# AMOS

> District Court, D. New Jersey · December 8, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11216103

## Case

- **Full name:** Kristen A. v. Commissioner of Social Security
- **Court:** District Court, D. New Jersey
- **Decided:** December 8, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

KRISTEN A.,1
Case No. 24–cv–11343–ESK
Plaintiff,

v.
OPINION
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.
KIEL, U.S.D.J.
THIS MATTER is before the Court on plaintiff Kristen A.’s appeal (ECF
No. 1) from the final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration denying plaintiff’s application for Social Security Disability
Insurance Benefits (ECF No. 4–2 pp. 2, 11–22). For the following reasons, the
Commissioner’s decision will be AFFIRMED.
I. BACKGROUND
Because the record is voluminous, I set forth only the facts necessary for
context and relevant to the issues on appeal.
On June 19, 2023, plaintiff filed an application for benefits and
supplemental security income. (Id. p. 11.) The application was denied
initially on August 15, 2023 and on reconsideration on November 29, 2023.
(Id.) An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) held a hearing on June 13, 2024, at
which plaintiff and a vocational expert testified. (Id. pp. 11, 34–63.) On

1 Due to the significant privacy concerns in Social Security cases, any
nongovernmental party will be identified and referenced solely by first name and last
initial in opinions issued in the United States District Court for the District of New
Jersey. See D.N.J. Standing Order 2021-10.
August 19, 2024, the ALJ issued a decision unfavorable to plaintiff, concluding
that she was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. (Id.
pp. 16–25.) On November 18, 2024, the Appeals Council denied plaintiff’s
request for review (id. pp. 2–6), making the August 2024 decision the
Commissioner’s final decision.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Standard Governing Benefits
The Act establishes a five-step sequential evaluation process for
determining whether a plaintiff is disabled within the meaning of the statute.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). “The claimant bears the burden of proof at steps
one through four, and the Commissioner bears the burden of proof at step five.”
Smith v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 632, 634 (3d Cir. 2010). The analysis
proceeds as follows:
At step one, the ALJ determines whether the claimant is
performing “substantial gainful activity.” 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i). If [the claimant] is,
[the claimant] is not disabled. Id. Otherwise, the ALJ
moves on to step two.

At step two, the ALJ considers whether the claimant has
any “severe medically determinable physical or mental
impairment” that meets certain regulatory requirements.
Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). A “severe
impairment” is one that “significantly limits [the
claimant’s] physical or mental ability to do basic work
activities.” Id. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). If the
claimant lacks such an impairment, [the claimant] is not
disabled. Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). If
[the claimant] has such an impairment, the ALJ moves on
to step three.

At step three, the ALJ decides “whether the claimant’s
impairments meet or equal the requirements of an
impairment listed in the regulations” [(Listings)]. Smith,
631 F.3d at 634. If the claimant’s impairments do, [the
claimant] is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii),
416.920(a)(4)(iii). If [the claimant does] not, the ALJ
moves on to step four.

At step four, the ALJ assesses the claimant’s “residual
functional capacity” (RFC) and whether he can perform his
[or her] “past relevant work.” Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv),
416.920(a)(4)(iv). A claimant’s “[RFC] is the most [the
claimant] can still do despite [the claimant’s] limitations.”
Id. §§ 404.1545(a)(1), 416.945(a)(1). If the claimant can
perform … past relevant work despite [the claimant’s]
limitations, [the claimant] is not disabled. Id.
§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). If [the claimant]
cannot, the ALJ moves on to step five.

At step five, the ALJ examines whether the claimant “can
make an adjustment to other work[,]” considering his
“[RFC,] … age, education, and work experience.” Id.
§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v). That examination
typically involves “one or more hypothetical questions
posed by the ALJ to [a] vocational expert.” Podedworny
v. Harris, 745 F.2d 210, 218 (3d Cir. 1984). If the
claimant can make an adjustment to other work, [the
claimant] is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v),
416.920(a)(4)(v). If [the claimant] cannot, [the claimant]
is disabled.

Hess v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 931 F.3d 198, 201 (3d Cir. 2019).
B. Standard of Review
A reviewing court may enter “a judgment affirming, modifying, or
reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without
remanding the cause for a rehearing.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Factual findings,
“if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.” Id.; see also Appau
v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 847 F. App’x 149, 151 (3d Cir. 2021) (“Like the District
Court, we must uphold a final agency determination unless we find that it is
not supported by substantial evidence in the record.” (quoting Rutherford v.
Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 552 (3d Cir. 2005))). Review of an ALJ’s decision “is
highly deferential” and “[t]he substantial-evidence threshold ‘is not high.’”
Sisco v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 840 F. App’x 685, 687 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Biestek
v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 103 (2019)). “Substantial evidence ‘means—and
means only—“such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.’”” Id. (quoting Biestek, 587 U.S. at 103).
Courts are bound by an ALJ’s findings so long as they are supported by
substantial evidence even if the court would have decided the matter
differently. See Taylor v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 826 F. App’x 224, 226 (3d Cir.
2020).
An ALJ must sufficiently develop the record and explain findings in order
to permit meaningful review when the decision is read as a whole. Cosme v.
Comm’r Soc. Sec., 845 F. App’x 128, 132 (3d Cir. 2021). In so doing, an ALJ
need not use any particular language or format. Id. Though there is
deference afforded to the ALJ’s evaluation of evidence, witnesses, and expert
opinions, “remand is necessary ‘where we cannot ascertain whether the ALJ
truly considered competing evidence, and whether a [plaintiff’s] conditions,
individually and collectively, impacted’ his ability to work.” Grier v. Comm’r
Soc. Sec., 822 F. App’x 166, 170 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Diaz v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 577 F.3d 500, 506 (3d Cir. 2009)).
III. THE ALJ DECISION
At step one, the ALJ found that plaintiff had not engaged in any
substantial gainful activity. (ECF No. 4–2 p. 14.)
At step two, the ALJ determined that plaintiff had the following severe
impairments: posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD); depressive disorder; and
anxiety disorder. (Id.)
At step three, the ALJ considered various Listings and determined that
plaintiff “does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets
or medically equals the severity” of any of the impairments listed by the
regulations. (Id. pp. 14–16.) Specifically, the ALJ determined that plaintiff’s
mental impairments did not satisfy the paragraph B criteria for having a
“marked” mental impairment. (Id. pp. 14, 15.) Based on the totality of the
evidence, the ALJ found that plaintiff had mild limitations in “understanding,
remembering, or applying information” and “adapting or managing oneself,” and
moderate limitations in “interacting with others” and “concentrating, persisting,
or maintaining pace.” (Id.) The ALJ then determined the paragraph C criteria,
that an individual “has only marginal adjustment” to changes in his environment,
were not met. (Id. pp. 15, 16.)
At step four, the ALJ concluded that while plaintiff no longer had the RFC
to resume her past relevant work as a sheriff officer, she had the RFC to perform
a full range of work at all exertional levels with certain nonexertional limitations.
(Id. pp.16–20.) The limitations included: “occasional exposure to moving
mechanical parts; occasional operating a motor vehicle; occasional exposure to
unprotected heights; able to perform routine and repetitive tasks; have no
interaction with the public; and only occasional interaction with co-workers and
supervisors.” (Id.) Upon summarizing plaintiff’s testimony, the ALJ
determined that plaintiff’s “statements concerning the intensity, persistence and
limiting effects of these symptoms [were] not entirely consistent with the medical
evidence and other evidence in the record.” (Id. p. 17.) For example, the ALJ
noted that while plaintiff spends most days at home, plaintiff’s testimony about
taking her medication, preparing meals, assisting in the care of her two young
children, doing laundry, shopping online, and texting friends, demonstrates that
plaintiff “engaged in a somewhat normal level of daily activity and interactions.”
(Id. p. 18.) Furthermore, “the record documents that she attend[ed] to her
treatment and during her follow up visits[,] she [was] engaged and
communicate[d] appropriately with providers,” having presented as oriented, well
appearing, and logical. (Id. pp. 15, 18.)
At step five, the ALJ considered plaintiff’s background, RFC, and
vocational expert testimony to determine that plaintiff was “capable of making
a successful adjustment to other work that exists in significant numbers in the
national economy.” (Id. p. 22.) These jobs consist of sandwich maker, marker,
and mail sorter. (Id. p. 21.) Accordingly, the ALJ found that plaintiff was not
disabled pursuant to the Social Security Act.
IV. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff raises three main challenges to the ALJ’s decision. (ECF No. 5
(Mov. Br.) p. 12.) First, plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s step three determination
that her severe mental impairments do not establish a medical equivalence is not
supported by substantial evidence. (Id. pp.15–21.) Next, plaintiff contends
that the ALJ’s RFC assessment fails to clearly account for the disability rating
made by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). (Id. pp. 21–27.) Lastly,
plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s step five analysis was deficient because the
vocational expert’s testimony was predicated on the ALJ’s faulty RFC
assessment. (Id. pp. 28–30.) The Commissioner filed an opposition brief (ECF
No. 7), in response to which, plaintiff filed a reply brief (ECF No. 8).
A. Step Three
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s evaluation of the paragraph B criteria
failed to utilize the considerations called for in the regulations. (Id. pp. 15–21)
Plaintiff takes issue with how the ALJ determined that there was a moderate
impairment, rather than marked. (Id. p. 17.) Instead of considering how the
regulations define these criteria and the scale for assessing a limitation,
plaintiff asserts that the ALJ’s conclusion was incorrect. (Id.)
“Listings 12.04, 12.06, and 12.15 provide multiple ways to demonstrate
the existence of a severe mental impairment based on satisfying certain
criteria.” Ramazan v. Dudek, No. 24–06138, 2025 WL 1720409, at *10 (D.N.J.
June 20, 2025). “Each of these listings have requirements listed in paragraphs
A, B, and C.” Id. “The listings may be satisfied by the applicant meeting the
criteria in both paragraphs A and B, or A and C.” Id. “Paragraph B for the
three listings is the same and requires showing the applicant has an ‘[e]xtreme
limitation of one, or marked limitation of two, of the following areas of mental
functioning: 1. Understand, remember, or apply information. 2. Interact with
others. 3. Concentrate, persist, or maintain pace. 4. Adapt or manage oneself.’”
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1 §§ 12.04(b),
12.06(b), 12.15(b)). “A limitation is marked when the claimant is seriously
limited in his or her ability to function independently, appropriately, effectively,
and on a sustained basis in an area; an ‘extreme’ limitation means the claimant
is not able to function independently, appropriately, effectively, and on a
sustained basis in this area.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).
When concluding that claimants are not disabled under the step three
analysis, conclusory statements are insufficient. Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d
700, 704–05 (3d Cir. 1981). Instead, ALJs must “set forth the reasons for
[their] decisions.” Burnett v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 220 F.3d 112, 119 (3d Cir.
2000). The ALJ is not required to “use particular language or adhere to a
particular format in conducting his analysis ... [but must] ensure that there is
sufficient development of the record and explanation of findings to permit
meaningful review.” Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 505 (3d Cir. 2004).
This standard is satisfied when an ALJ “clearly evaluat[es] the available
medical evidence in the record and then set[s] forth that evaluation in an
opinion, even where the ALJ did not identify or analyze the most relevant
Listing.” Scatorchia v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 137 F. App’x 468, 470–71 (3d Cir.
2005). “An ALJ’s decision on step three need not address every minor piece of
medical evidence in the record but need only show a meaningful consideration
of the elements of the listings, and whether the weight of medical evidence
presented shows [that the] [p]laintiff meets these elements.” Ramazan, 2025
WL 1720409, at *11. So long as the relevant medical evidence was considered
when evaluating whether the claimant met the specific medical requirements
of the listings, the ALJ’s decision will likely be upheld. Id.; Parrotta v.
Kijakazi, No. 21–13602, 2022 WL 2289554, at *9–11 (D.N.J. June 24, 2022);
Rivera v. Saul, No. 20–05308, 2021 WL 5122075, at *9–10 (D.N.J. Nov. 4, 2021);
Dance v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 20–03141, 2021 WL 3144696, at *4–5 (D.N.J.
July 26, 2021). “An ALJ is entitled to focus on the evidence they deem most
probative, and ‘[t]here is no requirement that the ALJ discuss in its opinion
every tidbit of evidence included in the record.’” Ramazan, No. 24–06138, 2025
WL 1720409, at *11 (alteration in original) (quoting Frederick F. v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., No. 20–11500, 2022 WL 445538, at *2 (D.N.J. Feb. 14, 2022)).
Of note, “[f]or a claimant to show that his [or her] impairment matches a
listing, it must meet all of the specified medical criteria.” Sullivan v. Zebley,
493 U.S. 521, 531 (1990). “An impairment that manifests only some of those
criteria, no matter how severely, does not qualify.” Id. In other words, “[a]
claimant cannot qualify for benefits under the ‘equivalence’ step by showing
that the overall functional impact of his unlisted impairment or combination of
impairments is as severe as that of a listed impairment.” Id. (quoting Social
Security Ruling (“SSR”) 83–19, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. Rulings 90,
91–92 (Jan. 1983)).
I find that the ALJ’s step three determination is supported by substantial
evidence. The ALJ considered the evidence in the record to conclude that
plaintiff had only mild or moderate paragraph B limitations. The ALJ
separately addressed each of the paragraph B criteria by drawing on plaintiff’s
own testimony, the Function Report, and medical reports. (ECF No. 4–2
pp. 14–16.) Plaintiff suggests that the ALJ gave great weight to the fact that
plaintiff successfully communicates with her doctors and ignored that she
largely isolates herself and does not travel to see her children in school activities
or greet her food delivery person. (Mov. Br. pp. 17, 18.) The ALJ, however,
specifically balanced these facts with the totality of the evidence to determine
that although plaintiff does have certain limitations, she is able to function
sufficiently. (ECF No. 4–2 pp. 14–16.) While plaintiff also takes issue with
the ALJ’s alleged failure to address VA’s disability rating (Mov. Br. pp. 18, 19),
the ALJ was not required to provide any analysis in the decision about how
such evidence was considered. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520b(c), 416.920b(c). The
ALJ acknowledged the VA’s determination as to plaintiff’s disability and noted
that the evidence the VA considered, was also considered here. (ECF No. 4–2
p. 20.) Given that a reviewing court “must not substitute [its] own judgment
for that of the fact finder,” I find plaintiff’s argument to be without merit.
Zirnsak v. Colvin, 777 F.3d 607, 611 (3d Cir. 2014.)
B. RFC
Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ’s findings as to the RFC are not supported
by substantial evidence because the ALJ failed to consider the VA’s
determination. (Mov. Br. pp. 21–27.) While plaintiff concedes that the VA
rating of 100% disability is not binding, she argues that the ALJ should have
better considered the underlying evidence from the VA physicians and
reviewers. (Id. p. 25.) Plaintiff asserts “that evidence of treatment at the VA
is virtually the entire medical record in this case” and that “medical evidence
must be considered under 20 CFR §404.1513.” (Id. p. 23.)
“To assess the RFC, the ALJ must consider all relevant evidence from the
record, which includes statements from medical sources and the claimant’s own
description of her limitations.” Morel v. Colvin, No. 14–02934, 2016 WL
1270758, at *6 (D.N.J. Apr. 1, 2016). “The RFC assessment must be supported
by a clear statement of the facts upon which the finding is based.” Id. “If a
claimant’s symptoms “suggest a greater functional restriction than is
demonstrated by the objective evidence alone, the Commissioner considers
evidence such as the claimant’s statements, daily activities, duration and
frequency of pain, medication, and treatment.” Id. (quoting Landeta v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 191 F. App’x 105, 111 (3d Cir. 2006)). “The claimant need
not be pain-free to be found ‘not disabled’ especially when her work issue
requires a lower exertional level.” Id.
“Although the ALJ is required to consider the [p]laintiff’s subjective
complaints of pain, the ALJ may reject these complaints when they are
inconsistent with objective medical evidence in the record.” Id. “The Third
Circuit recognizes the ‘acute need for some explanation by the ALJ when he has
received relevant evidence or when there is conflicting probative evidence in the
record.’” Id. (quoting Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 706 (3d Cir. 1981)). “The
ALJ has discretion to evaluate [a plaintiff’s] credibility and arrive at an
independent judgment in regards to the true extent of the pain alleged given
medical findings and other evidence.” Id. “[I]f the ALJ determines that the
testimony is not credible, he must indicate the basis for his conclusion.” Id.
“Courts will defer to the ALJ’s credibility determination because the ALJ had
the opportunity to assess the witness’ demeanor at a hearing.” Id. “The
substantial evidence standard entitles an ALJ to considerable deference,
especially in credibility findings.” Id. (quoting Volage v. Astrue, No. 11–04413,
2012 WL 4742373, at *7 (D.N.J. Oct. 1, 2012)).
At first, plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to “properly,” mention the VA’s
disability rating. (Mov. Br. p. 25.) Plaintiff then argues that the agency
regulation providing that ALJs will not discuss VA disability ratings “are not
consistent with the Social Security Act.” (Id. p. 27.) These arguments, which
are contradictory to one another, are meritless. Plaintiff offers no evidence in
support of her position. Instead, I find that when assessing plaintiff’s RFC,
the ALJ thoroughly discussed plaintiff’s medical history, self-reported
limitations and abilities, testimony, and medical reports. (ECF No.4–2 pp. 16–
20.) The ALJ provided a detailed summary of plaintiff’s limitations and
medical records and discussed in detail the opinions of her medical providers.
(Id.) To the extent plaintiff takes issue with plaintiff not having given the VA
disability rating proper weight as a medical opinion (see Mov. Br. p. 25), an ALJ
need not “defer or give any specific evidentiary weight, including controlling
weight, to any medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s), [ ]
including those from [the plaintiff’s own] medical sources.” 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520c(a). Instead of assigning weight to medical opinions, the ALJ
considers the persuasiveness of a medical opinion or finding. Id. Consistent
with this regulation, the ALJ did just that. See Wellington v. Kijakazi, No.
22–05042, 2023 WL 5551030, at *6 (D.N.J. Aug. 29, 2023) (“[T]he ALJ did not
merely announce her RFC determination without providing any support or
explanation. She appropriately evaluated the objective medical record.”); Jose
v. Kijakazi, No. 19–19077, 2023 WL 5125533, at *4 (D.N.J. Aug. 9, 2023)
(finding that the ALJ’s discussion of the objective medical evidence “indicates
that his RFC determination is supported by substantial evidence and that it
resulted from his ‘careful consideration of the entire record’”).
C. Step Five
Plaintiff’s final challenge is to the ALJ’s step five analysis. Plaintiff
argues that because the ALJ’s RFC analysis was deficient, the ALJ’s
corresponding finding that plaintiff could perform other work cannot be
sustained. (Mov. Br. pp. 28–30.) Specifically, plaintiff takes issue with the
ALJ having presented the vocational expert with a hypothetical predicated on
the ALJ’s faulty RFC determination. (Id.) Plaintiff argues that all of the jobs
identified by the vocational expert fall outside the RFC because she is unable
to interact with supervisors and co-workers on a level necessary to maintain
competitive employment. (Id.) In support of her position, plaintiff cites to
SSR 85-15, which provides that to do unskilled work, a plaintiff must have “the
abilities (on a sustained basis) to understand, carry out, and remember simple
instructions; to respond appropriately to supervision, coworkers, and usual
work situations; and to deal with changes in a routine work setting.” SSR 85-
15, Dept. of Health and Human Services (Jan. 1985).
Plaintiff’s argument is meritless. As a preliminary matter, since plaintiff
did not object to the vocational expert’s testimony during the hearing, any
objection raised now is untimely. Dionisio v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 23-
22067, 2025 WL 428557, at *5 (D.N.J. Feb. 7, 2025). However, even if the
challenge was timely, “courts routinely find that an individual can perform
unskilled work in the national economy, despite a limitation to only occasional
interaction with coworkers, supervisors, and the public.” Rebecca v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., 617 F. Supp. 3d 256, 273 (D.N.J. 2022) (quoting Torres v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., No. 14–06178, 2015 WL 8328346, at *7 (D.N.J. Dec. 8, 2015)).
Every job identified by the vocational expert indicated that interacting with
people was not significant. See Sandwich Maker, DOT: 317.664-010, 1991 WL
672749; Marker, DOT 209.587-034, 1991 WL 671802; Mail Sorter, DOT:
209.687-026, 1991 WL 671813.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Commissioner’s decision denying
plaintiff’s application for benefits is AFFIRMED.

/s/ Edward S. Kiel
EDWARD S. KIEL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: December 8, 2025

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11216103. Public record. Not legal advice.