# THROWER

> District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · December 8, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11216923

## Case

- **Full name:** Aquilla Thrower v. Vista Auto Group, ef al.
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** December 8, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11216923

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
AQUILLA THROWER, :
Plaintiff, ;:

v. CIVIL ACTION NO. 25-CV-6569
VISTA AUTO GROUP, ef al.,
Defendants. :
MEMORANDUM
WEILHEIMER, J. DECEMBER 2025
Plaintiff Aquilla Thrower brings this civil action against Vista Auto Group, Inc., Kemper
Insurance Company, and Westlake Financial Services. She seeks leave to proceed in forma
pauperis. For the following reasons, the Court will grant Thrower leave to proceed in forma
pauperis and dismiss her Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
Thrower’s Complaint is sparse. She alleges that she was financing a vehicle from Vista
Auto Group that was vandalized while in her care. (Compl. at 4.)! Although unclear, her claims
in this case appear to be based on allegations that she had to pay for both the vandalized vehicle
as well as another vehicle she drove as a replacement. U/d.) Specifically, Thrower claims that
she “continued to pay for the vehicle until it became final that [she] was not paying twice on [an]
insurance bill that [she] did not accrue of monetary damages.” (/d.) She also alleges that Vista
Auto Group “failed to protect” her because it did not stop Westlake Financial Service or Kemper
Insurance Company “from illegally taking [her] twice under the vandalism of [her] vehicle that

' The Court adopts the pagination supplied to the Complaint (ECF No. 2) by the Court’s
CM/ECF docketing system.

[she] consistently paid for while being placed in another car until the investigation was
determined and decided.” (/d.) She does not provide other details about her claims.
Based on those allegations, Thrower brings due process claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983 and various state law claims. (/d. at 3.) She claims to have suffered a “mental injury upon
an already prior disability” as a result of the events described in her Complaint. (/d. at 5.) She
seeks millions of dollars in damages. (/d.)
Il. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court will grant Thrower leave to proceed in forma pauperis because it appears that
she is incapable of paying the fees to commence this civil action. Accordingly, 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B) requires the Court to screen the Complaint and dismiss it if it is frivolous,
malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or seeks damages from an immune defendant.
Furthermore, the Court must dismiss the Complaint if it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(h)() (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the
court must dismiss the action.”); Grp. Against Smog and Pollution, Inc. v. Shenango, Inc., 810
F.3d 116, 122 n.6 3d Cir. 2016) (explaining that “an objection to subject matter jurisdiction may
be raised at any time [and] a court may raise jurisdictional issues sua sponte”). A plaintiff
commencing an action in federal court bears the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction. See
Lincoln Ben. Life Co. v. AEI Life, LLC, 800 F.3d 99, 105 (3d Cir. 2015) (“The burden of
establishing federal jurisdiction rests with the party asserting its existence.”). “Jurisdictional
[issues]... may be raised at any time and courts have a duty to consider them sua sponte.”
Wilkins v. United States, 598 U.S. 152, 157 (2023) (internal quotations omitted). As Thrower is
proceeding pro se, the Court construes her allegations liberally. Vogt v. Wetzel, 8 F 4th 182, 185
(3d Cir. 2021) (citing Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244-45 (3d Cir. 2013)).

Il. DISCUSSION
A. Federal Claims
Thrower attempts to invoke this Court’s federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331,
by using the Court’s form complaint for a plaintiff alleging a civil rights violation and asserting
due process claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, “wholly insubstantial” claims are
insufficient to invoke federal question jurisdiction, even if they purport to be predicated on a
federal statute. Shapiro v. McManus, 577 U.S. 39, 45 (2015) (“We have long distinguished
between failing to raise a substantial federal question for jurisdictional purposes . . . and failing
to state a claim for relief on the merits; only ‘wholly insubstantial and frivolous’ claims implicate
the former.”); Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1408-09 (3d Cir. 1991)
(dismissal of claims for lack of jurisdiction is proper “when the claim clearly appears to be
immaterial and made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction or is wholly insubstantial
and frivolous” (cleaned up)). The factual scenario described in the Complaint as the basis for
Thrower’s claims concerns transactions for car and insurance payments between Thrower and
private companies that are not subject to liability under § 1983. See, e.g., Abulkhair v. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., 441 F. App’x 927, 931 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (“As the District Court noted,
the defendants are not state actors. The alleged misconduct of Liberty Mutual and its attorneys
and adjustor in Abulkhair’s case is not fairly attributable to the state.”); Anfoine y. Superior Ct.
of N.J., No. 15-1267, 2015 WL 9582143, at *4 (D.N.J. Dec. 29, 2015) (“Mercury is a private
insurance agency. Royale is a private insurance broker. The Schenck defendants and M&W
defendants are private attorneys. There is no doubt that such defendants are private rather than
state actors and, generally, cannot be liable under Section 1983.”). Accordingly, the Complaint
does not raise a substantial federal question for jurisdictional purposes. See, e.g., Rose v.

Husenaj, 708 F. App’x 57, 60 (3d Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (concluding that civil rights claims
were insufficiently substantial to invoke federal question jurisdiction because “Rose’s conclusory
reference to ‘civil rights’ does not convert his tort claims against non-state actors into
constitutional claims”); Yoder v. Morrow, 671 F. App’x 27, 29 (3d Cir. 2016) (per curiam)
(affirming dismissal for lack of jursidction because “[a]lthough Yoder’s complaint purported to
rely on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, her allegations do not actually implicate that federal statute”).
B. State Claims
Thrower’s Complaint is best construed as raising contract and/or tort claims under
Pennsylvania law. See Holley v. Dep’t of Veteran Affairs, 165 F.3d 244, 248 (3d Cir. 1999)
(“We apply the applicable law, irrespective of whether a pro se litigant has mentioned it by
name.”). District courts may exercise jurisdiction over cases raising claims exclusively under
state law if “the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest
and costs, and is between . . . citizens of different States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). “Complete
diversity requires that, in cases with multiple plaintiffs or multiple defendants, no plaintiff be a
citizen of the same state as any defendant.” Zambelli Fireworks Mfg. Co. v. Wood, 592 F.3d
412, 419 (3d Cir. 2010). For diversity purposes, an individual is a citizen of the state where he is
domiciled, meaning the state where he is physically present and intends to remain. See
Washington v. Hovensa LLC, 652 F.3d 340, 344 (3d Cir. 2011). Several factors may be relevant
in determining an individual’s domicile, including “declarations, exercise of political rights,
payment of personal taxes, house of residence, and place of business”, as well as “location of
brokerage and bank accounts, location of spouse and family, membership in unions and other
organizations, and driver’s license and vehicle registration.” McCann v. Newman Irrevocable
Tr., 458 F.3d 281, 286 (3d Cir. 2006) (internal quotations omitted).

For diversity purposes, a corporation is a citizen of the state in which it is incorporated
and the state in which it has its principal place of business. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c). In contrast,
“the citizenship of an LLC [or other unincorporated entity] is determined by the citizenship of its
members.” Zambelli, 592 F.3d at 420. “[W]here an LLC has, as one of its members, another
LLC, the citizenship of unincorporated associations must be traced through however many layers
of partners or members there may be to determine the citizenship of the LLC.” /d. (internal
quotations omitted). At the pleading stage, a plaintiff need not affirmatively allege the
citizenship of a LLC if she alleges, after a reasonable investigation, that the members of the LLC
are not citizens of her state of citizenship. See Lincoln Benefit Life Co., 800 F.3d at 102.
Thrower provides a Pennsylvania address for herself, which suggests she may be a
Pennsylvania citizen, although she does not specifically allege her citizenship. (Compl. at 2.)
Nor does she allege the citizenship of the Defendants, which are either corporations whose
citizenship is governed by their principal place of business and state of citizenship, or LLCs
whose citizenship is governed by the citizenship of their members. (See Compl. at 2-3.) Absent
sufficient allegations pertaining to the parties’ citizenship, the Court cannot exercise diversity
jurisdiction under § 1332. See, e.g., Johnson v. Wal-Mart Stores E., LP, No. 20-02450, 2020
WL 3264066, at *3 (D.N.J. June 17, 2020) (“When a party to the action is an unincorporated
association, an allegation of diversity of citizenship must include the citizenship of each of the
association’s members.”),
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will dismiss this case for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. The dismissal will be without prejudice to Thrower filing an amended complaint in
the event she can allege a basis for subject matter jurisdiction over her state claims or,

alternatively, filing a complaint in the proper state court so she may proceed on her claims in that
venue.” An appropriate Order follows, which provides further instructions.
BY THE COUR

GAIL A. WEILHEIMER, J.

The Court expresses no opinion at this time on the merits of Thrower’s state claims. The Court
notes, however, that if Thrower returns with an amended complaint in this Court, she must allege
sufficient facts to both justify this Court’s exercise of jurisdiction and to state a clear, plausible
claim against each named defendant. This means Thrower must allege specific facts explaining
what each defendant did or did not do that caused her harm and describing the transactions
giving rise to her claims. See generally Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)
(“Because the plaintiffs here have not nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to
plausible, their complaint must be dismissed.”).

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11216923. Public record. Not legal advice.