# Opinion

> District Court, S.D. Florida · December 2, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11213743

## Case

- **Full name:** Triple Zero Accounting Corporation v. The Robinson Capital Group, LLC and Marquis Robinson
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Florida
- **Decided:** December 2, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Case No. 25-cv-23811-BLOOM/Elfenbein

TRIPLE ZERO ACCOUNTING CORPORATION,

Plaintiff,

v.

THE ROBINSON CAPITAL GROUP, LLC, and
MARQUIS ROBINSON,

Defendants.
______________________________________/

ORDER ON MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT

THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Plaintiff’s Motion for Final Default Judgment
(“Motion”), ECF No. [19], filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2) against
Defendants Robinson Capital Group, LLC. and Marquis Robinson (“Defendants”). Clerk’s
defaults were entered against the Defendants on October 17, 2025, ECF No. [18], because
Defendants failed to answer or otherwise plead to the complaint, despite having been properly
served. See ECF Nos. [15], [16]. The Court has carefully considered the Motion, the record in this
case, the applicable law, and is otherwise fully advised. For the following reasons, Plaintiff’s
Motion is granted in part and denied in part.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, Triple Zero Accounting Corporation, is a Florida corporation with its principal place
of business in Miami-Dade County, Florida. ECF No. [10] ¶ 9. Defendant, Robinson Capital
Group, LLC, is a Georgia limited liability company with its principal place of business in Atlanta,
Georgia. ECF No. [10] ¶ 10. Defendant, Marquis Robinson, is a natural person residing in Cobb
County, Georgia and is the authorized member, registered Agent, and sole member of Robinson
Capital Group, LLC. ECF No. [10] ¶ 11.
On or about October 25, 2023, Plaintiff and Robinson Capital Group entered into a Bridge
Loan Agreement (“First Agreement”), whereby Plaintiff committed $50,000 to Robinson Capital
Group “to help finance the acquisition of a 56-unit multifamily property” in Atlanta, Georgia. ECF
No. [10] ¶ 12. Section 1 of the First Agreement required Robinson Capital Group to repay $72,500
via “quarterly interest payments, with a final lump sum of the full capital and remaining interest
on or before April 25, 2025.” ECF No. [10] ¶¶ 13-14. Plaintiff received only one interest payment
of $3,750 on February 15, 2024. ECF No. [10] ¶ 15. “The First Agreement also included collateral
in the form of a $72,500.00 non-performing equity interest in Defendant”. ECF No. [10] ¶ 18.
On March 24, 2024, a second Bridge Loan Agreement (“Second Agreement”) was executed
between Plaintiff and Defendant Robinson Capital Group, whereby Plaintiff made another $50,000

investment “with a $72,000 repayment obligation due no later than August 28, 2025. ECF No. [10]
¶¶ 20-21. “The Second Agreement also contained identical provisions to the First Agreement
regarding quarterly payments, interest, collateral, and a personal guaranty”. ECF No. [10] ¶ 22. To
date, Plaintiff has not received any interest or principal payments under the Second Agreement.
ECF No. [10] ¶ 23. Plaintiff issued a formal demand to Defendants for payment under the First
Agreement via email on June 6, 2025, but did not receive a response. ECF No. [10] ¶ 24.
Plaintiff filed its First Amended Complaint on September 11, 2025, asserting claims for 1)
breach of contract as to the First Agreement, 2) breach of contract as to the second agreement, 3)
breach of personal guarantee under the first agreement, 4) anticipatory breach of personal
guarantee under the second agreement, 5) unjust enrichment, and 6) promissory estoppel. See ECF

No. [10].
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Default Judgment
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b), the Court is authorized to enter a final
judgment of default against a party who has failed to plead in response to a complaint.
Nonetheless, a default judgment is entirely appropriate and within the district court’s sound
discretion to render where the defendant has failed to defend or otherwise engage in the
proceedings. See, e.g., Tara Prods., Inc. v. Hollywood Gadgets, Inc., 449 F. App’x 908, 910 (11th
Cir. 2011); Dawkins v. Glover, 308 F. App’x 394, 395 (11th Cir. 2009); In re Knight, 833 F.2d
1515, 1516 (11th Cir. 1987); Wahl v. McIver, 773 F.2d 1169, 1174 (11th Cir. 1985); Pepsico, Inc.
v. Distribuidora La Matagalpa, Inc., 510 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1113 (S.D. Fla. 2007); see also Owens
v. Benton, 190 F. App’x 762 (11th Cir. 2006) (default judgment within district court’s direction).
A defendant’s “failure to appear and the Clerk’s subsequent entry of default against him do[es]
not automatically entitle Plaintiff to a default judgment.” Capitol Records v. Carmichael, 508 F.
Supp. 2d 1079, 1083 (S.D. Ala. 2007). Indeed, a default is not “an absolute confession by the

defendant of his liability and of the plaintiff’s right to recover,” Pitts ex rel. Pitts v. Seneca Sports,
Inc., 321 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1357 (S.D. Ga. 2004), but instead acts as an admission by the defaulted
defendant as to the well-pleaded allegations of fact in the complaint. See Eagle Hosp. Physicians,
LLC v. SRG Consulting, Inc., 561 F.3d 1298, 1307 (11th Cir. 2009) (“A defendant, by his default,
admits the plaintiff’s well-pleaded allegations of fact, is concluded on those facts by the judgment,
and is barred from contesting on appeal the facts thus established.”) (citations omitted); Descent
v. Kolitsidas, 396 F. Supp. 2d 1315, 1316 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (“the defendants’ default
notwithstanding, the plaintiff is entitled to a default judgment only if the complaint states a claim
for relief”); GMAC Commercial Mortg. Corp. v. Maitland Hotel Assocs., Ltd., 218 F. Supp. 2d
1355, 1359 (M.D. Fla. 2002) (default judgment is appropriate only if court finds sufficient basis
in pleadings for judgment to be entered, and that complaint states a claim). Stated differently, “a
default judgment cannot stand on a complaint that fails to state a claim.” Chudasama v. Mazda
Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1370 n.41 (11th Cir. 1997). Therefore, before granting default
judgment, “the district court must ensure that the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint . . .
actually state a cause of action and that there is a substantive, sufficient basis in the pleadings for
the particular relief sought.” Tyco Fire & Sec., LLC v. Alcocer, 218 F. App’x 860, 863 (11th Cir.
2007).
III. DISCUSSION
Because Defendant has not appeared, “all of Plaintiff's well-pled allegations in the Complaint
are deemed admitted.” Ordonez v. Icon Sky Holdings LLC, No. 10-60156-CIV, 2011 WL 3843890,
at *5 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 30, 2011) (citing Buchanan v. Bowman, 820 F.2d 359, 361 (11th Cir. 1987)).
Having reviewed the Complaint, the Court finds Plaintiff's allegations well-pled as to Counts I, II,

and III, and sufficient to establish Defendant's liability. By default, Defendant has admitted the
truth of the allegations, and accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has established its claims
against Defendant.
As to Count IV, Plaintiff brings a claim under Georgia law for an anticipatory breach of
personal guarantee under the second agreement. “Under Georgia law, an anticipatory breach of
contract—otherwise known as an anticipatory repudiation—occurs when a party to a contract
‘repudiates his contractual obligation to perform prior to the time such performance is required
under the terms of the contract.’” Owners Ins. Co. v. Brown, No. 4:19-CV-219, 2020 WL 2104937,
at *3 (S.D. Ga. May 1, 2020) (quoting Coffee Butler Serv., Inc. v. Sacha, 366 S.E.2d 672, 673 (Ga.
1988)). “The repudiation must apply to the entire contract and must include an unqualified refusal
to fulfill any future obligations under the contract.” Legacy Acad., Inc. v. Doles-Smith Enters.,
Inc., 344 Ga. App. 805, 810 (2018).
Plaintiff argues “Defendant Robinson’s actions demonstrate he has no intention of honoring
the personal guarantee following Defendant [Robinson Capital Group’s] default under the second
agreement.” ECF No. [10] ¶ 50. In support, Plaintiff claims, “[t]o date, Plaintiff has not received
any interest or principal payments under the Second Agreement. In light of this conduct, and
Defendants’ failure to respond to Plaintiff’s repeated demands, an anticipatory breach is evident
under the Second Agreement.” ECF No. [10] ¶ 23. These facts are insufficient to support a claim
for anticipatory breach.
Under the Second Agreement, Marquis Robinson agreed to personally guarantee a return of
$72,500 on or before September 28, 2025. ECF No. [10] ¶ 48. Marquis Robinson’s obligations
under the Second Agreement only trigger if Co-Defendant Robinson Capital Group fails to make

interest or principal payments. See ECF No. [10], Exhibit C. As such, Robinson Capital Group’s
failure to make interest and principal payments cannot be imputed upon Marquis Robinson as
evidence of anticipatory breach when it is precisely the condition that requires Marquis Robinson’s
personal performance.
Moreover, though Plaintiff argues Defendants’ failure to respond to their repeated demands
constitutes evidence of an anticipatory breach, such a breach must contain an absolute refusal to
perform, and that refusal must be unqualified. Caradigm USA LLC v. PruittHealth, Inc., 253 F.
Supp. 3d 1175, 1191 (N.D. Ga. 2017), order clarified, No. 1:15-CV-2504-SCJ, 2018 WL 1558575
(N.D. Ga. Mar. 28, 2018), and amended, No. 1:15-CV-2504-SCJ, 2018 WL 1956459 (N.D. Ga.
Apr. 25, 2018). Here, Marquis Robinson’s non-response is not evidence of an unqualified refusal

to perform. The Court also notes that though Plaintiff alludes to repeated demands, the Complaint
only alleges one specific instance of a “formal demand” to Defendants and it concerned repayment
for breaches under the First Agreement. ECF No. [10] ¶ 24. For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s
Motion for default judgment is denied as to Count IV.
As to Counts V and VI, Plaintiff brings claims for unjust enrichment and promissory estoppel.
ECF No. [10] at 9-10. The allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint establish the existence of an express
contract. See ECF No. [10]. Unjust enrichment is unavailable as a theory of recovery when “an
express contract exists governing all the claimed rights and responsibilities of the parties.”
Davidson v. Maraj, 609 F. App'x 994, 997 (11th Cir. 2015). Similarly, promissory estoppel claims
are only viable when no enforceable contract exists, as the doctrine serves as an alternative means
of recovery in the absence of contractual remedies. See Hemispherx Biopharma, Inc. v. Mid-S.
Cap., Inc., 690 F.3d 1216, 1227 (11th Cir. 2012) (citing Goldstein v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 609
F.Supp.2d 1340, 1347 (N.D. Ga. 2009).

A. Damages
“If the admitted facts in the Complaint establish liability, then the Court must determine
appropriate damages.” Ordonez, 2011 WL 3843890, at *5. “Where all the essential evidence is on
record, an evidentiary hearing on damages is not required.” Id. (citing SEC v. Smyth, 420 F.3d
1225, 1232 n.13 (11th Cir. 2005)) (“Rule 55(b)(2) speaks of evidentiary hearings in a permissive
tone ... We have held that no such hearing is required where all essential evidence is already of
record.” (citations omitted)).
Plaintiff seeks damages in the amount of $141,250.00. In support of its claims, it submits the

affidavit of Dagoberto Cruz, Manager and Officer of Triple Zero Accounting Corporation, See
ECF No. [23]. Accordingly, under the facts of this case and considering the evidence in the record,
the Court finds that a hearing on damages is unnecessary and the requested damages are justified.
Case No. 25-cv-23811-BLOOM/Elfenbein

IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:
1. Plaintiff’s Motion, ECF No. [19], is GRANTED as to Counts I, II, and II and
DENIED as to Counts IV, V, and VI;
2. Plaintiff is entitled to damages in the amount of $141,250.00;
3. Pursuant to Rule 58(a), Fed. R. Civ. P., the Court will enter a Final Default Judgment
in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant by separate order;
4. The Clerk is directed to CLOSE this case.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, on December 2, 2025.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
ce:
counsel of record

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11213743. Public record. Not legal advice.