# Jasso

> District Court, C.D. Illinois · December 3, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11213719

## Case

- **Full name:** Gerardo Jasso v. Tyrone Baker, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, C.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** December 3, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11213719

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that a warden does not incur § 1983 liability just by participating in the grievance process

## Opinion text

IN THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
ROCK ISLAND DIVISION

GERARDO JASSO,
Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 4:24-cv-04187-JEH

TYRONE BAKER, et al.,
Defendants.

Merit Review Order
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and currently incarcerated at Lawrence
Correctional Center (“Lawrence”), filed a Second Amended Complaint under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his constitutional rights while he was
incarcerated at Hill Correctional Center (“Hill”) and Lawrence. (Doc. 30). This case
is before the Court for a merit review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
I
In reviewing the Second Amended Complaint, the Court accepts the factual
allegations as true, liberally construing them in Plaintiff’s favor. Turley v. Rednour,
729 F.3d 645, 649-51 (7th Cir. 2013). However, conclusory statements and labels are
insufficient. Enough facts must be provided to “state a claim for relief that is
plausible on its face.” Alexander v. United States, 721 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). While the pleading standard does
not require “detailed factual allegations,” it requires “more than an unadorned,
the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Wilson v. Ryker, 451 F. App’x
588, 589 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).
II
Plaintiff files suit against Tyrone Baker (Warden at Hill), Alexander Spencer
(Correctional Officer at Hill), Jeremiah Brown (Warden at Lawrence), and Dr.
Quang Tran (Dentist at Lawrence).
While eating his lunch in the restrictive housing unit (“RHU”) at Hill on or
about October 3, 2023, Plaintiff alleges he bit into something hard inside a meatball
and broke his front tooth. Plaintiff informed Defendant Correctional Officer
Spencer about his broken tooth. Upon seeing Plaintiff’s bleeding mouth,
Defendant Spencer allegedly accused Plaintiff and his cellmate of fighting.
Plaintiff showed Defendant Spencer the bitten meatball, the hard object, and a
piece of his broken tooth and requested emergency dental care due to the severe
pain. Defendant Spencer allegedly told Plaintiff he could not take him to a dentist
because Plaintiff was being held in the RHU. Defendant Spencer instructed
Plaintiff to submit a request slip to the Health Care Unit (“HCU”). Plaintiff alleges
individuals housed in the RHU may sign up for emergency dental care on a “green
dental sick call list” and will be seen within a day. (Doc. 30 at p. 5).
Plaintiff alleges he experienced significant pain and had difficulty sleeping,
drinking, eating, and brushing his teeth. Plaintiff also felt severe pain if anything,
including air, touched his broken tooth.
On October 4, 2023, Plaintiff filed a grievance about his broken tooth and
need for dental care. On October 30, 2023, Plaintiff received a response which
stated: “Forward to Health Care Unit (HCU) for review, resubmit to second level
for further response.” Id. Plaintiff resubmitted the grievance and waited for a
response. Plaintiff alleges the grievance was received at the second level of the
grievance process on November 1, 2023.
The same day, Plaintiff was transferred to Lawrence. Plaintiff alleges
Defendant Warden Baker was deliberately indifferent to his serious dental needs
by transferring him to Lawrence before his dental issues were addressed.
On December 7, 2023, Grievance Officer Katherine Linboom recommended
that Plaintiff’s grievance be denied. Defendant Warden Baker concurred with the
recommendation to deny the grievance on December 8, 2023. Plaintiff alleges he
did not receive Warden Baker’s decision until January 14, 2024. On January 18,
2024, Plaintiff submitted an appeal.
On December 15, 2023, Defendant Dr. Tran, a dentist at Lawrence, examined
Plaintiff and determined he needed an extraction of tooth #8 and partial dentures.
On February 20, 2024, Plaintiff filed a grievance regarding his broken front
tooth and the delay in receiving dental care.
On April 29, 2024, Defendant Dr. Tran extracted Plaintiff’s tooth, which
relieved the continuous and severe pain. Plaintiff alleges Defendant Dr. Tran
recommended waiting four months before receiving partial dentures, but Plaintiff
did not receive partial dentures until June 3, 2025. Plaintiff asserts Defendant Dr.
Tran was deliberately indifferent to his serious dental needs by allowing him to
suffer severe pain while awaiting dental treatment from December 15, 2023, until
the extraction on April 29, 2024, and by delaying Plaintiff’s partial dentures until
June 3, 2025.
Plaintiff alleges Defendant Brown, the Warden at Lawrence, was
deliberately indifferent to his serious dental needs by allowing his subordinates to
delay dental treatment. Plaintiff also seeks injunctive relief in the form of an order
requiring Defendant Brown to reduce his security classification and to transfer him
to the Kewanee Life Skills Re-Entry Center, East Moline Correctional Center, or
Sheridan Correctional Center.
III
It is well established that deliberate indifference to a serious medical need is
actionable as a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Hayes v. Snyder, 546 F.3d 516,
522 (7th Cir. 2008). A claim of deliberate indifference contains both an objective
and a subjective component. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). To satisfy
the objective component, a prisoner must demonstrate that his medical condition
is “objectively, sufficiently serious.” Id. An objectively serious medical condition
is one that “has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that
is so obvious that even a lay person would perceive the need for a doctor’s
attention.” Hayes, 546 F.3d at 522. To satisfy the subjective component, the inmate
must demonstrate that the prison official acted with a “sufficiently culpable state
of mind.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. The official must know of and disregard an
excessive risk to the inmate’s health; “the official must both be aware of facts from
which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,
and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837. The prisoner must show that the
defendant engaged in more than negligence and that the defendant’s conduct
approached intentional wrongdoing or criminal recklessness. Holloway v. Delaware
Cnty. Sheriff, 700 F.3d 1063, 1073 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837).
“Dental care is an important need for inmates, and dental conditions
accompanied by pain can constitute an objectively serious medical need.” Suleiman
v. Wexford Health Source, Inc., No. 18 CV 50007, 2021 WL 1121119, at *4 (N.D. Ill.
Mar. 24, 2021) (citing Bd. v. Farnham, 394 F.3d 469, 480 (7th Cir. 2005)). “Courts
have generally found that dental pain is sufficiently serious only when it is
accompanied by other harm, such as recession of the gums, tooth decay, or
difficulty eating.” Whitney v. Khan, 330 F.R.D. 172, 179 (N.D. Ill. 2019); see also
Alvarado v. Illinois Dep't of Corr., 14-CV-832-JPG, 2014 WL 3725336, at *3 (S.D. Ill.
July 28, 2014) (plaintiff’s complaint of pain and difficulty chewing due to failure to
provide dentures stated a colorable claim at merit review).
The Court finds Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to proceed on an Eighth
Amendment deliberate indifference claim against Defendant Correctional Officer
Spencer, who allegedly denied Plaintiff’s request for emergency dental treatment
when Plaintiff broke his tooth at Hill on or about October 3, 2023. Plaintiff also
states an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against Defendant Dr.
Tran, who allegedly delayed dental treatment and caused Plaintiff to suffer severe
pain from December 15, 2023 until April 29, 2024, when he extracted Plaintiff’s
broken tooth. Defendant Dr. Tran also allegedly delayed Plaintiff’s partial
dentures until June 3, 2025, despite recommending that Plaintiff receive partial
dentures four months after his tooth was extracted.
Plaintiff alleges Defendant Warden Baker was deliberately indifferent to his
serious dental needs by transferring him to Lawrence before his dental needs had
been addressed. Plaintiff alleges he was transferred to Lawrence on November 1,
2023, and that Defendant Warden Baker concurred with the denial of his grievance
on December 8, 2023. Plaintiff does not allege, nor can any inference be made, that
Defendant Baker knew about Plaintiff’s dental needs when he was transferred on
November 1, 2023. Furthermore, Defendant Warden Baker cannot be held liable
based solely on his involvement in the grievance process. See Thomas v. Knight, 196
F. App'x 424, 429 (7th Cir. 2006) (explaining that a warden does not incur § 1983
liability just by participating in the grievance process); Diaz v. McBride, No. 3:93-
CV-176RM, 1994 WL 750707, at *4 (N.D. Ind. Nov. 30, 1994) (holding that a plaintiff
could not establish personal involvement and subject a prison official to liability
under § 1983 merely by sending the official various letters or grievances
complaining about the actions or conduct of subordinates). “If there is ‘no personal
involvement by the warden outside the grievance process,’ that is insufficient to
state a claim against the warden.” Neely v. Randle, No. 12 C 2231, 2013 WL 3321451,
at *3 (N.D. Ill. June 13, 2013) (quoting Gevas v. Mitchell, 492 F. App'x 654, 660 (7th
Cir. 2012)).
Plaintiff alleges Defendant Warden Brown was deliberately indifferent to
his serious dental needs by allowing his subordinates to delay dental treatment at
Lawrence. There is no respondeat superior under § 1983. In other words, Defendant
Brown cannot be liable based only on his supervisory position. Doe v. Purdue Univ.,
928 F.3d 652, 664 (7th Cir. 2019). Officials are accountable for their own acts; they
are not vicariously liable for the conduct of subordinates. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 667 (2009); Vance v. Rumsfeld, 701 F.3d 193, 203-05 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
Plaintiff also seeks injunctive relief in the form of an order requiring Defendant
Brown to reduce his security classification and to transfer him to a different
facility. This request is unrelated to his Eighth Amendment claims. Plaintiff fails
to state a claim against Defendants Baker and Brown.
In its prior Merit Review Order, the Court named Wardens Baker and
Brown, in their official capacities, to assist Plaintiff with identifying Correctional
Officer John Doe and Dentist John/Jane Doe. (Doc. 6 at pp. 7-8). Additionally,
Warden Brown remained a Defendant based on Plaintiff’s claim for injunctive
relief in the form of partial dentures. In his Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff
identified Correctional Officer Spencer and Dr. Tran as the Doe Defendants and
alleged he received partial dentures on June 3, 2025. As such, Plaintiff’s request for
injunctive relief is moot. Defendants Baker and Brown, in their individual and
official capacities, are dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and § 1915A.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
1) According to the Court's Merit Review of Plaintiff's Second Amended
Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, Plaintiff alleged sufficient facts to proceed on
an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against (1) Defendant
Alexander Spencer for allegedly denying Plaintiff's request for emergency dental
treatment after Plaintiff broke his tooth on October 3, 2023, and (2) Defendant Dr.
Quang Tran for allegedly allowing Plaintiff to suffer severe pain between
December 15, 2023 and April 29, 2024, delaying the extraction of Plaintiff's broken
tooth until April 29, 2024, and delaying Plaintiff's partial dentures until June 3,
2025. Additional claims shall not be included in the case above, except in the
Court's discretion on motion by a party for good cause shown under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 15.
2) Plaintiff has identified Defendant John Doe (Correctional Officer) as
Alexander Spencer (Correctional Officer at Hill Correctional Center) and
Defendant John/Jane Doe (Dentist) as Dr. Quang Tran (Dentist at Lawrence
Correctional Center). The Clerk is directed to ADD Alexander Spencer and Dr.
Quang Tran as Defendants and to TERMINATE Defendants John Doe
(Correctional Officer) and John/Jane Doe (Dentist).
3) Defendants Tyrone Baker and Jeremiah Brown, in their official and
individual capacities, are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to state
a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The
Clerk is directed to TERMINATE Defendants Tyrone Baker and Jeremiah Brown.
4) This case is now in the process of service. The Court advises Plaintiff
to wait until counsel has appeared for Defendants before filing any motions to give
Defendants notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed
before Defendants’ counsel has filed an appearance will generally be denied as
premature. Plaintiff need not submit any evidence to the Court at this time unless
otherwise directed by the Court.
5) The Court will attempt service on Defendants by mailing a waiver of
service. If Defendants fail to sign and return a waiver of service to the Clerk within
30 days after the waiver is sent, the Court will take appropriate steps to effect
formal service through the U.S. Marshals Service on Defendants and will require
Defendants to pay the full costs of formal service pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 4(d)(2).
6) Defendants shall file an answer within 60 days of the date the Clerk
sends the waiver of service. A motion to dismiss is not an answer. The answer
should include all defenses appropriate under the Federal Rules. The answer and
subsequent pleadings shall be to the issues and claims stated in this Order. In
general, an answer sets forth Defendants’ position. The Court does not rule on the
merits of those positions unless and until Defendants file a motion. Therefore, no
response to the answer is necessary or will be considered. If Defendants have not
filed an answer or appeared through counsel within 90 days of the entry of this
Order, Plaintiff may file a motion requesting the status of service. After
Defendants have been served, the Court will enter a scheduling order setting
discovery and dispositive motion deadlines.
7) If Defendants no longer work at the address Plaintiff provided, the
entity for whom Defendants worked while at that address shall submit to the Clerk
Defendants’ current work address, or, if not known, Defendants’ forwarding
address. This information shall be used only for effectuating service.
Documentation of Defendants’ forwarding address shall be retained only by the
Clerk and shall not be maintained in the public docket nor disclosed by the Clerk.
8) This District uses electronic filing, which means that after Defendants’
counsel has filed an appearance, Defendants’ counsel will automatically receive
electronic notice of any motion or other paper filed by Plaintiff with the Clerk.
Plaintiff does not need to mail to Defendants’ counsel copies of motions and other
documents that Plaintiff has filed with the Clerk. However, this does not apply to
discovery requests and responses. Discovery requests and responses are not filed
with the Clerk. Plaintiff must mail his discovery requests and responses directly
to Defendants’ counsel. Discovery requests or responses sent to the Clerk will be
returned unfiled unless they are attached to and the subject of a motion to compel.
Discovery does not begin until Defendants’ counsel has filed an appearance and
the Court has entered a scheduling order, which will explain the discovery process
in more detail.
9) Defendants’ counsel is hereby granted leave to depose Plaintiff at
Plaintiff’s place of confinement. Defendants’ counsel shall arrange the time for the
deposition.
10) Plaintiff shall immediately inform the Court, in writing, of any change
in his mailing address and telephone number. Plaintiff’s failure to notify the Court
of a change in mailing address or phone number will result in dismissal of this
lawsuit, with prejudice.
11) Plaintiff shall be provided a copy of all pertinent medical records
upon request.
12) Within 10 days of receiving from Defendants’ counsel an
authorization to release medical records, Plaintiff is directed to sign and return the
authorization to Defendants’ counsel. The Clerk is directed to enter the standard
qualified protective order pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act.
13) The Clerk is directed to set an internal court deadline 60 days from
the entry of this Order for the Court to check on the status of service and enter
scheduling deadlines.
14) The Court’s Scheduling Order (Doc. 16) entered on May 22, 2025, and
the dispositive motions deadline of December 23, 2025, are VACATED. The Court
will enter an Amended Scheduling Order after Defendants Spencer and Dr. Tran
answer Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint.
It is so ordered.

Entered: December 3, 2025

s/Jonathan E. Hawley
U.S. District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11213719. Public record. Not legal advice.