# Barron

> District Court, S.D. Ohio · December 3, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11214005

## Case

- **Full name:** Gina B. v. Commissioner of Social Security
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** December 3, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON

GINA B.1,

Plaintiff,
Civil Action 3:25-cv-00018
Judge Walter H. Rice
Magistrate Judge Elizabeth P. Deavers

COMMISSIONER OF
SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, Gina B., brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for review of a final decision
of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying her application for social
security disability insurance benefits (“DIB”). This matter is before the United States Magistrate
Judge for a Report and Recommendation on Plaintiff’s Statement of Errors (ECF No. 8), the
Commissioner’s Memorandum in Opposition (ECF No. 10), Plaintiff’s Reply (ECF No. 11), and
the administrative record (ECF No. 6). For the reasons that follow, it is RECOMMENDED that
the Court SUSTAIN Plaintiff’s Statement of Errors (ECF No. 8) and REVERSE the
Commissioner of Social Security’s nondisability finding and REMAND this case to the
Commissioner and the ALJ under Sentence Four of § 405(g).

1 Pursuant to General Order 22-01, due to significant privacy concerns in social security cases, any opinion,
order, judgment or other disposition in social security cases in the Southern District of Ohio shall refer to
p laintiffs only by their first names and last initials.
1
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff applied for DIB on December 21, 2022, alleging an amended onset date of
disability as of August 27, 2021,2 due to acid reflux, diabetes, bipolar disorder with psychosis,
PTSD [Post‒Traumatic Stress Disorder], and depression. (R. at 219-225, 290.) Plaintiff’s
application was denied initially in March 2023 and upon reconsideration in November 2023. (R. at
93-101, 102-110.) Plaintiff sought a de novo hearing before an administrative law judge. (R. at

128-29.) On May 1, 2014, Plaintiff, who was represented by counsel, appeared and testified at a
hearing held by an administrative law judge. (R. at 44-65.) On August 14, 2024, Stuart Adkins
(the “ALJ”) issued a decision finding that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the
Social Security Act. (R. at 14-43.) The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review on
November 22, 2024. (R. at 1-6.) This matter is properly before this Court for review.
II. RELEVANT RECORD EVIDENCE
The Court has thoroughly reviewed the transcript in this matter, including Plaintiff’s
medical records, function and disability reports, and testimony as to her conditions and
resulting limitations. Given the claimed error raised by Plaintiff, rather than summarizing
that information here, the Court will refer and cite to it as necessary in the discussion of the

parties’ arguments below.
III. ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION
On August 14, 2024, the ALJ issued his decision. (R. at 14-43.) The ALJ found that
Plaintiff meets the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through

2 Plaintiff previously filed for DIB on October 22, 2018, and ALJ Kevin R. Barnes issued a decision on
August 26, 2021, finding that Plaintiff was not disabled. (R. at 66-91.)
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December 31, 2024. (R. at 19.) At step one of the sequential evaluation process,3 the ALJ found
that Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since October 19, 2018, the alleged
onset date. (R. at 20.) The ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: type II
diabetes mellitus, gastroesophageal reflux disease (GERD), ulnar neuropathy, asthma, obesity,
bipolar disorder with psychosis, posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and depression. (R. at 20.)
The ALJ further found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments

that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments described in 20 C.F.R.
Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Id.)
Before proceeding to Step Four, the ALJ set forth Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity
(“RFC”) as follows:
[Plaintiff] has the residual functional capacity to perform medium work as defined in
20 CFR 404.1567(c) subject to the following limitations: 1) No climbing of ladders,
ropes, or scaffolds; 2) Frequently climbing ramps and/or stairs; 3) Occasional
crawling; 4) Frequent handling and fingering with the right upper extremity; 5) No
concentrated exposure to environmental irritants (including fumes, odors, dust, and
gases), poorly ventilated areas, and industrial chemicals; 6) No exposure to hazardous

3 Social Security Regulations require ALJs to resolve a disability claim through a five-step
sequential evaluation of the evidence. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). Although a dispositive finding at
any step terminates the ALJ’s review, see Colvin v. Barnhart, 475 F.3d 727, 730 (6th Cir. 2007), if fully
considered, the sequential review considers and answers five questions:

1. Is the claimant engaged in substantial gainful activity?
2. Does the claimant suffer from one or more severe impairments?
3. Do the claimant’s severe impairments, alone or in combination, meet or
equal the criteria of an impairment set forth in the Commissioner’s Listing of Impairments,
20 C.F.R. Subpart P, Appendix 1?
4. Considering the claimant's residual functional capacity, can [Plaintiff]
perform his or her past relevant work?
5. Considering the claimant’s age, education, past work experience, and residual functional
capacity, can the claimant perform other work available in the national economy?

See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4); see also Henley v. Astrue, 573 F.3d 263, 264 (6th Cir. 2009);
F oster v. Halter, 279 F.3d 348, 354 (6th Cir. 2001).
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machinery or unprotected heights; 7) Work is limited to simple, routine and repetitive
tasks performed in a work environment free of fast-paced production requirements;
8) Work can involve only simple, work-related decisions; 9) Work can involve few,
if any, work place changes; and 10) Occasional interaction with the public and only
occasional interaction with co-workers with no tandem tasks.

(R. at 24.)

At step four of the sequential process, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff has no past
relevant work based on the VE testimony on the updated work reports provided by Plaintiff in
connection with the current application. (R. at 37-38.) At step five, relying on the VE’s
testimony, and the ALJ concluded that, considering her age, education, work experience, and RFC,
there were jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could
perform, such as a kitchen helper, grocery bagger or laborer, stores. (R. at 38-39.) The ALJ
therefore concluded that Plaintiff has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security
Act, since October 19, 2018. (R. at 39.)
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
When reviewing a case under the Social Security Act, the Court “must affirm the
Commissioner’s decision if it ‘is supported by substantial evidence and was made pursuant to
proper legal standards.’” Rabbers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 582 F.3d 647, 651 (6th Cir. 2009)
(quoting Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007)); see also 42 U.S.C. §
405(g) (“[t]he findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by
substantial evidence, shall be conclusive . . . .”). Under this standard, “substantial evidence is
defined as ‘more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant
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evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Rogers, 486
F.3d at 241 (quoting Cutlip v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994)).
Although the substantial evidence standard is deferential, it is not trivial. The Court must
“‘take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from [the] weight’” of the
Commissioner’s decision. TNS, Inc. v. NLRB, 296 F.3d 384, 395 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting
Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487 (1951)). Nevertheless, “if substantial

evidence supports the ALJ’s decision, this Court defers to that finding ‘even if there is substantial
evidence in the record that would have supported an opposite conclusion.’” Blakley v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 406 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Key v. Callahan, 109 F.3d 270, 273 (6th Cir.
1997)). Finally, even if the ALJ’s decision meets the substantial evidence standard, “‘a decision of
the Commissioner will not be upheld where the SSA fails to follow its own regulations and where
that error prejudices [Plaintiff] on the merits or deprives [Plaintiff] of a substantial right.’”
Rabbers, 582 F.3d at 651 (quoting Bowen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 478 F.3d 742, 746 (6th Cir.
2007)).
V. ANALYSIS
Plaintiff sets forth one straightforward claim of error: the ALJ failed to build an accurate

and logical bridge between the evidence and his conclusion that Plaintiff can have unlimited
interaction with supervisors at work. (ECF No. 8 at PageID ##: 1371-1372.)
As Plaintiff explains, the ALJ found that Plaintiff is limited to occasional interaction with
co-workers and the public but inexplicably omitted any limitation regarding Plaintiff’s ability to
interact with supervisors. (Id. at PageID #: 1371, citing to R. at 23.) According to Plaintiff, the

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ALJ’s omission “does not make sense because there is no apparent reason why [Plaintiff] would
have difficulty interacting only with the public and co-workers, but could have unlimited
interaction with authority figures like supervisors.” (Id. at PageID ##: 1371-1372.) The
Commissioner counters that the ALJ properly evaluated the evidence, including the opinions of the
state agency psychologists, and appropriately addressed Plaintiff’s social interaction restrictions.
(ECF No. 10 at PageID ##: 1380-1385.)

As noted above, the ALJ found that Plaintiff suffered from several severe mental health
impairments, including bipolar disorder with psychosis, posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and
depression. With this in mind, the starting point for analysis is the record evidence relating to
these mental health impairments as they relate to Plaintiff’s interactions in the workplace. In a
psychological evaluation dated March 9, 2023, Tawnee Tanner, Psy.D, described Plaintiff’s
abilities and limitations in responding appropriately to supervision and to coworkers in a work
setting as follows:
The claimant reported that she has one friend that contacts her, though she often does
not respond. She also indicated that she tended to avoid female coworkers, and feels
she gets along better with males than females. The claimant is likely to be anxious in
interpersonal interactions, and to avoid potential conflicts.

(R. at 778; PageID #: 799.) Dr. Tanner further described Plaintiff’s abilities and limitations in
responding appropriately to work pressures in a work setting, concluding that Plaintiff was likely to
be easily overwhelmed or anxious when faced with stressors or pressure and to struggle with
responding appropriately at times when her mental health symptoms were heightened. (Id.)
The ALJ found Dr. Tanner’s opinion “somewhat persuasive,” explaining:
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The opinion of Dr. Tanner is vague and is qualified upon if she has an exacerbation
of symptomology (Exhibit B6F/5). Nevertheless, the opinion is generally supported
by [Plaintiff]’s performance on this examination, which demonstrated adequate
functioning despite some slight abnormalities (Exhibit B6F). The opinion is also
generally supported by and consistent with record (Exhibits B1F-B10F). Despite the
alleged severity of [Plaintiff]’s subjective complaints, [Plaintiff] did not require any
emergency or urgent care treatment except for medication refills (Exhibits B1F-
B10F). She consistently demonstrated adequate functioning on mental status
examinations despite sometimes presenting with mood and/or affect abnormalities
(Exhibits B1F-B10F). For example, she consistently presented as cooperative (e.g.
Exhibit B2F/102, 302; B8F/2, 16; B9F/13; B10F/41, 100, 145, 271). Recent and
remote memory, along with attention and concentration, were usually intact, and her
fund of knowledge was generally normal (e.g. Exhibits B2F/103, 303; B8F/16-17;
B10F/101, 146, 272). Insight was at least fair (e.g. Exhibits B2F/103, 303; B8F/17;
B9F/13; B10F/101, 272). Judgment was usually fair or impulsive, but it was rarely,
if ever, considered poor (e.g. Exhibits B2F/103, 260-261, 303; B8F/17; B9F/13;
B10F/101, 146, 272). Such findings support an ability to perform work activity when
the areas of concern noted by Dr. Tanner are adequately addressed. Her performance
on her subsequent examination, along with the opinion of that examiner, also support
an ability to perform work activity when the areas of concern are addressed (Exhibit
B7F). However, the undersigned notes that the necessary limitations are always
applicable and do not require a worsening of mental health symptoms as opined.
When giving her the full benefit of the doubt, the record does not suggest
improvement as indicated by the qualifiers on this opinion, and the more restrictive
residual functional capacity from the prior decision is supported by the totality of the
record. Thus, the opinion of Dr. Tanner is somewhat persuasive.

(R. at 36; PageID #: 52.)
Following a psychological evaluation dated September 21, 2023, consultative examiner Dr.
Richard Sexton offered the following relevant functional assessment:
Describe the claimant’s abilities and limitations in responding appropriately to
supervision and to co-workers in a work setting.

The claimant reported having a limited peer support network and limited social/
recreational activity involvement presently. She indicated she got along with
classmates but not with teachers while in school. She got along with co-workers but
not supervisors at work. She established a fair relationship with the examiner during
the present evaluation. Some limitations in her capacity to conform to social
expectations in a work setting are found.
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Describe the claimant's abilities and limitations in responding appropriately to
work pressures in a work setting.

The claimant reported having problems at times coping with work-related pressures
when she was working. She did not report a pattern of inability to adjust to
workplace demands. There is a reported history of mental or emotional
deterioration in direct response to work exposure. She is expected to have difficulty
responding appropriately to workplace pressures.

(R. at 786; PageID #: 807.)

The ALJ found Dr. Sexton’s opinion also to be “somewhat persuasive,” explaining:
The opinion of Dr. Sexton, which suggests some improvement in mental functioning,
is vague, and it is only somewhat supported by his own examination and the
remainder of the record, which suggests that [Plaintiff] is slightly more limited than
opined when giving her the full benefit of the doubt with respect to her subjective
complaints (Exhibits B1F-B10F). Despite the alleged severity of [Plaintiff]’s
subjective complaints, [Plaintiff] did not require any emergency or urgent care
treatment except for medication refills (Exhibits B1F-B10F). She consistently
demonstrated adequate functioning on mental status examinations despite sometimes
presenting with mood and/or affect abnormalities (Exhibits B1F-B10F). For example,
she consistently presented as cooperative (e.g. Exhibit B2F/102, 302; B8F/2, 16;
B9F/13; B10F/41, 100, 145, 271). Recent and remote memory, along with attention
and concentration, were usually intact, and her fund of knowledge was generally
normal (e.g. Exhibits B2F/103, 303; B8F/16-17; B10F/101, 146, 272). Insight was at
least fair (e.g. Exhibits B2F/103, 303; B8F/17; B9F/13; B10F/101, 272). Judgment
was usually fair or impulsive, but it was rarely, if ever, considered poor (e.g. Exhibits
B2F/103, 260-261, 303; B8F/17; B9F/13; B10F/101, 146, 272). Such findings
support an ability to perform work activity within the limitations opined, but the
totality of the record does not suggest the improvement indicated by Dr. Sexton’s
opinion. [Plaintiff]’s performance at her prior psychological consultative
examination further supports the more restrictive findings from the prior decision
(Exhibit B6F). As such, the opinion of Dr. Sexton is somewhat persuasive.

(R. at 37; PageID #: 53.)

Non-examining psychologists with the DDD, Dr. David Dietz and Dr. Courtney
Zeune, opined at the initial and reconsideration levels, respectively, that Plaintiff was
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“limited to simple, routine and repetitive tasks performed in a work environment free of fast-
paced production requirements,” involving “only simple, work-related decisions,” “few, if
any, workplace changes,” “[o]ccasional interaction with the public and only occasional
interaction with co-workers and no tandem tasks.” (R. at 95, 109; PageID ##: 112, 126.)
The ALJ had this to say about the opinions offered by Drs. Dietz and Zeune:
The opinions of Drs. David Dietz and Courtney Zeune, non-examining psychologists
with the DDD, are persuasive as to the residual functional capacity (Exhibits B3A
and B4A). Drs. Dietz and Zeune opined [Plaintiff] had mild limitations in
understanding, remembering, or applying information with moderate limitations in
the remaining “paragraph B” criteria (Exhibits B3A and B4A). They opined that work
is limited to simple, routine, and repetitive tasks performed in a work environment
free of fast-paced production requirements (Exhibits B3A and B4A). Work can
involve only simple, work-related decisions (Exhibits B3A and B4A). Work can
involve few, if any, workplace changes (Exhibits B3A and B4A). She was limited to
occasional interaction with the public and only occasional interaction with coworkers
with no tandem tasks (Exhibits B3A and B4A). They found no change in [Plaintiff]’s
mental impairments and adopted the prior findings pursuant to AR 98-4(6) (Exhibits
B3A and B4A). The opinions of Drs. Dietz and Zeune are somewhat internally
inconsistent, as their residual functional capacity is indicative of moderate limitations
in all of the “paragraph B” criteria (Exhibits B3A and B4A). However, their opinions
are explained with citations to the record, and their opinions regarding the residual
functional capacity are supported by and consistent with the medical record (Exhibits
B1F-B10F). Despite the alleged severity of [Plaintiff]’s subjective complaints,
[Plaintiff] did not require any emergency or urgent care treatment except for
medication refills (Exhibits B1F-B10F). She consistently demonstrated adequate
functioning on mental status examinations despite sometimes presenting with mood
and/or affect abnormalities (Exhibits B1F-B10F). For example, she consistently
presented as cooperative (e.g. Exhibit B2F/102, 302; B8F/2, 16; B9F/13; B10F/41,
100, 145, 271). Recent and remote memory, along with attention and concentration,
were usually intact, and her fund of knowledge was generally normal (e.g. Exhibits
B2F/103, 303; B8F/16-17; B10F/101, 146, 272). Insight was at least fair (e.g.
Exhibits B2F/103, 303; B8F/17; B9F/13; B10F/101, 272). Judgment was usually fair
or impulsive, but it was rarely, if ever, considered poor (e.g. Exhibits B2F/103, 260-
261, 303; B8F/17; B9F/13; B10F/101, 146, 272). Such findings support an ability to
perform work activity within the limitations opined. Her performances on her
psychological consultative examinations further support an ability to perform work
activity within the limitations opined (Exhibits B6F and B7F).
9
(R. at 34-35; PageID ##: 50-51.)
As the above excerpts reflect, both Dr. Tanner and Dr. Sexton noted Plaintiff’s social
challenges in the workplace, not limiting those challenges strictly to interactions with only co-
workers. And the ALJ, in weighing the persuasiveness of those opinions, seemed to conclude that,
in giving Plaintiff the benefit of the doubt, more restrictive findings were supported. In the ALJ’s
view, such more restrictive findings are taken from the prior decision. The findings from the prior
decision, as adopted by Dr. Dietz and Dr. Zeune, here, did not include limitations as to supervisors.
Against this backdrop, it is possible that the ALJ intended to include “supervisors” in the
limitation to “occasional interaction with co-workers.” It is also possible the ALJ did not find such
a limitation credible and, therefore, purposely left out any limitation with respect to supervisors. It

is likewise possible that any limitation was simply overlooked regarding supervisors. In short, it is
not clear from the ALJ’s discussion whether this exclusion was intentional or merely an oversight.
Any explanation as to why the ALJ believed Plaintiff’s mental health symptoms would impact her
interactions with the public and her co-workers but would have no impact on her interactions with
her supervisors is left entirely to speculation. Had the ALJ limited Plaintiff to “occasional
interaction” without specifying “with coworkers” the Undersigned perhaps reasonably could
conclude that the limitation applied in the work setting to both coworkers and supervisors. That,
however, simply is not the situation here and courts recognize a distinction between co-workers
and supervisors. See Hoffer v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:20-CV-02871-JRK, 2022 WL 584666,
at *5 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 11, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:20 CV 2871, 2022

10
WL 580756 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 25, 2022) (recognizing that the ALJ's decision to limit interaction
with coworkers does not necessarily limit the interaction with supervisors).
Certainly, in considering medical opinions, when determining the RFC, there is no
requirement that the ALJ adopt such opinions “verbatim.” Kearns v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No.
3:19 CV 01243, 2020 WL 2841707, at *12–13 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 3, 2020), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 3:19-CV-1243, 2020 WL 2839654 (N.D. Ohio June 1, 2020).

Nevertheless, “[i]f the RFC assessment conflicts with an opinion from a medical source, the
adjudicator must explain why the opinion was not adopted.” Social Security Ruling (SSR) 96-8p,
1996 WL 374184, *7 (S.S.A. July 2, 1996). Here, it is not clear whether the ALJ accounted for all
of the opinions in the RFC, and if he did not, why not. That is, the ALJ's failure to explain how he
accounted for the social workplace limitations identified by Dr. Tanner and Dr. Sexton, which
were not limited only to co-workers, deprived this court of a ‘logical bridge between the evidence
on the record and his conclusion.” Flesicher v. Astrue, 774 F. Supp. 2d 875, 877 (N.D. Ohio
2011). This constitutes error preventing the Undersigned from tracing the ALJ's reasoning.
Hoffer, 2022 WL 584666, at *6 (citing Perrine v. Berryhill, No. 1:18-cv-49, 2019 WL 1331597, at
*7 (N.D. Ohio, Mar. 25, 2019)) (“This Court recognizes that the ALJ need not address all

limitations; however, where the RFC does not include the limitation, the ALJ must explain why the
limitation was not included.”)
Notably, the Commissioner, does not address this issue head on, seemingly conceding
Plaintiff’s point. Moreover, where the Court cannot evaluate the ALJ's reasoning, accepting the
Commissioner's attempt to explain this omission would result in the Court “engaging in post hoc

11
rationalization, which is prohibited.” Miller v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:13–CV–1872, 2014 WL
3950912, at *13 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 12, 2014); see also Keeton v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 583 F. App'x
515, 524 (6th Cir. 2014) (“In reviewing an ALJ's findings and conclusions, this Court shall not
‘accept appellate counsel's post hoc rationalization for agency action in lieu of [accurate] reasons
and findings enunciated by the Board.’”) (quoting Hyatt Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 939 F.2d 361, 367 (6th
Cir. 1991)); Garrett v. Berryhill, No. 3:17-cv-00049, 2018 WL 1521763, at *7 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 28,

2018) (remanding where “the Commissioner improperly relies on post hoc rationalizations to
substitute for the ALJ's deficient consideration of” an issue). Accordingly, remand is required.
VI. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, it is therefore RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s Statement of Errors
(ECF No. 8) be SUSTAINED, that the Court REVERSE the Commissioner of Social Security’s
nondisability finding and REMAND this case under Sentence Four of § 405(g).
VII. PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS
If any party seeks review by the District Judge of this Report and Recommendation, that
party may, within fourteen (14) days, file and serve on all parties objections to the Report and
Recommendation, specifically designating this Report and Recommendation, and the part in

question, as well as the basis for objection. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).
Response to objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).
The parties are specifically advised that the failure to object to the Report and
Recommendation will result in a forfeiture of the right to de novo review by the District Judge

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and forfeiture of the right to appeal the judgment of the District Court. Even when timely
objections are filed, appellate review of issues not raised in those objections is forfeited Robert
v. Tesson, 507 F.3d 981, 994 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[A] general objection to a magistrate judge’s
report, which fails to specify the issues of contention, does not suffice to preserve an issue for
appeal . . . .”) (citation omitted)).

Date: December 3,2025 /s/ Elizabeth A. Preston Deavers
ELIZABETH A. PRESTON DEAVERS
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11214005. Public record. Not legal advice.