# Hall

> District Court, S.D. Ohio · December 8, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11217052

## Case

- **Full name:** Jaquan L. Hall v. Washington County Jail, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** December 8, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11217052

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that an “isolated incident, without any evidence of improper motive or resulting interference with [the inmate’s] right to counsel or to access to the courts, does not give rise to a constitutional violation.”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
JAQUAN L. HALL,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action 2:23-cv-3742
v. Judge James L. Graham
Magistrate Judge Elizabeth P. Deavers
WASHINGTON COUNTY JAIL, et al.,
Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This matter is before the Undersigned for a Report and Recommendation on the parties’
cross Motions for Summary Judgment. (ECF Nos. 54, 55, 56, 57, 59, 60.) Also before the
Court is Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. (ECF Nos. 58, 61, 64.) The
Motions are fully briefed. For the following reasons, the Undersigned RECOMMENDS that
the Court DENY the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (ECF No. 58), DENY Plaintiff’s
Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 55) and GRANT, in part, Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment (ECF No. 54) as set forth below on all claims except Plaintiff’s retaliation
claim relating to his placement in administrative segregation in September 2022 for possessing
an extra bed sheet. With respect to this limited retaliation claim, it is RECOMMENDED that
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment be DENIED, in part.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, currently a prisoner at Ross Correctional Institution, asserts claims under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 arising from his time as a pretrial detainee at the Washington County Jail while
awaiting trial on murder charges for a shooting that took place in Meigs County, Ohio, on April
4, 2021. (See Declaration of Kevin Carr, ECF No. 54-1 at ⁋ 5, “Carr Decl.”) In his operative
complaint, the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff named as Defendants the Washington County Jail,
Officer Joshua Elliott, Officer T.J. Flowers, Officer Ison, and Cpt. Carr. The Court previously
summarized the allegations of the Amended Complaint as follows.
Among other things, he alleges that Officers Elliot and Flowers harassed him,
threatened him, put him in danger, violated his attorney-client privilege, opened his
legal mail, refused to send out his mail to the news media, and violated his right to
the equal protection of the law. (ECF No. 5, PageID 53.) Factually, Plaintiff alleges
that Elliot kept him in a cold classroom until 4:00 a.m. the night before Plaintiff
had to go to court, made fun of him, his (unexplained) disorder, and his family, told
other inmates details about his criminal charges, and told Plaintiff that Elliot was
going to make sure Plaintiff spent the rest of his life in prison. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges
Elliot committed perjury and lied on the stand. (Id.)

Flowers was allegedly with Elliot the night in the classroom, and the incident
allegedly occurred because of him. (Id.) Plaintiff says that Flowers also used
racial slurs, wanted to fight Plaintiff in a bathroom, told other inmates about his
criminal case, said he had a target on his back after Plaintiff filed a grievance
against him, and put him in “the hole” for minor rule infractions for which other
inmates would not get similarly punished. (Id.)

Plaintiff appears to allege that Officer Ison was involved in an incident where
Plaintiff discovered “blue ink” inside his food after he complained about Flowers.
(ECF No. 5, PageID 55.) He also alleges that Ison repeated or was present for
Flower’s statement that he had a target on his back, told him to stay off the radar,
and admitted that Plaintiff was being closely watched. (Id.)

Plaintiff alleges that he reported Flowers to Captain Carr, who told Plaintiff that
Flowers was the reason he was being “targeted.” (Id.) Plaintiff also alleges that Carr
accused Plaintiff of trying to start a riot, and that Carr neglected his duties to ensure
that his staff members were following the rules and policies. (Id.)

Finally, Plaintiff alleges that this “lawsuit is against Washington County Jail.” (Id.,
PageID 52.) He says that the Jail:

Allowed these claims to happen without disciplinary action to their
staff. Ignored my grievances, did not file every one of my
complaints/grievances, and allowed violations of their policies to go
unpunished. I’ve complain[ed] to administration about my Federal
and Constitutional Rights being violated. Grievance officers failed
to investigate and/or solve these issues.

(Id., PageID 56.)

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As relief, Plaintiff seeks $1 million in damages from all Defendants, as well as a
$5,000 donation to a designated college fund, and several types of non-financial
orders.

(Order and Report and Recommendation, ECF No. 10 at 2-3.)
By Order and Report and Recommendation dated January 19, 2024, the Undersigned,
inter alia, recommended dismissal of all of Plaintiff’s claims against the Washington County
Jail. (ECF No. 10.) Further, the Undersigned recommended that Plaintiff be permitted to
proceed further on the following claims:
1. The legal mail/attorney-client privilege claim(s) against Elliot and
Flowers (First Amendment and/or Sixth Amendment);

2. The “classroom” claim against Elliot and Flowers (First Amendment
and/or Fourteenth Amendment);

3. The retaliation claim(s) against Elliot, Flowers, Ison, and Carr
concerning their alleged response to Plaintiff’s grievances (First
Amendment);

4. The related equal protection claim against Elliot and Flowers
(Fourteenth Amendment);

5. The claim about blue ink in Plaintiff’s food against Ison (presumably,
the Fourteenth Amendment); and

6. The supervisory liability claim against Carr concerning Flowers’
actions.

The Order and Report and Recommendation was adopted in full by the Court on July 10, 2024.
(ECF No. 20.)
II. MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
A. Legal Standard
A motion for judgment on the pleadings made under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(c) is analyzed in the same manner as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). See Tucker v.
Middleburg-Legacy Place, 539 F.3d 545, 549 (6th Cir. 2008). To overcome such a motion, “a
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complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)). The complaint need not contain detailed factual

allegations, but it must include more than labels, conclusions, and formulaic recitations of the
elements of a cause of action. Directv, Inc. v. Treesh, 487 F.3d 471, 476 (6th Cir. 2007).
“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
A motion for judgment on the pleadings should be granted when there is no material
issue of fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Tucker, 539 F.3d at
549. These standards apply equally when the plaintiff is pro se. Although a pro se litigant is
entitled to a liberal construction of his pleadings and filings, he still must do more than assert
bare legal conclusions, and the “complaint must contain either direct or inferential allegations

respecting all the material elements to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory.”
Mezibov v. Allen, 411 F.3d 712, 716 (6th Cir. 2005).
B. Analysis
Defendants move for judgment on the pleadings contending that Plaintiff failed to perfect
service on any of them. In response, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants had to have been notified
of this action and that a copy of the amended complaint was sent to their counsel. Further, he
argues that this issue could have been raised earlier and wonders why time, including his and the
Court’s, has been wasted.

4
In the absence of “proper service of process, consent, waiver, or forfeiture, a court may
not exercise personal jurisdiction over a named defendant.” King v. Taylor, 694 F.3d 650, 655
(6th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). And without personal jurisdiction, a federal court is
“powerless to proceed to an adjudication.” Id. (quoting Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526
U.S. 574, 584 (1999)).

Here, it appears undisputed that Defendants were not properly served. And, contrary to
Plaintiff’s understanding, “it is well established that mere knowledge of a lawsuit is not a
substitute for proper service under Rule 4.” Farley v. Potter, No. 3:22-CV-127-TAV-DCP, 2024
WL 3739668, at *9 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 26, 2024) (citing LSJ Inv. Co. v. O.L.D., Inc., 167 F.3d 320,
322 (6th Cir. 1999); Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Rhyme Syndicate Music, 376 F.3d 615, 623 (6th
Cir. 2004)).
Nevertheless, a defendant's appearances, filings, and actions in the district court may
constitute “legal submission to the jurisdiction of [that] court.” Boulger v. Woods, 917 F.3d 471,
477 (6th Cir. 2019) (citations and quotation omitted). Not all conduct, however, “serves as

constructive consent to personal jurisdiction.” Id. Instead, courts must consider whether a
defendant's conduct “has given the plaintiff ‘a reasonable expectation’ that the defendant will
defend the suit on the merits or whether the defendant has caused the court to ‘go to some effort
that would be wasted if personal jurisdiction is later found lacking.’” Id. (quoting King, 694 F.3d
at 659 (internal quotation omitted).
Under the circumstances of this case, the Undersigned finds that Defendants have
forfeited their insufficiency of service of process defense by their “extensive conduct in [this]
litigation.” King, 694 F.3d at 658. Defendants’ active participation in the litigation has included
issuing discovery requests, deposing plaintiff, filing a 26-page summary judgment motion, and,

5
at least with respect to Defendant Carr, submitting an affidavit in support of that motion –
actions all taken prior to the filing of their motion for judgment on the pleadings. Such conduct
can only be construed as creating for Plaintiff the reasonable expectation of their intention to
defend his suit on the merits.1 See, e.g., Gray v. City of Chattanooga, No. 1:19-CV-217, 2022
WL 20637198, at *4 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 9, 2022) (finding defendant’s “active and extensive

participation,” including, inter alia, participating in some discovery, moving for summary
judgment, and submitting an affidavit in support, gave Plaintiffs a reasonable expectation that
defendant intended to defend the suit on the merits thereby forfeiting the service defense). For
these reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
be DENIED. Following this recommendation, the Undersigned proceeds to consider the parties’
cross motions for summary judgment.
III. CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment
if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” The burden of proving that no genuine issue of material

fact exists falls on the moving party, “and the court must draw all reasonable inferences in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Stransberry v. Air Wisconsin Airlines Corp., 651
F.3d 482, 486 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing Vaughn v. Lawrenceburg Power Sys., 269 F.3d 703, 710
(6th Cir. 2001)); cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2) (providing that if a party “fails to properly address

1 While the focus of Defendants’ summary judgment motion is a qualified immunity defense,
“the first prong of the qualified immunity analysis necessarily merges with the Court’s decision
on the merits of [a] [p]laintiff’s claims.” Hysell v. Thorp, No. 2:06-CV-170, 2009 WL 262426,
at *14 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 2, 2009).

6
another party’s assertion of fact” then the Court may “consider the fact undisputed for purposes
of the motion”).
“Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmovant must ‘designate specific
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Kimble v. Wasylyshyn, 439 F. App’x 492,
495 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317-324 (1986)); see also Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(c) (requiring a party maintaining that a fact is genuinely disputed to “cit[e] to
particular parts of materials in the record”). “The nonmovant must, however ‘do more than
simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,’ ... there must be
evidence upon which a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the non-moving party to
create a ‘genuine’ dispute.” Lee v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cty., 432 F. App’x
435, 441 (6th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted).
In considering the factual allegations and evidence presented in a motion for summary
judgment, the Court “must afford all reasonable inferences, and construe the evidence in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Cox v. Kentucky Dep’t of Transp., 53 F.3d 146, 150

(6th Cir. 1995). “When a motion for summary judgment is properly made and supported and the
nonmoving party fails to respond with a showing sufficient to establish an essential element of
its case, summary judgment is appropriate.” Stransberry, 651 F.3d at 486 (citing Celotex, 477
U.S. at 322–23).
Here, the parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Each party, as a
movant for summary judgment, bears the burden of establishing that no genuine issue of material
fact exists and that it is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. The fact that one party fails to
satisfy that burden on its own Rule 56 motion does not automatically indicate that the opposing
party or parties has satisfied the burden and should be granted summary judgment on the other

7
motion. In reviewing cross-motions for summary judgment, courts should “evaluate each motion
on its own merits and view all facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party.” Wiley v. United States, 20 F.3d 222, 224 (6th Cir.1994).
“The filing of cross-motions for summary judgment does not necessarily mean that the
parties consent to resolution of the case on the existing record or that the district court is free to

treat the case as if it was submitted for final resolution on a stipulated record.” Taft Broad. Co. v.
United States, 929 F.2d 240, 248 (6th Cir.1991) (quoting John v. State of La. (Bd. of Trs. for
State Colls. & Univs.), 757 F.2d 698, 705 (5th Cir.1985)). The standard of review for cross-
motions for summary judgment does not differ from the standard applied when a motion is filed
by one party to the litigation. Taft Broad., 929 F.2d at 248.
IV. ANALYSIS
Defendants move for summary judgment, primarily claiming that they are entitled to
qualified immunity on all of Plaintiff’s claims.2 Qualified immunity shields government officials
performing discretionary functions “from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does
not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person

would have known.” Tlapanco v. Elges, 969 F.3d 638, 647 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). After a defendant “initially raises qualified immunity, the
plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity.”
Id. (citing Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 472 (6th Cir. 2013)). “There are two components to
the qualified immunity analysis.” Robinson v. City of Knoxville, Tennessee, No. 24-5159, 2025

2 Defendants also assert, without evidentiary support, that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies for many of his substantive claims as required under the PLRA. The
Court will not consider such a defense raised in this way. Defendants further contend that, to the
extent Plaintiff has asserted any state law claims, they are entitled to statutory immunity. The
Court does not construe Plaintiff’s allegations as asserting a claim under Ohio law.
8
WL 621451, at *3 (6th Cir. Feb. 26, 2025). “Qualified immunity shields federal and state
officials from money damages unless a plaintiff pleads facts showing (1) that the official violated
a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the
challenged conduct.” Id. (citations and quotation omitted). The Court “has discretion to decide
which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis to address first.” Id. (citing Ouza v.

City of Dearborn Heights, 969 F.3d 265, 275 (6th Cir. 2020)). “[I]f the facts alleged and
evidence produced, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, would permit a reasonable
juror to find that the officer violated a clearly established constitutional right, dismissal by
summary judgment is inappropriate.” Tlapanco at 648.
A. LEGAL MAIL CLAIM (ELLIOT AND FLOWERS)
In his unverified Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges in exceptionally conclusory fashion
that Defendant Elliot “open my legal mail, not sending out my mail to the news media.” (ECF
No. 5 at 5, PAGEID #: 53.) As for Defendant Flowers, Plaintiff alleges that he “opened my legal
mail.” (Id.) For purposes of the initial screen, the Undersigned construed Plaintiff’s limited

allegations as potentially asserting a claim arising under the First Amendment and/or Sixth
Amendment. In the Report and Recommendation, the Court noted that the claim or claims “may
relate to Plaintiff’s assertion that Defendants refused to send out his mail to the news media, or
they may relate to a claim that these officers read his incoming mail from his criminal defense
attorney, which is how they knew the details about his case.” (ECF No. 10 at n.1, PAGEID #:
99.) For this reason, the Court permitted further development.
Additional background relating to these claims is set forth in the parties’ competing
Motions, various exhibits, and deposition testimony. From those filings, the Court, at best, has
gleaned the following.

9
Two different sets of circumstances relating to Plaintiff’s alleged “legal mail” appear to
be at issue here. The first set of circumstances, which Plaintiff describes in his summary
judgment motion as involving “a letter to a friend that was addressed as legal mail” in May 2022
was the subject of a full evidentiary hearing in the Common Pleas Court of Meigs County on
September 22, 2022. (ECF No. 55 at 8-9, PAGEID #: 897-898.) Apparently, according to the

transcript from that proceeding submitted by Defendants in support of their summary judgment
motion, a detective investigating the murder of Kane Roush contacted the Washington County
Jail with concerns regarding Plaintiff’s outgoing mail. (Direct Testimony of Agent Jonathan
Jenkins, ECF No. 54-3 at 73-79; PAGEID ##: 829-835.) Following that outreach, Defendant
Elliot opened, inspected, and scanned the contents of Plaintiff’s outgoing mail to the detective.
(Direct Testimony of Defendant Joshua Elliot, ECF No. 54-3 at 91-102; PAGEID ##: 847-858.)
At Plaintiff’s criminal trial, the State attempted to use contents of an envelope Plaintiff had
marked as “legal mail.” (Deposition of Jacquan Hall., Volume II, ECF No. 53 at 12-13;
PAGEID ##: 507- 508 “Hall Depo.”; Deposition Exhibit T PAGEID ##: 610-612.) In response,

Plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss, and the evidentiary hearing was held. (Hall Depo., Volume II,
Deposition Exhibit T, ECF No. 53 at 115-117; PAGEID ##: 610-612.) The trial judge denied the
motion, concluding that nothing in the correspondence was directed to or from counsel or
privileged. (ECF No. 54-3 at 130; PAGEID #: 886.)
The second set of circumstances appears to relate to piece of mail that was the subject of
a grievance filed by Plaintiff several months later in November 2022, after his conviction. (Hall
Depo. Vol I, Exhibits L and M, ECF No. 52 at 183-186; PAGEID ##: 481-484; ECF No. 55-1 at
1-4, PAGEID #: 920-923.) Plaintiff testified at his deposition that the mail at issue was a “letter
… going to WTAP news station.” (Id. at 115; PAGEID #: 413.) Plaintiff explained that he had

10
addressed the letter to the WTAP news station and had marked it as legal mail. (Id.) Plaintiff
further confirmed that no part of his legal team worked at the WTAP news station. (Id.)
According to Plaintiff, the letter mentioned evidence at Plaintiff’s trial, Joshua Elliott, what was
going on inside the prison, and that Plaintiff “was going to the hole.” (Id. at 115-116; PAGEID
##: 413-414.) Additionally, Plaintiff testified, “Flowers’ name was in there,” it “mentioned

about [Plaintiff’s] legal mail, and “evidence that was missing from trial proving [Plaintiff’s]
innocence.” (Id. at 116; PAGEID #: 414.) Plaintiff stated that he hoped that, upon receipt of the
letter, WTAP news would “cover [his] story and look into the jail” “or to [his] case.” (Id.)
Plaintiff further testified that he had “marked it as legal mail when it’s not legal mail.” (Id. at
117, PAGEID #: 415.) Plaintiff confirmed that he did not re-send the letter to his attorney,
judge, or probation. (Id. at 118, PAGEID #: 416.)
To be sure, prisoners have a First Amendment right to send and receive mail. Sallier v.
Brooks, 343 F.3d 868, 873 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Knop v. Johnson, 977 F.2d 996, 1012 (6th Cir.
1992)). That right, however, may be subject to restrictions reasonably related to security or

other legitimate penological objectives. Id. “And it is well settled that prison officials do not
violate a prisoner's First Amendment rights by reading his outgoing non-legal mail.” King v.
Anderson Cnty. Det. Facility, No. 3:25-CV-66-KAC-JEM, 2025 WL 3124844, at *4 (E.D. Tenn.
Nov. 7, 2025) (citations omitted). Further, even if the outgoing mail at issue is legal mail,
prison officials can open “legal mail” and inspect it for contraband. Id. (citation omitted).
In Sallier, the Sixth Circuit considered several “potential sources of protection for legal
mail, including the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the First Amendment rights to petition for
redress of grievances and to access to the courts, and the prisoner's general interest in protecting
the attorney-client privilege.” Rodriguez-Arango v. Pancheri, No. 2:23-CV-34, 2023 WL

11
2552366, at *4 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 17, 2023). Not all outgoing mail, however, constitutes “legal
mail,” and “the question of what constitutes ‘legal mail’ is a question of law.” Sallier, 343 F.3d
at 871. As applicable here, the Ohio Administrative Code defines outgoing “legal mail” as
“mail addressed to an attorney-at-law, a public service law office, a law school legal clinic, a
court of law, or the correctional institution inspection committee.” O.A.C. Rule 5120-9-18(C)

(May 23, 2014). (ECF No. 54-2 at 1; PAGEID #: 753.)
Under the scenario outlined above, Plaintiff has failed to show a violation of either the
First or Sixth Amendments arising from the alleged interference with his mail. Fundamentally,
by Plaintiff’s own admission, neither piece of mail was actually “legal mail.” As he explained,
he had simply marked it as such. Moreover, with respect to the May 2022 letter to a friend, the
circumstances surrounding that mailing were the subject of a trial court ruling in the context of
Plaintiff’s criminal proceedings. This Court is barred from reviewing that decision under the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See, e.g., Williams v. Priv. Mortg. Invs. LLC, No. 25-CV-12347,
2025 WL 2313198, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 11, 2025) (citing Pieper v. Am. Arbitration Ass'n,

Inc., 336 F.3d 458, 460 (6th Cir. 2003) (when granting relief on a federal claim would imply that
the state-court decision was incorrect, federal courts do not have jurisdiction).
Moreover, Plaintiff’s mail claims arise from two alleged instances occurring several
months apart. “[I]solated instances of interference with prisoners' mail” generally do not rise to
the level of a constitutional violation under the First Amendment. See Johnson v. Wilkinson,
229 F.3d 1152 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing Gardner v. Howard, 109 F.3d 427, 431 (8th Cir. 1997)
(holding that an “isolated incident, without any evidence of improper motive or resulting
interference with [the inmate’s] right to counsel or to access to the courts, does not give rise to a
constitutional violation.”)); Colvin v. Caruso, 605 F.3d 282, 293 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Johnson

12
for the holding that “isolated incidents” of interference with prisoners' rights do not rise to the
level of a First Amendment violation).
At most, construing all facts in Plaintiff’s favor, he has alleged an inability to send non-
legal mail to WTAP on one occasion. According to his evidentiary submissions, he grieved this
incident and was informed that the “next time [he mailed] something to WTAP,” he should

“leave the mail unsealed and [should not] put ‘legal mail’ on it, and it will be sent out.” (ECF
No. 55-1 at 2; PAGEID #: 921.) Plaintiff’s allegations concerning this isolated incident are not
sufficient to state a First Amendment claim. Moreover, Plaintiff’s allegations regarding this
incident appear limited to Defendant Elliot, providing another basis for dismissal of any claim
involving Plaintiff’s non-legal mail intended for WTAP as it relates to Defendant Flowers. Abu-
Joudeh v. Schneider, 954 F.3d 842, 850 (6th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted) (“To prevail in a claim
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show that the defendant was personally involved in the
alleged constitutional violations.”).
Finally, to the extent that Plaintiff may be contending that Defendants violated

institutional policy regarding the handling of his mail, any such claim also fails. The violation of
institutional policies or procedures fails to give rise to a constitutional claim. Rush v. Burton,
No. 4:23-CV-67-DCLC-CHS, 2024 WL 54599, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. Jan. 4, 2024) (citing Stanley v.
Vining, 602 F. 3d 767, 769 (6th Cir. 2010) (“[i]t has long been established that violation of a
state statute or regulation is insufficient alone to make a claim cognizable under § 1983”)).
Because Defendants did not violate any constitutional right, the Court need not address
whether that right was clearly established. Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that summary
judgment be GRANTED in favor of Defendants Elliot and Flowers relating to Plaintiff’s legal
mail claims.

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B. “CLASSROOM CLAIM” (ELLIOT AND FLOWERS)

In his unverified Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Elliot “sat
[Plaintiff] in a cold classroom until 4 AM the night before [he] had court.” (ECF No. 5 at 5,
PAGEID #: 53.) With respect to Defendant Flowers, Plaintiff alleges that “[Flowers] was with
Elliott that night before court, threatening to harm me.” (Id.) For purposes of screening, the
Court construed this claim as arising under the “First Amendment and/or Fourteenth
Amendment.” (ECF No. 10 at n.2; PAGEID #: 99-100.) The Court noted that it was “unclear
whether Plaintiff presents this claim as a First Amendment access-to-courts type claim, or a
Fourteenth Amendment unconstitutional-punishment type claim” but that further development
was appropriate. (Id.)
In moving for summary judgment, Defendants provide additional background relating to
this claim, relying largely on Plaintiff’s deposition testimony. Apparently, this claim arises from
Plaintiff having been escorted to a classroom by Defendants Flowers and Elliot after a verbal
altercation between Plaintiff and Defendant Flowers. (Hall Depo. Vol. 1, ECF No. 52 at 27-44;

55-63; PAGEID #: 325-342; 353-361.) This incident, involving Plaintiff yelling and arguing
with Defendant Flowers after lights out, occurred on October 18, 2021. After the incident,
Defendants Flowers and Elliot took Plaintiff to a classroom to cool off. (Id.) In his deposition
testimony, Plaintiff was unclear about how long he remained in the classroom, but he stated that
he “had court at 8 AM” the next day, October 19, 2021. (Id.) Plaintiff attended the scheduled
hearing which involved his completion of a financial disclosure form and the substitution of his
counsel. (Id.) Plaintiff’s criminal trial did not occur until September 2022. (Id.) Plaintiff does
not dispute these facts as presented. Nor does he provide any evidence sufficient to raise a
genuine issue of material fact regarding any First or Fourteenth claim.

14
For example, with respect to any First Amendment claim, prisoners, of course, have a
well-established constitutional right of access to the courts, see Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343,
350 (1996), which “extends to direct appeals, habeas corpus applications, and civil rights claims
only.” Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 391 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc). Such a claim,
however, requires Plaintiff to demonstrate four elements: (1) a non-frivolous underlying claim;

(2) obstructive actions by state actors; (3) substantial prejudice to the underlying claim that
cannot be remedied by the court; and (4) a request for relief which is now otherwise unattainable.
Jackson v. City of Cleveland, 64 F.4th 736, 746 (6th Cir. 2023). Plaintiff fails to address any of
the required elements of a First Amendment access to the courts claim. At best, viewing
Plaintiff’s “classroom claim” as such a claim, it relates to his criminal proceeding, a proceeding
in which he was represented by counsel. A Plaintiff represented by counsel in a pending
criminal case “cannot state a claim for a violation of his right to access the courts with respect to
those proceedings.” Talley v. Dickson Cnty. Jail, No. 3:23-CV-00983, 2023 WL 7115566, at *2
(M.D. Tenn. Oct. 27, 2023).

Any Fourteenth Amendment claim arising from this classroom incident also fails.
“[P]retrial detainees are protected under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Blue v. Bailey, No. 1:24-CV-511, 2024 WL 3825248, at *4 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 15, 2024). The
Fourteenth Amendment is implicated because pretrial detainees “may not be punished prior to an
adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535
(1979). Accordingly, when a pretrial detainee raises a conditions of confinement claim, the
“proper inquiry” is “whether those conditions amount to punishment.” Id.; see also Griffith v.
Franklin Cnty., Ky., 975 F.3d 554, 569 (6th Cir. 2020). A “particular condition or restriction of

15
pretrial detention” does not amount to “punishment” when it is “reasonably related to a
legitimate governmental objective[.]” Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 539.
Here, Plaintiff does not contest that he was placed in the classroom following a verbal
altercation with Defendant Flowers. Plaintiff also does not challenge the idea that such action
bears a reasonable relationship to the legitimate objective of ensuring safety and security.

Further, construing all available facts in Plaintiff’s favor, his own testimony confirms that he
remained in that classroom for not more than a few hours. Such a brief segregation is not so
excessive as to constitute a punishment. See, e.g., Elliot v. Conner, No. 3:23-CV-01008, 2023
WL 7545036, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 13, 2023) (45-day placement in segregation was not
excessive following plaintiff’s involvement in a fight). Similarly, Plaintiff’s suggestions of
verbal abuse or harassment, in connection with this claim or otherwise, do not support any
Fourteenth Amendment claim. “As a matter of law, a prison official defendant's verbal abuse
and harassment towards a confined plaintiff do not constitute cruel and unusual punishment
under the Eighth Amendment—applicable to convicted inmates—nor under the Fourteenth

Amendment—applicable to pretrial detainees.” Green v. Eddy, No. 1:24-CV-12086, 2025 WL
845176, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 18, 2025) (citing Johnson v. Unknown Dellatifa, 357 F.3d 539,
546 (6th Cir. 2004) (additional citations omitted).
Because Defendants did not violate Plaintiff’s right of access to the courts or his
Fourteenth Amendment rights in connection with Plaintiff’s placement in a classroom, the Court
need not address whether such rights were clearly established. Accordingly, it is
RECOMMENDED that summary judgment be GRANTED in favor of Defendants Elliot and
Flowers relating to these circumstances.

16
C. RETALIATION CLAIM (ALL DEFENDANTS)

As confirmed above, Plaintiff’s allegations of retaliation in his unverified Amended
Complaint are quite scant. At best, Plaintiff makes unspecific suggestions that Defendant Elliot
discussed Plaintiff’s personal information with other inmates after Plaintiff filed grievances
against Defendant Elliot, that Defendant Flowers “targeted” Plaintiff after Plaintiff “wrote him
up,” that Defendant Ison informed Plaintiff when taking him to “the hole” that “this is what
happens when you put a target on your back” and that when Plaintiff reported Defendant
Flowers, presumably to Defendant Carr, Defendant Carr, again presumably, told Plaintiff that
Defendant Flowers was the reason Plaintiff “was being targeted.”3
Plaintiff’s deposition testimony sheds some additional light. For example, in the context
of being questioned about his allegations against Elliot, Plaintiff testified that being put in the
hole for having an extra bedsheet was the “main [infraction] that [he] was really pissed off
about.” (Hall Depo., Vol. 1, ECF No. 52 at 88-89; PAGEID ##: 386-387.) Plaintiff further
testified that Defendant Elliot “had a vendetta against [him] after [Plaintiff] ran these numerous

of grievances against him.” (Id. at 387.) Plaintiff also described Defendant Elliot using
“harassing language and … name calling.” (Id. at 388-389.) Additionally, when asked about his
post-conviction petition, Plaintiff testified regarding the affidavit he submitted in support, dated
February 2, 2024, in which he stated that “[he] was targeted and lost privileges after [he] had
written grievances about officers abusing their power and using racial slurs” and specifically
cites being “placed in the hole for having an extra bed sheet after being shook down.” (Id. at 94-
95; PAGEID ##: 589-590.)

3 At his deposition, however, Plaintiff testified that Defendant Carr did not tell him this. (Hall
Depo. Vol. I, ECF No. 52 at 93-94; PAGEID ##: 391-392.)
17
In his Motion for Summary Judgment, for the first time, Plaintiff provides additional
unsworn allegations which appear primarily directed to Defendant Flowers. For example,
Plaintiff alleges, with respect to Defendant Flowers, that he “told me I had a target on my back
after I wrote him up. Put me in the hold for minor rule infractions ….” (EF No. 5 at 5; PAGEID
#: 53.) Further, Plaintiff states that Defendant Flowers “harass[ed] him … because [Plaintiff]

wrote him up weeks prior.” (ECF No. 55 at 14; PAGEID #: 903.) Plaintiff also states that he
was the only person sent to the hole after a shakedown of his dorm in which Defendant Flowers
was involved. (Id. at 17; PAGEID #: 906.) Additionally, Plaintiff states that Defendant Flowers
took his prayer rugs after he reported Defendant Flowers’s use of a racial slur. (Id. at 16-17;
PAGEID #: 905-906.) For their part, Defendants contend that any grievances Plaintiff filed had
no bearing on any discipline he received for violating rules of the Washington County Jail. In
support, they cite to a litany of rules violations committed by Plaintiff, including possession of a
weapon and assault on another inmate.
With respect to the new allegations raised for the first time in Plaintiff’s Motion for

Summary Judgment, the Court will not consider them. The fact that a plaintiff is pro se does not
lessen his obligations under Rule 56. “The liberal treatment of pro se pleadings does not require
the lenient treatment of substantive law, and the liberal standards that apply at the pleading stage
do not apply after a case has progressed to the summary judgment stage.” Johnson v. Stewart,
No. 08-1521, 2010 WL 8738105 at *3 (6th Cir. May 5, 2010) (citations omitted). The Sixth
Circuit has made clear that, when opposing summary judgment, a party cannot rely on
allegations or denials in unsworn filings and that a party's “status as a pro se litigant does not
alter [this] duty on a summary judgment motion.” Viergutz v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 375 F. App'x
482, 485 (6th Cir. 2010); see also United States v. Brown, 7 F. App'x 353, 354 (6th Cir. 2001)

18
(affirming grant of summary judgment against a pro se plaintiff because he “failed to present any
evidence to defeat the government's motion”). Accordingly, the Court will not consider any
distinct claim of retaliation arising directly from the confiscation of Plaintiff’s prayer rugs.4
The same holds for Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendant Flowers was gratuitously
harassing him. Plaintiff appears to rely on two Call Slip requests and one Field Interview Report

to support his allegations. (ECF No. 55-4, PAGEID #: 960-964.) At best, these documents
demonstrate that, on August 21, 2021, Plaintiff reported that “certain Cos have been discussing
and giving out information about [his] case.” (Exhibit P-E; ECF No. 55-4 at 1; PAGEID #: 960.)
On November 2, 2021, Plaintiff filed another grievance request regarding Elliot and Flowers and
their alleged verbal harassment of him. (Exhibit P-F; ECF No. 55-4 at 1; PAGEID #: 962.) In
between these filings, on October 18, 2021, Officer Flowers filed a Field Interview Report
explaining the circumstances leading to what has been deemed Plaintiff’s “classroom claim.”
(Exhibit P-G, ECF No. 55-4 at 5; PAGEID #: 964.) These allegations, involving incidents in
2021, appear unrelated to the bedsheet infraction allegations. Moreover, even if the Court were

to consider these allegations, Plaintiff has failed to make any specific connection between the
filing of these grievances and an adverse action. Finally, “[v]erbal harassment or idle threats by
a state actor do not create a constitutional violation and are insufficient to support a section 1983
claim for relief.” Wingo v. Tenn. Dep't of Corr., 499 F. App'x 453, 455 (6th. Cir. 2012).

4 With respect to the issue regarding his prayer rugs, Plaintiff cited to another grievance dated
September 7, 2022. (Exhibit P-S, ECF No. 55-7 at 17-18; PAGEID ##: 1011-1012.) In that
document, Plaintiff asserted that his prayer rugs were taken by Defendant Flowers after Plaintiff
reported Defendant Flowers’s racial slur to the captain. (Id.) The Jail Staff response reveals that
Plaintiff was advised that he could only have one prayer rug, it could only be used for religious
services, and when not in use it was to be kept folded and off the floor. (Id.)

19
This leaves only Plaintiff’s allegation of being placed in the hole following a shakedown
after he was found to have had an extra bed sheet, the issue about which Plaintiff testified at his
deposition. To the best of the Court’s understanding, Plaintiff filed a grievance on September 4,
2022, complaining of a C/O telling him a racist joke and using a racist slur, prompting a
conversation with Defendant Carr. (Exhibit P-N, ECF No. 55-6 at 14; PAGEID #: 994.) On

September 7, 2022, Plaintiff filed the grievance against Defendant Flowers relating to his prayer
rugs. (Exhibit P-S, ECF No. 55-7 at 18; PAGEID #: 1011.) Shortly after Plaintiff filed these
grievances, a shakedown occurred in Plaintiff’s dorm. On September 10, 2022, Plaintiff filed a
grievance questioning the bedsheet violation, suggesting that the shakedown occurred sometime
between September 7 and September 10, 2022. (Hall Depo. Vol. I, Exhibit N, ECF No. 52 at
187; PAGEID #: 485.) In that grievance, Plaintiff states that Defendant Flowers found extra
bedding on “multiple people’s rack[s] and they did not get punished for the same actions.” (Id.)
Plaintiff also cites to another grievance he claims to have filed on September 10, 2022. (Exhibit
P-T, ECF No. 55-8 at 1-8; PAGEID ##: 1013- 1014.) According to that document, Plaintiff

admits to having had an extra bed sheet and blanket and acknowledges the necessity that he be
placed in lockdown and take responsibility for his actions. (Id.) The document does not refer to
Defendant Flowers’ or Defendant Elliot’s involvement in the alleged incident.
Defendants provide the following additional background information. On September 4,
2022, Plaintiff filed a written grievance related to certain officer’s conduct. (Hall Depo., Vol. I,
ECF No. 52, Exhibit J; PAGEID #: 476.) In that grievance, Plaintiff alleged that an officer made
a racist joke using a racial slur. (Id.) On September 6, 2022, Plaintiff filed another written
grievance related to officers’ conduct. (Id. at Exhibit K, PAGEID #: 477.). In that grievance,
Plaintiff alleged that he and other inmates wanted to speak “with Major Rhodes and Captain Carr

20
… about the behavior of certain C/Os and the incident that occurred of the last week.” (Id.)
Defendant Carr met with Plaintiff to address his concerns and instructed his command staff to
investigate and take corrective action. (Carr Decl., ECF No. 54-1 at ⁋ 15.) Although the
investigation did not determine whether racial comments were made, all officers were required to
complete training on the jail’s communication policies. (Id. at ⁋⁋ 20, 21.)

To be sure, a prisoner's claim that prison officials have retaliated against him for
engaging in protected conduct is grounded in the First Amendment. Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175
F.3d 378, 388 (6th Cir. 1999). To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under § 1983, a
plaintiff must prove that: (1) he engaged in protected conduct; (2) an adverse action was taken
against him that would deter a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that
conduct; and (3) the defendant's conduct was substantially motivated at least in part by
retaliation for the plaintiff's protected speech and conduct. Id. at 394-99. Further, if Plaintiff
meets his burden, the burden of production shifts to the defendant, and if the defendant “can
show that he would have taken the same action in the absence of the protected activity, he is

entitled to prevail on summary judgment.” Thaddeus-X 175 F.3d at 399.
With respect to the first element, filing a non-frivolous grievance against a prison official
is conduct protected by the First Amendment. Maben v. Thelen, 887 F.3d 252, 265 (6th Cir.
2018); Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 472 (6th Cir. 2010). Here, there is no dispute that Plaintiff
filed a grievance regarding a C/O’s racist joke and use of a racial slur. Defendant Carr
confirmed this in his Declaration. (Carr Decl. ECF No. 54-1 at ⁋ 12; PAGEID #: 736.) The
filing of this grievance prompted Defendant Carr to meet with Plaintiff and Defendant Carr
agreed to “mandate appropriate cultural, racial, and/or ethnic diversity and relations training to
the staff.” (Id. at ⁋ 16; PAGEID #: 737.) This is sufficient evidence from which a jury could

21
conclude that this particular grievance was non-frivolous. Further, there is indication in the
record to support Plaintiff’s explanation in his Motion for Summary Judgment that Defendant
Flowers was the focus of that grievance. (Id., Exhibit F, at PAGEID #: 742; Hall Depo., Vol. I,
ECF No. 52 at 16; PAGEID #: 314.)
As for the second element, being taken to administrative segregation or comparable

transfer action, with its corresponding loss of privileges may be a sufficiently adverse action to
support a retaliation claim. Kennedy v. Curtis, No. 2:19-CV-13210, 2023 WL 2974953, at *8
(E.D. Mich. Jan. 24, 2023), report and recommendation adopted, No. 19-13210, 2023 WL
2368017 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 6, 2023). Here, Plaintiff testified at his deposition that he received
thirteen days in the hole for the bedsheet infraction. (Hall Depo. Vol. I, ECF No. 52 at 89;
PAGEID #: 387.) A grievance and response attached to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary
Judgment indicates that Plaintiff received ten days for the bedsheet infraction. (ECF No. 55-8 at
2 Exhibit T; PAGEID ##: 1013-1014.) Beyond this information, there is no evidence confirming
the length of Plaintiff’s stay in the hole for this infraction or the extent of any loss of privileges

he suffered while in the hole. At the same time, however, there is nothing to allow the Court to
conclude that this action is so inconsequential, under the circumstances, as to readily defeat
Plaintiff’s retaliation claim.
The third element of a retaliation claim, causation, is a factual issue which may be
satisfied by circumstantial evidence. Richards v. Perttu, 96 F.4th 911, 919 (6th Cir.), cert.
granted, 145 S. Ct. 119 (2024), and aff'd, 605 U.S. 460 (2025). “[T]o prove causation it is not
enough to show that an official acted with a retaliatory motive and that the plaintiff was injured.”
Kennedy, at *8 (quoting Coleman v. Mohlman, No. 2:19-cv-13494, 2020 WL 5648352, at *6
(E.D. Mich. Aug. 24, 2020), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 5645715 (E.D.

22
Mich. Sept. 22, 2020)). “The retaliatory motive must be a ‘but-for’ cause to the adverse action.”
Id. In some circumstances, temporal proximity “may be ‘significant enough to constitute
indirect evidence of a causal connection so as to create an inference of retaliatory motive.’”
Branch v. Grahn, No. 1:25-CV-337, 2025 WL 2985259, at *10 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 23, 2025)
(citing Muhammad v. Close, 379 F.3d 413, 417–18 (6th Cir. 2004)). Evidence of temporal

proximity between the filing of grievances and subsequent adverse action is, by itself, generally
insufficient to establish retaliatory motive. Rutherford v. Free, No. 2:24-CV-764, 2025 WL
938506, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 28, 2025) (citing Hill, 630 F.3d 468, 476 (stating that temporal
proximity may show retaliatory motive if paired with other supporting evidence)).
Here, Plaintiff’s evidence suggests approximately four days between the filing of
grievance involving the racist joke or racial slur and his being sent to the hole for the bed sheet
infraction. Construing the record in Plaintiff’s favor, however, that is not all the evidence
bearing on the issue of causation. That is, Plaintiff also testified at his deposition that Defendant
Flowers had found other inmates in possession of extra bed sheets, but they were not sent to the

hole. (Hall Depo. Vol. I, ECF No. 52 at 94; PAGEID #: 392.) Further, in his deposition,
Plaintiff described that, when he was taken to administrative segregation, he was told by
Defendant Ison that “this is what happens when you have a target on your back.” (Hall Depo.
Vol. II, ECF No. 53 at 95; PAGEID #: 590.) Plaintiff also testified that he was told it “wasn’t
personal” and that he was told that “the administration’s making them enforce the rules on me.”
(Hall Depo Vol. II, ECF No. 53 at 95; PAGEID #: 590 and Hall Depo. Vol. I, ECF No. 52 at
122; PAGEID #: 420.) Nevertheless, as with the second element, the evidence in the record
overall is limited on this element. Moreover, the parties do not directly address the issue of
causation in their briefing. Accordingly, on this record, the Court cannot conclude that

23
Plaintiff’s filing a grievance regarding the incident involving the racist joke/racial slur, which
prompted Defendant Carr to “mandate appropriate cultural, racial and/or ethnic diversity and
relations training to the staff,” was not the but for cause of Plaintiff’s being placed in
administrative segregation for his possession of an extra bedsheet. (Carr Decl., ECF No. 54-1 at
⁋⁋ 16, 17.)

Importantly, as noted above, once a prisoner can show that a defendant’s adverse action
was at least partially motivated by the prisoner's protected conduct, the burden shifts to the
defendant to show they would have taken the same action even absent such protected conduct.
Hill, 630 F.3d at 675. Defendants also have not addressed this issue in moving for summary
judgment. To be sure, they have argued that Plaintiff violated numerous jail rules during his
time in the Washington County Jail. (ECF No. 54 at 15; PAGEID #: 723.) Further, they have
provided evidentiary support for this assertion relating to Plaintiff’s throwing another inmate’s
belongings on the floor in October 2021 (Hall Depo. Vol. II, Exhibit V, ECF No. 53 at 119;
PAGEID #: 614); violently assaulting another inmate in February 2022 (Id. Exhibit W, ECF No.

53 at 122-132; PAGEID ##: 617-627), committing a theft offense in April 2022 (Id. Exhibit X,
ECF No. 53 at 137; PAGEID #: 632), and concealing a razor in extra bedsheets in May 2022.
(Id. Exhibit Y, ECF No. 53 at 144-152; PAGEID ##: 639-647.) They have not, however,
addressed whether Plaintiff would have been sent to administrative segregation for possessing an
extra bed sheet in the absence of his September 2022 grievance which prompted a response from
Defendant Carr.
To summarize, the parties have failed to address in any serious way the second and third
elements of Plaintiff’s retaliation claim relating to Plaintiff’s being placed in “the hole”
following the shakedown of his dorm in September 2022. Further, Defendants have not

24
addressed whether Plaintiff would have been sent to administrative segregation for possessing an
extra bed sheet regardless of his September 2022 grievance and Defendant Carr’s response.
Thus, on the current record, neither party has established that no genuine issue of material fact
exists as to this specific, limited claim such that summary judgment in their favor is warranted.
For this reason, it is RECOMMENDED that both Motions for Summary Judgment be DENIED

as to Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim against arising from this specific incident.
Finally, to the extent that Plaintiff may be contending that any Defendants violated
institutional harassment policies, any such claim fails. The violation of institutional policies or
procedures fails to give rise to a constitutional claim. Rush v. Burton, No. 4:23-CV-67-DCLC-
CHS, 2024 WL 54599, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. Jan. 4, 2024) (citing Stanley v. Vining, 602 F. 3d 767,
769 (6th Cir. 2010) (“[i]t has long been established that violation of a state statute or regulation is
insufficient alone to make a claim cognizable under § 1983”)).
D. EQUAL PROTECTION CLAIM (ELLIOT AND FLOWERS)

Plaintiff’s claim in his Complaint that Defendants Elliot and Flowers violated his equal
protection rights is wholly conclusory and remains so at the summary judgment stage. At the
very most, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Flowers put him “in the hole for minor rule
infractions, but … let it go for other inmates.” (ECF No. 5 at 5; PAGEID #: 53.)
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides that no state shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. To sufficiently plead an equal protection
claim, the plaintiff “must allege facts that support his allegation that others were treated
differently than he was, and he must allege facts that would support the inference that those who
were treated differently were similarly situated in all relevant respects.” Petersmark v. Burgess,

25
No. 1:24-CV-604, 2024 WL 3648074, at *17–18 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 5, 2024) (citing Umani v.
Mich. Dep't of Corr., 432 F. App'x 453, 460 (6th Cir. 2011)). Without supporting facts of
disparate treatment, an equal protection claim fails.
In this case, Plaintiff has not set forth any specific facts supporting a finding of disparate
treatment. To the extent he claims that he was punished where others were not, he provides no

evidentiary support. At most, for purposes of an equal protection claim, he has offered only
vague allegations that other unidentified individuals were not punished for similar infractions.
Importantly, for summary judgment purposes, a bare assertion that a plaintiff “was treated one
way and everyone else another ... has never been thought to raise an equal protection claim.”
Green Genie, Inc. v. City of Detroit, Michigan, 63 F.4th 521, 529 (6th Cir. 2023). That is, at
most, all Plaintiff has offered here. Because disparate treatment is a necessary element for an
equal protection claim, Plaintiff cannot establish the violation of any constitutional right and the
Court need not address whether that right was clearly established. Accordingly, it is
RECOMMENDED that summary judgment be granted in favor of Defendants Elliot and

Flowers on Plaintiff's claim for an equal protection violation.
E. “BLUE INK” CLAIM (ISON)

Aside from any suggestion of retaliation, Plaintiff alleged the following with respect to
Defendant Ison:
After being released [from Administrative Segregation], I went back into general
population and days after I discovered blue ink inside my food. I get Muslim trays
the day they served pork, and that day I had chicken. When I cut into it I seen it
was blue and a note was underneath it. I tried to report this to an officer, but I was
ignored. The following morning Ison came back there to take me to the hole for
corresponding with other inmates. I did not go to the hole because I wrote down in
my notebook that incident that occurred. He read my incident report book and that
was the only thing that saved me. I asked him why you keep tryin to put me down.
He admitted Admin watchin me close.

26
(ECF No. 5 at 7; PAGEID #: 55.) For purposes of the initial screen, the Court characterized this
“claim about blue ink in Plaintiff’s food” as presumably arising under the Fourteenth
Amendment. (ECF No. 10 at 6; PAGEID #: 100.) Further, the Court noted that it was not clear
whether “Plaintiff is alleging that Ison put the blue ink in his food, or that Ison failed to
appropriately respond when Plaintiff complained about the blue ink in his food.” (Id. at n. 3.)

On summary judgment, Defendants contend that any such claim fails under either theory. The
Court agrees.
Citing Plaintiff’s deposition testimony, Defendants’ summary judgment motion provides
additional background relevant to this claim. As Defendants explain, when asked if he had any
idea how blue ink came to be in his chicken, Plaintiff testified:
…there was a note right under the chicken, and then, so -- the only reason why I
say ‘note," because it had writing on it. And so it had seeped into the chicken from
the bottom, and then, so there was blue ink into the chicken. And then, so I couldn't
read the -- obviously, because it's hot. You see what I'm saying? The moisture from
the chicken going to go into the paper, so it blurred it out. So I couldn't really read
what was on it.

(ECF No. 54 at PAGEID #: 726 citing Hall Depo. Vol. 1, ECF No. 52, at PAGEID #:
363.) Defendants further assert that when asked who he suspected wrote the note he
found under his chicken, Plaintiff testified that he believed it was James Warner, another
inmate who was working in the kitchen or “another officer that… worked back there in
the kitchen who knew that I was getting my trays.” (Id., at Page ID ##: 366-367.)
For his part, Plaintiff does not challenge Defendants’ recitation of this evidence. Nor
does he provide any of his own evidence sufficient to raise any genuine issue of material fact as
to whether Defendant Ison placed the note under Plaintiff’s food or caused the blue ink to be in
Plaintiff’s food. Thus, based on Plaintiff’s own testimony, Defendant Ison had no personal
involvement in the “blue ink” incident. It is well settled that “[e]ach defendant must be
27
‘personally involved’ in the unconstitutional action in order to be found liable under § 1983.
Pineda v. Hamilton Cnty., Ohio, 977 F.3d 483, 490 (6th Cir. 2020). Accordingly, it is
RECOMMENDED that summary judgment be GRANTED in favor of Defendant Ison as to
any claim under this theory.
Similarly, any claim that Defendant Ison failed to investigate Plaintiff’s claim regarding

blue ink in his food also fails. The failure to investigate a prisoner's complaint or grievance does
not state a claim for relief. Smith v. Washington, No. 2:23-CV-12903, 2024 WL 233730, at *3
(E.D. Mich. Jan. 22, 2024) (citing Carlton v. Jondreau, 76 F. App'x 642, 644 (6th Cir. 2003)).
Accordingly, because Plaintiff has not established the violation of a constitutional right based on
an alleged failure to investigate, it is RECOMMENDED that summary judgment be
GRANTED in favor of Defendant Ison as to any claim under this theory.
Beyond this, two things are of note for purposes of clarity. In his summary judgment
filings, Plaintiff suggests that the circumstances surrounding the blue ink in his food violated
certain jail policies. Even if the Court were to consider such a claim raised in this way, it would

not succeed. As explained above, the violation of institutional policies or procedures fails to
give rise to a constitutional claim. Rush, 2024 WL 54599, at *2. Additionally, the Court does
not construe Plaintiff’s allegations as attempting to assert any Fourteenth Amendment claim
arising from any punishment for the blue ink incident. Plaintiff’s own allegations confirm that
Defendant Ison accepted Plaintiff’s explanation of the incident and did not take him to “the hole”
for corresponding with other inmates. Accordingly, because Plaintiff has not established
Defendant Ison’s violation of any constitutional right, it is RECOMMENDED that summary
judgment be GRANTED in favor of Defendant Ison on Plaintiff’s “blue ink” claim in its
entirety.

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F. SUPERVISORY LIABILITY CLAIM (CARR)

Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendant Carr state, in their entirety:

Cpt. Carr - When I reported Flowers I was told he was the reason why I was being
targeted. I sat down with him and a Lt. about an issue that occurred between two
officers using excesses force. He accused me of starting a riot. He then said he
would make it real strict, and asked me if I wanted him to start coming in watching
the cameras. He wasn’t informed of every incident that occurred in the jail because
of chain of command, according to him. He neglected his duties to ensure his staff
was ethically following the rules and policies.

ECF No. 5 at 7; PAGEID #: 55.) Aside from the information relating to the limited retaliation
claim described above, Plaintiff’s summary judgment filings shed little light on Plaintiff’s
additional claims against Defendant Carr. For their part, Defendants explain that, at his
deposition, Plaintiff alleged that Defendant Carr took no action after being advised that
Defendant Flowers threatened to assault Plaintiff.
Thus Plaintiff’s allegations, construed in his favor, confirm that for all claims, besides
perhaps his retaliation claim, Plaintiff is suing Defendant Carr in his supervisory role. The
doctrine of respondeat superior, or the right to control employees, does not apply in § 1983
actions to impute liability onto supervisors. Monell v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S 658,
691 (1978). “Because § 1983 liability cannot be imposed under a theory of respondeat superior,
proof of personal involvement is required for a supervisor to incur personal liability.” Miller v.
Calhoun Cnty., 408 F.3d 803, 817 n.3 (6th Cir. 2005). There is no respondeat superior liability
where the plaintiff alleges only that the defendant merely failed to act or control employees.
Shorts v. Bartholomew, 255 F. App'x 46, 53 (6th Cir. 2007); Salehpour v. Univ. of Tenn., 159
F.3d 199, 206 (6th Cir. 1998). That appears to be what Plaintiff alleges here with respect to all
but the retaliation claim.
29
Moreover, to the extent that Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Carr failed to properly act
upon Plaintiff’s grievances, § 1983 liability may not be imposed upon Defendant Carr on this
basis. Smith v. Par., No. 1:22-CV-978, 2023 WL 2399827, at *3 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 8, 2023)
(citing Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999)) simply because a supervisor denied
an administrative grievance or failed to act based upon information contained in a grievance.).

The same is true as to any claim that Defendant Carr violated institutional policy. As stated
above, violations of institutional policy do not rise to the level of a constitutional claim. Rush,
2024 WL 54599, at *2.
“Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that summary judgment be GRANTED in favor
of Defendant Carr on all claims but Plaintiff’s limited retaliation claim as recognized herein.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Court DENY the
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (ECF No. 58), DENY Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (ECF No. 55) and GRANT, in part, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
(ECF No. 54) on all claims except Plaintiff’s limited retaliation claim relating to his placement in

administrative segregation in September 2022 for possessing an extra bed sheet. With respect to
this limited retaliation claim, it is RECOMMENDED that Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment be DENIED, in part.
PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS
If any party seeks review by the District Judge of this Report and Recommendation, that
party may, within 14 days, file and serve on all parties its objections to the Report and
Recommendation, specifically designating this Report and Recommendation, and the part in
question, as well as the basis for objection. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).

30
Response to objections must be filed within 14 days after being served with a copy. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 72(b).
The parties are specifically advised that the failure to object to the Report and
Recommendation will result in a forfeiture of the right to de novo review of by the District Judge
and forfeiture of the right to appeal the judgment of the District Court. Even when timely

objections are filed, appellate review of issues not raised in those objections is forfeited. Robert
v. Tesson, 507 F.3d 981, 994 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[A] general objection to a magistrate judge’s
report, which fails to specify the issues of contention, does not suffice to preserve an issue for
appeal . . . .” (citation omitted)).
Date: December 8, 2025 /s/ Elizabeth A. Preston Deavers
ELIZABETH A. PRESTON DEAVERS
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

31

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11217052. Public record. Not legal advice.