# HILL

> District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · December 8, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11216858

## Case

- **Full name:** Raymond Hill v. Judge Marc J. Lieberman, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** December 8, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

RAYMOND HILL, :
Plaintiff, :
:
v. : CIVIL ACTION NO. 25-CV-5678
:
JUDGE MARC J. LIBERMAN, et al., :
Defendants. :

MEMORANDUM
PADOVA, J. DECEMBER 8, 2025
Plaintiff Raymond Hill, a pretrial detainee, filed this pro se civil rights action under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, naming as Defendants Pennsylvania Magisterial District Judge Marc Lieberman,
the West Chester Police Department, three of the department’s officers (Officer Douglas Gilbert,
Officer Aaron Diefenderfer, and Officer Turner), the public defender who was appointed to his
state criminal case (P.J. Redmond), and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.1 (ECF No. 3 at 2.)
Hill seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (See ECF Nos. 1 and 2.) For the following
reasons, the Court will grant Hill leave to proceed in forma pauperis, dismiss his Complaint in
part pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), and stay the remaining claims pursuant to the
principles of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).

1 Hill misspelled the judge’s name in his Complaint as “Liberman;” the correct spelling is
“Lieberman.”
I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS2
Hill is a pretrial detainee incarcerated at Chester County Prison awaiting trial on three
criminal matters pending against him in the Chester County Court of Common Pleas. See
Commonwealth v. Hill, CP-15-CR-0001493-2024 (C.P. Chester); Commonwealth v. Hill, CP-15-

CR-0001496-2024 (C.P. Chester); Commonwealth v. Hill, CP-15-CR-0002396-2024 (C.P.
Chester). Trial on the pending criminal charges in those cases is currently scheduled for
December 8, 2025. See, e.g., Docket, Commonwealth v. Hill, CP-15-CR-0002396-2024 (C.P.
Chester), at 3 of 16. Hill’s claims in the instant case apparently pertain to the charges against
him in Docket Number CP-15-CR-0002396-2024. (ECF No. 3-1 at 10.) Hill states that he was
arrested on May 3, 2024, while he stood next to his vehicle in a parking lot waiting for a friend to
return from a nearby store. (Compl. at 3.) Two West Chester police officers approached him
with weapons drawn. (Id.) The officers allegedly told Hill that they were placing him under
arrest pursuant to a felony warrant. (Id.) Hill claims that, sixteen months after the arrest, he
requested a search of records with the Chester County Court Record Room and the search

yielded no records of arrest warrants for him in Chester County. (Id.) Hill also later requested
body cam footage of the arrest and claims that the Chester County Prison possesses the thumb
drive containing the video. (Id. at 4.)
At the time of Hill’s arrest on May 3, officers seized his vehicle and towed it to the West
Chester large evidence room. (Id. at 3.) Police obtained a search warrant of the car, either on

2 The factual allegations set forth in this Memorandum are taken from Hill’s handwritten
Complaint (“Compl.”) and attached documents. (See ECF No. 3.) The Court deems the entire
submission to constitute the Complaint and adopts the pagination supplied by the CM/ECF
docketing system. The Court may also consider matters of public record when conducting a
screening under § 1915. Castro-Mota v. Smithson, Civ. A. No. 20-940, 2020 WL 3104775, at *1
n.3 (E.D. Pa. June 11, 2020) (citing Buck v. Hampton Twp. Sch. Dist., 452 F.3d 256, 260 (3d Cir.
2006)).
May 4 or 5, 2024. (Id. at 3-4.) He asserts that the West Chester Police Department never
provided paperwork about the vehicle, and he does not know where it is located. (Id. at 5.)
Hill maintains that he told the public defender appointed to his case, Attorney Redmond,
that he should have received a copy of the arrest warrant no later than one day after his

preliminary arraignment pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 515, but he did
not. (Id. at 5.) Hill claims that Redmond informed him that “we don’t go by [the] arrest warrant
to lock you up in Chester County.” (Id. at 5-6.) Redmond allegedly “did nothing” about the
Fourth Amendment violation. (Id. at 4.) Hill filed a motion in April 2025 to remove Redmond
from his case due to ineffective assistance of counsel, but the court denied his motion. (Id. at 6.)
Judge Lieberman set his bail at $750,000, although, Hill alleges, he was falsely arrested. (Id. at
4.) Hill asked Redmond to file a motion for modification of bail, but Redmond never scheduled
a pretrial hearing. (Id. at 6.) Presumably referring to a possible plea deal, Hill asserts that
Redmond kept telling him to “take the deal” because “the DA is a sweetheart of [his].” (Id. at 6.)
Hill also submitted a complaint about Redmond with the Judicial Board of Conduct on June 11,

2025, but it was denied. (Id.)
Hill filed this civil action asserting violations of his Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Amendment
rights based on his arrest and prosecution. (Id. at 2-3.) He claims that, as a result of the
allegedly false arrest, prosecution, and incarceration, he has lost his home and all his lifetime
possessions, except for the clothes he was wearing when arrested. (Id. at 4.) Hill’s relationship
with his 22-year-old son has deteriorated due to Hill’s incarceration, and he is suffering from
depression, mental anguish, and extreme paranoia due to his treatment by the West Chester
Police Department. (Id. at 4-5.) As relief, Hill seeks injunctive relief in the form of release from
imprisonment and that the police officers and judge be terminated from employment. (Id. at 5.)
He also requests $20 million in damages. (Id.)
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court will grant Hill leave to proceed in forma pauperis because it appears that he
does not have the ability to pre-pay the fees to commence this case.3 Accordingly, 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) requires the Court to dismiss the Complaint if it fails to state a claim. Whether
a complaint fails to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same standard
applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), see Tourscher
v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999), which requires the Court to determine whether
the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotations omitted). See also
Talley v. Wetzel, 15 F.4th 275, 286 n.7 (3d Cir. 2021). At this early stage of the litigation, the
Court will accept the facts alleged in the pro se complaint as true, draw all reasonable inferences
in the plaintiff’s favor, and ask only whether the complaint contains facts sufficient to state a

plausible claim. See Shorter v. United States, 12 F.4th 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2021), abrogation on
other grounds recognized by Fisher v. Hollingsworth, 115 F.4th 197 (3d Cir. 2024). Conclusory
allegations do not suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. As Hill is proceeding pro se, the Court
construes his allegations liberally. Vogt v. Wetzel, 8 F.4th 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021) (citing Mala
v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244-45 (3d Cir. 2013)).

3 Because Hill is currently incarcerated, he will be obligated to pay the filing fee in
installments in accordance with the Prison Litigation Reform Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b).
IV. DISCUSSION

Hill alleges constitutional claims under the Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Amendments. The
vehicle by which constitutional claims may be asserted in federal court is 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “To
state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the
Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was
committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988)
(citations omitted).
“A defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged
wrongs” to be liable. Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988); see also
Jutrowski v. Twp. of Riverdale, 904 F.3d 280, 290 (3d Cir. 2018) (“Each Government official,
his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct.” (emphasis in
original) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677)); Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2020)
(“Personal involvement requires particular ‘allegations of personal direction or of actual
knowledge and acquiescence.’” (quoting Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207)).

A. Improper Claims for Relief
The Court will dismiss Hill’s requests for injunctive relief, which seek his release from
imprisonment based on pending state criminal charges and ask that the police officers and judge
be terminated from their employment. (See Compl. at 5.) First, Hill’s claims challenging his
imprisonment because of alleged constitutional violations must be pursued in a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus because they are not cognizable in a civil rights action. See Jaffery v. Atl. Cnty.
Prosecutor’s Off., 695 F. App’x 38, 41-42 (3d Cir. 2017) (“[T]o the extent Jaffery
seeks dismissal of the charges against him as a result of constitutional violations, such relief is
only available through a writ of habeas corpus.” (citation omitted)); Duran v. Weeks, 399 F.
App’x 756, 759 (3d Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (“[T]o the extent that Duran is seeking dismissal of
the charges against him as a result of constitutional violations, he is essentially asking for relief
only available through habeas corpus.” (citation omitted)); see generally Preiser v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973) (stating that when a prisoner “is challenging the very fact or duration

of his physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to
immediate release or a speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ
of habeas corpus”). Accordingly, to the extent Hill raises claims for relief in this civil rights case
that seek to challenge his imprisonment on pending state criminal charges, he has failed to state a
claim. Garrett v. Murphy, 17 F.4th 419, 430 (3d Cir. 2021) (“[W]henever a plaintiff pleads a
violation of § 1983 and effectively seeks habeas relief, the plaintiff fails to state a § 1983 claim.
Instead, the prisoner’s only federal remedy is through a writ of habeas corpus after exhausting
state remedies.”). Furthermore, to the extent that Hill wants the police officers and judge to be
terminated from their employment, the Court has no authority to order such relief in a Section
1983 civil rights case. See Hall v. Carny, Civ. A. No. 22-4094, 2023 WL 187569, at *1 n.3

(E.D. Pa. Jan. 13, 2023) (dismissing with prejudice the request that defendant be terminated from
his employment); Buskirk v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, Civ. A. No. 22-1826, 2022 WL
4542094, at *2 n.4 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 2022) (construing plaintiff’s request for the court to
terminate the defendants’ employment as seeking injunctive relief and holding that the court has
no authority to terminate the employment of a state employee (citations omitted)). Hill’s claims
for relief on both grounds will be dismissed.
B. Claim Against Judge Lieberman
Hill asserts that Judge Lieberman set his bail at $750,000 “in a case [in which Hill] was
falsely arrested.” (Compl. at 4.) To the extent that Hill alleges a § 1983 claim against the judge,
it will be dismissed because Judge Lieberman is entitled to absolute immunity. Judges are
entitled to absolute immunity from civil rights claims based on their acts or omissions taken
within their judicial capacity, as long as they do not act in complete absence of all jurisdiction.
See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-56 (1978) (citation omitted); Harvey v. Loftus, 505 F.

App’x 87, 90 (3d Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (citing Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 199
(1985)). An act is taken in a judge’s judicial capacity if it is “a function normally performed by a
judge.” Gallas v. Supreme Ct. of Pa., 211 F.3d 760, 768 (3d Cir. 2000). Because judges must
feel free to act without fear of incurring personal liability for their actions in court, judicial
immunity remains in force even if the actions are alleged to be legally incorrect, in bad faith,
malicious, or corrupt, Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991), or are taken as a result of a
conspiracy with others, Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 26-27 (1980). Likewise, “grave
procedural errors,” “conduct[ing] a proceeding in an informal and ex parte manner,” or acting
“unfair[ly] or controversial[ly]” will not defeat absolute judicial immunity. Gallas, 211 F.3d at
769 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

Hill’s sole apparent claim against Judge Lieberman is that he set bail in a case where Hill
was allegedly falsely arrested. (Compl. at 4.) But this claim clearly arises from determinations
made in Judge Lieberman’s judicial capacity where he unquestionably could exercise jurisdiction
as a Pennsylvania Magisterial District Judge. See Figueroa v. Blackburn, 208 F.3d 435, 443-44
(3d Cir. 2000) (“Generally, . . . ‘where a court has some subject matter jurisdiction, there is
sufficient jurisdiction for immunity purposes.’” (quoting Barnes v. Winchell, 105 F.3d 1111,
1122 (6th Cir. 1997))). Accordingly, Hill’s claim against Judge Lieberman for money damages
is barred by judicial immunity and will be dismissed. Friend v. Vann, 614 F. App’x 593, 596 (3d
Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (“Friend’s allegations against Judge Vann stem from her signing an
arrest warrant and presiding over the trial of one of Friend’s acquaintances. These are official
acts, which were not taken in the absence of jurisdiction, for which she is immune from suit.”);
Mendoza v. Larotonda, 270 F. App’x 157, 159 (3d Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (“Judge Larotonda is
immune from suit for issuing the bench warrant against Mendoza because judges enjoy a

comparatively sweeping form of immunity for official acts taken in their functional capacity as
judges.” (quotation omitted)).
C. Claims Against Attorney Redmond
Hill’s civil rights claims against Redmond for his actions as Hill’s counsel in the state
criminal case are not plausible because a public defender acting within his role as counsel is not
a state actor for the purposes of Section 1983. Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981)
(“[A] public defender does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer’s
traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.”). “Attorneys
performing their traditional functions will not be considered state actors solely on the basis of
their position as officers of the court.” Angelico v. Lehigh Valley Hosp., Inc., 184 F.3d 268, 277

(3d Cir. 1999) (citations omitted); see also Clark v. Punshon, 516 F. App’x 97, 98-99 (3d Cir.
2013) (per curiam) (concluding that court-appointed attorney was not a state actor for purposes
of § 1983); Webb v. Chapman, 852 F. App’x 659, 660 (3d Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (“[A]ttorneys
representing individuals in criminal proceedings generally are not state actors for purposes of §
1983.”). Because Redmond was not a state actor when he represented Hill in his criminal action,
he is not amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the claims against him will be dismissed
with prejudice.
D. Claims Against the West Chester Police Department
Hill claims that West Chester Police Department did not provide him with paperwork
following the seizure of his car, and he generally states that he is fearful of the Department.
(Compl. at 4-5.) But these claims cannot proceed because the West Chester Police Department

is not a proper defendant under § 1983. Following the decision in Monell v. Department. of
Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978), courts concluded that a police department is a sub-
unit of the local government and, as such, is merely a vehicle through which the municipality
fulfills its policing functions. See e.g. Johnson v. City of Erie, Pa., 834 F. Supp. 873, 878-79
(W.D. Pa. 1993) (citations omitted). Thus, while a municipality may be liable under § 1983, a
police department, as a mere sub-unit of the municipality, may not. Id.; Martin v. Red Lion
Police Dep’t, 146 F. App’x. 558, 562 n.3 (3d Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (stating that police
department is not a proper defendant in an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because it is a
sub-division of its municipality (citing Johnson, 834 F. Supp. at 878-79)); Bonenberger v.
Plymouth Twp., 132 F.3d 20, 25 (3d Cir. 1997) (“As in past cases, we treat the municipality and

its police department as a single entity for purposes of section 1983 liability” (citing Colburn v.
Upper Darby Twp., 838 F.2d 663, 671 n.7 (3d Cir.1988)); Hadesty v. Rush Twp. Police Dep’t,
Civ. A. No. 14-2319, 2016 WL 1039063, at *9 n.4 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 15, 2016) (citations omitted).
Accordingly, the West Chester Police Department and any claims alleged against it will be
dismissed for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
E. Claims Against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
Although Hill names the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania as a Defendant, states are not
considered “persons” for purposes of Section 1983 lawsuits. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State
Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65-66 (1989). Furthermore, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania is immune
from suit for money damages under the Eleventh Amendment and has not waived that immunity
for lawsuits filed in federal court. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89,
100 (1984) (“[I]n the absence of consent a suit in which the State or one of its agencies or
departments is named as the defendant is proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment.” (citations

omitted)); Downey v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 968 F.3d 299, 310 (3d Cir. 2020) (“Pennsylvania has
not waived its sovereign immunity defense in federal court.”); see also 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§
8521-22. Accordingly, the claims for money damages Hill seeks to assert against the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania may not proceed.
F. Claims Stayed Pursuant to Younger
Hill asserts Fourth Amendment claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious
prosecution (see Compl. at 3), but, critical to the analysis here, Hill’s state criminal prosecutions
are ongoing. He awaits trial on the state criminal charges at the basis of this civil action,
currently scheduled to begin on December 8, 2025. See Hill, CP-15-CR-0002396-2024. Under
Younger abstention principles, this Court has an obligation to abstain from considering cases

“that would interfere with certain ongoing state proceedings.” Malhan v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of
State, 938 F.3d 453, 461 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 77-
78 (2013); Younger, 401 US. 31). When assessing whether Younger abstention is appropriate,
the Court “proceeds in two sequential stages.” Greco v. Bruck, No. 21-1035, 2022 WL 1515375,
at *2 (3d Cir. May 13, 2022). At the first stage, the Court must examine the underlying state
court litigation to determine whether it falls into one of three categories of cases: (1) criminal
prosecutions, (2) quasi-criminal state civil enforcement proceedings, and (3) “civil proceedings
involving orders in furtherance of the state courts’ judicial function.” See PDX N., Inc. v.
Comm’r N.J. Dep’t of Labor & Workforce Dev., 978 F.3d 871, 882 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting
ACRA Turf Club, LLC v. Zanzuccki, 748 F. 3d 127, 138 (3d Cir. 2014)); ACRA Turf Club, 748
F.3d at 138 (“[T]he threshold requirement for applying Younger abstention is that the state civil
enforcement proceeding must be ‘quasi-criminal’ in nature” (citing Sprint, 571 U.S. at 81)).
Because Hill’s criminal prosecution is the underlying state court litigation here, the first stage of

the analysis is met.
At the second stage, courts consider three factors articulated by the Supreme Court in
Middlesex County. Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Association, 457 U.S. 423, 432
(1982),4 whether: (1) there is an ongoing state judicial proceeding; (2) the proceeding
“implicates important state interests”; and (3) “there is an adequate opportunity . . . to raise
constitutional challenges” in the state proceeding. See PDX N., 978 F.3d at 883 (quoting
Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm., 457 U.S. at 432). Each of these factors is satisfied here. First,
publicly available dockets reflect that there is an ongoing criminal prosecution in the Court of
Common Pleas in Chester County. Second, the state proceedings implicate the important interest
of enforcing the Commonwealth’s criminal laws. Third, Hill has an opportunity to raise his

constitutional challenges to the validity of the charges against him in the state proceedings. See
Jaffery v. Atl. Cnty. Prosecutor’s Office, 695 F. App’x 38, 40-41 (3d Cir. 2017) (Younger applied
where “[t]here are ongoing state criminal proceedings in the Superior Court of New Jersey that
are judicial in nature, the state proceedings implicate the important state interest in prosecuting
criminal behavior, and the state proceedings provide [the § 1983 plaintiff] an opportunity to raise
federal constitutional defenses to prosecution”); Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 670-71 (3d

4 The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has noted that when the state
court proceeding is quasi-criminal, the Middlesex factors must be met, but when the state-court
proceedings are criminal, it is not necessary to consider the Middlesex factors. See Samaritano v.
New Jersey, No. 24-1889, 2025 WL 1554932, at *2 n.1 (3d Cir. June 2, 2025). In an abundance
of caution, the Court will nonetheless consider the Middlesex factors.
Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (explaining that Younger requires only an opportunity to present federal
claims in state court, and the burden rests with plaintiff to show that state procedural law bars
presentation of the claims (citing Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1987)).
Further, Hill has not alleged, nor is there anything in the Complaint to suggest, that his claims

fall within any of the narrow exceptions to the Younger doctrine. See Stagliano v. Coll, No. 22-
2691, 2023 WL 3943732, at *4 (3d Cir. June 12, 2023) (per curiam) (affirming application of
Younger doctrine where plaintiff failed to plausibly plead that the state criminal proceedings
were “being undertaken in bad faith or for purposes of harassment,” or some other extraordinary
circumstances existed (quoting Schall v. Joyce, 885 F.2d 101, 106 (3d Cir. 1989)).
Because the state criminal proceeding affords Hill an opportunity to raise his
constitutional challenges, and because the claims raised in the instant civil action appear to
implicate rulings that will likely be made in the state proceeding, the Court will stay the
remainder of this case until that proceeding has resolved.5 See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384,
393-94 (2007) (“If a plaintiff files a false-arrest claim before he has been convicted (or files any

other claim related to rulings that will likely be made in a pending or anticipated criminal trial), it
is within the power of the district court, and in accord with common practice, to stay the civil
action until the criminal case or the likelihood of a criminal case is ended.” (citations omitted));
Rex v. Fisher, No. 12-4045, 2012 WL 3537846, at *1-2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 15, 2012) (staying false
arrest and illegal search claims for damages in light of pending criminal prosecution when
plaintiff “ha[d] the opportunity to raise his Fourth-Amendment challenges in the course of his

5 In the future, when the Younger stay is lifted, the Court may conduct additional
screening of the remaining claims in the Complaint. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(i)-(iii) (providing
that “the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines” that the complaint is
frivolous, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks damages from an
immune defendant).
criminal proceeding.”); Zimmerman v. Leek, Civ. A. No. 23-220, 2024 WL 3695334, at *3 (W.D.
Pa. July 18, 2024) (holding that, because plaintiff was still awaiting trial on underlying arrest, his
false arrest, false imprisonment, illegal search and seizure, and malicious prosecution claims
were subject to Younger abstention), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 3691889

(W.D. Pa. Aug. 7, 2024); see also Borowski v. Kean Univ., 68 F.4th 844, 855 (3d Cir. 2023)
(“[D]ismissal of a damages claim on abstention grounds is no longer permissible.” (citation
omitted)).
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Hill’s Motion to Proceed in forma
pauperis. All claims against Judge Lieberman, Attorney P.D. Redmond, the West Chester Police
Department, and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania will be dismissed with prejudice pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Hill’s requests for release from custody and the termination of
certain Defendants’ employment will also be dismissed with prejudice. The dismissal of his
claims seeking release from imprisonment does not preclude Hill from challenging his criminal

charges in state court or, if appropriate, by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus after
exhausting state remedies. The relief sought in Hill’s “Notice” at ECF No. 6 will be denied
without prejudice.6 All further proceedings with respect to the remaining claims in this matter,

6 In ECF No. 6, Hill seeks to amend his Complaint to add Chester County Prison and its
Warden as Defendants. Hill cannot proceed in this fashion because the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure do not contemplate piecemeal pleadings or the amalgamation of pleadings, even in the
context of a pro se litigant. See Bryant v. Raddad, Civ. A. No. 21-1116, 2021 WL 2577061, at
*2 (E.D. Pa. June 22, 2021) (“Allowing a plaintiff to file partial amendments or fragmented
supplements to the operative pleading, ‘presents an undue risk of piecemeal litigation that
precludes orderly resolution of cognizable claims.’” (quoting Uribe v. Taylor, Civ. A. No. 10-
2615, 2011 WL 1670233, at *1 (E.D. Cal. May 2, 2011)); Brooks-Ngwenya v. Bart Peterson’s
the Mind Tr., No. 16-cv-193, 2017 WL 65310, at *1 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 6, 2017) (“Piecemeal
pleadings cause confusion and unnecessarily complicate interpretation of a movant’s allegations
and intent[] . . . .”). If Hill wants to amend his complaint, he must do so consistent with the
including the screening of Hill’s remaining claims for damages, will be stayed pursuant to
Younger, 401 U.S. 37. Hill may move to lift the stay when his state court criminal proceeding is
finally resolved, including any appeals. An appropriate Order follows.
BY THE COURT:

/s/ John R. Padova, J.
__________________________________________
JOHN R. PADOVA, J.

Court’s order. Additionally, to the extent Hill seeks to add the Chester County Prison as a
defendant, the Prison is not a proper party to a § 1983 action because it is not a “person.”
Edwards v. Bucks Cnty. Corr. Facility, Civ. A. No. 19-4923, 2019 WL 5579486, at *2 (E.D. Pa.
Oct. 29, 2019) (“Bucks County Correctional Facility is not an entity susceptible to suit under §
1983.”); see also Cephas v. George W. Hill Corr. Facility, Civ. A. No. 09-6014, 2010 WL
2854149, at *1 (E.D. Pa. July 20, 2010). Moreover, Hill has not alleged any factual bases for
establishing that the Warden was personally involved in the events that give rise to his claims, as
would be required to state a claim against the Warden. Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11216858. Public record. Not legal advice.