# Hinton

> District Court, E.D. North Carolina · December 3, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11213908

## Case

- **Full name:** Atlas Power Technologies, Inc. v. Sidney W. Hinton; Utility Innovation Holdings, Inc.; Utility Innovation Group, LLC; and Gridsure, LLC
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. North Carolina
- **Decided:** December 3, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
WESTERN DIVISION
Case No. 5:25-CV-00783-M
ATLAS POWER TECHNOLOGIES,
INC.,
Plaintiff,
v.
ORDER
SIDNEY W. HINTON; UTILITY
INNOVATION HOLDINGS, INC.;
UTILITY INNOVATION GROUP,
LLC; and GRIDSURE, LLC;
Defendants.

This matter comes before the court on Plaintiff's Motion for Temporary Restraining Order.
DE 5. For the reasons explained and subject to the limitations detailed below, the motion is
GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
To obtain a temporary restraining order (TRO), the movant must show “he is likely to
succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary
relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.”
Winter v. Nat. Res. Def: Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). Additionally, to obtain an ex parte
TRO, the movant must comply with the requirements laid out in Rule 65(b) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.
First, although this court offers no opinion regarding the ultimate merits of Plaintiff's
action, at this stage, Plaintiff has made a prima facie case under the Defend Trade Secrets Act
(DTSA) based on the facts stated in the verified complaint and relevant attachments. In other
words, the facts alleged in the complaint, if true, create a sufficient likelihood of success to warrant

a TRO pending a hearing from the parties concerning the sought-after preliminary injunction.
“Where multiple causes of action are alleged, plaintiff need only show likelihood of success on
one claim to justify injunctive relief.” McNeil-PPC, Inc. v. Granutec, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 198, 201
(E.D.N.C. 1995). Accordingly, the court sees no reason to address the merits of Plaintiff's claims
under North Carolina and British Columbia law.
Under the DTSA, “[a]n owner of a trade secret that is misappropriated may bring a civil
action... if the trade secret is related to . . . interstate or foreign commerce.” 18 U.S.C. §
1836(b)(1). Trade secret “means all forms and types of . . . business, scientific, technical, .. . or
engineering information, including . .. plans, . . . designs, . .. methods, techniques, [or] processes”
so long as “the owner thereof has taken reasonable measures to keep such information secret,” and
“the information derives independent economic value” from its secrecy. 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3). The
statute provides two definitions for the term “misappropriation:”
(1) the “acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person who knows or has
reason to know that the trade secret was acquired by improper means;” and
(2) the “disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without express or implied
consent by a person who. . . at the time of disclosure or use, knew or had reason
to know that the knowledge of the trade secret was . . . acquired under
circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain the secrecy of the trade secret or
limit the use of the trade secret; or derived from or through a person who owed
a duty to the person seeking relief to maintain the secrecy of the trade secret or
limit the use of the trade secret.”
18 U.S.C. § 1839(5).
Here, Plaintiff has introduced sufficient evidence for the court to conclude Plaintiff is likely
to succeed in establishing that the relevant information is a trade secret. To protect Plaintiffs
interest in an alleged trade secret and Defendants’ interest in an innovative technology on the verge
of being brought to market, for now, it will suffice to say that Plaintiff developed, in secret, what
it believed to be a “first of its kind” technology to address the problems posed by the “unresolved

fluctuations in AI data center power systems.” DE 9 § 17. On its face, such a technology certainly
meets the statute’s definition of a trade secret; it is “information” that Plaintiff “has taken
reasonable measures to keep . . . secret,” and which appears to “derive[] independent economic
value” from its secrecy. See 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3).
Plaintiff has, likewise, introduced sufficient evidence for the court to conclude Plaintiff is
likely to establish that Defendants misappropriated trade secrets. Plaintiff developed the relevant
technology in secret. In the development of this technology, Plaintiff contracted with Supplier-1,
a manufacturer of power conversion systems to which Plaintiff attached its own technology.
Supplier-1 expressed interest in developing a joint product—combining its conversion system and
Plaintiff's power solution into one product. Plaintiff declined that request, instead choosing to
value the privacy of its own development process and keep its power solution separate from
Supplier-1’s conversion systems. Defendant Hinton sat on Plaintiff's board of directors, during
which he received detailed technological reports and apparently knew of Supplier-1’s interest in
developing a joint product. Defendant UIG, a corporation led and founded by Defendant Hinton,
is on the verge of bringing to market, in collaboration with Supplier-1, the exact product Plaintiff
seeks to bring to the market, also using Supplier-1’s conversion system. Plaintiff contends that
the power solution, Defendant UIG’s contribution to the joint product, is identical to Plaintiffs
power solution.
At this stage of the proceeding, the simpler answer is often the best. Here, Defendant
Hinton sat on Plaintiff's board of directors—a position from which he learned both the specifics
of Plaintiff's secret technology and of Supplier-1’s interest in a joint product. Now, Defendant
UIG, a corporation Defendant Hinton founded and for which he serves as CEO, plans to bring to
market a joint product based on technology supposedly identical to Plaintiff's. There may be many

explanations for these events, but the simplest is clear: Defendant Hinton misappropriated
Plaintiff's trade secrets to develop and bring to market innovative technology. This possibility is
sufficiently likely to justify a TRO while the parties have the opportunity to argue, in greater detail,
whether further injunctive relief is appropriate.
Plaintiff has also demonstrated that the alleged trade secret “is related to a product or
service used in, or intended for use in, interstate or foreign commerce.” 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(1).
First, Plaintiff developed the technology in British Columbia, Canada, contracted with a supplier
in California, and planned to sell its product across the United States. Accordingly, the interstate
commerce element is satisfied.
Second, Plaintiff will likely suffer irreparable harm in the absence of injunctive relief.
Irreparable harm is “neither remote nor speculative, but actual and imminent.” Direx Israel, Ltd.
v. Breakthrough Med. Corp., 952 F.2d 802, 812 (4th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). “[H]arm is not
‘irreparable’ if it can be compensated by money damages.” Person v. Mayor & City Council of
Baltimore, 437 F. Supp. 2d 476, 479 (D. Md. 2006) (citing Hughes Network Sys. v. Inter Digital
Commc'ns Corp., 17 F.3d 691, 694 (4th Cir. 1994)). But “when the failure to grant preliminary
relief creates the possibility of permanent loss of customers to a competitor or the loss of goodwill,
the irreparable harm injury prong is satisfied.” Multi-Channel TV Cable Co. v. Charlottesville
Quality Cable Operating Co., 22 F.3d 546, 552 (4th Cir. 1994), abrogated on other grounds by
Winter, 555 U.S. 7. “A trade secret once lost is, of course, lost forever.” FMC Corp. v. Taiwan
Tainan Giant Indus. Co., 730 F.2d 61, 63 (2d Cir. 1984). Thus, “[clourts have recognized that the
potential for the loss of trade secrets ... demonstrates irreparable harm.” Teksystems, Inc. v.
Spotswood, 2005 WL 8174397, at *5 (D. Md. June 29, 2005). Because, taking the facts alleged in
the complaint as true, the court sees a sufficient risk that Defendants have misappropriated trade

secrets, Plaintiff “‘is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief.” Winter,
555 U.S. at 20.
Third, given the above explanation, the balance of equities favors a TRO. In weighing the
equities, the court “must balance the competing claims of injury and must consider the effect on
each party of the granting or withholding of the requested relief.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 24. As
explained above, Plaintiff “faces the prospect of suffering irreparable harm through the continued
disclosure of its trade secrets.” Brightview Grp., LP v. Teeters, 441 F. Supp. 3d 115, 141 (D. Md.
2020). And “the continued use of a purloined trade secret is a harm of significant measure that
warrants injunctive relief.” FE. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 894 F. Supp. 2d
691, 708 (E.D. Va. 2012) (overruled on other grounds, 564 F. App'x 710, 712-13 (4th Cir. 2014)
(remanding for a new trial due to an erroneous ruling on a pretrial motion in limine). On the other
hand, Defendants likely will not suffer irreparable harm if the court grants a TRO. The TRO may
force Defendants to briefly delay their plans to bring this new technology to market, but, as
Plaintiffs argue, Defendants “will not be prevented from serving customers of its other [] products
while a restraining order .. . remain[s] pending.” DE 25. As such, the balance of equities favor
granting the TRO.
Fourth, the public interest favors the granting of temporary injunctive relief. In
determining whether the “injunction is in the public interest,” Winter, 555 U.S. at 20, the court
must recognize that the public interest “balances free competition in the marketplace with the
warrant for monopoly protection of a trade secret, if one be found.” Direx Israel, Ltd., 952 F.2d
at 814. It is “in the public's interest to validate . . . the proprietary nature of trade secrets,”
NaturaLawn of Am., Inc. v. W. Grp., LLC, 484 F. Supp. 2d 392, 404 (D. Md. 2007), and “[w]hile
the public certainly has an interest in promoting free market competition in a capitalist economy,

that interest is not protected unless the legal system prevents unethical business behavior.”
Brightview Grp., LP, 441 F. Supp. 3d at 142 (cleaned up).
Finally, Plaintiff has complied with the requirements of Rule 65(b) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. As detailed above, taken as true, the “specific facts in [Plaintiffs] affidavit [and]
verified complaint clearly show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result
to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(A).
Plaintiff's attorney has “certifie[d] in writing,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(B), that Defendant Hinton
“thas been notified of this motion through email to the email address he used to conduct business
with [Plaintiff], as well as FedEx to his home in Raleigh,” that Defendants “UIGLLC, GridSure,
and UJHI have been notified by virtue of notice to [Defendant] Hinton, email to its general office
address, and FedEx to their Raleigh office,” and Plaintiff's attorney intends “to personally serve
[Defendants] Hinton and UIG over the next several days,” DE 8 at 27.
Accordingly, the Motion is GRANTED IN PART. The court HOLDS IN ABEYANCE
the portion of Plaintiff's motion requesting a preliminary injunction. Plaintiffs Motion for Hearing
by Teleconference, DE 14, is DENIED AS MOOT. It is further ORDERED that:
(1) Utility Innovations Holding, Inc. (“UIHI”’), Utility Innovation Group, LLC
(“UIGLLC”), GridSure, LLC (“GridSure” and, collectively with UIHI and
UIGLLC, “UIG”), Hinton, and all those acting in concert with them, are
prohibited from using or disclosing to any person Atlas’s confidential
information;
(2) Hinton and UIG shall immediately preserve and return to Atlas the Atlas Trade
Secrets and all of Atlas’s confidential information, and all copies thereof,
regardless of the format in which such copies are stored or maintained;
(3) Neither Hinton nor UIG shall commercialize, sell, or deploy any control system
utilizing the Atlas Trade Secrets, including without limitation UIG’s new

“integrated energy management and controls ecosystem,” also described as
“agile grid forming;”!
(4) Neither Hinton nor UIG shall utilize the Atlas Trade Secrets in furtherance of
their business or in any other manner;
(5) Neither Hinton nor UIG shall (i) misappropriate, use, or disclose to any person
or entity the Atlas Trade Secrets and/or Atlas’s confidential information, or (ii)
possess any original, copies or summaries of Atlas’s confidential information
and the Atlas Trade Secrets in any form, electronic or otherwise.
It is further ORDERED that this temporary restraining order shall go into effect today,
December 3, 2025, at 2:00 P.M., and remain in full force and effect for fourteen (14) days from
the date of the entry of this order or until the court orders otherwise, whichever is earlier. The
court further notes that it specifically DENIES Plaintiff's motion with respect to the fifth condition
of the proposed order, DE 5-1 at 2, § 5; the court will not require that condition as part of a
temporary restraining order.
Rule 65 further requires the movant to “give[] security in an amount that the court considers
proper to pay the costs and damages sustained by any party found to have been wrongfully enjoined
or restrained.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c). “In trade secret misappropriation cases, courts often set bond
between $100,000 and $200,000.” M Corp v. Infinitive, Inc., 2024 WL 4696132, at *9 (E.D. Va.
Nov. 6, 2024) (collecting cases). In this matter, a bond in the amount of one hundred thousand
dollars ($100,000) is proper. Plaintiff is ORDERED to post a $100,000 bond. This amount will
appropriately account for any harm that could come to Defendants due to the TRO.
Additionally, Plaintiff's Motion to Seal, DE 10, is GRANTED. Plaintiff seeks to restrict
from public access the unredacted verified complaint, the unredacted memorandum in support of
Plaintiff's Motion for TRO and Preliminary Injunction, and the unredacted copy of the declaration

' This order specifically enjoins for fourteen (14) days the commercialization of the product
described in Plaintiff's sealed exhibits 13 and 14, DE 9-13, 9-14.

of Mitchell Miller and its attached exhibits. Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 79.2 and consistent with
the requirements set forth in Ashcraft v. Conoco, Inc., 218 F.3d 233, 302 (4th Cir. 2000), the court
finds that the records contain confidential information that should be sealed. Plaintiff filed its
Motion to Seal on the public docket reasonably in advance of the court issuing this order; thus, the
court has provided public notice of Petitioner’s request to seal—thereby allowing interested parties
a reasonable opportunity to object. Plaintiff's request is the least drastic alternative to protect the
confidential information at issue here. Plaintiff has requested to file under seal only the documents
that contain information relating to Plaintiff's potential trade secrets. The Clerk of the Court shall
maintain under seal the documents located at DE 7, 8, and 9 until further order of the court.
The court will hold an in-person hearing on the portion of Plaintiff's motion requesting a
preliminary injunction on Wednesday, December 17, 2025, at 2:00 P.M. in neal i,
Wilmington. Defendants shall respond to Plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction no later
than Friday, December 12, 2025, at 12:00 P.M.
Additionally, the court reminds the parties that the burden remains on Plaintiff to
demonstrate that further injunctive relief is appropriate. The court grants this TRO out of an
abundance of caution—specifically based on the unique nature of the harm and based on Plaintiff's
factual allegations—but offers no opinion regarding the ultimate merits of Plaintiff's action or
whether a preliminary injunction is appropriate. This temporary restraining order dissolves on its
own terms on December 17, a
SO ORDERED this © day of December, 2025.
vhs [eee cn
RICHARD E. MYERS II
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11213908. Public record. Not legal advice.