# Mills

> District Court, W.D. Louisiana · November 7, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11215440

## Case

- **Full name:** Travis C. Mills et al v. Rocket Mortgage LLC et al
- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Louisiana
- **Decided:** November 7, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11215440

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding, for the FDCPA to apply, the defendant must qualify as a debt collector
- finding that Rule 5 permits service of an amended complaint without personal service of the summons and complaint on defendants who were properly served with the original complaint and have appeared
- stating that whether defendant is a debt collector is a “threshold determination” for an FDCPA claim

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
MONROE DIVISION

TRAVIS C MILLS ET AL CIVIL ACTION NO. 25-cv-239

VERSUS JUDGE TERRY A. DOUGHTY

ROCKET MORTGAGE LLC ET AL MAG. JUDGE KAYLA D. MCCLUSKY

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION AND MEMORANDUM ORDER
Before the undersigned Magistrate Judge, on reference from the District Court, are
several motions, including (1) Motion to Remand and Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss for Lack
of Subject Matter Jurisdiction, as well as a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a
Claim [docs. #5, 16, 20] filed jointly by Defendants Rocket Mortgage and Herschel Adcock; (2)
Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim [doc. #23] filed by Defendant
Judge Walter Caldwell; (3) Rule 12(b)(5) Motion to Dismiss for Insufficient Service of Process
[doc. #26] filed by Defendant Sheriff Mike Tubbs; and (4) Motion for Leave to File Second
Amended Complaint [doc. #18] filed by Plaintiffs Travis C. Mills and Regina Harrell Mills. The
motions are opposed [docs. #8, 18, 20, 29, 31, 32].
For reasons detailed below, IT IS ORDERED that the Motion for Leave to File Second
Amended Complaint [doc. #18] filed by Plaintiffs Travis C. Mills and Regina Harrell Mills is
GRANTED.
IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Motion to Remand [docs. #5, 16, 20] filed by
Defendants Rocket Mortgage and Herschel Adcock be DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss for
Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction [docs. #5, 16, 20] filed jointly by Defendants Rocket
Mortgage and Herschel Adcock be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss for

Failure to State a Claim [docs. #5, 16, 20] filed jointly by Defendants Rocket Mortgage and
Herschel Adcock, the Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim [doc. #23]
filed by Defendant Judge Walter Caldwell, and the Rule 12(b)(5) Motion to Dismiss for
Insufficient Service of Process [doc. #26] filed by Defendant Sheriff Mike Tubbs be
GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND
On or about May 13, 2022, Travis C. Mills and Regina Harrell Mills (collectively,
“Plaintiffs”) entered into a promissory note with Rocket Mortgage, LLC (“Rocket”) in the amount
of $305,550 in exchange for a mortgage on property located at 6950 Westlake Road, Sterlington,
Louisiana. [doc. #5-6]. The promissory note was a fixed-rate note with an interest rate of 5.375%
per annum, amounting to a monthly payment of $1,711.00 due on the first of each month beginning
on July 1, 2022. Id. The mortgage agreement provided that any failure to pay any charges
provided in the note could result in acceleration of the sums owed and sale of the property. [doc.
#5-7]. On May 1, 2024, Plaintiffs failed to make a timely payment in accordance with the note.

[doc. #1-2]. Rocket provided Plaintiffs with the notice of default, and Plaintiffs failed to properly
cure the default. Id.
On December 3, 2024, Herschel C. Adcock, Jr. (“Adcock”) filed a Petition for Mortgage
Foreclosure By Executory Process Without Appraisal in the 4th Judicial District Court for
Morehouse Parish, Louisiana, on behalf of Rocket. Id. On December 10, 2024, the state court
judge, Judge Walter M. Caldwell, IV (“Judge Caldwell”) ordered that a Writ of Seizure and Sale
be issued commanding the Sheriff of Morehouse Parish to seize and sell the immovable property
encumbered by Rocket’s mortgage. [doc. #5-2]. On January 5, 2025, the Sheriff of Morehouse
Parish, Mike Tubbs (“Sheriff Tubbs”), served a copy of a notice of seizure of the immovable

property described in the mortgage upon the Clerk of Court for Morehouse Parish, Louisiana.
[doc. #5-3]. That same day, Plaintiffs, as well as Adcock, were also served a certified copy of the
notice of seizure. [docs. #5-4, 5-5]. The notice of seizure noted that the property would be sold
at a sheriff’s sale on Wednesday, February 26, 2025, at 10:00 A.M. Id.
On the morning of February 26, 2025, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint and Notice of Removal
in the Western District of Louisiana.1 [doc. #1]. In this Complaint, Plaintiffs named Rocket,
Adcock, Judge Caldwell, and Sheriff Tubbs as Defendants and alleged violations of the Truth in
Lending Act (“TILA”), violations of due process, and fraudulent actions which preceded the
foreclosure. Id. Plaintiffs simultaneously filed a motion for Temporary Restraining Order
(“TRO”) to stay the foreclosure proceedings. [doc. #2]. The TRO was denied by Judge Doughty

on February 26, 2025. [doc. #4]. As such, the Louisiana state court foreclosure proceeding of the
property was completed as scheduled.
On March 6, 2025, Defendants Adcock and Rocket filed a joint motion to remand2 and
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. [doc. #5]. Both

1 The filing made by Plaintiffs in the Western District of Louisiana both purported to be a removal
of a state court action and an original complaint. Insofar as Plaintiffs intended to remove the
ongoing state court proceedings to federal court, those claims were terminated by Judge Doughty’s
denial of Plaintiffs’ motion for a TRO and the subsequent completed sheriff’s sale, which ended
any ongoing state controversy. Given this, as well as Plaintiffs’ pro se status, the Court will treat
Plaintiffs’ filings as an original complaint in its analysis hereafter.

2 As the Court will be continuing its analysis with the understanding that Plaintiffs’ claims are an
original filing, there is no ongoing state court controversy to remand.
Defendants argue that the Court does not possess subject matter jurisdiction over the claims for
several reasons. Id. First, they argue that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to modify or
hinder the state court decision because of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Id. Second, they contend
diversity jurisdiction cannot be established because three of the Defendants added, namely

Adcock, Sheriff Tubbs, and Judge Caldwell, are citizens of the same state as the Plaintiffs. Id.
Finally, they contend the Plaintiffs cannot base federal question jurisdiction upon allegations
contained in their removal complaint concerning federal law. Id.
Plaintiffs filed an opposition to Defendants’ motion to remand and motion to dismiss on
March 10, 2025. [doc. #8]. Plaintiffs reasserted this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction, arguing
that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply to their present claims as they are not seeking to
overturn a state court judgment but assert fraudulent actions by Defendants. Id. They additionally
filed a First Amended Complaint and Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint on
March 26, 2025, and on April 23, 2025, respectively. [docs. #10, 18]. The amended complaints
contain several additional claims against the Defendants, including violations of the Racketeer

Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
(“FDCPA”), and various state claims of fraud, unjust enrichment, and civil conspiracy. [doc. #18].
Plaintiffs seek various forms of relief, including recission of the original mortgage, declaration of
invalidity as to the mortgage and foreclosure, quiet title in favor of the Plaintiffs, restitution for
payments toward the mortgage, other compensatory damages and punitive damages. [docs. #1,
10, 18].3

3 While the most recent pleading is typically the operative one, in light of Plaintiffs’ pro se
status, the Court has considered all allegations in the Complaint, Amended Complaint, and
Second Amended Complaint.
Each of the Defendants filed responses to these original and amended complaints. Rocket
and Adcock objected to both the first and second amended complaints alleging that they were not
properly served with the amended complaints and reasserted their motion to remand and motion
to dismiss on April 17, 2025, and April 24, 2025. [docs. #16, 20]. Judge Caldwell filed a motion

to dismiss for failure to state a claim on April 26, 2025. [doc. #23]. Sheriff Tubbs filed a motion
to dismiss for insufficient service of process. [doc. #26].
All of the aforementioned matters are now ripe.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction; without jurisdiction conferred by statute,
they lack the power to adjudicate claims.” In re FEMA Trailer Formaldehyde Products Liab.
Litig. (Mississippi Plaintiffs), 668 F.3d 281, 286 (5th Cir. 2012). A motion to dismiss under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) challenges a federal court’s subject matter jurisdiction.
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1). Under Rule 12(b)(1), “[a] case is properly dismissed for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction when the court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the
case.” Home Builders Ass’n of Miss., Inc. v. City of Madison, Miss., 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir.
1998) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, the court may rely on (1) the complaint
alone, presuming the allegations to be true, (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts,
or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts and by the court’s resolution of disputed
facts. Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap As v. HeereMac Vof, 241 F.3d 420, 424 (5th Cir. 2001); see
also Barrera-Montenegro v. USA & DEA, 74 F.3d 657, 659 (5th Cir. 1996). When examining a
factual challenge to subject matter jurisdiction that does not implicate the merits of plaintiff's cause
of action, the district court has substantial authority “to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to
the existence of its power to hear the case.” Garcia v. Copenhaver, Bell & Assocs., 104 F.3d 1256,
1261 (11th Cir. 1997); see also Clark v. Tarrant County, 798 F.2d 736, 741 (5th Cir. 1986).
Accordingly, the Court may consider matters outside the pleadings, such as testimony and

affidavits. See Garcia, 104 F.3d at 1261. A court’s dismissal of a case for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction is not a decision on the merits, and the dismissal does not necessarily prevent the
plaintiff from pursuing the claim in another forum. See Hitt v. City of Pasadena, 561 F.2d 606,
608 (5th Cir. 1977).
B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a district court may dismiss a
complaint, or any part of it, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted if the
plaintiff has not set forth factual allegations in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief.
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); Cuvillier v. Taylor, 503 F.3d 397, 401 (5th
Cir. 2007). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. The court, however, does not accept as true
legal conclusions or mere conclusory statements, and “conclusory allegations or legal conclusions
masquerading as factual conclusions will not suffice to prevent a motion to dismiss.” S. Christian
Leadership Conference v. Supreme Court of the State of La., 252 F.3d 781, 786 (5th Cir. 2001)
(citing Fernandez-Montes v. Allied Pilots Ass’n, 987 F.2d 278, 284 (5th Cir. 1993)).
“[T]hreadbare recitals of elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements”
or “naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement” are not sufficient. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 663, 678 (citations omitted).
In summary, “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the

court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has
not show[n]—that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)).
“Dismissal is appropriate when the complaint ‘on its face show[s] a bar to relief.’” Cutrer v.
McMillan, 308 F. App’x 819, 820 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (quotations omitted).
C. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5)
A motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5) “challenges the mode of
delivery or the lack of delivery of the summons and complaint.” Gartin v. Par Pharm. Cos., Inc.,
289 Fed. App’x 688, 692 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting 5B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL 3D § 1353) (internal quotations omitted).
When service is challenged, the serving party bears the burden of proving its validity or good cause

for failure to effect timely service. Kitchen v. Walk-On’s Bistreaux & Bar, 2020 WL 2404911, at
*3 (W.D. La. May 12, 2020) (citing Sys. Signs Supplies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Washington D.C.,
903 F.2d 1011, 1013 (5th Cir. 1990)).
“If a defendant is not served within 90 days after the complaint is filed, the court – on
motion or on its own after notice to the plaintiff – must dismiss the action without prejudice against
that defendant or order that service be made within a specific time.” FED. R. CIV. P. 4(m).
However, “if the plaintiff shows good cause for the failure, the court must extend the time for
service for an appropriate period.” Id.
III. POTENTIAL RULE 11 VIOLATIONS
Normally, the undersigned would now turn to an analysis of the parties’ arguments.
However, as an initial matter, many of Plaintiffs’ referenced filings are rife with citations to cases
that do not exist, mischaracterizations of cases which do exist, or incorrect citations to cases. It

appears that Plaintiffs likely used generative artificial intelligence (“GenAI”) to assist in research
and failed to check whether the GenAI-generated content was accurate.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b), by presenting this brief to the Court,
Plaintiffs “certifie[d] to the best of their knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an
inquiry reasonable under the circumstances,” that the “legal contentions are warranted by existing
law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b). Plaintiffs have not abided by this certification with the
aforementioned filings. The fact that Plaintiffs are proceeding pro se does not excuse the failure to
comply with Rule 11. Gordon v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A. Inc., 2025 WL 1057211, at *3 (M.D. Ga.
Apr. 8, 2025); Attaway v. Ill. Dep't of Corr., 2025 WL 1101398 at *3 (explaining that the fact that
a party is pro se and “not a licensed attorney” “is not an excuse for leniency with Rule 11”);

McKeown v. Paycom Payroll LLC, No. CIV-24-301-PRW, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60391, 2025
WL 978221, at *9 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 31, 2025). Therefore, it is recommended the District Court
consider whether Rule 11(c) sanctions should be ordered based on their inappropriate use of
GenAI. See Gauthier v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 2024 WL 4882651, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Nov.
25, 2024) (requiring an attorney who cited quotes and cases that do not exist to pay a $2000 penalty
to the Court). Regardless of any action which may be taken by the presiding District Judge, on
this occasion, Plaintiffs are warned that any further inappropriate use of GenAI could result in
sanctions, such as the striking of their briefs, fines, or other appropriate actions.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The undersigned now turns to consider whether it possesses subject matter jurisdiction over
the present case. Plaintiffs contend this Court possesses subject matter jurisdiction under both 28

U.S.C. § 1331, federal question jurisdiction, and 28 U.S.C. § 1332, diversity jurisdiction. [docs.
#1, 18-2]. Defendants Rocket Mortgage and Adcock contend that there are Defendants who are
Louisiana residents, defeating diversity jurisdiction. [doc. # 5]. Defendants further allege that
federal question jurisdiction has not been properly pleaded on the face of Plaintiff’s Complaint.
Id.
Turning first to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, the undersigned finds that there a lack of complete
diversity to support diversity jurisdiction. Diversity jurisdiction requires all plaintiffs to be diverse
in citizenship from all defendants and that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, exclusive
of interest and costs. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. “Because federal courts have limited jurisdiction, parties
must make ‘clear, distinct, and precise affirmative jurisdictional allegations’ in their pleadings.”

Getty Oil Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 841 F.2d 1254, 1259 (5th Cir. 1988). In alleging diversity,
this requires properly alleging the citizenship of the parties. For individuals, citizenship is an
individual’s domicile, which requires “residence and the intention to remain.” Preston v. Tenet
Healthsystem Mem’l Med. Ctr., Inc., 485 F.3d 793, 798 (5th Cir. 2007). A corporation’s
citizenship is the state in which it has been incorporated and the state of its principal place of
business. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1). Defendants have asserted, and Plaintiffs do not contest, that
Defendants Adcock, Judge Caldwell, and Sheriff Tubbs are all citizens of Louisiana. As Plaintiffs
are also citizens of Louisiana, there is not complete diversity between the Plaintiffs and all
Defendants as required under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Accordingly, this Court is not able to exercise
diversity jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims.
However, this Court finds that federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 has
been established initially. “[F]ederal-question jurisdiction is governed by the ‘well-pleaded

complaint rule,’ which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is
presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint.” Rivet v. Regions Bank of
Louisiana, 522 U.S. 470, 474 (1998) (citations omitted). Section 1331 jurisdiction is properly
invoked when plaintiff pleads a colorable claim “arising under” the Constitution or laws of the
United States. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corporation, 546 U.S. 500 (2006). Indeed, “[t]he assertion of a
claim under a federal statute alone is sufficient to empower the District Court to assume
jurisdiction over the case…” Cervantez v. Bexar County Civil Service Commission, 99 F.3d 730,
733 (5th Cir. 1996) (quoting, Holland/Blue Streak v. Barthelemy, 849 F.2d 987, 988-989 (5th Cir.
1988)).
In both their initial Complaint and their Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs allege violations
of the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”),4 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601, et seq.; they further allege in their

amended complaint violations of the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1692, et seq.; the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution; and the Racketeer
Influences and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961, et seq. This Court has
original jurisdiction over each of these claims, all of which arise under federal law and, thus, trigger
federal question jurisdiction. See Smith v. Barrett Daffin Frappier Turner & Engel, LLP, 735 Fed.
App’x 848, 853 (5th Cir. 2018). Accordingly, based on the claims currently asserted in Plaintiffs’

4 This analysis, again, presumes Plaintiffs’ filings to be an original Complaint rather than a
removal.
Amended Complaint, this Court may exercise subject matter jurisdiction. Moreover, this Court
may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ remaining state law claims. 28 U.S.C. §
1367. The federal and state law claims both arise from and presuppose the alleged fraudulent
foreclosure and, thus, are so related that they form part of the same case or controversy.

While there is an initial finding of jurisdiction, the Court’s inquiry may not conclude here.
Defendants further argue that the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction is improper under the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal courts from adjudicating claims
where the plaintiff seeks to overturn a state-court judgment. Truong v. Bank of Am., N.A., 717
F.3d 377, 382 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing Dist. of Columbia Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462
(1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923)). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine holds
that inferior federal courts do not have the power to modify or reverse state court judgments except
when authorized by Congress. Truong, 717 F.3d at 382 (citing Union Planters Bank Nat’l Ass’n
v. Salih, 369 F.3d 457, 462 (5th Cir. 2004)).
The doctrine is a narrow one confined to cases brought by “state-court losers” complaining

of injuries caused by state court judgments rendered before the commencement of the federal
district court proceedings and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments. Id.
(citing Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)). Importantly,
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not prohibit a plaintiff from presenting an independent claim,
even if that claim denies a legal conclusion that a state court has reached in a case to which he was
a party. Id. (citing Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284). However, a plaintiff cannot circumvent this
jurisdictional limitation “by asserting claims not raised in the state court proceedings or claims
framed as original claims for relief” if such claims are “‘inextricably intertwined’ with a state court
judgment.” United States v. Shepherd, 23 F.3d 923, 924 (5th Cir. 1994) (quoting Feldman, 460
U.S. at 482 n.16)). Likewise, “litigants may not obtain review of state court actions by filing
complaints about those actions in lower federal courts cast in the form of civil rights suits.” Hale
v. Harney, 786 F.2d 688, 690-91 (5th Cir. 1986), overruled on other grounds by Miller v. Dunn,
35 F.4th 1007 (5th Cir. 2022); see also Kimball v. The Fla. Bar, 632 F.2d 1283, 1284-85 (5th Cir.

1980). Indeed, the only federal recourse for constitutional questions arising in state court may be
found by applying for a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. See Liedtke v. State
Bar of Tex., 18 F.3d 315, 317 (5th Cir. 1994).
In determining whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars a federal lawsuit it is important
to identify the source of the plaintiff’s alleged injury and the relief sought. Jones v. Wells Fargo
Home Mortg., Inc., 2025 WL 2419721 at *2; see also Truong, 717 F.3d at 382-83 (quoting Noel
v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1164 (9th Cir. 2003)). In Brooks v. Flagstar Bank, the court reviewed
allegations similar to those in this case and held them to be inextricably intertwined with the state
court judgment. Brooks v. Flagstar Bank, 2011 WL 2710026 at *1 (suit challenging the
defendant’s actions in connection with a final judgment of foreclosure on the plaintiffs’ home).

The plaintiffs alleged that defendant Flagstar “did not have the right to foreclose on the property
and that defendants’ actions before and after the foreclosure violated numerous federal and state
laws.” Id.
The Brooks court held that “[c]ertain of plaintiffs’ claims would require the Court to review
the state court judgment ordering issuance of the writ of seizure and sale, or are inextricably
intertwined with that judgment, and the Court lacks jurisdiction over those claims” under the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Id. at *4 (reasoning that the plaintiffs’ causes of action related to
defendants alleged “abuse” of the executory process, failure to properly serve plaintiffs with a
notice of foreclosure and a proper demand, improper issuance of a writ of seizure, and bad faith
abuse of the executory process “constitute direct attacks on the state court judgment and seek a
thorough review of state court foreclosure procedures”); see also Thomas v. Sticker, 2025 WL
1170725 at *10 (holding that claims of failure to follow proper executory procedures are “direct
attacks on the state court judgment” and are, therefore, “inextricable intertwined with” the state

court judgment).
Several of the claims in Plaintiffs’ complaints are precisely the kind of claims to which the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine is intended to apply. Specifically, for Counts 3, 5, 6, 7, and 8, the relief
sought would require the Court to invalidate, or otherwise negate, the state court’s order judgment
ordering the seizure and sale of the property or that the process undertaken by Defendants was
invalid or improper.5 Thus, these claims are outside the jurisdiction for this Court to adjudicate.
However, violations of the TILA, the FDCPA, and RICO do not appear to implicate the validity
of the state court foreclosure judgment. Adjudicating those claims does not call upon this court to
either review or disturb the state court foreclosure judgment. The Court is persuaded that the
federal claims are independent claims that properly fall under this Court’s original subject matter

jurisdiction. Therefore, this Court finds that Count 3, 5, 6, 7, and 8 are barred by the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine while Counts 1, 2, and 4 are properly within this Court’s jurisdiction.
IT IS RECOMMENDED that Counts 3, 5, 6, 7 and 8 be DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE for a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

5 The Court to the counts as numbered in the Second Amended Complaint [doc. #18] filed by
Plaintiffs. Count 3 is an alleged Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Violation which seeks
only injunctive relief. Count 5 is a state law claim of fraud under La. Civ. Code art. 1953.
Count 6 is a state law claim for unjust enrichment under La. Civ. Code art. 2298. Count 7 is
simply a request for a quiet title decree in Plaintiffs’ favor. Finally, count 8 is a civil conspiracy
state law claim which specifically centered on the sale of the property in question. As such, each
of these claims implicate the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
B. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint
Notably, the counts as outlined above were documented in Plaintiffs’ Second Amended
Complaint. [doc. #18-2]. Plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to file this Second Amended
Complaint on April 23, 2025. [doc. #18-1]. The only objection to Plaintiff’s motion for leave was

raised by Rocket and Adcock for inadequate service of process. [doc. #20].
Plaintiffs have the burden to ensure that Defendants are properly served with summons and
a copy of the original complaint under Rule 4(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. FED.
R. CIV. P. 4(c)(1). After a party has been served with the initial pleading and has appeared,
however, service of subsequent pleadings on that party is proper under Rule 5(a). Fluor Engineers
and Constructors, Inc. v. Southern Pacific Transp. Co., 753 F.2d 444, 449 & n. 7 (5th Cir. 1985)
(explaining that the purpose of Rule 5 is “to facilitate the pleadings process by permitting service
on attorneys of record rather than the individual litigants once the parties are before the court”).
Accordingly, personal service of the summons and complaint is not required to serve an amended
complaint on parties who have already appeared in the litigation. See id.; see also Employee

Painters’ Trust v. Ethan Enters., Inc., 480 F.3d 993, 995-96, 999 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding that Rule
5 permits service of an amended complaint without personal service of the summons and complaint
on defendants who were properly served with the original complaint and have appeared); Ware v.
Gary Community School Corp., 2015 WL 6756870, at *5 (N.D. Ind. 2015) (finding that no
summons is required for service of an amended pleading on parties who have been served with the
initial pleading under Rule 4) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 5(a)(1)(B)); Handshoe v. Abel, No., 2015 WL
12915568, at *2 (S.D. Miss. 2015) (“Rule 5 permits service of an amended complaint [on] an
existing defendant, without personal service of the summons and complaint, if the defendant
previously appeared in the action”).
Further, it is well established that “pro se complaints are held to less stringent standards
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Miller v. Stanmore, 636 F.2d 986, 988 (5th Cir. 1981);
see also Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2002). Rule 15(a) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the Court should freely grant leave to amend “when

justice so requires.” FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a). However, “a district court may refuse leave to amend
if the filing of the amended complaint would be futile, i.e., if the complaint as amended would be
subject to dismissal.” Varela v. Gonzales, 773 F.3d 704, 707 (5th Cir. 2014).
The docket reflects that all Defendants named in the original complaint, apart from Sheriff
Tubbs, were properly served with the original complaint. Personal service of summons and the
amended complaint is not required for these Defendants who have been properly served under
Rule 4 and who have already appeared. Under Rule 5, they were served with the amended
complaint when Plaintiff filed it using the Court's electronic filing system. Additionally, the Court
finds granting Plaintiffs leave to amend will not cause Defendants any prejudice. Therefore, the
motion for leave to file a Second Amended Complaint is GRANTED, and the Court considers the

claims in Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint.
C. Rocket and Adcock’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim
As noted above, the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss was filed jointly by Rocket and
Adcock. For the following analysis, however, Rocket and Adcock’s arguments apply with equal
force to Plaintiffs’ claims against Judge Caldwell and Sheriff Tubbs. Where, as here, a defending
party establishes that a plaintiff has no cause of action, this defense should inure to similarly
situated defendants. See Lewis v. Lynn, 236 F.3d 766, 768, 236 F.3d 766 (5th Cir. 2001) (where
defending party establishes that plaintiff has no cause of action, the defense generally inures to the
benefit of a non-appearing co-defendant). Furthermore, the instant report and recommendation
provides adequate notice to the parties. McCoy v. Wade, 2007 WL 1098738, *1 (W.D. La. Mar.
12, 2007) (citing Magouirk v. Phillips, 144 F.3d 348, 359 (5th Cir. 1998)). Therefore, any and all
Rule 12(b)(6) motion rulings apply, not only to Rocket and Adcock, but to all Defendants.
1. Violations of TILA

In their original complaint, Plaintiffs allege Defendants violated TILA under 15 U.S.C. §
1601 for failing to properly provide the appropriate disclosure statement in a separate document
and failing to make “key loan terms…clearly and conspicuously presented.” Their First Amended
Complaint adds claims under U.S.C. § 1641(g) for allegedly failing to notify Plaintiffs of “transfers
and assignments.” The relief sought in the First Amended Complaint for these alleged TILA
violations included recission of the original mortgage contract. In their Second Amended
Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants violated TILA by failing to “notify Plaintiffs of the
mortgage assignment…and failed to provide a separate TILA Disclosure Statement or disclose
down payment terms.” [doc. #18-2, p. 8]. Plaintiffs claim these failures were violations of 15
U.S.C. §§ 1641(g) and 1601. Id.

TILA “has the broad purpose of promoting ‘the informed use of credit’ by assuring
‘meaningful disclosure of credit terms’ to consumers.” Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444
U.S. 555, 559-60 (1980) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1601). TILA defines disclosures that must be made
in certain consumer credit transactions, including disclosure of the consumer's right to rescind up
to three business days following consummation of the transaction, delivery of a notice of right to
rescind, or delivery of all material disclosures, whichever occurs last. See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a); 12
C.F.R. § 226.23(a)(3), (b). If notice of the right to rescind and certain material disclosures are not
timely made, the right to rescind expires three years after consummation of the transaction. See
15 U.S.C. § 1635(f); 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a)(3). If an obligor exercises his right to rescind, the
security interest given by the obligor is void, and the creditor must return any money or property
given as earnest money or down payment and take any necessary action to reflect the termination
of the security interest. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b). However, there is no right of rescission with respect
to “residential mortgage transactions.” See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(e)(1); 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(f)(1);

Perkins v. Central Mortg. Co., 422 F. Supp. 2d 487, 489 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (explaining that the right
of rescission does not apply to residential mortgage transactions). A “residential mortgage
transaction” means “a transaction in which a mortgage . . . is created or retained against the
consumer’s dwelling to finance the acquisition or initial construction of such dwelling.” 15 U.S.C.
§ 1602(w). To bring an action against a creditor under TILA for damages, the debtor must bring
the action “within one year from the date of the occurrence of the violation.” 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e);
see also, In re Smith, 737 F.2d 1549, 1552 (11th Cir. 1984).
The Court finds that the relief sought by Plaintiffs for failure to disclose is not available.
As an initial matter, the Court notes that the Plaintiffs’ mortgage and note were for the purposes
of purchasing the property located at 6950 Westlake Road, and, as such, Plaintiffs have no right

of rescission for any alleged failure to disclose. See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(e)(1); 12 C.F.R. §
226.23(f)(1). Likewise, Defendants were not required to make specific disclosures related to the
right of rescission because Plaintiffs had no such right. See Perkins v. Central Mortg. Co., 422 F.
Supp. 2d 487, 489 (E.D. Pa. 2006); see also 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(b)(1) (“In a transaction subject to
rescission, a creditor shall deliver two copies of the notice of the right to rescind…”) (emphasis
added). Moreover, because Plaintiffs’ mortgage rate was fixed, Defendants were not required to
provide them with a copy of the Consumer Handbook on Adjustable-Rate Mortgages. See 12
C.F.R. § 226.19(b)(1) (requiring disclosure of the handbook “[i]f the annual percentage rate may
increase after consummation”).
Further, even assuming Defendants somehow violated TILA by failing to make the
required disclosures, Plaintiffs’ claim is time barred. Under 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e), “[a]ny action
under this section may be brought . . . within one year from the date of the occurrence of the
violation.” “The limitations period in Section 1640(e) runs from the date of the transaction . . . but

the doctrine of equitable tolling may, in the appropriate circumstances, suspend the limitations
period until the borrower discovers or had reasonable opportunity to discover the fraud or
nondisclosures that form the basis of the TILA action.” Jackson v. Adcock, 2004 WL 1900484,
*4 (E.D. La. 2004) (quoting King v. California, 784 F.2d 910, 915 (9th Cir. 1986)). Plaintiffs
signed the note and mortgage documents on May 13, 2022, but did not bring this action against
Defendants in state court until February 20, 2025, and did not allege violations of TILA until
February 26, 2025. The statute of limitations thus bars Plaintiffs’ claims. See Jackson, 2004 U.S.,
2004 WL 1900484 at *4 (dismissing plaintiff's TILA claim for failure to file within the limitation
period and noting that “[n]othing prevented [plaintiff] from comparing the loan documents and
TILA's statutory and regulatory requirements”).

For the preceding reasons, the undersigned finds that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim
against either Rocket or Adcock under TILA. As such, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss be GRANTED as to the TILA claims, and these claims be DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.
2. Violations of the FDCPA
The threshold determination for stating an FDCPA claim is whether the defendants fall
under the statute’s definition of a “debt collector.” See Brown v. Morris, 243 F. App’x 31, 36 (5th
Cir. 2007) (stating that whether defendant is a debt collector is a “threshold determination” for an
FDCPA claim); accord Gburek v. Litton Loan Servicing LP, 614 F.3d 380, 384 (7th Cir. 2010)
(holding, for the FDCPA to apply, the defendant must qualify as a debt collector); Montgomery v.
Huntington Bank, 346 F.3d 693, 698 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding whether the defendants fall under
the FDCPA definition of a “debt collector” is a “threshold matter”). The FDCPA defines a “debt
collector” as:

any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any
business the principle purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who
regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or
asserted to be owed or due another... For the purpose of section 1692f(6) of this
title, such term also includes any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate
commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the
enforcement of security interests.

15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). Debt collectors are prohibited from, inter alia, making false or misleading
representations in connection with the collection of a debt and using unfair or unconscionable
means to collect a debt. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692f. Plaintiffs do not allege any of the Defendants
are debt collectors and simply state that Rocket and Adcock used “falsified documents” and
“misrepresented the sale price” of the property. [doc. #18-2, p. 9]. However, even if Plaintiffs
were to allege Rocket is a debt collector, the Fifth Circuit has held that “mortgage companies
collecting debts are not ‘debt collectors’” for purposes of the FDCPA. Perry v. Stewart Title Co.,
756 F.2d 1197, 1208 (5th Cir. 1985) (“The legislative history of section 1692a(6) indicates
conclusively that a debt collector does not include the consumer's creditors, a mortgage servicing
company, or an assignee of a debt, as long as the debt was not in default at the time it was
assigned”). Courts also have held “the activity of foreclosing on a property pursuant to a deed of
trust is not the collection of debt within the meaning of the FDCPA.” Bittinger v. Wells Fargo
Bank NA, 744 F. Supp. 2d 619 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (quoting Williams v. Countrywide Home Loans,
Inc., 504 F. Supp. 2d 176, 190 (S.D. Tex. 2007), aff'd, 269 F. App’x 523 (5th Cir. 2008)). Thus,
Plaintiffs have failed to state an FDCPA claim against Rocket.
With respect to Adcock the FDCPA may apply to litigating lawyers “who ‘regularly
collec[t] or attempt[t] to collect, directly or indirectly, [consumer] debts owed or due or asserted
to be owed or due another.’” Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 294 (1995) (citing 15 U.S.C.
1692a(6)). Essentially, a lawyer who regularly tries to obtain payment of consumer debts through

legal proceedings is a lawyer who regularly “attempts” to “collect those consumer debts.” Id.
However, Plaintiffs have not alleged in their complaint that Adcock regularly attempts to collect
consumer debts in order to qualify as a debt collector under the FDCPA.
Further, to assert a valid FDCPA claim against Adcock, Plaintiffs also must allege that 1)
they are consumers and 2) Defendants violated a provision of the FDCPA. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3)
(“The term consumer means any natural person obligated or allegedly obligated to pay any debt”),
1692i, 1692a-1692o, 1692k; see also Serna v. Law Office of Joseph Onwuteaka, P.C., 614 F.
App’x 146, 151-52 (5th Cir. 2015); Robinson v. Managed Accounts Receivables Corp., 654 F.
Supp. 2d 1051 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (“In order for a plaintiff to recover under the FDCPA, there are
three threshold requirements: the plaintiff must be a ‘consumer’; (2) the defendant must be a ‘debt

collector’; and (3) the defendant must have committed some act or omission in violation of the
FDCPA”). Plaintiffs, however, have not alleged they are consumers under the FDCPA or alleged
sufficient facts to state a claim for a violation of any section of the FDCPA. Plaintiffs’ factual
allegations amount to the use of allegedly falsified documents and misrepresentation of the sale
price. [doc. #18, p. 9].
Further, although citing 15 U.S.C. § 1692e, Plaintiffs do not allege any actions taken by
Adcock that violate any of the FDCPA’s prohibitions against false or misleading representations
or unfair or unconscionable means in collecting a debt. Section 1692e provides, “[a] debt collector
may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the
collection of any debt” and enumerates non-exclusive examples of false representations, including
“[t]he false representation of the character, amount, or legal status of any debt” and “[t]he use of
any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.” Plaintiffs
additionally cite 15 U.S.C. § 1692f, which prohibits a debt collector from using “unfair or

unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.”
Plaintiffs have not pleaded sufficient facts to support a finding that Adcock made a false,
deceptive, or misleading representation in violation of § 1692e or used unfair or unconscionable
means in violation of § 1692f. The general allegations that Adcock “falsified documents,” without
more, lacks plausibility on its face. General and conclusory allegations are also inadequate to
survive a motion to dismiss. Brooks, 2011 WL 2710026 at *7 (holding that plaintiff's allegation
they received “threatening letters” from debt collector defendants without providing the contents
of the letter was an insufficient pleading of facts to show a violation of the FDCPA). For these
reasons, the undersigned finds that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim against either Rocket or
Adcock under the FDCPA.

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss be GRANTED as to
Plaintiffs’ FDCPA claims, and these claims be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
3. Violations of RICO
Plaintiffs also seek statutory damages under RICO, specifically, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c),
which provides damages to those injured by reason of a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962. RICO
claims brought under § 1962 have three common elements: “(1) a person who engages in (2) a
pattern of racketeering activity, (3) connected to the acquisition, establishment, conduct, or control
of an enterprise.” Abraham v. Singh, 480 F.3d 351, 355 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting World of Faith
World Outreach Center Church, Inc. v. Sawyer, 90 F.3d 118, 121-22 (5th Cir. 1996)); see also St.
Germain v. Howard, 556 F.3d 261, 263 (5th Cir. 2009).
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants “formed an enterprise to fraudulently foreclose on
Plaintiffs’ property, engaging in mail fraud…and wire fraud…via falsified documents.” [doc. #18-

2, p. 9]. They further allege that this “pattern of racketeering caused Plaintiffs to lose their
property…” Id. at 10. To allege a “pattern of racketeering activity,” a plaintiff must show that the
defendant committed two or more predicate offenses that are 1) related and 2) amount to or pose
a threat of continued criminal activity. H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 239 (1989);
see also Word of Faith World Outreach Center Church, Inc. v. Sawyer, 90 F.3d 118, 122 (5th Cir.
1996); Abraham v. Singh, 480 F.3d 351, 355 (5th Cir. 2007).
Predicate offenses include the violation of certain state and federal laws. See 18 U.S.C. §
1961(1). “The requirement of ‘continued criminal activity’ reflects Congress’s concern with
‘long-term criminal conduct.’” Castrillo v. Am. Home Mortg. Servicing, Inc., 670 F. Supp. 2d 516,
530 (E.D.La. 2009) (citing H.J., Inc., 492 U.S. at 242). Continuity is “both a closed- and open-

ended concept, referring either to a closed period of repeated conduct, or past conduct that by its
nature projects into the future with a threat of repetition.” H.J., Inc., 492 U.S at 239. An open
period of continuity refers to a “specific threat of repetition extending indefinitely into the future”
or “that the predicates are a regular way of conducting defendant's ongoing legitimate business.”
Id. A closed period of continuity may be demonstrated by a series of related predicates extending
over a substantial period of time. Id. at 242.
The Fifth Circuit has consistently held that “where alleged RICO predicate acts are part
and parcel of a single, otherwise lawful transaction, a ‘pattern of racketeering activity’ has not
been shown.” See Word of Faith, 90 F.3d at 123. In Word of Faith, a church alleged various
racketeering acts in connection with the production of ABC PrimeTime broadcasts, including
interstate transportation of stolen computer disks, theft of donations, wire fraud, and obstruction
of justice. Id. at 121. The Fifth Circuit affirmed dismissal of the RICO complaint because the
alleged predicate acts “were all part of a single, lawful endeavor - namely the production of

television news reports concerning a particular subject.” Id. at 123; see also In re Burzynski, 989
F.2d 733, 742-43 (5th Cir. 1993) (affirming dismissal of a RICO complaint arising out of what it
deemed a single, discrete transaction); Delta Truck & Tractor, Inc. v. J.I. Case Co., 855 F.2d 241,
244 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1079 (1989) (holding that a complaint which alleged
“nothing more than numerous predicate acts which were necessary segments of an otherwise
legitimate and singular commercial endeavor” was insufficient to sustain a RICO claim).
The Court finds these foreclosure proceedings are, essentially, a “single, discrete”
transaction. See Word of Faith, 90 F.3d at 123. The foreclosure of a property in default does not
“by its nature project[] into the future with a threat of repetition.” H.J., Inc. 492 U.S. at 241. To
the contrary, it is by its nature a one-time resolution of disputed property rights. Defendants’

conduct thus implicates, at best, “[p]redicate acts extending over a few weeks or months and
threatening no future criminal conduct.” H.J., Inc., 492 U.S. at 242. Therefore, Plaintiffs have
failed to allege the requisite pattern of racketeering activity to properly assert a RICO claim.
However, with respect to the second element, “a RICO plaintiff may show that the
defendant engaged in the collection of unlawful debt as an alternative to showing the defendant
engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity.” 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (a)-(c); see In re MasterCard
Intern. Inc., 313 F.3d 257, 261 (5th Cir. 2002); Nolen v. Nucentrix Broadband Networks, 293 F.3d
926, 928-29 (5th Cir. 2002). The definition of an unlawful debt under RICO is limited to debts
“incurred or contracted in an illegal gambling activity or in connection with the illegal business of
lending at usurious rates.” 18 U.S.C. § 1961(6); see also MasterCard, 313 F.3d 257 at 263.
Plaintiffs do not allege their mortgage was unlawful due to usurious rates. Nor do they allege it
was made incurred or contracted in connection with illegal gambling activity. As a result,
Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts sufficient to constitute the collection of an unlawful debt.

Because all three elements must be alleged, and Plaintiffs have not alleged facts to support
the second element, the Court need not consider whether the other elements have been alleged.
See MasterCard, 313 F.3d. 257 at 261, 263 (affirming district court's dismissal of a RICO claim
under a 12(b)(6) motion because the plaintiff failed to show a pattern of racketeering activity or
collection of an unlawful debt). Therefore, the undersigned finds that Plaintiffs have failed to allege
RICO claims against Rocket and Adcock.
IT IS RECOMMENDED that the 12(b)(6) motions should be GRANTED as to any and
all RICO claims and these claims be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
D. Judge Caldwell’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim
“Judicial immunity is an immunity from suit and not just from the ultimate assessment of

damages.” Ballard v. Wall, 413 F.3d 510, 515 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S.
9, 11 (1991)). When assessing the entitlement to judicial immunity, the Fifth Circuit has held that
“[i]t is the Judge’s actions alone, not intent, that we must consider.” Malina v. Gonzales, 994 F.2d
1121, 1125 (5th Cir. 1993). Judicial immunity “can be overcome in two sets of circumstances: (1)
‘a judge is not immune from liability for nonjudicial actions, i.e., actions not taken in the judge’s
judicial capacity’; and (2) ‘a judge is not immune for actions, though judicial in nature, taken in
the complete absence of all jurisdiction.’” Ballard, 413 F.3d at 515 (quoting Mireles, 502 U.S. at
11-12). A judge’s actions are judicial in nature if they are “normally performed by a judge” and
the parties affected “dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity.” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 12 (quoting
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362 (1978)).
Judge Caldwell asserts he is entitled to judicial immunity, and, thus, Plaintiffs’ claims
against him in his official capacity must be dismissed. [doc. #23-1]. As discussed above, Plaintiffs

allege that “Defendants knowingly and repeatedly misrepresented the authenticity of records to
mislead the Court and dispossess Plaintiffs of their property.” [doc. #4, 18]. In opposition to
Judge Caldwell’s motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs assert that Judge Caldwell had a mandatory duty to
“review the mortgage and confirm the presence of…[a] valid notarization…[a] conspicuous
confession of judgment… and [a]uthentic evidence” and that he had failed to do so. [doc. #31,
p.7].
Plaintiffs’ allegations are not sufficient to overcome Judge Caldwell’s judicial immunity,
as Plaintiffs’ allegations are clearly related to actions taken by Judge Caldwell in his judicial
capacity. See Ballard, 413 F.3d at 515 (“[J]udges are entitled to absolute immunity for all actions
taken in their judicial capacity, even when allegedly rooted in malice and corruption . . . ”; see also

Mitchell v. McBryde, 944 F.2d 229, 230 (5th Cir. 1991) (“Judges are immune from damages claims
arising out of acts performed in the exercise of their judicial functions, even when the judge is
accused of acting maliciously.” McAlester v. Brown, 469 F.2d 1280, 1282 (5th Cir. 1972); Brown
v. Anderson, No. 3:16-CV-0620, 2016 WL 6903730 at *3 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 5, 2016), report and
recommendation adopted (N.D. Tex. Nov. 21, 2016); Crissup v. Greenwell, No. 2:13-cv-137, ,
2013 WL 12090341, at *2 (S.D. Tex. July 8, 2013), report and recommendation adopted, 2013
2013 WL 12090342 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 7, 2013) (citations omitted).
The undersigned, therefore, finds that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim on which relief
can be granted. IT IS RECOMMENDED that Judge Caldwell’s 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss be
GRANTED, and the claims be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
E. Sheriff Tubbs’ Motion to Dismiss for Insufficient Service of Process

Sheriff Tubbs moves for dismissal for insufficient service, contended that Plaintiffs
attempted to serve him via certified mail. Sheriff Tubbs argues that this is insufficient for two
primary reasons. First, Plaintiffs’ mailing of the complaint to Sheriff Tubbs themselves was
improper under Rule 4(c), which allows only those who are “at least 18 years old and not a
party” to serve a summons and complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2). Second, Sheriff Tubbs
argues that certified mail is not “a proper means of service under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c),” and,
further, was not authorized under Louisiana law. [doc. #26-1].
Plaintiffs argue in opposition that service was timely and proper as Sheriff Tubbs was
served by a process server, Melissa Miley (“Miley”), at 351 South Franklin St. in Bastrop,
Louisiana. [doc. 28]. Plaintiffs filed a proof of service created by Miley which alleges that a

copy of the summons and complaint were delivered to Christopher Thirdkill who accepted
service on Sheriff Tubbs’ behalf. Id. In his reply, Sheriff Tubbs points out that 351 South
Franklin Street is not his residence as Plaintiffs allege but is the address of the Morehouse Parish
Sheriff’s Office. Sheriff Tubbs states that service upon an individual at their place of work does
not meet the service requirements under Louisiana law. Plaintiffs argue in their sur-reply that
because Sheriff Tubbs was sued in his official capacity service at his place of employment was
proper.
Under the federal rules, service of process for claims filed against a defendant in his
official capacity must comport with the requirements of Rule 4(j)(2). Wells v. Gautreaux, 771 F.
Supp. 3d 842, 849 (M.D. La. 2025); see also Gilmore v. Wolfe, 2016 WL 438978, at *2 (M.D.
La. Feb. 3, 2016). According to Rule 4(j)(2), “[a] state, a municipal corporation, or any other
state-created governmental organization that is subject to suit must be served by: (A) delivering a
copy of the summons and of the complaint to its chief executive officer; or (B) serving a copy of

each in the manner prescribed by that state’s law for serving a summons or like process on such a
defendant.” FED. R. CIV. P. 4(j)(2).
In Louisiana, service of citation or other process is made typically made by “personal or
domiciliary service.” Able Sec. & Patrol, LLC v. State of Louisiana, 2009 WL 1870851, at *2
(E.D. La.) (citing LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 1231). However, under Article 1265 of the Louisiana
Code of Civil Procedure, “[a] public officer, sued as such, may be served at his office either
personally, or in his absence, by serve upon any of his employees of suitable age and discretion.”
LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 1265; see also Gilmore v. Wolfe, 2016 WL 438978, at *2 (M.D.
La.) (stating that Article 1265 governs service on individuals sued in their official capacities).
However, Article 1265 mandates that “a defendant sued in his official capacity must be

personally served at his office unless he is absent from work.” Gilmore, 2016 WL 438978, at *2
(citing LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 1265) (emphasis added); see also Wells, 771 F. Supp. 3d
at 849. Service upon an individual sued in their official capacity at their workplace is proper, but
Article 1265 still requires service upon the individual personally. Here, the Proof of Service
submitted to the Court by Plaintiffs indicates that Sheriff Tubbs’ summons was served on
Christopher Thirdkill who identified himself to the process server as the lieutenant at Morehouse
Parish Sheriff’s Office. Plaintiffs do not anywhere assert that Sheriff Tubbs was not personally
served because he was absent from work. As such, the requirements of Art. 1265 are not met,
and service on Sheriff Tubbs in his official capacity was not proper. Gilmore, 2016 WL 438978,
at *2 (finding defendants sued in their official capacity not properly served because plaintiff did
not assert that said defendants were not personally served because they were absent from work at
the time). Further “[e]stablishing that he has properly effectuated service upon each defendant is
Plaintiff's burden to bear.” Wells, 771 F. Supp. 3d at 850 ( citing Gilmore, 2016 WL 438978, at

*2; see also Carimi v. Royal Carribean Cruise Line, Inc., 959 F.2d 1344, 1346 (5th Cir. 1992).
The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to carry this burden and, therefore, service was improper
on Sheriff Tubbs in his official capacity.
IT IS RECOMMENDED that Sheriff Tubbs’ motion to dismiss for improper service of
process be GRANTED, and the claims against Sheriff Tubbs be DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE.
V. CONCLUSION
For the above assigned reasons,
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint [doc.
#18] filed by Plaintiffs Travis C. Mills and Regina Harrell Mills is GRANTED.6

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Motion to Remand [docs. #5, 16, 20] filed by
Defendants Rocket Mortgage and Herschel Adcock be DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss for
Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction [docs. #5, 16, 20] filed jointly by Defendants Rocket
Mortgage and Herschel Adcock be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. IT IS

6 Although the undersigned has ruled on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File Second Amended
Complaint within a Report and Recommendation and Memorandum Order, these motions are not
excepted in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and not dispositive of any claim on the merits within the
meaning of Rule 72 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Therefore, these orders issue of the
date of this Report and Recommendation and Memorandum Order. Any objection/appeal must be
made to the district judge in accordance with Rule 72(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
within fourteen (14) days of this date.
RECOMMENDED THAT Counts 3, 5, 6, 7, and 8, be DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE.
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss for
Failure to State a Claim [docs. #5, 16, 20] filed jointly by Defendants Rocket Mortgage and
Herschel Adcock, the Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim [doc. #23]
filed by Defendant Judge Walter Caldwell and the Rule 12(b)(5) Motion to Dismiss for
Insufficient Service of Process [doc. #26] filed by Defendant Sheriff Mike Tubbs be GRANTED
and the claims against all Defendants be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
Under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), the parties
have fourteen (14) days from service of this Report and Recommendation to file specific, written
objections with the Clerk of Court. A party may respond to another party’s objections within
fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. A courtesy copy of any objection or
response or request for extension of time shall be furnished to the District Judge at the time of
filing. Timely objections will be considered by the District Judge before he makes a final ruling.
A PARTY’S FAILURE TO FILE WRITTEN OBJECTIONS TO THE PROPOSED
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS CONTAINED IN THIS
REPORT WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS FROM THE DATE OF ITS SERVICE SHALL
BAR AN AGGRIEVED PARTY, EXCEPT ON GROUNDS OF PLAIN ERROR, FROM
ATTACKING ON APPEAL THE UNOBJECTED-TO PROPOSED FACTUAL FINDINGS
AND LEGAL CONCLUSIONS ACCEPTED BY THE DISTRICT JUDGE.
MONROE, LOUISIANA, this 6" day of November, 2025.

KAYLA DYE MCCLY$KY¥
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Page 29 of 29

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11215440. Public record. Not legal advice.