# People of Michigan v. Furquan Michael-Deshawn Knox

> Michigan Court of Appeals · December 10, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11218750

## Case

- **Court:** Michigan Court of Appeals
- **Decided:** December 10, 2025
- **Precedential status:** Unpublished
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11218750

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that an effective trial strategy may include a decision not to object to proffered evidence

## Opinion text

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, UNPUBLISHED
December 10, 2025
Plaintiff-Appellee, 11:01 AM

v No. 368164
Ingham Circuit Court
FURQUAN MICHAEL-DESHAWN KNOX, LC No. 20-308-FC

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: YATES, P.J., and BOONSTRA and YOUNG, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant appeals by right his jury-trial convictions of five counts of criminal sexual
conduct in the first degree (CSC-I), MCL 750.520b(1)(a), MCL 750.520b(2)(c), and four counts
of criminal sexual conduct in the second degree (CSC-II), MCL 750,520c(1)(a),
MCL 750.520c(2)(c).1 The trial court sentenced defendant to prison terms of 25 to 50 years for
each CSC-I conviction, and 75 months to 15 years for each CSC-II conviction. The trial court
found that three of defendant’s CSC-I convictions, and one of defendant’s CSC-II convictions,
arose out of the same transaction, and ordered them to be served consecutively to each other; the
remaining sentences are concurrent to each other and to the first CSC-I conviction. We affirm.

I. PERTINENT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This case arises out of defendant’s sexual abuse of his two nieces, TK and LM. Defendant
is the brother of Haja Knox. Haja Knox is married to Tycheke Myers. LM is Myers’s biological
child, and TK is Haja’s biological child.2 LM and TK spent periods of time in both Michigan and
Georgia, including attending school in both states. During the relevant periods of time in this case,
defendant lived with his mother, Donna Haymon, in Michigan.

1
Defendant was acquitted of one additional count of CSC-I.
2
Both Knox and Myers are women.

-1-
In 2020, LM, then fourteen years old, disclosed to Myers that defendant had sexually
abused both her and TK years earlier. TK confirmed this allegation when Myers asked her about
it. LM testified at trial regarding an incident that had occurred at Haymon’s house sometime
between 2013 and 2015. The girls’ mothers would sometimes leave the girls at Haymon’s house
so that she could watch them; Haymon, in turn, would sometimes leave them in the care of
defendant. LM testified that, while watching television with defendant and TK in defendant’s
bedroom, defendant sexually abused them in various ways, including forcing both girls to perform
oral sex on him, and attempting to penetrate TK’s vagina and anus with his penis (but stopping
when TK said that it hurt). LM testified that defendant later touched her breasts, vagina, and
buttocks while she was in the bathroom.

TK testified to several incidents when defendant sexually abused her individually,
generally when she slept over at Haymon’s house. TK testified that Haymon’s house had a guest
bedroom, but that there was no bed in it and TK found it scary. TK would sleep in Haymon’s bed
unless Haymon did not want her to do so on a particular night; in that case, she would sleep in
defendant’s bed. TK testified that defendant rubbed his penis on her buttocks, and that this
happened when she was six or seven. Defendant told TK not to say anything or they would both
go to jail. TK testified to another incident when defendant pulled her pants down and rubbed his
penis between her thighs and vaginal lips until he ejaculated; TK testified that she was eleven at
this time. Defendant again told her not to tell anyone or she would go to jail because she “let him
do it.” TK testified to another incident when defendant forced her to stroke his penis with her
hand. TK testified that she did not remember specifics, but that there were several times when
defendant would touch her vagina or rub against her. TK testified to the incident when LM was
present; she testified that defendant’s penis penetrated her vagina and anus slightly before he
stopped because it wouldn’t fit. TK testified that when she was thirteen, defendant grabbed her
arm and attempted to force her to touch his penis, but she resisted, causing a physical altercation
that ended when TK got a knife from the kitchen and threatened to kill defendant if he ever did
anything to her again. TK made up a story to tell her parents; she told them that defendant said
something she didn’t like and she chased him out of the house.

During cross-examination, defense counsel asked TK if any “incidents” had occurred
between her and defendant in Georgia, prior to the incidents that she had disclosed in Michigan.
TK testified that there was “one little small incident that I remember very little.” Defense counsel
pointed out that TK had not mentioned the Georgia incident during her forensic interview. On
redirect, TK testified that the Georgia incident had involved defendant making her smoke a
cigarette; later, he told her to sit on his lap and “proceed[ed] to hump basically using his penis area
and my butt area.” TK estimated that she was “very young” when this happened, younger than
the age a child starts school.

When the trial court released TK from her subpoena, it cautioned her not to discuss her
testimony during trial, and added: “If you are in therapy, you certainly can talk about whatever
you want with your therapist, but as to any of the testimony, please refrain from that.” When the
trial court released LM from her subpoena, it gave her a similar caution, stating: “And if you’re in
therapy, I don’t know, but you certainly can talk about what you said or what you hear with your
therapist but just not with any witness.”

-2-
During Myers’s direct examination, the prosecution asked her, “What has this whole
experience been like for your family?” Myers responded at length, detailing the self-harm and
other behaviors exhibited by LM and TK over the past several years. During her lengthy statement,
she said, “I deal with [TK] falling down the stairs trying to get to [LM] because she thought the
one door in the basement somebody could get into, because he’s cut his tether off and they think
he’s on the way to get them.”

Haja testified that defendant (her brother) could cook for himself, use a phone, spell, count,
and bathe himself. She testified that he had had a few relationships with adult women. She
believed he was not disabled. Haja believed TK was four years old when the incident in Georgia
occurred; she said Haymon had told her TK was lying at the time.

Defendant’s brother, Carl Knox, testified that he overheard a conversation between
Haymon and defendant in which Haymon “coached” defendant on what to say. He testified that
defendant said something like “they hot little girls and, you know, they act like they had wanted it
or had it coming or whatever.”

Barbara Welke testified as an expert witness for the prosecution. The trial court qualified
her, without objection, as an expert in the areas of child sexual abuse and the dynamics surrounding
disclosure of that abuse. Welke testified that she had not met or spoken with LM and TK or any
witnesses in the case, or reviewed any documentation. Welke testified generally about the
behavior of children who have been sexually abused, particular surrounding disclosure of that
abuse.

After the close of the prosecution’s proofs, outside the presence of the jury, the parties
discussed the defense’s first witness, Haymon. The prosecution informed the trial court that
Haymon had violated the court’s sequestration order by speaking to Carl on the phone and by
speaking to defendant on recorded jail phone calls. The prosecution stated that it would be
exploring this topic on cross-examination. The trial court confirmed with Haymon that she
understood that her testimony could result in her being held in contempt.

Defense counsel opted to have Haymon testify. Haymon testified about various homes the
family had resided in over the years in both Georgia and Michigan, and when they had moved in
and out of those homes. Haymon also testified that defendant had been hit by a car when he was
five years old, sustaining a closed head injury. She testified that defendant received special
education services in school and ultimately quit school when he was sixteen and in the seventh
grade. Haymon admitted that defendant could bathe and cook simple dishes, but was skeptical of
his ability to live on his own. She testified that he was “limited” after his injury, and had impulsive
behavior and a lack of empathy. Haymon admitted to speaking to defendant on recorded jail calls.
The recording of one of those calls was played for the jury.

The jury convicted defendant as described. The trial court sentenced defendant as
described. The three CSC-I sentences and the CSC-II sentence that were imposed consecutively
related to defendant’s sexual abuse of LM and TK on the same day and substantially in the same
room.

-3-
After sentencing, defendant moved the trial court for a new trial or a Ginther3 hearing
regarding his trial counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness, as well as for resentencing. The trial court
denied defendant’s motion.

This appeal followed. After filing his claim of appeal, defendant moved this Court to
remand for a Ginther hearing regarding his counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness, which this Court
denied “without prejudice to a case call panel of this Court determining that remand is necessary”
on plenary review.4

II. JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT

Defendant argues that the trial court pierced the veil of impartiality by telling the
complainants in front of the jury that they could discuss their testimony with therapists. We
disagree. We generally review de novo, as a question of constitutional law, whether judicial
misconduct occurred and denied a defendant a fair trial. People v Stevens, 498 Mich 162, 168;
869 NW 233 (2015). However, because defendant did not raise this issue before the trial court
during trial, this issue is unpreserved and reviewed for plain error affecting substantial rights.
People v Jackson, 292 Mich App 583, 597; 808 NW2d 541 (2011).

“A defendant claiming judicial bias must overcome a heavy presumption of judicial
impartiality.” Jackson, 292 Mich App at 597 (quotation marks and citation omitted). “A judge’s
conduct pierces this veil and violates the constitutional guarantee of a fair trial when, considering
the totality of the circumstances, it is reasonably likely that the judge’s conduct improperly
influenced the jury by creating the appearance of advocacy or partiality against a party.” Stevens,
498 Mich at 171. A reviewing court should evaluate the totality of the circumstances surrounding
the alleged misconduct, and should consider several factors, including, but not limited to:

[1] the nature of the trial judge’s conduct, [2] the tone and demeanor of the judge,
[3] the scope of the judicial conduct in the context of the length and complexity of
the trial and issues therein, [4] the extent to which the judge’s conduct was directed
at one side more than the other, and [5] the presence of any curative instructions,
either at the time of an inappropriate occurrence or at the end of trial. [Id. at 164
(citation omitted).]

A single instance of misconduct may, in some instances, “be so egregious that it pierces the veil
of impartiality.” Id. at 171.

In this case, after LM and TK testified, the trial judge gave each of them the standard
warning not to discuss their testimony with anyone else, but added that if the witness had a
therapist, she could discuss her testimony with that therapist. The trial judge made it clear that she
did not know whether LM or TK was seeing a therapist, nor did the judge make any further

3
People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436, 442-443; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).
4
People v Knox, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered March 24, 2025 (Docket No.
368164).

-4-
commentary on the matter. However, the trial judge did not tell other witnesses that they could
discuss their testimony with a therapist.

Applying the Stevens factors, we conclude that the veil of impartiality was not pierced.
Regarding the nature of the alleged misconduct, defendant argues that the trial judge’s comments
were “biased commentary” in the presence of the jury. Stevens, 498 Mich at 244. Specifically,
defendant argues that the trial judge’s statements “communicated to the jury that the complainants
were different and they were different because they were victims, i.e., they were assaulted by
[defendant].” We disagree. The trial judge’s comments were brief and matter-of-fact, and made
it clear that the trial judge had no personal knowledge of whether the girls were in therapy. While
a better practice may have been to inform every witness that they were free to discuss their
testimony with persons bound by confidentiality, we do not find that the trial judge’s brief
statements created an appearance that she believed the girl’s testimony or believed defendant to
be guilty. Stevens, 498 Mich at 171. Regarding the trial judge’s tone and demeanor, and although
this Court has only the transcript to review, it appears, as stated, that the trial judge’s statements
were brief and matter-of-fact. Id. Regarding the third and fourth factors, the alleged judicial
misconduct occurred just twice in a six-day trial, but it did reflect an “imbalance” in the “manner
of conduct” by virtue of the fact that the trial judge did not instruct other witnesses the same way.
Id. at 177. And regarding the fifth factor, the jury was properly instructed at the end of trial that it
should not infer from the judge’s comments or questions that the judge had formed an opinion
regarding defendant’s guilt. See id.

Considering the totality of the circumstances, we find no error requiring reversal (plain or
otherwise) in the trial judge’s statements to LM and TK. Defendant’s citation to this Court’s
decision in People v Hudson, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued
March 14, 2024 (Docket No. 364772), is unpersuasive.5 In Hudson, the trial judge directly
addressed the jury at length after the victim’s testimony, offering the jurors mental health resources
and counseling services as a result of the “tough testimony” they had heard. Id., unpub op at 1.
The trial judge also stated that “these cases—are challenging for me and everyone else in the
courtroom[.]” Id. This Court found that the trial court had “pierced the veil of judicial impartiality
by indicating that it was disturbed by the victim’s testimony, thus creating the appearance of
sympathy for, or partiality toward, the victim.” Id. at 5. The trial court made no such indication
in this case; rather, it merely correctly instructed LM and TK that they could discuss their
testimony with a therapist, if either was seeing one. While it is true that other witnesses were not
given this additional instruction, we conclude, on the whole, that defendant has not overcome the
presumption of judicial impartiality. Jackson, 292 Mich App at 597.

III. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

Defendant also argues that his counsel was ineffective in several respects: (1) by failing to
object to the trial court’s instructions to LM and TK at the close of their testimony and failing to
seek a mistrial, (2) by eliciting testimony from TK that defendant had assaulted her in Georgia, (3)

5
This Court is not bound by its prior unpublished opinions, although they may be persuasive. See
MCR 7.215(C)(1); see also Cox v Hartman, 322 Mich App 292, 307; 911 NW2d 219 (2017).

-5-
by failing to request a Daubert6 hearing and challenge Welke’s expert testimony, and (4) by failing
to object to testimony informing the jury that defendant was incarcerated during the proceedings
below. We disagree.

The determination whether a defendant has been deprived of the effective assistance of
counsel presents a mixed question of fact and constitutional law. See People v Trakhtenberg, 493
Mich 38, 47; 826 NW2d 136 (2012). When the trial court did not hold an evidentiary hearing on
the issue, there are no factual findings to which this Court, in applying a clear error standard, must
defer. People v Gioglio (On Remand), 296 Mich App 12, 20; 815 NW2d 589 (2012), vacated not
in relevant part, lv den in remaining part, 493 Mich 864 (2012), cert den sub nom Gioglio v
Michigan, 568 US 1217 (2013). In such cases, this Court will determine whether the defendant
received ineffective assistance on the record alone. Id. This Court reviews de novo whether a
particular act or omission by counsel fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under
prevailing professional norms and prejudiced the defendant. Id. at 19-20.

To establish a right to a new trial premised on the ineffective assistance of counsel, a
defendant must show: (1) that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness under prevailing professional norms; and (2) that there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s error, the result of the proceedings would have been different. Trakhtenberg,
493 Mich at 51. In evaluating whether defense counsel’s conduct fell below an objective standard
of reasonableness, this Court begins with the strong presumption that counsel’s conduct fell within
the wide range of reasonable professional assistance and could be considered trial strategy. People
v Vaughn, 491 Mich 642, 670; 821 NW2d 288 (2012); Gioglio (On Remand), 296 Mich App at
22-23. This Court will not substitute its judgment for that of counsel regarding matters of trial
strategy, nor will it assess counsel’s competence with the benefit of hindsight. See Strickland v
Washington, 466 US 668, 689; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984); People v Payne, 285 Mich
App 181, 190; 774 NW2d 714 (2009).

To establish prejudice, a defendant must show that, but for counsel’s deficient
performance, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings against him
would have been different. See Trakhtenberg, 493 Mich at 51.

A. TRIAL COURT’S STATEMENTS TO LM AND TK

Defendant argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the trial court’s
statements discussed in section II of this opinion. As stated, we find no error requiring reversal in
the trial court’s statements; accordingly, any objection by defense counsel would have been futile,
and a motion for a mistrial would have been unsuccessful. Counsel is not required to make futile
objections or advance a meritless position in order to provide effective assistance. People v
Ericksen, 288 Mich App 192, 201; 793 NW2d 120 (2010).

6
Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc, 509 US 579, 589; 113 S Ct 2786; 125 L Ed 2d
469 (1993).

-6-
B. OTHER-ACTS TESTIMONY

Defendant also argues that his trial counsel erred by eliciting testimony from TK that
defendant had assaulted her in Georgia. We disagree. During defense counsel’s cross-examination
of TK, defense counsel elicited testimony from TK that defendant had assaulted her in Georgia,
despite TK having stated at her preliminary examination that all of the assaults occurred in
Michigan. On redirect, TK testified regarding the details of that incident, specifically that
defendant had forced her to inhale a lit cigarette and had “humped” underneath her while she was
sitting on defendant’s lap. TK testified that she told her grandmother, who told TK that she was
mistaken about defendant’s intentions and that defendant “was basically moving.”

Defense counsel’s elicitation of this testimony from TK could have been based in sound
trial strategy. See People v Horn, 279 Mich App 31, 39; 755 NW2d 212 (2008). Defense counsel’s
efforts to point out inconsistencies in TK’s and LM’s statements in order to cast doubt on their
credibility was a valid strategy in a case that hinged on their testimony. Even though defense
counsel “opened the door” for the prosecution to provide more details about defendant’s prior
uncharged conduct, defense counsel could have concluded that the risk was worth the reward. We
will not assess this strategy with the benefit of hindsight, Payne, 285 Mich App at 190, or declare
counsel ineffective merely because the strategy did not work, People v Petri, 279 Mich App 407,
412; 760 NW2d 882 (2008).

Additionally, defendant cannot demonstrate prejudice. If the jury found TK’s testimony
concerning the assault in Georgia credible, then it stands to reason that it found TK’s testimony
concerning the other assaults in Michigan credible as well. The jury was properly instructed
concerning the elements of each charged offense and what it needed to find in order to find
defendant guilty, including being instructed that it was to find that the charged acts occurred in
Ingham County in Michigan. Defendant has not demonstrated a reasonable probability that the
introduction of this evidence altered the outcome of the proceedings against him. Trakhtenberg,
493 Mich at 51.

C. WELKE’S TESTIMONY

Defendant also argues that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to request a Daubert
hearing and challenge the scientific validity of Welke’s expert testimony. We disagree. This Court
reviews for an abuse of discretion a trial court’s decision to admit evidence. People v Bynum, 496
Mich 610, 623; 852 NW2d 570 (2014). We review de novo preliminary questions of law, such as
the interpretation of statutes or the rules of evidence. Id.

MRE 702 governs the admissibility of expert testimony and provides:

If the court determines that scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise if (1) the
testimony is based on sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of
reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and
methods reliably to the facts of the case.

-7-
MRE 702 incorporates the standards of reliability established by the United States Supreme Court
in Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharm, Inc, 509 US 579; 113 S Ct 2786; 125 L Ed 2d 469 (1993). See
Gilbert v Daimler Chrysler Corp, 470 Mich 749, 781; 685 NW2d 391 (2004). Accordingly, a
Daubert hearing tests whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the proposed expert
testimony is scientifically valid and whether the methodology can be applied to the facts at issue.
See Daubert, 509 US at 592-593. A trial court may admit expert testimony only once it is satisfied
that the testimony meets MRE 702’s standards of relevance and reliability. Gilbert, 470 Mich at
782; Bynum, 496 Mich at 624. In other words, an expert’s opinion “must be shown to be reliable,
including the data underlying the expert’s theories and the methodology by which the expert draws
conclusions.” People v Muniz, 343 Mich 437, 444; 997 NW2d 325 (2022).

Defendant argues that Welke’s testimony was not sufficiently reliable under Daubert
because it was based on her experience treating victims of sexual assault, rather than on academic
studies. We disagree. “Michigan courts regularly admit expert testimony concerning typical and
relevant symptoms of abuse, such as delayed reporting and secrecy.” Muniz, 343 Mich App at
443. Although it is insufficient to “simply point to an expert’s experience and background to argue
that the expert’s opinion is reliable,” Edry v Adelman, 486 Mich 634, 642; 786 NW2d 567 (2010),
in this case Welke testified that her opinion was based on more than her personal experience as a
counselor. She testified that she had approximately 700 hours of additional training and education
in child sexual abuse and forensic interviewing, apart from her academic study that earned her
bachelor’s and master’s degrees. She also testified that she kept abreast of relevant research, best
practices and techniques in the field of forensic interviewing, and participated in a quarterly
research review with other forensic interviewers.7 Defendant has failed to establish that Welke’s
testimony was unreliable on this basis. Muniz, 343 Mich at 444-445.

Defendant also argues that, to the extent Welke’s testimony was based on her
understanding of Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome (CSAAS), it was unreliable and
inadmissible because of a lack of scientific consensus concerning CSAAS’s validity. But Welke
did not testify regarding CSAAS specifically; rather, she provided general testimony regarding the
range of behaviors child sexual assault victims may exhibit after an assault, particularly concerning
delayed disclosure. “It has . . . long been recognized that the behavior of victims of varying kinds
of trauma often appears irrational and confusing to most people; and expert testimony is admissible
and appropriate to explain that behavior with no need to engage in an analysis of scientific
reliability.” Muniz, 343 Mich App at 445 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Welke’s
testimony “gave a general explanation of ‘the common postincident behavior of children who are
victims of sexual abuse.’ ” Muniz, 343 Mich App at 445, quoting People v Peterson, 450 Mich
349, 373; 537 NW2d 857 (1995). Defendant has failed to establish a basis for challenging Welke’s
testimony under Daubert.

Defendant has not established a reasonable likelihood that a request for a Daubert hearing
would have altered the outcome of the proceedings against him. Trakhtenberg, 493 Mich at 51.

7
Welke’s testimony suggests that she may conduct some of her own research: “I participate in a
quarterly research review where – now its done by Zoom where forensic interviewers get together
and we discuss our recent research in the field.”

-8-
Accordingly, his counsel was not ineffective for failing to advance a meritless position. Ericksen,
288 Mich App at 201.

Relatedly, defendant also argues that Welke’s testimony was inadmissible because it
vouched for the complainants’ credibility. We disagree. An expert may not vouch for the
credibility or truthfulness of a victim. People v Dobrek, 274 Mich 58, 71; 732 NW2d 546 (2007).
An expert may not testify that a specific victim’s allegations are truthful, and may not testify that
a particular complainant’s behavior is consistent with that of a sexually abused child. Peterson,
450 Mich at 374.

In this case, defendant argues that Welke’s testimony regarding the behaviors of actual
abuse victims “far too closely tracked the specifics of the complainant’s allegations.” Although
defendant repeats this argument several times, he does not elaborate regarding which aspects of
TK’s and LM’s allegations tracked Welke’s testimony. The record shows that Welke testified
very clearly that she had not viewed or read the transcript of the forensic interviews in this case,
and had never met or spoken to the complainants or other witnesses in the case. Welke referred to
TK and LM as “alleged victims.” She made no reference to TK’s and LM’s specific allegations,
the time, place, and manner of their disclosures, or any other aspect of the case, and made it clear
that she was not testifying that the alleged abuse in this case actually happened. Rather, she
testified generally regarding the wide range of postabuse behaviors children may exhibit. This
testimony did not constitute vouching for TK’s and LM’s credibility. See Muniz, 343 Mich App
at 447 (“That the general information about abuse victims’ conduct about which [the expert]
testified happened to be consistent with the complainant’s postincident behavior does not
constitute vouching.”).

D. TESTIMONY INDICATING THAT DEFENDANT WAS INCARCERATED

Defendant also argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to testimony
indicating that defendant was incarcerated. Specifically, defense counsel did not object to Myers’s
testimony that TK was scared because defendant had cut his tether off, and did not object to the
introduction of jail phone call recordings during Haymon’s testimony. We disagree that defense
counsel was ineffective in this regard.

Regarding Myers’s statement about the tether, it was an unprompted statement made in
response to the prosecution’s question about what the “whole experience” (presumably the
disclosure, investigation, and trial) had been like for her family. As a matter of trial strategy,
defense counsel may have opted not to draw attention to the statement with an objection. See
People v Unger, 278 Mich App 210, 242, 253; 749 NW2d 272 (2008) (noting that an effective
trial strategy may include a decision not to object to proffered evidence). We will not declare
counsel ineffective merely because the strategy did not work. Petri, 279 Mich App at 412.

Regarding the jail phone call recording, the attorneys and the trial court discussed (outside
of the presence of the jury) the consequences of calling Haymon to testify, including that she could
be impeached with evidence that she violated the trial court’s sequestration order by speaking to
defendant on the phone. Defense counsel nonetheless presented Haymon’s testimony. Haymon
testified concerning when the family had moved to various homes, and also testified to the
limitations defendant suffered after his childhood car accident. Defense counsel referred to the

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jail calls in his closing argument, stating that he was “really glad” the jury got to hear defendant’s
voice and that “[t]hat is the voice of a man who sustained a traumatic brain injury.” Defense
counsel made further reference to the jail call by asking the jury, “Did you ever hear a recorded
confession on a jail call?” It is clear from the record that defense counsel’s decision to present
Haymon’s testimony, even though the jail call recording would be introduced into evidence, was
one of trial strategy. Again, we will not assess this strategy with the benefit of hindsight, Payne,
285 Mich App at 190, or declare counsel ineffective merely because the strategy did not work,
Petri, 279 Mich App at 412. Defendant has not demonstrated that his counsel’s conduct fell
outside the range of reasonable professional assistance. Vaughn, 491 Mich at 670.

IV. SENTENCING

Defendant also argues that the trial court erred by imposing multiple consecutive sentences.
We disagree. This Court reviews for an abuse of discretion a trial court’s decision to impose
statutorily-authorized consecutive sentences. People v Norfleet, 317 Mich App 649, 664-665; 897
NW2d 195 (2016).

In Michigan, concurrent sentencing is the norm. See People v Ryan, 295 Mich App 388,
401; 819 NW2d 55 (2012). Consequently, a trial court cannot impose consecutive sentences unless
authorized by the Legislature. See People v Chambers, 430 Mich 217, 222; 421 NW2d 903 (1988).
When the Legislature has authorized, but not mandated, consecutive sentencing, the trial court
must articulate its rationale for its decision to impose consecutive sentencing; the rationale must
be sufficiently particularized to permit appellate review. See Norfleet, 317 Mich App at 664-665.

Under MCL 750.520b(3), a trial court may order a term of imprisonment imposed for a
CSC-I conviction “to be served consecutively to any term of imprisonment imposed for any other
criminal offense arising from the same transaction.” Accordingly, consecutive sentencing was
authorized, but not mandated, in defendant’s case.

Defendant argues that the trial court failed to sufficiently articulate its rationale for
imposing consecutive sentences. We disagree. At sentencing, defense counsel was able to argue
extensively against consecutive sentencing, citing defendant’s own history as an abuse victim and
neurocognitive issues he suffered as a result of a childhood accident. In determining that
consecutive sentencing was appropriate, the trial court stated in relevant part:

There’s the argument that sentencing you consecutively will be cruel and/or
unusual punishment. I can tell you that what happened to those girls is cruel and
unusual punishment, and they will suffer for the rest of their lives. You took away
their first sexual experience. You took away how they feel about men. You took
away about [sic] how they feel about the world, how they feel about themselves,
how they see themselves.

You gave them now a life of pain and constant healing, triggers, and trauma.
Thankfully they have some mothers who are supportive, but ultimately they have
to live in their skin and in their bodies, and they will always remember the way they
were wrongfully touched.

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* * *

In regard to, Counsel, your statement, the severity of the offense and how
he has handled these little girls and the testimony that I heard and him taking no
responsibility—I understand his constitutionally protected right, but the severity of
the offenses on all of these counts speak for themselves and the multiple offenses.

I understand the prosecutor—well, technically I don’t understand, but I
understand it’s common. I understand that not every single time he touched those
girls or that was testified to there’s [sic] a count. I think there were many, many
counts that could have been. This could have been a 100-page felony information.
It wasn’t. That’s not my choice. I have to deal with what I’m given.

I think a whole lot more went on than was charged. That’s not my call.
With the severity of what was actually in front of this Court and what the jury found
him guilty [of] is so very serious. He essentially took the lives of these girls,
changed them forever.

The sentence imposed for the same offense in this county—I’ve had
multiple, multiple very similar cases, and this sentence is not unlike those.

It’s also, as you yourself, Counsel, acknowledged, part of the legislative
intent when there are such severe crimes and so many of them.

When we look at the Snow factors—punishment of Defendant,
rehabilitation of Defendant, deterrence of others, and protection of society—I find
that this sentence is proportional.

The punishment of Defendant is needed, but I don’t think it will deter him.
. . . It’s also noted under evaluation and plan that when Defendant talked to
probation he had a lack of remorse, empathy, and denial, and he did not accept any
responsibility.

* * *

Given the series of events in this file, rehabilitation is unlikely and will be
an uphill battle. His rehabilitation must be within the confines of the Michigan
Department of Corrections. He is a young man—I recognize that—but I think the
consecutive sentencing will take him to be a very old man and unlikely for him to
be released. For the safety and mental health and well-being of his victims, I think
that’s important—and for the safety of the community and society as a whole.

Contrary to defendant’s argument, we find the trial court’s thorough recitation of its
rationale behind the imposition of defendant’s sentences to be sufficient to facilitate appellate
review. Defendant argues that the trial court did not provide “any direct explanation for why
several consecutive sentences were appropriate or why she chose to impose them.” We disagree
with defendant’s characterization of the record. The trial court’s articulation was more than
sufficient to enable this Court to assess whether the trial court’s decision to impose consecutive

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sentences fell within the range of reasonable and principled outcomes. See Norfleet, 317 Mich
App at 664.

Defendant also argues that the trial court violated his constitutional rights by finding that
the offenses for which consecutive sentences were imposed arose out of a single transaction.
Again, we disagree. Defendant did not raise this issue before the trial court, and we review it for
plain error. Jackson, 292 Mich App at 597. In any event, this Court has held that “neither
Apprendi, Alleyne, nor Lockridge compels the conclusion that consecutive sentencing in Michigan
violates a defendant’s Sixth Amendment protections,” and that judge-found facts supporting the
imposition of consecutive sentencing is constitutionally permissible. People v DeLeon, 317 Mich
App 714, 722-726; 895 NW2d 577 (2016), citing Oregon v Ice, 555 US 160, 164; 129 S Ct 711;
172 L Ed 2d 517 (2009). DeLeon remains binding precedent on this Court. MCR 7.215(J)(1).
Defendant has not established entitlement to relief on this issue.8

Defendant also argues that the trial court failed to explain why its chosen sentences were
proportionate to the offense and the offender. But, as quoted above, the trial court engaged in a
thorough explanation of the rationale behind its sentencing decisions, including an analysis of the
four basic sentencing considerations found in People v Snow, 386 Mich 586, 592; 194 NW2d 314
(1972). To the extent that defendant argues that the trial court failed to satisfy its duty to articulate
a rationale in support of its sentencing decisions, we disagree.

The actual thrust of defendant’s argument appears to be that the trial court failed to consider
mitigating factors about defendant and, accordingly, imposed an unreasonable sentence. A
sentencing court must impose offenses that are proportionate to the offense and the offender. See
People v Boykin, 510 Mich 171, 187; 987 NW2d 58 (2022). However, “a proportionality challenge
to a given sentence must be based on the individual term imposed and not on the cumulative effect
of multiple sentences.” Norfleet, 317 Mich App at 734. “Therefore, although the combined term
is not itself subject to a proportionality review, the decision to impose a consecutive sentence when
not mandated by statute is reviewable for an abuse of discretion.” Id. The question therefore
becomes whether the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences in this case was within the
range of principled outcomes. Id. at 664.

We conclude that it was. The trial court noted the extreme effect that defendant’s abuse
had had upon his two victims, both of whom had engaged in self-harm, suicide attempts, and other
self-destructive behaviors. The court also noted that numerous uncharged acts of sexual abuse
likely occurred; this inference is more than supported by TK’s testimony. The trial court explicitly
stated that it had considered defendant’s own history of abuse, mental health issues, and cognitive
limitations, but also noted defendant’s low chance of rehabilitation and lack of remorse or
empathy. On this record, we cannot say that the trial court’s decision fell outside the range of
principled outcomes. Norfleet, 317 Mich App at 734. Although defendant may have had some
cognitive limitations as a result of a childhood accident, the record shows that he was found

8
We note that defendant does not challenge the determination that several of defendant’s offenses
did arise from the same transaction; defendant merely argues that this fact was required to be found
by a jury, not the sentencing judge.

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competent to stand trial, and witness testimony indicated that defendant could generally live as an
adult in society. Defendant was able to read, speak, drive (although he did not have a license),
cook basic foods, and even date and father children of his own. The trial court did not abuse its
discretion by imposing consecutive sentences.

Affirmed.9

/s/ Christopher P. Yates
/s/ Mark T. Boonstra
/s/ Adrienne N. Young

9
Defendant also argues that the trial court erred by denying him a Ginther hearing regarding his
counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness. Because defendant did not assert any errors that would require
further factual development of the record in order to review them, any error in the trial court’s
denial of an evidentiary hearing was harmless. See People v Heft, 299 Mich App 69, 80; 829
NW2d 266 (2012).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11218750. Public record. Not legal advice.