# August

> District Court, S.D. Ohio · December 1, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11212345

## Case

- **Full name:** Lency Donnell August v. Warden James J. Forshey, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** December 1, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11212345

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding that isolated incidents of serving nonkosher food to an inmate was insufficient to sustain a free exercise claim
- applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standards to review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

LENCY DONNELL AUGUST,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Actions 2:25-cv-915; 2:25-cv-1010;
2:25-cv-1234

WARDEN JAMES J. FORSHEY, et al., Chief Judge Sarah D. Morrison
Magistrate Judge Chelsey M. Vascura
Defendants.

ORDER and REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, Lency Donnell August, an Ohio inmate who is proceeding without the
assistance of counsel, brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Warden James J. Forshey
(“Warden Forshey”); Correctional Officer Larrison (“CO Larrison”); Correctional Officer D.
Stack (“D. Stack”); and Correctional Officer M. Stack (“M. Stack”). This matter is before the
Court for the initial screen of Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 1)1, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)
and 1915A to identify cognizable claims and to recommend dismissal of Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A(b)(1)–(2); see also McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d
601, 608 (6th Cir. 1997). Having performed the initial screen, it is RECOMMENDED that

1 Plaintiff has submitted identical copies of his Complaint in three different actions. Citations are
to the filings docketed in 2:25-cv-915.
Plaintiff be permitted to proceed with his excessive force claim against D. Stack in his individual
capacity and that Plaintiff’s other claims be DISMISSED.
This matter is also before the Court for consideration of Plaintiff’s motion for leave to
proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) and (2), which is GRANTED. (ECF
No. 2.) Plaintiff must pay the full amount of the Court’s $350 filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

Plaintiff’s certified trust fund statement reveals that he has $.04 in his prison account.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), the custodian of Plaintiff’s inmate trust accounts
(Inmate ID Number A787408) at Richland Correctional Institution (“RCI”) is DIRECTED to
submit to the Clerk of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio as an
initial partial payment, 20% of the greater of either the average monthly deposits to the inmate
trust account or the average monthly balance in the inmate trust account, for the six months
immediately preceding the filing of the Complaint.
After full payment of the initial, partial filing fee, the custodian shall submit 20% of the
inmate’s preceding monthly income credited to the account, but only when the amount in the

account exceeds $10.00, until the full fee of $350.00 has been paid to the Clerk of this Court. 28
U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997).
Checks should be made payable to: Clerk, United States District Court. The checks
should be sent to:
Prisoner Accounts Receivable
260 U.S. Courthouse
85 Marconi Boulevard
Columbus, Ohio 43215
The prisoner’s name and this case number must be included on each check.
It is ORDERED that Plaintiff be allowed to prosecute his action without prepayment of
fees or costs and that judicial officers who render services in this action shall do so as if the costs
had been prepaId. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to mail a copy of this Order to Plaintiff
and the prison cashier’s office.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the federal in forma pauperis statute, seeking to
“lower judicial access barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). In

doing so, however, “Congress recognized that ‘a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are
assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from
filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.’” Id. at 31 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490
U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To address this concern, Congress included subsection (e):
(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid,
the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that—
* * *
(B) the action or appeal—
(i) is frivolous or malicious; [or]
(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. . . .
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) & (ii); Denton, 504 U.S. at 31. Thus, § 1915(e) requires sua sponte
dismissal of an action upon the Court’s determination that the action is frivolous or malicious, or
upon determination that the action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See
also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (requiring a court to conduct a screening of “a complaint in a civil action
in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a
governmental entity . . . [to] identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion

of the complaint [that is] frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted”).
Further, to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a plaintiff must satisfy the
basic federal pleading requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). See also
Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) standards to review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Under Rule
8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Thus, Rule 8(a) “imposes legal and factual
demands on the authors of complaints.” 16630 Southfield Ltd., P’Ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B.,
727 F.3d 502, 503 (6th Cir. 2013).
Although this pleading standard does not require “detailed factual allegations, a pleading
that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action”
is insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (cleaned up). A complaint will not
“suffice if it tenders naked assertion devoid of further factual enhancement.” Id. (cleaned up).
Instead, to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, “a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. (cleaned up). Facial

plausibility is established “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The
plausibility of an inference depends on a host of considerations, including common sense and the
strength of competing explanations for the defendant’s conduct.” Flagstar Bank, 727 F.3d at 504
(citations omitted). Further, the Court holds pro se complaints “to less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Garrett v. Belmont Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 374 F. App’x 612,
614 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). This lenient
treatment, however, has limits; “courts should not have to guess at the nature of the claim
asserted.” Frengler v. Gen. Motors, 482 F. App’x 975, 976–77 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Wells v.
Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989)).
II. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, who is Muslim, alleges all the following. (ECF No. 1–4, PageID # 18.) Plaintiff
was previously incarcerated at Noble Correctional Institute (“NCI”). NCI policy designates the

area next to an inmate’s bunk for prayers. (Id.) On the evening of August 6, 2024, Plaintiff was
praying in that location. (Id.) CO Larrison demanded that Plaintiff stop praying and told him that
he could not pray there even though other officers on different shifts had never said anything
about his prayer practice. (ECF No. 1–2, PageID # 15.) CO Larrison also kicked Plaintiff’s
sutrah, stepped on his prayer rug, and threatened to confiscate it. (ECF No. 1–4, PageID # 18.)
Plaintiff requested a supervisor, and during a pat down, a yard officer snatched his kufi from his
head and threw it on the floor. (Id.) When Plaintiff bent to retrieve it, CO Larrison yelled at him
to “leave it there.” (Id.) When Plaintiff yelled back that he would not, CO Larrison handcuffed
him with restraints purposely tightened to cut off his circulation. (Id.) Plaintiff was placed in
handcuffs even though he told CO Larrison that he needed his cane to walk. (ECF No. 1–2,

PageID # 15.)
Plaintiff also alleges that on December 2, 2024, he was reclining in his bunk when M.
Stack instructed him to reposition his television. (ECF No. 1–5, PageID # 19.) When he
questioned her, she became loud and aggressive. (Id.) Plaintiff agreed to move his television but
D. Stack, who is M. Stack’s son, arrived on the scene. (Id.) Plaintiff repositioned his television
while M. Stack made derogatory remarks to him before walking away. (Id.) Plaintiff continued
to reposition his television while both officers watched from approximately ten feet away. (ECF
No. 1-6, PageID # 20.) After they heard Plaintiff talking about them to a nearby inmate, they
rushed over, and D. Stack radioed for assistance. (Id.) Plaintiff was taken “up front” and patted
down. (ECF No. 1–7, PageID # 21.) He complied with pat down procedures and stood against a
wall. (Id.) During the pat down D. Stack stood closer to Plaintiff than necessary and yanked his
right hand from the wall and repositioned it while M. Stack lightly but repeatedly kicked the
inside of his right ankle to get him to spread his legs further apart. (Id.) When Plaintiff briefly
removed his right hand from the wall to remove a beard hair from his mouth, D. Stack

immediately sprayed his eyes, nose, and mouth with mace. (Id.) Other officers also appeared and
tackled Plaintiff before lifting him and escorting him from the building. (Id.) D. Stack screamed
expletives while Plaintiff was taken away but then quietly left his post to follow the escort. (Id.)
Plaintiff requested medical treatment but was only provided water. (ECF No. 1, Page ID # 6.) A
subsequent investigation, including video review, found that Plaintiff was cooperative, not
argumentative or resisting and that his brief hand movement appeared reflexive. (ECF No. 1–8,
PageID # 22.) The investigation determined that Plaintiff did not violate any conduct rules. (Id.)
Plaintiff contends that he suffered discrimination based on his religion and race and
unprofessional misconduct. He indicates that he was not physically injured during the August

2024 events but that the December 2024 events caused injuries to his nose, mouth, throat, and
right elbow as well as continued light sensitivity in his left eye. He sues all Defendants in their
individual and official capacities, and he seeks $75,000 in actual and punitive damages. (ECF
No. 1, PageID # 6.)
III. ANALYSIS
A. Official-Capacity Claims Against All Defendants
To the extent Plaintiff sues Defendants in their official capacities, his claims must be
DISMISSED under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The Eleventh Amendment operates as a
bar to federal-court jurisdiction when a private citizen sues a state or its instrumentalities unless
the state has given express consent. Pennhurst St. Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100
(1983); Lawson v. Shelby Cty., 211 F.3d 331, 334 (6th Cir. 2000). A suit against a state official
in his or her official capacity is “not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the
official’s office,” and is therefore “no different from a suit against the State itself.” Will v. Mich.
Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). “There are three exceptions to sovereign
immunity: (1) when the state has waived immunity by consenting to the suit, (2) when Congress

has expressly abrogated the states’ sovereign immunity, and (3) when the doctrine set forth in Ex
Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908), applies.” Boler v. Earley, 865
F.3d 391, 410 (6th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted).
None of these exceptions apply. First, “Ohio has not waived sovereign immunity in
federal court.” Mixon v. State of Ohio, 193 F.3d 389, 397 (6th Cir. 1999). Second, “Section 1983
does not abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity.” Boler, 865 F.3d at 410 (citing Will, 491 U.S.
at 66). Third, the Ex Parte Young doctrine applies only when a plaintiff brings “claims for
prospective relief against state officials sued in their official capacity to prevent future federal
constitutional or statutory violations.” Boler, 865 F.3d at 412. Plaintiff’s claim for damages—the

only form of relief he seeks—falls outside the scope of Ex Parte Young. Accordingly, his
official-capacity claims against all Defendants must be dismissed.
B. Individual-Capacity Claims Against Warden Forshey
Plaintiff’s individual-capacity claims against Warden Forshey must also be DISMISSED
for failure to allege that Warden Forshey was personally involved in Plaintiff’s injuries. To
prevail on a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must plead two elements: “(1) deprivation of a right secured
by the Constitution or laws of the United States (2) caused by a person acting under color of state
law.” Hunt v. Sycamore Cmty. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 542 F.3d 529, 534 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing
McQueen v. Beecher Cmty. Sch., 433 F.3d 460, 463 (6th Cir. 2006)). To establish the second
element, a plaintiff must show “personal involvement” by the defendant. Grinter v. Knight, 532
F.3d 567, 575 (6th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). This is because Ҥ 1983 liability cannot be
imposed under a theory of respondeat superior.” Id. (citation omitted). Thus, to hold a supervisor
liable under § 1983, a plaintiff “must show that the official at least implicitly authorized,
approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct.” Everson v. Leis, 556 F.3d
484, 495 (6th Cir. 2009) (cleaned up).

Plaintiff does not, however, allege that Warden Forshey implicitly authorized, approved,
or knowingly acquiesced in the other named Defendants’ allegedly unconstitutional conduct.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s individual-capacity claims against Warden Forshey must be dismissed.
C. Individual-Capacity Claims Against CO Larrison
All of Plaintiff’s individual-capacity claims against CO Larrison must also be
DISMISSED. Again, to prevail on a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must plead: “(1) deprivation of a
right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States (2) caused by a person acting under
color of state law.” See Hunt, 542 F.3d at 534 (citing McQueen, 433 F.3d at 463). Plaintiff’s
individual-capacity claims fail on the first element—he fails to allege a violation of his
constitutional rights.

1. Free Exercise
The undersigned construes Plaintiff’s Complaint as making a claim against CO Larrison
under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, which states that “Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . ”
U.S. Const. amend. I. This free exercise protection extends to inmates. Hayes v. Tenn., 424 F.
App’x 546, 549 (6th Cir. 2011).
To state a free-exercise claim under § 1983, an inmate must allege that a belief or
practice “is religious in [his] own scheme of things,” is sincerely held, and that prison officials
have infringed that belief or practice. Pryor v. Chambers-Smith, No. 24-3301, 2025 WL
1090997, at *2 (6th Cir. Apr. 2, 2025) (quoting Kent v. Johnson, 821 F.2d 1220, 1224-25 (6th
Cir. 1987). An inmate must also allege that the prison officials’ infringement constitutes a
substantial burden on his sincerely held religious belief. Mustin v. Wainwright, No. 23-3671,
2024 WL 3950810, at *2 (6th Cir. Aug. 27, 2024) (citations omitted). Prison officials
substantially burden a prisoner’s religious exercise if they place “substantial pressure on an

adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs” or “effectively bar” his sincere faith-
based conduct. Haight v. Thompson, 763 F.3d 554, 565 (6th Cir. 2014) (cleaned up). Minor or
isolated incidents do not, however, create a substantial burden. Colvin v. Caruso, 605 F.3d 282,
293 (6th Cir. 2010) (finding that isolated incidents of serving nonkosher food to an inmate was
insufficient to sustain a free exercise claim).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that CO Larrison’s actions prevented him from praying on only
one occasion. Plaintiff’s filings, in fact, indicate that other officers on different shifts never said
anything about his prayer practice. (ECF No. 1–2, PageID # 15.) CO Larrison’s interference with
Plaintiff’s prayer practice was thus de minimis and does not constitute a substantial burden on his

religious exercise. See e.g., Dykes v. Schroeder, No. 2:22-CV-110, 2022 WL 2167727, at *4
(W.D. Mich. June 16, 2022) (inmate’s inability to read a proclamation or conduct a closing
prayer for four days when worship services were shortened was a de minimis burden on his
Moorish Science Temple practice); Mubashshir v. Moore, No. 3:10 CV 2802, 2011 WL
1496670, at *6 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 19, 2011) (denying inmates services in chapel on two occasions
were isolated instances that did not constitute a substantial burden on a Muslim inmate’s
religious freedom); Crump v. Winn, No. 11-10409, 2012 WL 1033663 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 5, 2012)
(missing prayer on two occasions as a result of a schedule change was not a substantial burden),
adopted and aff’d, 2012 WL 1021711, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 27, 2012). Plaintiff’s First
Amendment claim against CO Larrison in his individual capacity must, therefore, be
DISMISSED.
2. Equal Protection
The undersigned also construes Plaintiff’s Complaint as making a claim against CO
Larrison under the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection clause, which provides that no

state shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S.
Const. amend. XIV. This clause “embodies the principle that all persons similarly situated should
be treated alike.” Scarbrough v. Morgan Cty. Bd. of Educ., 470 F.3d 250, 260 (6th Cir. 2006)
(citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439(1985)).
“[T]o establish an equal protection violation, an inmate must establish more than
differential treatment alone—a discriminatory intent or purpose is required.” Maye v. Klee, 915
F.3d 1076, 1085, (6th Cir. 2019). Thus, an inmate adequately states an equal protection claim if
he alleges that (1) he was treated disparately from similarly situated prisoners, and (2) the
disparate treatment “is the result of intentional and purposeful discrimination.” Robinson v.

Jackson, 615 F. App’x 310, 314–15 (6th Cir. 2015).
Here, Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege any facts suggesting that CO Larrison treated him
differently than other similarly situated individuals. Indeed, Plaintiff does not allege any facts
about how CO Larrison treated other inmates, let alone ones who were similarly situated in all
relevant respects. Nor does Plaintiff allege that CO Larrison’s actions were accompanied by
racial or religious slurs or epithets or conduct from which a discriminatory animus could be
inferred. Instead, Plaintiff states that he experienced discrimination and that his religious rights
to pray were violated by racist staff. (ECF No. 1–2, PageID # 15; ECF No. 1–9, PageID # 23.)
Such conclusory allegations are insufficient. See Harden-Bey v. Rutter, 524 F.3d 789, 796 (6th
Cir. 2008) (“[C]onclusory allegations of unconstitutional conduct without specific factual
allegations fail to state a claim.”) (quoting Lillard v. Shelby Cty. Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 726
(6th Cir. 1996)). Consequently, Plaintiff’s Equal Protection claims against CO Larrison in his
individual capacity must be DISMISSED.
3. Excessive Force

The undersigned additionally construes Plaintiff’s Complaint as making an excessive
force claim against CO Larrison in violation of the Eight Amendment, which prohibits the
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain against prisoners. Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380,
383 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986)). To make out a claim
under the Eighth Amendment, a prisoner must satisfy both an objective and a subjective
component. Id. (citing Moore v. Holbrook, 2 F.3d 697, 700 (6th Cir.1993)).
The objective component requires the pain inflicted to be “sufficiently serious.” Wilson v.
Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991). Yet the seriousness of the injuries is not by itself dispositive.
Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37 (2010) (per curiam). “When prison officials maliciously and

sadistically use force to cause harm, contemporary standards of decency always are violated . . .
[w]hether or not significant injury is evident.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992).
“Otherwise, the Eighth Amendment would permit any physical punishment, no matter how
diabolic or inhuman, inflicting less than some arbitrary quantity of injury.” Id.
The subjective component focuses on the state of mind of the prison officials. Williams,
631 F.3d at 383. The “core judicial inquiry” is “whether force was applied in a good-faith effort
to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Wilkins, 449
U.S. at 37 (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7).
Here, any claim that Plaintiff intends to advance arising out of CO Larrison’s handcuffing
him fails to satisfy the objective component. Plaintiff alleges that CO Larrison handcuffed him
with “restraints purposely tightened to cut off circulation.” (ECF No. 1–4, PageID # 18.) But
Plaintiff additionally alleges that no injuries were inflicted on him during that August 6, 2025
incident involving CO Larrison. In the absence of allegations that the handcuffs caused pain,

lasting injury, or were inflicted in a manner “repugnant to the conscience of mankind,” this type
of de minimis use of physical force is “necessarily exclude[d] from constitutional recognition.”
Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9–10 (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 327). Therefore, Plaintiff’s excessive
force claim against CO Larrison in his individual capacity must be DISMISSED.
D. Individual-Capacity Claims Against M. Stack and D. Stack
The Court also construes Plaintiff’s Complaint as making equal protection, excessive
force, and medical indifference claims against M. Stack and D. Stack. These claims fail, in part,
because Plaintiff does not adequately allege violations of his constitutional rights.
1. Equal Protection
Plaintiff fails to adequately allege an equal protection claim against these Defendants. As

previously explained, an inmate adequately states an equal protection claim if he alleges that (1)
he was treated disparately from similarly situated prisoners, and (2) the disparate treatment “is
the result of intentional and purposeful discrimination.” Robinson, 615 F. App’x 314–15. Once
again, however, Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege any facts suggesting that these Defendants
treated him differently than other similarly situated individuals. Although Plaintiff alleges, for
instance, the existence of “racial disrespect,” “white racism among staff,” and “institutional
racism,” he fails to make particularized allegations about how M. Stack and D. Stack treated
other similarly situated inmates. (ECF No. 1, PageID # 5.) Nor does Plaintiff allege that these
Defendants’ actions were accompanied by racial or religious slurs or epithets or conduct from
which a discriminatory animus could be inferred. Although Plaintiff states M. Stack made
derogatory statements to him while he repositioned his television, he does not allege that these
derogatory statements were race-based. (ECF No. 1–5, PageID # 19.) Other expletives allegedly
screamed by D. Stack after he was maced were not racial. (ECF No. 1–7, PageID # 21.)
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s equal protection claims against M. Stack and D. Stack in their individual

capacities must be DISMISSED.
2. Excessive Force
Plaintiff also fails to adequately plead an excessive force claim against M. Stack. As
noted, to make out a claim under the Eighth Amendment, a prisoner must satisfy both an
objective and a subjective component. The objective component requires the pain inflicted to be
“sufficiently serious.” Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298. Here, Plaintiff does not allege that that M.
Stack’s actions caused him sufficiently serious pain. Plaintiff alleges only that M. Stack lightly
but repeatedly kicked the inside of his right ankle to get him to spread his legs further apart while
he was being patted down. (ECF No. 1–7, PageID # 21.) Because he does not allege that this

light kicking caused pain, lasting injury, or that it was inflicted in a manner “repugnant to the
conscience of mankind,” it constitutes a de minimis use of physical force that is “necessarily
exclude[d] from constitutional recognition.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9–10 (quoting Whitley, 475
U.S. at 327). Therefore, Plaintiff’s excessive force claim against M. Stack in her individual
capacity must be DISMISSED.
3. Medical Indifference
Plaintiff additionally fails to adequately allege a medical indifference claim against M.
Stack and D. Stack. It is well established that “[t]he Eighth Amendment forbids prison officials
from unnecessarily and wantonly inflicting pain on an inmate by acting with deliberate
indifference toward [his] serious medical needs.” Jones v. Muskegon Cty., 625 F.3d 935, 941
(6th Cir. 2010) (internal quotations omitted). A claim for deliberate indifference “has both
objective and subjective components.” Alspaugh v. McConnell, 643 F.3d 162, 169 (6th Cir.
2011). The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has explained:
The objective component mandates a sufficiently serious medical need. [Blackmore
v. Kalamazoo Cty., 390 F.3d 890, 895 (6th Cir. 2004).] The subjective component
regards prison officials’ state of mind. Id. Deliberate indifference “entails
something more than mere negligence, but can be satisfied by something less than
acts or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm
will result.” Id. at 895–96 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The
prison official must “be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn
that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.”
Id. at 896 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Barnett v. Luttrell, 414 F. App’x 784, (6th Cir. March 10, 2011); see also Jones, 625 F.3d at 941
(“[T]he prison official must have acted with a state of mind similar to recklessness. Thus, to
prove the required level of culpability, a plaintiff must show that the official: (1) subjectively
knew of a risk to the inmate’s health, (2) drew the inference that a substantial risk of harm to the
inmate existed, and (3) consciously disregarded that risk.” (citations omitted)).
The Sixth Circuit has also noted that in the context of deliberate indifference claims:
“[W]e distinguish between cases where the complaint alleges a complete denial of
medical care and those cases where the claim is that a prisoner received inadequate
medical treatment.” Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860 n.5 (6th Cir. 1976).
Where a prisoner alleges only that the medical care he received was inadequate,
“federal courts are generally reluctant to second guess medical judgments.” Id.
However, it is possible for medical treatment to be “so woefully inadequate as to
amount to no treatment at all.” Id.
Alspaugh, 643 F.3d at 169. See also Santiago v. Ringle, 734 F.3d 585, 590 (6th Cir. 2013) (“If
the plaintiff’s claim, however, is based on the prison’s failure to treat a condition adequately . . .
the plaintiff must place verifying medical evidence in the record to establish the detrimental
effect of the delay in medical treatment.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). “In
examining whether a claimed injury is ‘sufficiently serious’” to sustain a claim for deliberate
indifference, “courts look to the effect of any delay in treatment caused by an officer’s inaction.”
Vaughn v. City of Lebanon, 18 F. App’x 252, 274 (6th Cir. 2001) (emphasis in original).
Specifically, a plaintiff “who complains that delay in medical treatment rose to a constitutional
violation must place verifying medical evidence in the record to establish the detrimental effect
of the delay in medical treatment to succeed.” Id. (citing Napier v. Madison Cty., Ky., 238 F.3d

739, 742 (6th Cir. 2001)).
Here, Plaintiff fails to allege that either M. Stack or D. Stack was subjectively aware of
facts indicating that Plaintiff faced a substantial risk of serious harm, or that either one
consciously disregarded such a known risk. Plaintiff alleges that after he was maced by D. Stack,
other officers tackled him, lifted him up, and escorted him out of the building. (ECF No. 1–7,
PageID # 21.) He further alleges that he requested medical treatment but was only given water.
(ECF No. 1, Page ID # 6.) But he does not allege that he made this request to M. Stack or D.
Stack, or that they were aware that he had requested treatment after he was escorted away.
Although Plaintiff indicates that D. Stack “quietly followed” during his escort, he also appears to

indicate he later learned this from another prison official. (Id.) Based on Plaintiff’s filings, it
therefore appears that he had no interactions with D. Stack or M. Stack after the macing, and he
does not allege that he requested medical care from either of them. Therefore, Plaintiff’s medical
indifference claims against these Defendants must be DISMISSED.
IV. DISPOSITION
Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is GRANTED.
For the forgoing reasons, it is further RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff be permitted to proceed
on his individual-capacity claim against D. Stack for use of excessive force (arising from the use
of mace during the pat down in December 2024), and that the Court DISMISS all of Plaintiff’s
remaining claims because they are barred by immunity or fail to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted.
PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS
If any party objects to this Report and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen
(14) days of the date of this Report, file and serve on all parties written objections to those

specific proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made, together with
supporting authority for the objection(s). A District Judge of this Court shall make a de novo
determination of those portions of the Report or specified proposed findings or recommendations
to which objection is made. Upon proper objections, a District Judge of this Court may accept,
reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made herein, may receive
further evidence or may recommit this matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to the Report and
Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to have the District Judge review the Report
and Recommendation de novo, and also operates as a waiver of the right to appeal the decision of

the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140
(1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).

IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Chelsey M. Vascura
CHELSEY M. VASCURA
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11212345. Public record. Not legal advice.