# Gary Wygant v. Bill Lee, Governor

> Tennessee Supreme Court · December 10, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11218021

## Case

- **Court:** Tennessee Supreme Court
- **Decided:** December 10, 2025
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurring in part
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11218021

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding registered voter in Alaska seeking to challenge a reapportionment plan even though “she does not reside in or near the challenged district” had standing under constitution and Alaska common law

## Opinion text

12/10/2025
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE
October 3, 2024 Session

GARY WYGANT, ET AL. v. BILL LEE, GOVERNOR, ET AL.

Direct Appeal from the Chancery Court for Davidson County
No. 22-0287-IV
Russell T. Perkins, Chancellor; J. Michael Sharp, Judge; and
Steven W. Maroney, Chancellor
___________________________________

No. M2023-01686-SC-R3-CV
___________________________________

HOLLY KIRBY, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I agree with most of the majority’s excellent opinion, including its conclusions
concerning Mr. Wygant’s claim. I write separately because I disagree with the majority’s
analysis and conclusion on Ms. Hunt’s standing.1

With respect, on Ms. Hunt’s claim, there is much the majority opinion doesn’t talk
about. As explained below, in denying that Ms. Hunt has standing, Tennessee becomes
the first state in the nation to hold that a voter does not have standing to challenge the
constitutionality of her own voting district. The State has cited no case from anywhere in
the country—federal or state—holding what the majority now holds: that a voter who has
been placed into an unconstitutionally-configured voting district suffered no harm from it
and has no standing to challenge it. And the majority cites no such case in its opinion. Not
one.

The majority doesn’t talk about the fact that, like Mr. Wygant, Ms. Hunt asserts a
district-specific claim. And like Mr. Wygant, Ms. Hunt is the object of the redistricting of
her voting district; she alleges representational harm caused by the unconstitutional
configuration of her district. State and federal cases across the country recognize that a
voter who has been placed into an unconstitutionally configured district is harmed by the

1
Citing Case v. Wilmington Trust, N.A., 703 S.W.3d 274, 289 (Tenn. 2024), the majority concludes
that the claim Ms. Hunt is asserting involves public rights. In this separate opinion, I refrain from reaching
the issue of whether Ms. Hunt’s claim involves public rights; I instead assume arguendo that Ms. Hunt’s
claim involves public rights. For that reason, I assume Ms. Hunt is required to show injury-in-fact, as noted
in Wilmington Trust, and conclude that she has standing even with that assumption. Wilmington Tr., 703
S.W.3d at 291 (noting that prior Tennessee cases requiring injury-in-fact involved public rights).
constitutional violation and has injury-in-fact to satisfy standing requirements like ours.
Case v. Wilmington Tr., N.A., 703 S.W.3d 274, 291 (Tenn. 2024) (noting Tennessee’s
injury-in-fact requirement for public rights cases).

The majority overlooks this established redistricting jurisprudence and erects
additional hurdles for Ms. Hunt. This is error in and of itself.

But the majority’s analysis of those additional hurdles is also flawed. Ms. Hunt in
fact clears every one of them. She has sustained injury now in the form of a 3-1 staggered-
term representative structure for District 17 and Davidson County, instead of the
constitutionally-required 2-2 structure. Turnover will most certainly occur in District 17
and Davidson County, and injury from the unconstitutional 3-1 structure is certain to
manifest each time it does. The redistricted map places Ms. Hunt in a different senate
district with a new senator whom she perceives as not connected to her county. Ms. Hunt
felt that her previous senator could understand her county’s concerns, and the redistricting
shortened the period of time she was represented by the previous senator. And Ms. Hunt
now resides in a senate district whose misnumbering renders it unconstitutional. All of this
is discussed further below.

First, consider what the majority doesn’t talk about. Without question, Ms. Hunt
asserts a district-specific claim, and the majority’s analysis of Ms. Hunt’s standing doesn’t
mention it. Ms. Hunt contends that the misnumbering of her own Senate voting district
violates Article II, Section 3 of the Tennessee Constitution, which requires: “In a county
having more than one senatorial district, the districts shall be numbered consecutively.”
Tenn. Const. art. II, § 3. She seeks only to correct the misnumbering of her own Senate
district.2 Her trial expert created an alternative Senate reapportionment plan that would
remedy that constitutional violation. The entire trial court panel, including the dissent,
viewed Ms. Hunt’s claim as district-specific. Ms. Hunt’s claim here is district-specific.3

Next, like Mr. Wygant, Ms. Hunt is the object of the redistricting of her Senate
district. “[S]tanding depends considerably upon whether the plaintiff is himself an object

2
Even if Ms. Hunt had not limited her own claim, the majority limits Mr. Wygant’s statewide claim
to a district-specific claim and the same would ordinarily be done for Ms. Hunt’s claim.
3
In its briefs before this Court, the State asserts that Ms. Hunt challenges the statewide map and
argues that allowing her to bring this claim would constitute judicial overreach. In support, the State points
to a statement made in the filings of Plaintiffs Gary Wygant and Akilah Moore during the temporary
injunction proceedings. But Ms. Hunt had not joined the lawsuit at this point, and the statement in question
cannot fairly be attributed to her. It is clear from the record of the proceedings below that the relief Ms.
Hunt seeks is district-specific.

-2-
of the action . . . at issue. If he is, there is ordinarily little question that the action . . . has
caused him injury. . . .” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561–62 (1992). See also
Wilmington Tr., 703 S.W.3d at 283 n.8 (quoting same language in Lujan). Here, Ms. Hunt
belongs to a unique subset of voters: she not only lives in District 17, she lives in the small
portion of Davidson County located in District 17, which makes her district subject to the
constitutional consecutive numbering requirement. It is undisputed that District 17, Ms.
Hunt’s new voting district, was misnumbered. As a voter in District 17, Ms. Hunt was the
“object” of the State’s unconstitutional misnumbering of her voting district. See Gill v.
Whitford, 585 U.S. 48, 66 (2018) (“[W]e have held that a plaintiff who alleges that he is
the object of a racial gerrymander—a drawing of district lines on the basis of race—has
standing to assert only that his own district has been so gerrymandered.” (emphasis added)
(citing United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 744–45 (1995)).

As the object of the unconstitutional misnumbering of her Senate district, Ms. Hunt
has sustained representational harm. The United States Supreme Court has recognized
“representational harm” in the context of racial gerrymandering, where harm to voters in a
voting district arises from the tangible configuration of district in a way that violates
constitutional standards. See, e.g., Hays, 515 U.S. at 744. Summarizing its “standing
principles,” the Court explained that “the harm asserted by the plaintiffs is best understood
as arising from a burden on those plaintiffs' own votes,” which in a gerrymandering context
arises from “a voter's placement in a” gerrymandered district. Gill, 585 U.S. at 69. For
that reason, if a plaintiff “resides in a racially gerrymandered district, . . . the plaintiff has
. . . standing to challenge the legislature's action.” Hays, 515 U.S. at 745.

The same has been held as to violations of state constitutional provisions governing
the structure of voting districts—like the Tennessee constitutional provisions at issue here.
For example, in Wilkins v. West, the plaintiffs alleged that certain reapportioned legislative
districts in Virginia violated constitutional requirements of compactness and contiguity,
and also that they were racially gerrymandered in violation of the Virginia Constitution.
571 S.E.2d 100, 106 (Va. 2002). As to the racial gerrymandering allegations, the Virginia
Supreme Court adopted the reasoning on standing used by the United States Supreme Court
in Hays. Id. at 106–07 (citing Hays, 515 U.S. at 743). On the alleged violations of the
state constitutional provisions on compactness and contiguity, the Wilkins Court likened
the harm caused by these provisions to “representational harms” suffered in racial
gerrymandering cases, and it adopted the same standard:

While this standard was developed in the context of racial gerrymandering
claims, we believe the same standard is appropriate to establish standing for
allegations that electoral districts violate the compactness and contiguous

-3-
requirements of Article II, § 6 of the Constitution of Virginia. If a district
fails to meet the compactness and contiguous requirements, residents of that
district are directly affected by the legislature's failure to comply with the
Constitution of Virginia. In the absence of residency in a challenged district,
a complainant can establish standing only by showing a particularized injury.

Id. at 107. The only evidence of injury produced by the plaintiffs in Wilkins was proof of
residency in their legislative districts. Id. at 106. That was enough. The Wilkins Court
recognized that residents in the challenged electoral districts sustained representational
harm from being placed into unconstitutionally configured districts and had standing to
assert district-specific claims.4 Id. at 107.

Similarly, in Abbott v. Mexican American Legislative Caucus, Texas House of
Representatives, a redistricting case cited in the majority opinion, the Texas Supreme Court
held that an individual voter had an injury-in-fact for purposes of standing for allegations
that the reapportioned district violated county-splitting prohibitions in the Texas
constitution. 647 S.W.3d 681, 695 (Tex. 2022).5 As a resident of the county and of the
partial district that had been split, the voter established particularized injury to challenge
the allegedly unconstitutional split into two districts.6 Id. (“[W]e agree that Cortez has
sufficiently alleged a particularized injury as a Cameron County (and, notably, as a District
37) resident.”). If a resident of the county at issue did not have standing to pursue a claim

4
The Virginia Supreme Court held that residence in an allegedly unconstitutional district shows
particularized injury without the need for further proof. Wilkins, 571 S.E.2d at 107 (explaining that the
particularized injury requirement applies to claims of an unconstitutionally-configured district, including
but not limited to racial gerrymandering, and residents of the affected district suffer “representation harm”
and are “directly affected” by the constitutional violation, so they are deemed to have standing “without
further proof of personalized injury” beyond proof of residency).
5
Texas follows the federal requirements for standing, including the requirement for a particularized
injury-in-fact. See Abbott, 647 S.W.3d at 690 (citations omitted).
6
The voter originally also alleged injury as a candidate in the district, but the holding was not based
on his allegations of candidate status. Abbott, 647 S.W.3d at 695 n.4. It was based only on his residence
in the challenged district.

In Abbott, notwithstanding the finding of particularized injury, the court noted that the individual
plaintiffs had sued the wrong defendant; they sued only the State of Texas. Id. at 697–98. Their injuries
were not traceable to the State of Texas, so the individual plaintiffs “failed to meet the traceability element
of standing.” Id. at 698. The Court found this defect was “curable” and remanded to give the individual
plaintiffs an opportunity to replead. Id. at 704. There are no allegations in this case that Ms. Hunt sued the
wrong defendant.

-4-
under that constitutional provision, the Texas Supreme Court said, “we struggle to envision
a plaintiff who would.” Id. at 693. Abbott described “[v]oting in a lawfully apportioned
district” as “a personal right.” Id. at 694.

Thus, for state constitutional provisions that seek to enhance voter communities,
such as county integrity, contiguity, and the like, states view reapportionment violations as
causing district residents a type of representational harm sufficient to satisfy injury-in-fact
requirements, not unlike voters in United States Supreme Court cases involving racially
gerrymandered districts. See, e.g., Abbott, 647 S.W.3d at 694; Wilkins, 571 S.E.2d at 107;
Graham v. Sec’y of State Adams, 684 S.W.3d 663, 677 (Ky. 2023) (“[T]he Apportionment
Plans interfere with their interest in translating their votes into representation under fair
and constitutional apportionment plans. . . . As such, the standing requirement of actual,
concrete, and particularized injury is satisfied”). See also In re Reapportionment of Towns
of Hartland, Windsor & W. Windsor, 624 A.2d 323, 330 (Vt. 1993) (“All of the
nonnumerical criteria at issue here. . . are not only important but are related to one another
in that they share the common purpose of assuring more effective representation.”). Cf.,
Hays, 515 U.S. at 745 (referring to “the special representational harms racial classifications
can cause in the voting context”).

Here, Ms. Hunt also describes her claim in terms of representational injury or harm.
Her complaint alleges that the new Senate map violates her “constitutional right, as a
Davidson County resident and voter, to representation by a consecutively numbered county
senatorial delegation and her right to vote in a senatorial district constructed in compliance
with the Tennessee Constitution.” In opening statements at trial, her counsel said she had
been “denied the opportunity to vote for . . . a staggered term senate delegation, and to be
represented by it.” Ms. Hunt’s brief to this Court refers to the “unique voting rights” the
Tennessee Constitution gives citizens of populous counties, including the “constitutional
right to be represented in the State Senate as a political group by senators subject to election
by all voters within that political group,” the “constitutional right to vote in a senatorial
district consecutively numbered with the other senatorial districts in her county of
residence,” and “the political power to elect staggered-term legislative delegations
regardless of the unique dynamics of any given election.”

Ms. Hunt’s claim is similar to Mr. Wygant’s claim. Mr. Wygant’s claim is based
on Section 5 of Article II of our Constitution, while Ms. Hunt’s claim is based on Section
3 of Article II. As is clear from the text and history of both sections, both implicate the
same concerns for preserving counties as cohesive units of representation.7 Both
7
Counties are a predominant political subdivision in Tennessee’s Constitution. The word “county”
(or a variation of the word) is used over 115 times in our modern Constitution. The focus on counties began

-5-
provisions were added to the Constitution in 1966 with the objective of improving
representation and advancing the shared political interests of the county as an entity.8 Our
constitutional history and redistricting jurisprudence recognize the importance of the
interests served by these provisions. See State ex rel. Lockert v. Crowell, 631 S.W.2d 702,
709 (Tenn. 1982) (“Lockert I”) (noting that there are “excellent policy reasons for the
presence of a provision that counties must be represented in the Senate,” including the
legislature’s ability to pass legislation with local application and effects); State ex rel.
Lockert v. Crowell, 656 S.W.2d 836, 840 (Tenn. 1982) (“Lockert II”) (noting that in federal

with the State’s founding, and Tennessee’s earliest Constitution included provisions to protect county
integrity in apportionment by prohibiting the division of counties to form senatorial districts. See Tenn.
Const. art. II, § 4 (1796) (“When a District shall be composed of two or more Counties, they shall be
adjoining, and no County shall be divided in forming a District.”); Tenn. Const. art. II, § 6 (1834) (“When
a district is composed of two or more counties, they shall be adjoining; and no county shall be divided in
forming a district.”); Tenn. Const. art. II, § 6 (1870) (“When a district is composed of two or more counties,
they shall be adjoining; and no county shall be divided in forming a district.”).
8
Article II, Section 3 was the subject of much discussion at the 1965 Constitutional Convention.
Transcript of the Proceedings (Aug. 11, 1965) in Journal and Proceedings of the Limited Constitutional
Convention of Tennessee 502–11 (1966), https://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.b4181359 (hereinafter
Constitutional Convention); Transcript of the Proceedings (Aug. 12, 1965) in Constitutional Convention,
supra, at 541–53; Transcript of the Proceedings (Nov. 30, 1965) in Constitutional Convention, supra, at
817–20. As the text of the Convention’s Journal makes clear, the primary purpose of Article II, Section 3
was to produce more effective representation for counties as a whole by letting Senators gain legislative
experience and focus less on campaigning. See Statement of James L. Bomar (July 29, 1965) in
Constitutional Convention, supra, at 413 (“It was felt that by extending the term of Senators to 4 years,
greater continuity of service and experience would be gained. . . Its enactment is in line with modern views
for improved legislative process.”); Statement of Frierson M. Graves, Jr. (Aug. 12, 1965) in Constitutional
Convention, supra, at 541–42 (“Why did we stagger the terms of Senators? And why did we increase the
terms? . . . [E]xperience gained during the first part of a session or during the legislator’s time in office
would . . . make the Senate a more deliberative body in their actions”); id. at 544 (In a four-year term,
senators “can give better service to the State”).

The structure for enhanced representation for counties included the consecutive numbering
provision. See Statement of Frierson M. Graves, Jr. (Aug. 11, 1965) in Constitutional Convention, supra,
at 502–03 (“Now in order to stagger the terms of office we provided that there would be two classes of
Senators and the easiest way of division would be in the even and odd-numbered senatorial districts in
which we are divided . . . . In order to provide that there would be equal rotation in counties that had more
than one senatorial district, we provided that these counties would be numbered consecutively . . . . The
whole purpose being so that there will be approximately one-half of the Senators experienced and only one-
half coming up for election each time, but with a whole group of Representatives coming up for election
and responsibility to the people on a two-year basis.”). See also Statement of Richard Fisher (Dec. 1, 1965)
in Constitutional Convention, supra, at 896–97 (“I believe that any county . . . needs representation of it as
an entity and its entirety in state government. It has problems that are broad in scope, broader than these
districts in which the county will be divided[.]”).

-6-
equal protection contexts, “a constitutionally backed state policy of preserving county
boundaries will clearly be given high priority in the table of legitimate state policy
considerations to justify variances from the ideal”).

While the majority acknowledges that Mr. Wygant suffered a type of
representational harm, it does not even mention representational harm in connection to Ms.
Hunt. But analytically, they are the same. Ms. Hunt’s placement into a district that is not
consecutively numbered, as required under Article II, Section 3, deprives her of the full
panoply of constitutional protections intended to improve legislative representation for
populous counties. In short, she has suffered “representational harm.”

And, like Mr. Wygant, Ms. Hunt’s representational harm is injury-in-fact, sufficient
to give her standing to assert a district-specific claim.9

This is the norm in state redistricting jurisprudence. Across the nation, voters have
been allowed to challenge the constitutionality of their own voting districts. States
recognize the representational harm sustained by voters who are placed into a voting
district that violates constitutional standards—and recognize that it gives them standing.

Here, neither the State nor the majority cites a redistricting case in which a voter in
Ms. Hunt’s position—who asserts a district-specific claim challenging the constitutionality
of her own legislative district—was found not to have sustained particularized injury for
standing. Not even one. And I have found none.

Surveying the states, a number have either constitutional provisions or a statute
granting standing to voters or public officials to challenge reapportionment.10

9
The majority inaccurately describes my position as “a voter always has standing to challenge the
constitutionality of the voter’s own voting district, regardless of the nature of the voter’s claim or alleged
injury.” Respectfully, in this separate opinion, I do not offer an advisory opinion about such a situation, as
it is not presented here. Here, Ms. Hunt was placed into an unconstitutionally configured senate district;
she was directly affected by the redistricting and has alleged ample representational harm caused by it. My
position is that her representational harm gives her standing in this case.
10
See, e.g., Alaska Const. art. VI, § 11 (granting standing to “[a]ny qualified voter”); Ark. Const.
art. VIII, § 5 (“any citizen[] and taxpayer[]”); Cal. Const. art. XXI, § 3(b)(2) (“any registered voter”); Conn.
Const. art. III, § 6d (“any registered voter”); Del. Const. art. II, § 2A ( “[a]ny qualified voter”); Haw. Const.
art. IV, § 10 (“any registered voter”); Iowa Const. art. III, § 36 (“any qualified elector”); Me. Const. art.
IX, § 24(3) (“any citizen or group of citizens”); Md. Const. art. III, § 5 (“any registered voter”); Mass.
Const. amend. art. CI, § 3 (“any voter of the Commonwealth”); Mo. Const. art. III, § 7(i) (“an eligible
Missouri voter who sustains an individual injury by virtue of residing in a district that exhibits the alleged

-7-
In the majority of state redistricting cases, with or without such provisions, the
standing of plaintiff voters to challenge reapportionment of their own voting district has
never been questioned.11 Until the present case, Tennessee also fell into this category.12
See, e.g., Lockert I, 631 S.W.2d at 704 (standing of voters in affected districts “not in
issue”); Lockert II, 656 S.W.2d at 840 (standing of voters not questioned); State ex rel.
Lockert v. Crowell (Lockert III), 729 S.W.2d 88 (Tenn. 1987) (same).

But in every state redistricting case where standing is discussed, courts have
recognized that voters who are redistricted into an unconstitutionally-configured district

violation, and whose injury is remedied by a differently drawn district”); N.Y. Const. art. III, § 5 (“any
citizen”); Okla. Const. art. V, § 11C (“[a]ny qualified elector”); Or. Const. art. IV, § 6(2)(a) (“any elector”).
See also Mich. Comp. Laws § 4.18 (“any elector”); Minn. Stat. § 200.57(a) (“any individual aggrieved by
a violation of this act”).
11
See, e.g., Rice v. English, 835 So. 2d 157, 159 (Ala. 2002); Arizona Minority Coal. for Fair
Redistricting v. Arizona Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 208 P.3d 676, 682 (Ariz. 2009) (en banc); Blum v.
Schrader, 637 S.E.2d 396, 397 (Ga. 2006); Pentico v. Idaho Comm’n for Reapportionment, 504 P.3d 376,
379 (Idaho 2022); Durst v. Idaho Comm’n for Reapportionment, 505 P.3d 324, 328 (Idaho 2022); State ex
rel. Welsh v. Marion Super. Ct., Room 5, 185 N.E.2d 18, 19 (Ind. 1962); Rivera v. Schwab, 512 P.3d 168,
173, 177 (Kan. 2022); Wattson v. Simon, 970 N.W.2d 42, 44–45 (Minn. 2022); Mauldin v. Branch, 866 So.
2d 429, 430 n.2 (Miss. 2003); Pick v. Nelson, 528 N.W.2d 309, 313 (Neb. 1995); Grisham v. Van Soelen,
539 P.3d 272, 276 (N.M. 2023); League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Ohio Redistricting Comm’n, 195
N.E.3d 974, 978 (Ohio 2022); State ex rel. Cooper v. Tennant, 730 S.E.2d 368, 373–76 (W. Va. 2012).
12
The majority suggests we should ignore cases where the standing of voters who live in the
challenged district was not questioned, including our own. But in jurisdictions where “standing is a
question of subject matter jurisdiction that can never be waived and that courts must raise sua sponte,” the
fact that a redistricting case is addressed on the merits “implicitly supports that plaintiffs similarly situated
. . . have standing.” Pereira v. Town of N. Hempstead, 682 F. Supp. 3d 234, 243 (E.D.N.Y. July 13, 2023).
See also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 206 (1962) (holding that the plaintiffs had standing and noting that
prior decisions “have assumed rather than articulated the premise in deciding the merits of similar claims”).

Indeed, a case relied upon by the majority in analyzing Ms. Hunt’s standing does just that. See
State ex rel. Steinke v. Lautenbaugh, 642 N.W.2d 132, 138 (Neb. 2002) (“[B]y reaching the merits and
determining that the statute requiring election by subdistrict was constitutional, Barnett implicitly
recognized that the plaintiffs had standing to bring the action.”).

And regardless, these cases are part of the national landscape, in which state and federal courts
have uniformly recognized that a voter who has been placed into an unconstitutionally configured voting
district has standing to challenge the constitutionality of her own district.

-8-
are harmed by it and have standing to challenge the constitutionality of their own districts.13
States recognize representational harm and injury based on the voter’s “placement” into
the challenged district.14 Gill, 585 U.S. at 69.

In sum, the topics omitted from the majority’s analysis of Ms. Hunt’s claim are
plenty to show that Ms. Hunt has standing to challenge the constitutionality of her Senate
district. As a voter in the challenged Senate district, Ms. Hunt is the object of the
unconstitutional misnumbering of that district and was harmed by it. She maintains a
district-specific claim asserting representational harm. Based on established redistricting
jurisprudence the majority acknowledges as to Mr. Wygant, it’s apparent that Ms. Hunt
likewise satisfies the requirements for standing.

The Court here need not go further to assess Ms. Hunt’s standing. Under long-
accepted redistricting caselaw, as a voter redistricted into an unconstitutional voting
district, she is recognized as having sustained representational harm from the constitutional
violation.

But the majority here bypasses Ms. Hunt’s representational harm and then erects
additional hurdles before her. This is error. And on top of that error, its analysis on those
additional requirements is flawed.15 As explained below, Ms. Hunt clears all of the hurdles
the majority erects.
13
See, e.g., Abbott, 647 S.W.3d at 693, 695; Wilkins, 571 S.E.2d at 107; Faatz v. Ashcroft, 685
S.W.3d 388, 396 (Mo. 2024) (en banc) (“Each Appellant lives in a district in which a community has been
split in alleged violation of the Missouri Constitution and, therefore, has standing to challenge the Senate
Map.”). Cf. In re Reapportionment, 624 A.2d at 335 (“[W]e agree with the State that petitioners have no
standing to raise [a claim based on compactness, contiguity, and common interest requirements in the state
constitution] because they do not reside in the challenged district.”). Some courts that have addressed
standing do not even require district residency. See, e.g., Carpenter v. Hammond, 667 P.2d 1204, 1208–09
(Alaska 1983) (holding registered voter in Alaska seeking to challenge a reapportionment plan even though
“she does not reside in or near the challenged district” had standing under constitution and Alaska common
law); Graham, 684 S.W.3d at 677 (finding standing for voters’ claims based on representational harm
without considering district residency); Harkenrider v. Hochul, 197 N.E.3d 437, 444–45 (N.Y. 2022)
(holding New York voters had standing to challenge reapportionment in districts in which they did not live).
14
This survey of state redistricting cases renders implausible the State’s notion that permitting a
voter such as Ms. Hunt to challenge the constitutionality of her own voting district offends separation of
powers. If it did, surely the State would have discovered one other court that denied standing to a voter
who lived in the challenged district based on separation of powers. It cited no such case.
15
I respond to the majority’s analysis on its own terms, but overall, its over-focus on short-term
effects like the outcome of the most recent senate election for District 17 and Davidson County is
concerning. The constitutional provisions at issue in this appeal govern structural elements for legislative

-9-
Take its discussion of whether Ms. Hunt’s harm is “actual or imminent.” The
majority briefly frames the objective of the consecutive numbering requirement in Article
II, Section 3 as “designed to promote political stability by preventing all the Senate
positions in a particular county from turning over at the same time.”16 The majority seems
to characterize the protections of the provisions in Article II, Section 3 as meant to prevent
“greater-than-usual turnover.” It then says that the fact that “only one of the three Davidson
County Senate seats up for election 2022 turned over” leads inevitably to the conclusion
that Ms. Hunt’s injury is “conjectural” or “hypothetical” or a “mere possibility.” This is
incorrect.

The citizens who ratified Article II, Section 3 well understood that voters may return
senators to office term after term. The near-term results of the most recent election are not
relevant to the assessment of Ms. Hunt’s injury. The consecutive numbering provision was
not intended to prevent turnover or “greater-than-usual turnover,” whatever that means. As
is evident from the text, it is intended to work with the other provisions in Article II, Section
3 to provide voters with better representation when turnover occurs.

The provisions in Article II, Section 3 link senate districts in populous counties to
enhance the representation of their shared interests.17 One mandates that counties with two

districts that are intended to affect election results over the long term, but the majority’s analysis focuses
mainly on immediate effects. For example, for Mr. Wygant, the majority dismisses his complaint that
Gibson County is no longer represented by a Gibson County resident by saying that “it will always be
possible that Gibson County’s representative could reside in a different county.” This is corrosive
reasoning. It is hard to imagine a court in a racial gerrymandering case making a similar observation, that
the election of a white candidate is “always a possibility” in a district that includes some white citizens. Cf.
Petteway v. Galveston Cnty., 667 F. Supp. 3d 447, 464 (S.D. Tex. 2023) (rejecting defendants’ argument
that plaintiff’s racial gerrymandering case was moot because the county executive appointed an African
American to serve in the disputed new district).
16
The majority interjects a comment that “even assuming” deprivation of its intended enhancement
to stability of representation “would constitute the sort of ‘distinct and palpable’ injury that suffices to
establish standing . . . .” This seems to suggest that it is questionable whether the consecutive numbering
requirement accomplishes anything at all. Respectfully, that’s not our call to make. Our job doesn’t include
assessing whether the consecutive numbering requirement is effective in providing its intended benefit to
voters. That assessment was made by the voters who ratified the 1966 amendments to the Constitution.
17
Ms. Hunt alleges this type of injury, asserting that she “suffers an individualized injury every
time she votes in District 17 because District 17’s misnumbering dilutes the political power of her vote as
compared to the voters in the state’s other populous counties.” Enhancing the representation of District 17,
as linked to the other Davidson County senate districts, can fairly be characterized as leveraging the political
power of voters in District 17.

- 10 -
or more senators are divided into “separate districts.”18 Tenn. Const. art. II, § 6. Another
extends the term of senators from two years to four years but provides staggered terms,
with half up for election every two years. Tenn. Const. art. II, § 3. And the provision at
issue here requires consecutive numbering of senate districts in populous counties with
multiple districts. Tenn. Const. art. II, § 3. The text and the history of the provisions in
Article II, Section 3 show they were meant to work together—long term—to enhance
voters’ representation.19 They are “not only important but . . . related to one another in that
they share the common purpose of assuring more effective representation.” In re
Reapportionment, 624 A.2d at 330. See Lockert I, 631 S.W.2d at 709 (noting that there are
“excellent policy reasons for the presence of a provision that counties must be represented
in the Senate”).

Here, we may not know when, but we know for sure that turnover in representation
for District 17 and Davidson County will occur. One way or another, even the most
successful legislators will eventually leave office. That’s neither “conjectural,”
“hypothetical,” nor a “mere possibility.” It’s a certainty. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l
USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013) (holding that an injury is imminent if it is “certainly
impending”). Cf. McConchie v. Scholz, 567 F. Supp. 3d 861, 875 (N.D. Ill. 2021) (for
redistricting claims, “probability of future injury counts as injury for the purpose of
standing”) (cleaned up).

18
The debate on this provision centered on whether division into separate districts should be
mandatory or permissive, and whether those counties should be represented by senators at-large or senators
from separate districts. See Transcript of the Proceedings (Dec. 1, 1965) in Constitutional Convention,
supra, at 890–99; Transcript of the Proceedings (Dec. 9, 1965) in Constitutional Convention, supra, at
967–68.
19
For example, delegates of the Limited Constitutional Convention of 1965 explained:
Now in order to stagger the terms of office we provided that there would be two classes of
Senators and the easiest way of division would be in the even and odd-numbered senatorial
districts in which we are divided . . . . In order to provide that there would be equal rotation
in counties that had more than one senatorial district, we provided that these counties would
be numbered consecutively . . . . The whole purpose being so that there will be
approximately one-half of the Senators experienced and only one-half coming up for
election each time. . . .

Statement of Frierson M. Graves, Jr. (Aug. 11, 1965) in Constitutional Convention, supra, at 502–03.
Another delegate explained: “I believe that any county . . . needs representation of it as an entity and its
entirety in state government.” Statement of Richard Fisher (Dec. 1, 1965) in Constitutional Convention at
896–97.

- 11 -
And when turnover occurs, Ms. Hunt will have a 3-1 staggered representative
system for the county’s four senate districts, instead of the constitutionally required 2-2
staggered representative system. See Tenn. Const. Art. II, § 3. This isn’t a “statistical
probability” as asserted by the majority; it’s a certainty. Clapper, 568 U.S. at 409. Ms.
Hunt has been denied the more effective senate representation our Constitution requires for
her.

Thus, Ms. Hunt’s injury is both immediate and future. Right here and now, Ms.
Hunt has lost the staggered-term representational structure guaranteed by the Tennessee
Constitution and enjoyed by other populous counties. And forevermore under the
challenged Senate map, every time District 17 and Davidson County experience turnover
in representation, voters in District 17 will have a 3-1 staggered representative system for
Davidson County’s four senate districts instead of the constitutionally required 2-2
staggered system. See Tenn. Const. Art. II, § 3.

The majority also quibbles with Ms. Hunt’s description of her injury as, in some
respects, akin to vote dilution. It criticizes that the unconstitutional misnumbering of Ms.
Hunt’s Senate district “does not implicate the one-person, one-vote principle,” does not
“involve gerrymandering,” and “does not affect the weight or strength of her vote,” so it is
not vote dilution. But differentiating Ms. Hunt’s harm from the harm in other cases doesn’t
show she sustained no harm.

Ms. Hunt readily acknowledged that her claim was “not vote dilution in the
framework of a malapportionment case.” Her counsel described it instead as a diminution
“of essentially the political power of your vote” because Davidson County voters in District
17 did not have the representational strength afforded to other populous counties under the
constitutionally required 2-2 staggered representative system.20 Her brief described it as
“diluting the political weight of [Davidson County voters] as compared to the votes of the
citizens of the State's other populous counties.”21

These arguments merely describe the type of representational harm Ms. Hunt
sustained from this particular constitutional violation. This is done in other redistricting
20
Asked to explain the nature of Ms. Hunt’s “vote dilution” claim at oral argument, Ms. Hunt’s
counsel explained that it was “in some respects vote dilution, but not vote dilution in the framework of a
malapportionment case. Vote dilution in a diminishment of essentially the political power of your vote
because our Constitution as amended . . . included a long-recognized benefit of continuity and stability
within government by creating staggered terms, and afforded that right to the citizens of populous counties.”
21
Ms. Hunt also argued that “District 17’s misnumbering dilutes the political power of her vote as
compared to the voters in the state’s other populous counties.”

- 12 -
cases that are not gerrymandering. For example, the Abbott case cited by the majority
alluded to the plaintiffs’ description of their county-splitting claims as “representational
dilution,” in that county residents’ voting power would be diluted by being split. Abbott,
647 S.W.3d at 692. The provisions in Article II, Section 3, including the consecutive
numbering provision, “share the common purpose of assuring more effective
representation.” In re Reapportionment, 624 A.2d at 330.

In the same vein, the majority sums up Mr. Wygant’s allegations: “In essence,
Wygant is alleging that the split of Gibson County reduces the effectiveness of his
representation in the House.” The majority accepted this as representational harm to Mr.
Wygant. Ms. Hunt describes her injury from the unconstitutional misnumbering of her
senate district in a similar way. Like Mr. Wygant, she has sustained representational harm.

Consider next the majority’s conclusion that Ms. Hunt was not injured because
“[t]he new map moved Hunt from District 18, which voted for state senators in presidential
election years, to District 17, which voted for state senators in gubernatorial election
years,” so Ms. Hunt’s “opportunity to vote was accelerated, not delayed.”22 But voters

22
The case cited by the majority in support of this conclusion, State ex rel. Steinke v. Lautenbaugh,
642 N.W.2d 132 (Neb. 2002), is pretty thin gruel. The majority describes it as “concluding that voter had
standing to challenge renumbering of legislative districts where his vote was delayed.” But Steinke does
not involve unconstitutional legislative districts; the plaintiffs there asserted that a county election
commissioner exceeded his statutory authority by renumbering school board districts. 642 N.W.2d at 136
(citing Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 32-552, -553 (1998 & Supp. 2001)).

Because Steinke was not a constitutional redistricting case, it did not even consider the “special
representational harms” that occur in constitutional redistricting settings. Cf. Hays, 515 U.S. at 745 (noting
that voters in racially gerrymandered districts in violation of equal protection may suffer “special
representational harms”); Wilkins, 571 S.E.2d at 107 (adopting representational harm standard for
“allegations that electoral districts violate the compactness and contiguous requirements of Article II, § 6
of the Constitution of Virginia”). And it did not pretend to describe the minimum parameters for standing
in constitutional redistricting cases.

And the majority’s analysis as to Steinke veers uncomfortably close to reasoning by negative
inference or denying the antecedent. An example of this type of unsound reasoning is:

If it is snowing, then it is cold outside.
It is not snowing.
Therefore, it is not cold outside.

Here, the majority describes Steinke as “concluding that [a] voter had standing to challenge renumbering
of legislative districts where his vote was delayed.” Because the redistricting here caused the election to

- 13 -
with similar injury have been deemed to have standing to challenge the constitutionality of
their voting districts.

For example, in Pereira v. Town of North Hempstead, plaintiff McHugh resided in
District 5 prior to redistricting of town board voting districts; after redistricting, he resided
in District 4. 682 F. Supp. 3d 234, 242 (E.D.N.Y. 2023). The town board had staggered
terms of office by district number, and the redistricting caused the plaintiff’s next election
date to fall two years earlier. Id. Similar to the reasoning of the majority here, the
defendants in Pereira argued that McHugh was not injured because his ability to vote for
a new representative was not delayed, it was “accelerated.” Id. The federal district court
rejected this argument:

While it is a close call, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have alleged enough to
show that McHugh suffered an injury in fact. In Gill v. Whitford, the Supreme
Court articulated that Article III standing “is best understood as arising from
a burden on . . . plaintiffs’ own votes,” which in the “gerrymandering context
. . . arises through a voter's placement in a[n]” allegedly unconstitutional
district. 138 S. Ct. at 1931. Here, McHugh has alleged district-specific harm
that is concrete and particularized—he alleges that he will be in a different
district in the new map, with a new representative, and will be represented
for only two years by his current representative when he previously would
have been represented for four.

Id. See id. at 243 (stating that “at least one federal court has found that similarly situated
plaintiffs had standing” (citing League of Women Voters of Chicago v. Wolf, 965 F. Supp.
2d 1007, 1011 (N.D. Ill. 2013), aff’d sub nom., League of Women Voters of Chicago v. City
of Chicago, 757 F.3d 722 (7th Cir. 2014)).23

As in Pereira, after the redistricting, Ms. Hunt is in a different district, with a new
senator. Prior to being “swapped,” Ms. Hunt was in District 18 with Senator Ferrell Haile.
After being swapped, Ms. Hunt is now in District 17 with Senator Mark Pody. Ms. Hunt
met with Senator Haile several times as her senator and felt he could understand the issues
in the urban area where she lives. But the redistricting moved Ms. Hunt from a

be accelerated and not delayed, the majority simply concludes that, therefore, Ms. Hunt does not have
standing. This is inherently unsound reasoning.
23
The majority does not attempt to distinguish Pereira on injury-in-fact, the issue for which the
case is cited.

- 14 -
consecutively numbered district (District 18) to a non-consecutively numbered district
(District 17) and shortened the time in which she was represented by Senator Haile.24

And Ms. Hunt’s injury is more pronounced than the plaintiff’s injury in Pereira.
While plaintiff McHugh’s claim in Pereira was based only on the “swapping” of his voting
districts, id. at 241–44, the Tennessee Constitution renders the numbering of Ms. Hunt’s
new senate district unconstitutional. Consequently, Ms. Hunt was “swapped” from a
constitutionally numbered senate district into an unconstitutionally-numbered district. See,
e.g., Common Cause Fla. v. Byrd, 726 F. Supp. 3d 1322, 1358 (N.D. Fla. 2024) (plaintiffs
alleged redistricting resulted in race-based vote dilution) (stating that the plaintiff “credibly
testified that he has lived in Tallahassee since 1982, that he is a registered and active voter,
that he intended to vote in future elections, that he was in the former Benchmark CD-5,
and that he is now in the Enacted CD-2. That is enough to demonstrate his standing.”). Cf.
Gill, 585 U.S. at 69 (“[T]he harm asserted by the plaintiffs is best understood as arising
from a burden on those plaintiffs' own votes. . . . [T]hat burden arises through a voter's
placement in” an unconstitutionally configured district.).

And, like Mr. Wygant, Ms. Hunt provided factual testimony on how the “swap”
from a constitutional senate district to an unconstitutional district detrimentally affected
the representation of her interests and the interests of her county. In her deposition,25 Ms.
Hunt testified that the switch from Senator Haile to Senator Pody “frustrated” her. She
24
Faced with yet another particularized injury, the majority pivots to causation and redressability.
It interposes that there is no causal connection between Ms. Hunt’s dissatisfaction with her current
representative and the non-consecutive numbering of her district. Pshaw. “[T]he causation element is not
onerous” and only requires “a showing that the injury to a plaintiff is fairly traceable to the conduct of the
adverse party.” City of Memphis v. Hargett, 414 S.W.3d 88, 98 (Tenn. 2013) (cleaned up). As the majority
itself points out, “the new map moved Hunt from District 18 . . . to District 17” and “accelerated” her
election date. The fact that Ms. Hunt was more satisfied with her representation by Senator Haile gives
context to why she was harmed by shortening the time Senator Haile represented her and by her placement
into a new district with another senator. As in Pereira, this is representational harm that gives her standing
to challenge her placement into an unconstitutionally configured voting district. 682 F. Supp. 3d at 242.

And we should not lose sight of Ms. Hunt’s primary representational harm. She now has a 3-1
staggered representative system for the county’s four senate districts, instead of the constitutionally required
2-2 staggered representative system. Without question, this injury is caused directly by the violation of
Art. II, § 3 of the Tennessee Constitution and would be redressed by renumbering or redistricting to comply
with the Constitution.
25
The issue of standing came before the panel as part of the parties’ competing motions for
summary judgment. Both parties submitted Ms. Hunt’s deposition to the panel for consideration and relied
on it in their respective motions. In its order addressing both parties’ motions, the three-judge panel decided
to reserve its ruling on the question of Ms. Hunt’s standing to challenge the Senate map.

- 15 -
explained that Senator Haile, in Sumner County, was part of “the urban core,” while
Senator Pody, in Wilson County, was “very disconnected from what life experiences are
in [her] area.” She said that the change from District 18 to District 17 took away her
community’s voice in the legislature because Senator Pody “is really not connected to the
community in our area,” and doesn’t “represent [her] or [her] community’s interest.” She
felt that, under the current districting plan, “there would be little chance to have somebody
that has that kind of understanding for my area and for my life.”

Ms. Hunt’s trial testimony also focused on how the redistricting plan impacted her
community’s voice in the legislature. She reiterated at trial that Senator Pody was “very
disconnected from the life experiences in [her] area.” She also asserted that the new 3-1
staggered-term structure put Nashville at a disadvantage versus other populous counties by
placing three districts up for election at a point in the election cycle with lower voter
turnout. She described a county issue impacted by the change in her representation,
namely, legislative efforts that she believed targeted Nashville, as “an overreach from the
State into Nashville to even decide how we can govern ourselves.” As an example, she
cited “an effort to . . . take away [her] representative at the local level” by changing the
number of metropolitan council districts in Nashville from 40 to 20. She believed the
Nashville delegation could more effectively resist these efforts if the staggered-term
structure of the delegation remained evenly split as constitutionally mandated.26

This proof in the record on Ms. Hunt’s representational injury echoes Mr. Wygant’s
testimony on his representational injury. They both describe how the redistricting
detrimentally affected the representation of their individual interests and the interests of
their home counties.

In short, even under the majority’s framework, Ms. Hunt demonstrates
particularized injury for purposes of standing. She has sustained injury in the form of a 3-
1 staggered-term representative structure for District 17 and Davidson County that is both
immediate and imminent in the future. Her injury is neither conjectural nor hypothetical;
it is certain to manifest again and again, each time turnover occurs in District 17 and
Davidson County. Ms. Hunt perceived that her former senator could understand her urban
area, and the redistricted map shortened the time Ms. Hunt was represented by her former
senator. It placed her into a different senate district with a new senator whom she perceives
as not connected to the community in her county. And Ms. Hunt has been placed into a
senate district whose misnumbering renders it unconstitutional.

26
Cf. Lockert I, 631 S.W.2d at 709 (citing the legislature’s ability to pass laws with local application
or effect as an “excellent policy reason for the presence of a provision that counties must be represented in
the Senate”).

- 16 -
By any measure, Ms. Hunt has standing to assert her district-specific claim. As with
the Texas Supreme Court in Abbott, if Ms. Hunt “does not have standing to pursue” an
Article II, Section 3 claim, I “struggle to envision a plaintiff who would.” Abbott, 647
S.W.3d at 693.

I respect and share the majority’s concern that courts be faithful to separation of
powers and refrain from usurping authority that belongs to the legislative and executive
branches. Tenn. Const. art. II, §§ 1–2. It is appropriate for the Court to require plaintiffs
in public rights cases to show injury that is distinct and palpable. Wilmington Tr., 703
S.W.3d at 290 (quoting City of Memphis v. Hargett, 414 S.W.3d 88, 98 (Tenn. 2013)).

But respect for constitutional boundaries does not mean we should recoil from our
responsibilities. Where appropriate, we must not shrink from using the judicial power
accorded to the Court under our Constitution. Tenn. Const. art. VI, § 1. It is essential to
the constitutional order that each branch—and especially the judiciary—fulfill its role in
our tripartite government.

Under our standing jurisprudence in redistricting cases, it should not be easier for
the proverbial camel to go through the eye of a needle than for a voter to challenge the
constitutionality of her own voting district.27 Ms. Hunt has proper standing, and her claim
should be considered on its merits.

S/HOLLY KIRBY, JUSTICE
HOLLY KIRBY, JUSTICE

27
Matthew 19:24 (King James).

- 17 -

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11218021. Public record. Not legal advice.