is
subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question”). In
addition, the alleged events giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims appear to have occurred in Arizona,
as the Complaint references conduct occurring at the Northern Arizona University campus and a
“nearby hospital.” Id. at 4. Plaintiff does not allege that any event giving rise to his claims

1 Although this issue is jurisdictional, the Court addresses the other deficiencies in Plaintiff’s
Complaint for the sake of efficiency in the event any amended pleading cures the jurisdictional
issue.
occurred in Oregon. Id. Accordingly, based on the facts alleged in Plaintiff’s Complaint, venue is
not proper in the District of Oregon because Defendant does not reside in this district and the
events giving rise to this action took place outside this district. Plaintiff’s Complaint is dismissed
on this basis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (“The district court of a district in which is filed a case

laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice,
transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought”).
C. Failure to State a Claim
Finally, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for relief. A complaint must comply with the
pleading requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009). Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8(a)(2) requires a complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing the
pleader is entitled to relief.” However,
[w]hile a complaint ... does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s
obligation to provide the “grounds” of his “entitle[ment] to relief” requires more
than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of action will not do, see Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92
L.Ed.2d 209 (1986) (on a motion to dismiss, courts “are not bound to accept as true
a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation”). Factual allegations must be
enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . .
Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). The Supreme Court has emphasized that,
when assessing the sufficiency of any civil complaint, a court must distinguish factual
contentions—which allege behavior on the part of the defendant that, if true, would satisfy one
or more elements of the claim asserted—and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements. . . .” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678. In short, “a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that
is plausible on its face.” Id.
In determining the sufficiency of a self-represented party’s complaint, the court must be
mindful to construe it liberally in favor of the plaintiff. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21
(1972); see also Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rts., Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007) (in
assessing whether a complaint fails to plead a claim, the court must accept all factual allegations

as true); Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996) (“allegations of
material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to [plaintiff]”).
Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that he was discriminated against on the basis of sex, giving
rise to a Title IX claim. Compl. 4. Additionally, although Plaintiff’s Complaint does not
explicitly identify a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) claim, the Court construes Plaintiff’s
alleged violation of his rights under the Equal Protection Clause as such because Section 1983
provides the mechanism by which a plaintiff may vindicate their constitutional rights. Albright v.
Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court addresses each
claim in turn.
1. Title IX Claim

Title IX provides that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance ....” 20 U.S.C. §
1681(a). To state a Title IX claim, a plaintiff must allege that: “(1) the defendant educational
institution receives federal funding; (2) the plaintiff was excluded from participation in, denied
the benefits of, or subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity, and (3)
the latter occurred on the basis of sex.” Schwake v. Arizona Board of Regents, 967 F.3d 940, 946
(9th Cir. 2020).
Here, Plaintiff has alleged Defendant is an educational institution that receives federal
funding. However, the Court cannot discern the facts upon which Plaintiff’s claim of Title IX
discrimination is based. The Complaint does not identify what persons, education programs, or
activities subjected Plaintiff to discrimination. Additionally, Plaintiff’s Complaint states that

“[d]efendant anesthetized and raped the plaintiff.” Compl. 4. While sexual assault can fall within
the scope of a Title IX claim, the Court cannot determine Defendant’s role in this allegation, as
an educational institution, without additional facts. Finally, there is no indication in any of the
allegations that any of the conduct occurred on the basis of Plaintiff’s sex. Thus, Plaintiff fails to
state a Title IX claim and that claim is dismissed.
2. Section 1983 Claim
“To sustain an action under section 1983, a plaintiff must show (1) that the conduct
complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) that the
conduct deprived the plaintiff of a federal constitutional or statutory right.” Wood v. Ostrander,
879 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1989). Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim because (1)

Defendant is not a “person” under Section 1983 and is entitled to Eleventh Amendment
immunity; and (2) Plaintiff fails to plead conduct depriving him of his rights under the Equal
Protection Clause.
First, Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim is deficient because Defendant is not a “person”
under Section 1983 and is entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. The Eleventh
Amendment grants states immunity from citizen lawsuits in federal court. Pennhurst State Sch.
& Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984). “[A] state university is an arm of the state
entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.” Flint v. Dennison, 488 F.3d 816, 825 (9th Cir.
2007). Here, Plaintiff only names Northern Arizona University as a defendant without
identifying any university administrators or officials who took actions related to Plaintiff’s
claims. Defendant is a state university.2 Thus, it is not a ‘person’ and is entitled to Eleventh
Amendment immunity.
Even if Plaintiff’s claim were pled against individuals employed by the university, such

claims are likewise limited by the Eleventh Amendment. “[S]tate officials sued in their official
capacities, including university officials, are not ‘persons’ within the meaning
of Section 1983 and are therefore generally entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity” except
“when sued for prospective injunctive relief.” Id. Conversely, state officials sued in their
individual capacities may be “persons” under Section 1983 and may be sued for monetary
damages. Cerrato v. San Francisco Cmty. Coll. Dist., 26 F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir. 1994). Here,
Plaintiff is not seeking injunctive relief, nor has Plaintiff identified any university officials or
administrators who acted in relation to Plaintiff’s claims and could be sued in their individual
capacities.
Second, Plaintiff has failed to adequately plead conduct violating his constitutional rights

under the Equal Protection Clause. To state a Section 1983 claim for a violation of
the Equal Protection Clause, a plaintiff must plead “that the defendants acted with an intent or
purpose to discriminate against the plaintiff based upon membership in a protected class.” Lee v.
City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686 (9th Cir. 2001). As with Plaintiff’s Title IX claim, the
Court cannot discern the facts upon which this claim is based. There are no allegations that

2 The Court takes judicial notice of Northern Arizona University’s status as a state university.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15-1601. See Coultas v. Payne, No. 3:11-cv-45-AC, 2015 WL 5920645,
at *3 (D. Or. Oct. 9, 2015) (“The court may ‘take judicial notice of undisputed matters of public
record . . . including documents on file in federal or state courts.’”) (quoting Harris v. County of
Orange, 682 F.3d 1126, 1131–32 (9th Cir. 2012)).
Defendant took any intentionally discriminatory action based on Plaintiff’s membership in a
protected class, or even that Plaintiff was a member of a protected class.
In sum, because Plaintiff has not identified an appropriate “person” acting under color of
state law, nor pled sufficient facts to allege a deprivation of a constitutional right, Plaintiff has

failed to state a Section 1983 claim.
III. Leave to Amend
In civil rights cases in which the plaintiff is self-represented, the court construes the
pleadings liberally and must afford plaintiff the benefit of any doubt. Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d
1026, 1027 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc). Ordinarily self-represented plaintiffs are given leave to
amend their complaint. Karim-Panahi v. L.A. Police Dep't, 839 F.2d 621, 623-24 (9th Cir. 1988).
But if it is “absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by
amendment,” leave to amend need not be given. Id. at 623 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Because it is not clear this Complaint could not be cured by amendment, the Court will permit
Plaintiff an opportunity to amend his Complaint and address the deficiencies identified above.

Plaintiff is advised to review the District of Oregon’s website, which contains a webpage titled
“Information about Representing Yourself in Court,” that is available to the public at
https://ord.uscourts.gov/index.php/representing-yourself/information-about-representing-
yourself.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above, Plaintiff's motion to proceed IFP (ECF No. 1) is
GRANTED. However, the Complaint is DISMISSED. Plaintiff has leave to amend his
Complaint within 30 days of the date of this Order. The Clerk of the Court shall not issue process
until further order of the Court.

DATED this 10th day of December 2025.

s/ Mustafa T. Kasubhai
MUSTAFA T. KASUBHAI (he/him)
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11219031. Public record. Not legal advice.