# State Of Washington, V. Tony Rico Sanders

> Court of Appeals of Washington · December 8, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11215967

## Case

- **Court:** Court of Appeals of Washington
- **Decided:** December 8, 2025
- **Precedential status:** Unpublished
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

STATE OF WASHINGTON,
No. 88037-3-I
Respondent,
DIVISION ONE
v.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
TONY RICO SANDERS,

Appellant.

BIRK, J. — A jury convicted Tony Sanders of completed and attempted

aggravated murder in the first degree, among other charges. Sanders now argues

the court should have suppressed his confession as he did not validly waive his

rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694

(1966). He claims he never adequately understood his right to counsel. He alleges

that after he referenced a prior proceeding where a court found him to be not

indigent his confusion arose when interrogating officers stated they could not give

“legal advice.” Sanders also asserts sentencing errors and in a statement of

additional grounds (SAG) makes ER 404(b) and corpus delicti claims. We affirm.

I

The State charged Sanders with aggravated murder in the first degree for

his actions against G.C. in November 2021.1 The State further charged Sanders

1 While not directly at issue on appeal, the State further charged Sanders

with assault in the fourth degree for his actions against G.C. in October 2021, as
well as malicious mischief in the third degree for “caus[ing] physical damage to
vehicle [windows], the property of another” in November 2021.
No. 88037-3-I/2

with attempted aggravated murder in the first degree, assault in the first degree,

and robbery in the first degree for his actions against T.L. on the same date.

The State alleged Sanders stabbed G.C., his intimate partner, and T.L.

while stealing T.L.’s phone after she attempted to call 911. G.C. succumbed to

her injuries at the hospital. T.L. survived and testified.

This appeal centers on Sanders’s confession at his interrogation on

November 10, 2021, and whether he validly waived his Miranda rights. We provide

the relevant context for this interrogation below.

A

At Sanders’s October 18, 2021, arraignment before a municipal court,

Sanders’s faced a charge for assault in the fourth degree (domestic violence)

related to an incident with G.C. Sanders received a public defender for the

arraignment.

The municipal court found Sanders was not indigent as he made “quite a bit

above the threshold for the appointment of an attorney” and advised him to obtain

counsel “as quickly as possible.” Before the hearing concluded, Sanders’s public

defender informed him “you were not qualified for the public defender so our

representation will cease now. You’ll have to find private counsel.” During

Sanders’s subsequent interrogation on November 10, 2021, Sanders appeared to

refer back to his October arraignment indicating he had not successfully found

private counsel.

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No. 88037-3-I/3

B

On November 10, 2023, Tacoma police arrested Sanders in connection with

the incidents with G.C. and T.L. The police transported Sanders to the Tacoma

Police Department headquarters where he was interrogated by Detective Jeffrey

Maahs and Detective Steven Shank.2 The excerpts below occurred prior to any

interrogative questioning:

Maahs: All right. So just so you know, everything in this room
is audio and visually, visually recorded. Okay.

Sanders: Yeah.

....

Maahs: All right. So right now I’m just gonna advise you of your
rights. All right.

Sanders: Yep.

Immediately thereafter, Maahs read a hardcopy Miranda waiver nearly verbatim:

Maahs: All right. You have the right to remain silent. Any
statement that you do make can be used against, used
as evidence against you in a court of law. You have
the right at this time to talk to an attorney of your choice
and to have your attorney present before or during
questioning and the making of any statement. If you
cannot afford an attorney you are entitled to have one
appointed for you without cost to you. And you can
have the attorney present at any time during
questioning and the making of any statements. You
may stop answering questions or ask for an attorney at
any time during any questioning and the making of any
statement. Do you understand these rights?

2 In addition to a written transcript, this court has reviewed the video and

audio recording of the interrogation that was presented to and reviewed by the trial
court.

3
No. 88037-3-I/4

Sanders: Yes.

Maahs: All right. Having these rights in mind are you willing to
talk to us?

Sanders: I’ll talk to you guys, but like I said, I couldn’t afford to
get the attorney and they said I couldn’t get a state
prosecutor[3] because when I was in jail the last time
they said I was making too much, even though I lost my
job while I was in the jail.

Maahs: Okay.

Sanders: Okay.

Shank: So do you want to talk to us?

Sanders: I’ll talk to you guys. And like I said an attorney’s always
nice too, you know.

Maahs: Okay. So we, we just want to get a little, a little bit of
background from you.

(Emphasis added.) At this point, Maahs handed the Miranda waiver to Shank who

then placed it on the table in front of Sanders. Sanders leaned forward to read the

waiver. The officers and Sanders continued speaking as follows:

Shank: (Unintelligible) we’ll just have you sign right here.

Sanders: And where’s the attorney at?

Maahs: Would you want to put your glasses on?

Sanders: No. They hurt my eyes that’s the problem.[4]

So, public defender, attorney since I can’t afford one or
what are you guys talking about?

3 We assume Sanders’s reference to a “state prosecutor” intended to
reference a public defender.
4 Sanders’s glasses were on the table in front of him throughout the entire

portion of the interrogation provided here.

4
No. 88037-3-I/5

Shank: Well, we can’t really give you legal advice.

Sanders: Like I said, that you can have an attorney but then you
can’t get an attorney.

What’s this one?

Maahs: So this you’d . . . .

(Emphasis added.) Sanders, still leaning forward, audibly read portions of the

Miranda waiver to himself:

Sanders: I want the police department, Pierce County Sheriff’s
Department, other 11/10/21. (Unintelligible) is 3
(Unintelligible). Incident number 21-305-00483.

Advisement of right, before questioning and the making
any other statement I want to remind you your rights.
And you have (Unintelligible) court of law and I can
save stuff.

Immediately thereafter, Sanders signed the Miranda waiver. By signing, Sanders

attested to the waiver’s statements that he “understand[s] each of these rights,”

has “been made fully aware of these rights,” and “voluntarily wish[es] to answer

questions now.”

In response to the officers’ questions, Sanders ultimately confessed to

stabbing both G.C. and T.L., as well as taking T.L.’s phone. Sanders also pointed

the police to the locations of physical evidence, including the knife and T.L.’s

phone.

C

By November 16, 2021, Sanders received a public defender through the

Department of Assigned Counsel. On August 7, 2023, Sanders moved through

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No. 88037-3-I/6

his assigned counsel to suppress his statements from the November 10, 2021,

interrogation under CrR 3.1 and 3.5.

Sanders argued he “did not understand he could speak to a court-appointed

attorney prior to questioning” and the “waiver of his Miranda rights was equivocal.”

Sanders urged his “statements clearly indicate that he knows he can have an

attorney in theory, but he does not believe he can actually get one, because he

cannot afford to hire one, but also makes too much money to be appointed one.”

Sanders further argued “law enforcement did not clarify whether he wanted to

waive his right to an attorney” and “continued with his interrogation anyway.”

Instead, the officers “say nothing, except ‘we can’t really give you legal advice’ and

allow Mr. Sanders to assume their response is affirmation of his mistaken belief.”

The court denied Sanders’s motion to suppress and issued findings of fact

and conclusions of law, which will be discussed below.

D

After a trial in August 2023, the jury convicted Sanders as charged. The

court sentenced Sanders to mandatory life imprisonment without possibility of

release under RCW 10.95.030(1) for his aggravated murder in the first degree

conviction. Sanders timely appealed and filed a SAG in this court.

II

Sanders argues that “what happened in [his] interrogation was inadequate

to amount to a valid waiver of his Miranda rights because he was misinformed.”

Sanders alleges two sources for this confusion. First, he cites his past arraignment

in municipal court where he was found to be not indigent, and so denied counsel

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No. 88037-3-I/7

at public expense at that time. Second, his “expressions of confusion were

variously met with silence, or misinformation in the form of being told by police that

he was asking for ‘legal advice,’ which the police would not give him.

The United States Supreme Court held in Miranda that

[p]rior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a
right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used
as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of
an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive
effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily,
knowingly and intelligently.

384 U.S. at 444. “The State bears the burden of showing a knowing, voluntary,

and intelligent waiver of Miranda rights by a preponderance of the evidence.” State

v. Athan, 160 Wn.2d 354, 380, 158 P.3d 27 (2007). “ ‘The preponderance of the

evidence standard requires that the evidence establish the proposition at issue is

more probably true than not true.’ ” State v. Arredondo, 188 Wn.2d 244, 257, 394

P.3d 348 (2017) (quoting Mohr v. Grant, 153 Wn.2d 812, 822, 108 P.3d 768

(2005)).

Sanders assigns error to three findings of fact and two conclusions of law

within the court’s CrR 3.5 order. “[F]indings of fact entered following a CrR 3.5

hearing will be verities on appeal if unchallenged, and, if challenged, they are

verities if supported by substantial evidence in the record.” State v. Broadaway,

133 Wn.2d 118, 131, 942 P.2d 363 (1997). Substantial evidence is evidence

sufficient to persuade a fair-minded, rational person of the truth of the finding.

State v. Solomon, 114 Wn. App. 781, 789, 60 P.3d 1215 (2002). A reviewing court

will “not disturb a trial court’s conclusion that a waiver was voluntarily made if the

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No. 88037-3-I/8

trial court found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the statements were

voluntary and substantial evidence in the record supports the finding.” Athan, 160

Wn.2d at 380 (citing Broadaway, 133 Wn.2d at 129). We then “review de novo

whether the trial court’s conclusions of law are properly derived from its findings of

fact.” State v. Gasteazoro-Paniagua, 173 Wn. App. 751, 755, 294 P.3d 857

(2013). For this inquiry, “ ‘[o]nly if the totality of the circumstances surrounding the

interrogation reveals both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of

comprehension may a court properly conclude that the Miranda rights have been

waived.’ ” State v. Mayer, 184 Wn.2d 548, 556, 362 P.3d 745 (2015) (internal

quotation marks omitted) (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421, 106 S. Ct.

1135, 89 L. Ed. 2d 410 (1986)). Additionally, “[i]nvocation and waiver [of Miranda

rights] are entirely distinct inquiries, and the two must not be blurred by merging

them together.” Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 98, 105 S. Ct. 490, 83 L. Ed. 2d 488

(1984). We address each challenged finding of fact and conclusion of law below.

A

In finding of fact V, the court found

the defendant was taken to an interview room at the Tacoma Police
Department where he gave a statement to law enforcement. The
entirety of the statement was audio and video recorded. At the
beginning of the interview, the defendant was read his Miranda rights
and signed a Miranda form. . . .

....

On the video, the defendant can be seen reviewing the written
form and signing it. When the defendant asks ‘And where’s the

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No. 88037-3-I/9

attorney at?’ he is looking directly down at the form and is looking for
the attorney information in the document he is actively reading.

(Formatting added.)

On appeal, there is no dispute the hardcopy Miranda waiver and Maahs’s

initial reading of it accurately stated Sanders’s rights as required by Miranda. 384

U.S. at 444. In line with the court’s finding, the video shows Sanders leaning

forward to read the Miranda waiver when he states, “[W]here’s the attorney at?”

We hold sufficient evidence supports finding of fact V.

B

In finding of fact VI, the court found

[t]hat the defendant made a knowing, voluntary, intelligent waiver of
his right to remain silent based on the fact that the defendant was
read his Miranda warnings on this case, had, on at least two previous
cases, been advised of his Miranda rights, acknowledged he
understood his rights, and had a voluntary conversation with law
enforcement after being read his rights.

(Formatting added.) The court’s reference to how Sanders “was read his Miranda

warnings on this case,” as discussed above, is supported by the record.

(Formatting added.) The court further finding Sanders “acknowledged he

understood his rights, and had a voluntary conversation with law enforcement after

being read his rights,” aligns with the record where Sanders expressly said “[y]es”

when asked if he “understand[s] these rights?” immediately after Maahs’s reading

of the Miranda waiver. Sanders also expressly said, “I’ll talk to you guys”

immediately thereafter when asked, “Having these rights in mind are you willing to

talk to us?”

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No. 88037-3-I/10

1

Sanders argues the State did not show a knowing and intelligent waiver of

his right to counsel by pointing to his then referencing his prior arraignment and

subsequent inability to afford an attorney. However, Sanders was speaking to his

ability to afford counsel instead of having one at public expense, rather than his

right to have counsel present during questioning. The court could validly discredit

Sanders’s claim of confusion based on his affirming to officers that he understood

his rights, his reading the Miranda waiver out loud to himself, and his signing

immediately thereafter attesting again that he “understand[s] each of these rights”

of which he is “fully aware.” The Miranda waiver stated that Sanders has “the right

at this time to talk to an attorney . . . before and during questioning” and that “[i]f

you cannot afford an attorney, you are entitled to have one appointed for you

without cost to you.”

2

Sanders points to Shank stating they could not offer Sanders “ ‘legal

advice’ ” as misinformation. But the officers’ unwillingness to attempt to expand

on the Miranda warnings they had given was not misinformation as this context

transpired, nor does it rise to the level of United States v. Garcia, 431 F.2d 134

(9th Cir. 1970) on which Sanders relies. There, “agents gave [the defendant]

several different versions of the Miranda bundle of warnings” and “[o]n no occasion

was a warning given fully complying with Miranda.” Garcia, 431 F.2d at 134

(formatting added). Here, it is undisputed the Miranda waiver and Maahs’s

recitation of it provided an accurate and plainly worded Miranda warning.

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No. 88037-3-I/11

In State v. Whitaker, we rejected a similar argument that “[Federal Bureau

of Investigation] agents ‘affirmatively misrepresented’ [Whitaker’s] right to

counsel.” 133 Wn. App. 199, 216, 135 P.3d 923 (2006). There, Whitaker asked

about when he could talk to an attorney, and the “agents told Whitaker the court

‘would deal with this’ when he went to court the next morning,” after his questions

about the right to counsel. Id. However, this court held that because “the agents

also told Whitaker he could request an attorney ‘at that moment’ ” he “could not

have reasonably believed that he did not have the right to counsel at that moment.”

Id. at 216-17. Here too, Maahs’s recitation and the Miranda waiver accurately

stated Sanders’s rights, including that he had the right to an attorney “at this time”

and “before and during questioning.”

This matter is also unlike Mayer, where the officer’s “warnings conditioned

the attachment of [the defendant’s] right to appointed counsel on several future

events,” as opposed to being immediately available before or during the

investigation. 184 Wn.2d at 563. The court distinguished a conditional statement

of rights from officers relying upon a “written advice of rights form,” which “ ‘touched

all the bases required by Miranda.’ ” Mayer, 184 Wn.2d at 563 (quoting Duckworth

v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 198, 203, 109 S. Ct. 2875, 106 L. Ed. 2d 166 (1989)).

Maahs and Shank did not express a statement of rights conditioned on future

events. Id. Instead, the officers relied on an accurate Miranda waiver, similar to

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No. 88037-3-I/12

the written advice of rights form discussed in Mayer, that indicated Sanders had

the right to counsel at that time.5

3

The court also found Sanders had “on at least two previous cases, been

advised of his Miranda rights, acknowledged he understood his rights, and had a

voluntary conversation with law enforcement after being read his rights.” Sanders

argues a “defendant’s prior experience with Miranda warnings weighs little in

general, and in this case to no extent.”

Our Supreme Court has held a “defendant’s prior experience with police,

crime, custodial interrogations, and the criminal justice system in general is

particularly relevant.” State v. Luna, No. 103251-0, slip op. at 28 (Wash. Oct. 30,

2025), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/1032510.pdf. The defendant in

Luna “had never been questioned or interrogated by police as a suspect” and there

“was also no evidence Luna had ever been given a Miranda warning or exercised

her right to silence or counsel before the day of the interrogation.” Id. at 3. In

contrast, the defendant in State v. Hutchinson, “had been advised of his rights at

least five separate times in recent years” and “[e]ach time, he acknowledged

5 Compare the statement here, (“You have the right at this time to talk to an

attorney of your choice and to have your attorney present before and during
questioning. . . . If you cannot afford an attorney, you are entitled to have one
appointed for you without cost to you and to have the attorney present at any time
during any questioning.”), with the statement discussed in Mayer (“ ‘You have a
right to talk to a lawyer for advice before we ask you any questions, and to have
him with you during questioning. You have this right to the advice and presence
of a lawyer even if you cannot afford to hire one . . . one will be appointed for
you.’ ”). Mayer, 184 Wn.2d at 563 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Duckworth, 492
U.S. at 198).

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No. 88037-3-I/13

understanding those rights, waived them, and spoke to police.” 135 Wn.2d 863,

885, 959 P.2d 1061 (1998), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Jackson, 195

Wn.2d 841, 856, 467 P.3d 97 (2020).

Here, Sanders previously received Miranda warnings on at least three other

occasions. First, in October 2021 a state trooper arrested Sanders for driving

under the influence and read him a “department issued Miranda Rights Card,” after

which Sanders “acknowledged his rights and agreed to speak.” Second, in

January 2018 Sanders heard a Tukwila police officer “read Sanders his Miranda

Rights which he exercised” after which he was arrested. Third, in March 2009 a

Pierce County sheriff’s deputy “advised [Sanders] of his [Miranda] warning rights,

which he stated he understood and agreed to waive.”6

4

Sanders also argues that doubt about whether he was validly waiving his

rights needed to be clarified at the time, claiming “[w]hat should have happened

here, when [he] expressed confusion as to whether he could actually get an

attorney, is that an officer should have properly clarified the right.” Sanders also

supplements this argument in his SAG. We disagree.

6 The authorities recounted above do not state a defendant’s past
experience with Miranda warnings automatically establishes they understand their
rights at subsequent proceedings. Hutchinson, 135 Wn.2d at 885; Luna, slip op.
at 28, 35. Rather, these prior experiences are part of the totality of circumstances
around a defendant’s Miranda waiver. Luna, slip op. at 28, 35; Mayer, 184 Wn.2d
at 556.
We also note that at least two of the past Miranda advisements the State
offered here were much more distant in the past than those on which the State
relied in Hutchinson, rendering their probative value clearly less.

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No. 88037-3-I/14

In 1982, our Supreme Court, when “applying the United States

Constitution’s Fifth Amendment, stated that a suspect’s equivocal request for an

attorney forbids any further police questions except to clarify the request.” State

v. Radcliffe, 164 Wn.2d 900, 902, 194 P.3d 250 (2008) (citing State v. Robtoy, 98

Wn.2d 30, 39, 653 P.2d 284 (1982)). “Twelve years later, the United States

Supreme Court clarified otherwise; under the Fifth Amendment, once a suspect

has knowingly waived his right to an attorney, he must explicitly ask for an attorney

or the police may continue questioning.” Id. (citing Davis v. United States, 512

U.S. 452, 459, 114 S. Ct. 2350, 129 L. Ed. 2d 362 (1994)). “Davis is the law under

the federal constitution.” Id. at 907.

But Sanders’s briefing and SAG point to authority limiting this principle to

postwaiver invocation of Miranda rights, not at issue here, in contrast to waiver.

United States v. Rodriguez interpreted Davis to “address[] only the scope of

invocations of Miranda rights in a post-waiver context.” Rodriguez, 518 F.3d 1072,

1078-79 (9th Cir. 2008). Rodriguez focused on the language from Davis that

“ ‘after a knowing and voluntary waiver of the Miranda rights, law enforcement

officers may continue questioning until and unless the suspect clearly requests an

attorney.’ ” Rodriguez, 518 F.3d at 1078 (quoting Davis, 512 U.S. at 461). In other

words, the Ninth Circuit held only after a valid Miranda waiver does “the suspect

. . . bear[] the ‘burden’ of cutting off questioning by unambiguously retracting the

clear waiver he has already given.” Id. at 1079. According to Rodriguez, to the

extent Ninth Circuit law requires prewaiver clarification of a suspect’s wishes

concerning his Miranda rights, “it has not been superseded by Davis.” Id. at 1080.

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No. 88037-3-I/15

In Radcliffe, our Supreme Court did not adopt Rodriguez. Radcliffe, 164

Wn.2d at 906-07. Moreover, Rodriguez is inapposite here. “We also infer a waiver

‘when a defendant voluntarily discusses the charged crime with police officers and

indicates an understanding of his rights.’ ” State v. Campos-Cerna, 154 Wn. App.

702, 709, 226 P.3d 185 (2010) (quoting State v. Ellison, 36 Wn. App. 564, 571,

676 P.2d 531 (1984)). Here, the trial court could conclude Sanders waived

Miranda when he both expressly stated he understood his rights and that he would

talk to the officers immediately after Maahs’s recitation of his Miranda rights.

Sanders further negated any need for clarification when he suspended the

conversation to read the written Miranda warnings and sign them. To reiterate,

Sanders stated the following when leaning forward to read the Miranda waiver

placed in front of him:

Sanders: Like I said, that you can have an attorney but then you
can’t get an attorney.

What’s this one?

Maahs: So this you’d . . . .

Sanders: I want the police department, Pierce County Sheriff’s
Department, other 11/10/21. (Unintelligible) is 3 (Unintelligible).
Incident number 21-305-00483. Advisement of right, before
questioning and the making any other statement I want to remind you
your rights. And you have (Unintelligible) court of law and I can save
stuff.

(Emphasis added.) As shown above, Sanders opted to suspend the conversation

and read the accurate Miranda waiver himself out loud instead of waiting for

Maahs’s response. Sanders then signed the waiver to attest he was “fully aware

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No. 88037-3-I/16

of these rights” and “understand[s] each of these rights.” Only after that point did

the officers begin their interrogation.

We hold substantial evidence supports the court’s finding of fact VI that

Sanders’s voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights.

C

Sanders also assigns error to the court’s finding of fact VII, which states,

The court finds that the defendant’s statements regarding an
attorney contained above are not an unequivocal request for
counsel. The court find that the defendant’s statement ‘where’s the
attorney at’ is a reference to the attorney information contained within
the form and is not a request for an attorney in the interview. The
court finds that the defendant clearly conveyed to law enforcement
that he wished to speak to them.

Sanders offers little substantive argument on whether Sanders unequivocally

requested counsel, instead focusing on the validity of his Miranda waiver, which is

a distinct inquiry from invocation. Smith, 469 U.S. at 98.

In support of its finding, the court observed “the defendant’s statement

‘where’s the attorney at’ is a reference to the attorney information contained within

the form and is not a request for an attorney in the interview.” This finding is

supported by substantial evidence as Sanders’s statement immediately followed

both Shank placing the Miranda waiver in front of him and stating, “[W]e’ll just have

you sign here” as Sanders leaned forward to read the waiver out loud to himself.

The court further finding Sanders “wished to speak” with “law enforcement” is

supported by Sanders twice stating, “I’ll talk to you guys,” signing the Miranda

waiver attesting he “voluntarily wish[es] to answer questions now,” and as

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No. 88037-3-I/17

discussed above is further buttressed by the full context of his conversation with

the officers.

We hold substantial evidence supports the court’s finding of fact VII.

D

The trial court’s supported findings in turn support the legal conclusion that

Sanders’s confession was admissible at trial under Miranda. Gasteazoro-

Paniagua, 173 Wn. App. at 755. Sanders assigns error to conclusion of law V,7

which reads,

That on November 10, 2021, the defendant was in custody and
subjected to interrogation. The court finds the defendant was
properly advised of his Miranda rights. Both the oral advisement of
rights and the written advisement of rights contained a complete and
accurate renditions of the defendant’s Miranda right as required
under CrR 3.5 and Miranda . . . . The court finds by a preponderance
of evidence that the defendant made a knowing, voluntary[,]
intelligent waiver of his right to remain silent on November 10, 2021.

(Some formatting added.) The above conclusion flows from the court finding the

Miranda waiver and Maahs’s reading of it accurately stated Sanders’s rights. The

full context of Sanders’s interactions with the officers, including Sanders opting to

read the accurate Miranda waiver out loud to himself before signing, further

supports the court’s conclusion that he made a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent

waiver of his rights. We hold the “the trial court’s conclusions of law are properly

derived from its findings of fact.” Gasteazoro-Paniagua, 173 Wn. App. at 755. In

7 Sanders also assigns error to conclusion of law VI, in which the court

determined he did not unequivocally “invoke” his Miranda rights. However,
Sanders’s arguments take issue with the court addressing invocation “rather than
determining that Mr. Sanders did not knowingly waive his Miranda rights,”
(emphasis added), and otherwise focus on waiver, as opposed to substantively
addressing invocation, which is legally distinct. Smith, 469 U.S. at 98.

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No. 88037-3-I/18

turn, we hold the court did not err by denying Sanders’s motion to suppress his

confessions.

III

Sanders asserts three claims in his SAG. His first claim supplements his

Miranda claim as discussed above. His remaining two claims assert errors under

ER 404(b) and the corpus delicti rule. We reject both.

A

Sanders argues the court abused its discretion under ER 404(b) by

admitting statements from G.C.’s father to support his conviction for murder in the

first degree against G.C. The statements of G.C.’s father relate to a September

2021 domestic violence incident between Sanders and G.C.

Sanders argues that under State v. Powell, 126 Wn.2d 244, 262, 893 P.2d

615 (1993), G.C.’s “death was caused by multiple stab wounds” and “[a]ll injuries

inflicted upon the victim are indicators that the suspect intended to inflict harm,”

meaning “the trial court erred by admitting a prior act to prove intent when intent

was not at issue.” We disagree.

We review a court’s decision to admit evidence under ER 404(b) for an

abuse of discretion. State v. Fisher, 165 Wn.2d 727, 745, 202 P.3d 937 (2009). A

trial court abuses its discretion when it fails to abide by the requirements of ER

404(b). Id.

Here, the State moved to admit “evidence of the defendant’s past violent

behavior towards” G.C. through her father’s statements to police on the September

2021 incident. The State characterized this evidence as showing a “tumultuous

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No. 88037-3-I/19

relationship that involved a violent assault witnessed by a third party that the

defendant admitted began when he discovered [G.C.] was not being faithful.” The

State urged that the “jury must be able to know about the defendant’s prior bad

acts in order to understand the volatile dynamics of the defendant’s relationship

with G.C.” as “[w]ithout this background, premeditation and motive are

nonsensical.”

The court ruled “the evidence the State seeks to admit under ER 404(b) is

admissible for the limited purpose of proving premeditation and the defendant’s

intent, state of mind, and motive, as related to Count 6, Aggravated Murder in the

First Degree.”

Powell explained, “Evidence of previous disputes or quarrels between the

accused and the deceased . . . must be necessary to prove a material issue” such

as “intent when intent is at issue or when proof of the doing of the charged act

does not itself conclusively establish intent.” 126 Wn.2d at 261-62. In Powell,

“[p]roof of the act of manual strangulation” was among the evidence establishing

an intent to kill. Id. at 262. As a result, Powell upheld this court’s holding that “the

prior misconduct evidence was improperly admitted for intent” where “intent was

not a disputed issue” and, given the nature of the homicide, “none of the contested

evidence in this case is necessary to prove intent.” Id.

But Powell held evidence of past disputes was admissible for other

purposes under ER 404(b), notably, motive. Powell, 126 Wn.2d at 260-61. In

addition, this case involved a charge of murder in the first degree, which requires

premeditation. RCW 9A.32.030(1)(a). Powell involved a conviction for murder in

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the second degree, Powell, 126 Wn.2d at 247, which does not require

premeditation. RCW 9A.32.050(1)(a).8 Powell explained, “[e]vidence of previous

disputes or quarrels between the accused and the deceased is generally

admissible in murder cases, particularly where malice or premeditation is at issue.”

126 Wn.2d at 261. Here, the trial court properly admitted evidence of the past

dispute to show premeditation. Thus, even if it was error to allow the evidence to

show intent, this would not require reversal because a reviewing court “will uphold

a trial court’s decision to admit evidence of prior misconduct under ER 404(b) if

one of its cited bases is justified.” Powell, 126 Wn.2d at 264. Sanders focuses

solely on intent and does not challenge the trial court’s rulings that the statements

were properly admitted for premeditation and motive.

We reject Sanders’s ER 404(b) claim as Powell supports the trial court’s

ruling and does not require reversal.

B

Sanders argues this court must reverse his conviction for attempted murder

in the first degree against T.L. as his confession “cannot be used to prove guilt

absent independent evidence corroborating” it under the corpus delicti rule. He

claims “[t]here is no reference to any evidence of the mens rea intent to kill” and

instead the “evidence supports that [he] stabbed [T.L.] to facilitate a robbery.”

Sanders refers to court’s instructions and RCW 9A.32.030(1)(a) requiring “a

8 RCW 9A.32.50 has been amended since the events of this case
transpired. Because the amendment does not impact the statutory language relied
on by this court, we refer to the current version of the statute.

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No. 88037-3-I/21

premeditated intent to cause the death of another person” to convict a defendant

of murder in the first degree. We disagree.

Under the corpus delicti rule, a “confession or admission of a defendant

charged with a crime cannot be used to prove the defendant’s guilt in the absence

of independent evidence corroborating that confession or admission.” State v.

Whalen, 131 Wn. App. 58, 62, 126 P.3d 55 (2005). To satisfy this rule, the State

need only show “evidence of sufficient circumstances supporting a logical and

reasonable inference of criminal activity,” which is a lower bar than even a

“preponderance of evidence.” Id. Corpus delicti involves two elements: (1) an

injury or loss (2) caused by someone’s criminal act. State v. Cardenas-Flores, 189

Wn.2d 243, 263, 401 P.3d 19 (2017). Mens rea is not required to satisfy corpus

delicti. Id. at 263-64. The generally prevailing view is that corroborating evidence

need only tend to show the major or essential harm involved in the offense charged

and not all of the elements technically distinguished. Id. at 264 n.9 (quoting 1

KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 146, at 810 (7th ed. 2013)).

“The corpus delicti doctrine generally is a principle that tests the sufficiency

or adequacy of evidence, other than a defendant’s confession,” State v. Dow, 168

Wn.2d 243, 249, 227 P.3d 1278 (2010), and “[w]e review a challenge to the

sufficiency of the evidence de novo.” State v. Perry, 6 Wn. App. 2d 544, 552, 431

P.3d 543 (2018). For a corpus delicti claim, “we must assume the truth of the

State’s evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom.” Whalen, 131

Wn. App. at 62.

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No. 88037-3-I/22

Here, T.L. testified she witnessed Sanders attacking G.C. Sanders fled

after T.L. arrived at the scene of the attack and screamed. However, Sanders

returned as T.L. attempted to assist G.C. Sanders then stabbed T.L. seven times,

including once in the temple, which cracked her skull.

Sanders’s return to the scene and the nature of his attack on T.L. establish

for purposes of the corpus delicti rule premeditation and a clear intent to kill, well-

surpassing “a logical and reasonable inference of criminal activity” on both points.

Whalen, 131 Wn. App. at 62; see also State v. Sherrill, 145 Wn. App. 473, 484-85,

186 P.3d 1157 (2008) (“Premeditation is ‘the deliberate formation of and reflection

upon the intent to take a human life’ ” and includes consideration of the “method

of killing.”) (quoting State v. Hoffman, 116 Wn.2d 51, 82, 804 P.2d 577 (1991));

see also State v. Elmi, 138 Wn. App. 306, 313, 156 P.3d 281 (2007) (“[I]t is not

necessary for the State to show that [the defendant] verbalized or acted out his

intent beforehand[,] . . . intent to kill may be inferred from all the circumstances

surrounding the event.”). This matter is distinct from Whalen where the State failed

to provide any evidence of the defendant’s intent to manufacture an illegal

substance beyond his “mere possession” of the substance. 131 Wn. App. at 63-

65.

We reject Sanders’s corpus delicti claim as corroborating evidence supports

his premeditation and intent to kill T.L.

IV

Sanders argues the sentencing court violated his right to a jury trial by

determining same criminal conduct and washout issues, arguing they are

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No. 88037-3-I/23

“undeniably factual questions” that a jury must determine beyond a reasonable

doubt. We conclude we are unable to review these claims of error.

The question of “same criminal conduct” affects certain sentencing

decisions under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA), ch. 9.94A RCW. See

RCW 9.94A.589(1)(a). Similarly, “washout” refers to certain rules for counting prior

convictions under the SRA. See RCW 9.94A.525(2)(b), (c), (d), (f); State v.

Schwartz, 194 Wn.2d 432, 434, 450 P.3d 141 (2019). Sanders points to nothing

in the record showing the court at any time addressed or ruled on washout or same

criminal conduct issues. He also does not show that either could have affected

the court’s sentencing determination when imposing life imprisonment without

possibility of release under RCW 10.95.030(1) for his aggravated murder in the

first degree, a sentencing statute different from the SRA.9 Thus, this challenge

fails due to inadequate briefing. Cowiche Canyon Conservancy v. Bosley, 118

Wn.2d 801, 809, 828 P.2d 549 (1992); State v. Garcia, 45 Wn. App. 132, 140, 724

P.2d 412 (1986) (“A party seeking review has the burden of perfecting the record

so that the appellate court has before it all the evidence relevant to the issue.”).

Sanders’s failure to show that the trial court ever made rulings on same

criminal conduct or washout and his failure to show any effect on his overall

sentence foreclose review by this court even though Sanders was simultaneously

sentenced on felony convictions subject to the SRA. Aside from the fact his

briefing never points to rulings for this court to review, he also does not show that

9 At sentencing, Sanders’s attorney acknowledged the “State is correct that

the sentence is largely dictated by statute” and “we are in agreement with
everything the State has proposed.”

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No. 88037-3-I/24

his overall sentence would be affected on remand given his mandatory sentence

based on his aggravated murder in the first degree conviction. Cf. In re Pers.

Restraint of Rowland, 149 Wn. App. 496, 508, 204 P.3d 953 (2009) (“When a

sentencing court incorrectly calculates the standard range before imposing an

exceptional sentence, remand is the remedy unless the record clearly indicates

the sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence anyway.”).

V

We affirm Sanders’s judgment sentence.

WE CONCUR:

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11215967. Public record. Not legal advice.