# Risper

> District Court, C.D. Illinois · December 8, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11216083

## Case

- **Full name:** Broderick Risper v. Latota Hughes, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, C.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** December 8, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11216083

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- declining to consider a prisoner’s constitutional claims, and considering solely his RLUIPA claim after noting the heightened protection it offers

## Opinion text

IN THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION

BRODERICK RISPER,
Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:24-cv-03092-JEH

LATOTA HUGHES, et al.
Defendants.

Order
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and presently incarcerated at Western Illinois
Correctional Center, brought the present lawsuit alleging a claim pursuant to the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–1(a), and
a First Amendment free exercise claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The matter
comes before this Court for ruling on the Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment. (Doc. 20). For the reasons stated, infra, the motion is granted in part and
denied in part.
I
Summary judgment should be granted “if the movant shows that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). All facts must be construed in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences must be
drawn in his favor. Ogden v. Atterholt, 606 F.3d 355, 358 (7th Cir. 2010). The party
moving for summary judgment must show the lack of a genuine issue of material
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fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). In order to be a “genuine”
issue, there must be more than “some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). “Only
disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing
law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
II
Plaintiff has been incarcerated at Western Illinois Correctional Center
(“Western”) since December 29, 2021. UMF 1. Defendants worked at the facility in
the following capacities: Defendant Greene was the warden; and, Defendant
Llewellyn was the chaplain. UMF 3, 4.
Plaintiff practices the Baptist faith. UMF 7. As part of his religious practice,
he obtained a chain and a religious medallion while incarcerated at Menard
Correctional Center. UMF 5. Plaintiff testified that the medallion depicted the
“Virgin Mary, Mother of Jesus,” which he has “always recognized as a symbol of
my Christian religion.” Pl.’s Dep. 15:21; (Doc. 25 at 2). Because Menard officials
would not permit Plaintiff to wear the chain and medallion on the transfer bus, he
placed the items in his property box in preparation for his transfer to Western. Pl.’s
Dep. 12:10-15.
The applicable rules1 permit inmates to possess “up to two traditionally
accepted religious symbols or religious symbols which have been authorized by
the Religious Practice Advisory Board and which represent their designated

1 Defendants reference rules in a facility handbook. UMF 10. Defendants did not provide a copy
of that handbook, and Defendant Llewellyn’s recitation of the contents of that handbook is not
admissible. Fed. R. Evid. 802. Therefore, the Court’s reference to the applicable rules is limited to
the Illinois Administrative Code. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4).
2
faith,” including medals, medallions, scapulas, or prayer beads. 20 Ill. Admin.
Code § 425.90. Officials maintain authority to prohibit otherwise permissible items
they deem a threat to safety or security. Id. § 425.90(c). Medals or medallions must
comply with size requirements, may not exceed a designated value, may not
contain precious gems or stones, and “shall not be of a design that could be used
as a weapon or to conceal contraband.” Id.
The medallion and chain were not in Plaintiff’s property box when he
retrieved it at Western. UMF 11. Defendant Llewellyn refused to authorize
Plaintiff’s possession of the medallion and chain in July 2022 because he opined
that the medallion depicted an image traditionally associated with the Catholic,
not Baptist, faith. UMF 12; Pl.’s Dep. 37:13-14. When he had ordered it, Plaintiff
was unaware of the medallion’s association with Catholicism. UMF 15. Plaintiff
voluntarily exchanged the medallion for a cross in August 2022; he did not seek
Defendant Llewellyn’s permission prior to doing so. UMF 13, 14. Defendant
Llewellyn initially denied Plaintiff’s possession of the cross. UMF 14.
Plaintiff met with Defendant Llewellyn on December 6, 2022, where they
discussed the medallion and Defendant Llewellyn’s offer to assist Plaintiff if
Plaintiff desired to convert to Catholicism. UMF 15, 16. Plaintiff declined the latter.
UMF 16. Regarding the cross, Plaintiff testified that Defendant Llewellyn stated
that “everybody was wearing the chains for show…and he said that I would have
to attend his service for at least five months and then he’ll approve [the cross].”
Pl.’s Dep. 36:18-22. Plaintiff complied, and Defendant Llewellyn sent him written
approval for the chain and cross. UMF 17. Plaintiff never received the items. UMF
18.

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Prison staff eventually destroyed chain and cross. Id. A non-defendant
prison official approved Plaintiff’s possession of the cross and offered to reimburse
him for the one that was destroyed. UMF 19.
III
A
The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”)
prohibits governmental imposition of a “substantial burden on the religious
exercise” of a confined individual, even if the burden results from a rule of general
applicability, unless the burden “(1) is in furtherance of a compelling
governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that
compelling governmental interest.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–1(a).
In establishing a claim under RLUIPA, the plaintiff bears the initial burden
of showing (1) that he seeks to engage in an exercise of religion; and (2) that the
challenged practice substantially burdens that exercise of religion. 42 U.S.C. §
2000cc–2(b). Once the plaintiff establishes this prima facie case, the burden shifts to
the government to show that the policy in question was the least restrictive means
to further a compelling government interest. Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 135 S. Ct.
853, 863 (2015).
“Religious exercise” under RLUIPA includes “any exercise of religion,
whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000cc-5(7)(A). Governmental action substantially burdens religious exercise
when the inmate is forced to “engage in conduct that seriously violates his
religious beliefs,” regardless of whether other religious accommodations offset the

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burden imposed.2 Holt, 135 S. Ct. at 862 (quoting Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,
134 S. Ct. 2751, 2775 (2014)); Jones v. Carter, 915 F.3d 1147, 1150 (7th Cir. 2019).
Once the burden shifts, RLUIPA requires courts to examine the application
of the challenged practice “to the person.” Holt, 135 S. Ct. at 863. Officials must
explain why they denied the plaintiff an exemption and show that such a denial is
the least restrictive means in furtherance of a compelling government interest. Id.
at 364. The least-restrictive-means standard “requires the government to show that
it lacks other means of achieving its desired goal without imposing a substantial
burden on the exercise of religion by the objecting party.” Id. (citations omitted). If
less restrictive means are available, “the Government must use [them].” Id.
RLUIPA does not require prisoners to limit their religious exercise to items
traditionally associated with their designated faiths. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A).
Plaintiff’s affiliation with the Baptist faith and his sworn statements that he
believed the medallion symbolized this faith are sufficient to permit a reasonable
inference that he sought to engage in a religious exercise and that his beliefs were
sincerely held. Schlemm, 784 F.3d at 365 (Plaintiff’s testimony that denial of game
meat for religious ceremony imposed substantial burden was sufficient where “the
record was not so lopsided as to permit that contention’s rejection on summary
judgment.”).

2 Holt and Hobby Lobby redefined “substantial burden” under RLUIPA. Prior to these decisions,
courts interpreted “substantial burden” for RLUIPA purposes as “one that necessarily bears
direct, primary, and fundamental responsibility for rendering religious exercise…effectively
impracticable,” which was consistent with the standard applied in First Amendment cases.
Schlemm v. Wall, 784 F.3d 362, 364 (7th Cir. 2015); see also Nelson v. Miller, 570 F.3d 868, 876 (7th
Cir. 2009) (RLUIPA has been “interpreted with reference to Supreme Court free exercise
jurisprudence.”). Holt and Hobby Lobby “articulated a standard much easier to satisfy” than the
“effectively impracticable” standard. Schlemm, 784 F.3d at 364; see also Jones, 915 F.3d at 1149.

5
Defendant Llewellyn’s denial of the medallion, his apparent attempt to
condition receipt of the item upon Plaintiff’s conversion to Catholicism, and his
requirement that Plaintiff attend services3 for an extended period before
approving the necklace and cross permit a reasonable inference that Defendant
Llewellyn’s actions forced Plaintiff to choose between possession of the items and
practicing his faith. Viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the record
permits a reasonable inference that officials substantially burdened his religious
practice. Jones, 915 F.3d at 1150 (forcing a prisoner to choose between adequate
nutrition and religious practice imposed a substantial burden).
The existence of rules and prison officials’ desire to enforce them is not a
compelling government interest under RLUIPA. Schlemm, 784 F.3d at 365. The
statute requires prison officials to change the rules to accommodate sincerely held
religious beliefs, and Defendants’ argument that the rules prohibited Plaintiff’s
possession of the medallion and cross does not support a finding that they are
entitled to summary judgment. Id. Defendants have not offered any evidence
showing that the chain and medallion posed a safety and security risk, and the fact
that Defendant Llewellyn’s denials hinged on factors not associated with those
interests negates an inference to that effect. Defendants have not otherwise
presented any argument or evidence showing why they could not accommodate
the medallion. Defendants are not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on
Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim.
B
The Court’s Merit Review Order also found that Plaintiff stated a First
Amendment Free Exercise claim against Defendant Llewellyn and a John Doe

3 The record does not disclose the religious affiliation of the services Defendant Llewellyn forced
Plaintiff to attend.
6
prison official based on the alleged confiscation of the medallion. Plaintiff did not
identify the John Doe official within the deadlines set forth in the Court’s
Scheduling Order, and, therefore, this defendant is dismissed without prejudice.
See (Doc. 18 at 4, ¶ 9).
Federal courts must avoid making unnecessary constitutional decisions.
Koger v. Bryan, 523 F.3d 789, 801 (7th Cir. 2008); Miller v. Downey, 915 F.3d 460, 463
(7th Cir. 2019). Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim arises from the same conduct at
issue in his RLUIPA claim. Because the statute affords greater protection, the
Court finds that Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim is moot. See Koger, 523 F.3d at
801 (“Because the prison officials are liable under RLUIPA for the conduct
complained of in the constitutional claims, we decline to consider those latter
claims.”); Schlemm, 764 F.3d at 363 (bypassing prisoner’s constitutional claims
because RLUIPA provides greater protection); Borzych v. Frank, 439 F.3d 388, 390
(7th Cir. 2006) (declining to consider a prisoner’s constitutional claims, and
considering solely his RLUIPA claim after noting the heightened protection it
offers).
C
Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity. Qualified
immunity protects government officials “from liability for civil damages insofar
as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555
U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (internal quotations and citations omitted). This defense is
moot as it relates to Plaintiff’s First Amendment claims.
RLUIPA does not authorize money damages against officials in their official
or individual capacities. Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277, 292 (2011) (“States, in
accepting federal funding, do not consent to waive their sovereign immunity to
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private suits for money damages under RLUIPA because no statute expressly and
unequivocally includes such a waiver.”); Nelson, 570 F.3d at 889 (damages not
available under RLUIPA against defendants in their individual capacities).
Because injunctive relief is the only relief available, Defendants are not entitled to
qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim. Hannemann v. S. Door Cnty. Sch.
Dist., 673 F.3d 746, 758 (7th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he defense of qualified immunity does
not protect defendants from an action for injunctive relief.”).
THEREFORE:
1) Defendant John Doe is dismissed without prejudice. Clerk is directed
to terminate this defendant.
2) Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [20] is GRANTED as to
Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim and DENIED as to any other relief
requested.
3) This matter is referred to Magistrate Judge Hanna for a settlement
conference. Clerk is directed to notify Judge Hanna’s chambers of this
referral. Judge Hanna’s chambers will contact the parties to schedule
the conference.
4) The Court will set a final pretrial conference, jury trial, and the
associated deadlines, if necessary, after the settlement conference has
occurred.
It is so ordered.

Entered: December 8, 2025

s/Jonathan E. Hawley
U.S. District Judge
8

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11216083. Public record. Not legal advice.